Roland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL WAYNE ROLAND, No. 4:25-CV-01307

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

WAYNE COUNTY PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 24, 2026

Plaintiff Daniel Wayne Roland filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit

under Section 1983,1 claiming that officials at Wayne County Correctional Facility

violated his constitutional rights. After dismissal of his initial complaint, Roland

filed an amended pleading. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss in

part Roland’s amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Roland lodged his initial complaint in July 2025 while incarcerated at SCI

Phoenix, eventually paying the initial partial filing fee approximately one month

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

later.2 It appears that Roland is no longer incarcerated and currently resides in

Lemoyne, Pennsylvania.3

Roland initially alleged Section 1983 claims sounding in Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process, Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement, and Eighth Amendment failure to protect.4 He named the following

eight defendants: Wayne County Prison, Wayne County Prison Board, Warden

Williams, Deputy Warden John Masco, Lieutenant Paul Soccodoto, Sergeant

Huffman, Acting Sergeant Jaycox, and Correctional Officer Carney.5

The Court screened the complaint as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).6

All claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Roland was given

limited leave to amend.7 Roland timely filed an amended complaint,8 which is

now the operative pleading.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court “shall dismiss” an in forma

pauperis case or claim “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . .

2 See Doc. 1.

3 See Doc. 9; Doc. 12 at 5.

4 See generally Doc. 1.

5 Id. at 2-3.

6 Although Roland is no longer incarcerated, when he filed his complaint, he was imprisoned at

SCI Phoenix. See Doc. 1 at 3. Thus, Section 1915A applied at initial screening. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). Review of the complaint was also appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), as

Roland is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

7 See generally Docs. 14, 15.

8 Doc. 16.

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]”9 This language closely

tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the

same standard of review to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as they utilize when resolving

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).10

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”11 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.12 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.13

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.14 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

10 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); Allah v.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

11 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

12 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

13 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

14 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”15 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.16 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”17

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”18

Because Roland proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”19

III. DISCUSSION

In his amended complaint, Roland asserts a failure-to-protect claim under

the Eighth Amendment against the following defendants: Wayne County

Correctional Facility, Warden Randal Williams, Deputy Warden John Masco,

Lieutenant Paul Soccodoto, Acting Sergeant Scott Jaycox, and Correctional Officer

Walker Carney.20 Roland generally provides well-pleaded allegations, but several

15 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

16 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

17 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

19 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

20 See generally Doc. 16; id. ¶¶ 2-7.

of his claims are still insufficient. The Court will address Roland’s pleading

deficiencies in turn.

A. “Person” for Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.”21 Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983, and

entities such as prisons, medical departments, or private medical companies

generally do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.22

Under this well-settled law, any Section 1983 claim against Wayne County

Correctional Facility must be dismissed, as this county prison is not a person

subject to Section 1983 liability. Moreover, Roland does not allege an

unconstitutional policy or custom by this entity such that a Section 1983 suit could

21 Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).

22 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989) (explaining that a state

is not a “person” for Section 1983 purposes); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.

1973) (holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was a state agency and not a

“person” under Section 1983); Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir.

2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that district court properly “dismissed Clarion

County Jail as a defendant in this case,” quoting district court’s reasoning that “‘it is well

established in the Third Circuit that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit under federal civil

rights laws’”); Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp. 2d 543, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that

PrimeCare Medical is not a “person for purposes of Section 1983” and thus not subject to

liability under that statute); Foye v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 675 F. App’x 210, 215 (3d

Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against prison and Department

of Corrections because they “are not persons subject to suit under” Section 1983).

be maintained against it through its connection with the municipal government.23

Thus, Wayne County Correctional Facility will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”24 Prison officials,

therefore, have “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners.”25 However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of

another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for

the victim’s safety.”26

To plead an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison

official, the inmate must plausibly allege that “(1) he was incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was

deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health and safety,

and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused [the prisoner] harm.”27 In this

context, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard; that is, “the prison official-

defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate

23 See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).

24 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack

v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

25 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

26 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

27 Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.

safety.”28 Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to an inmate’s

safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial

evidence.”29

Roland alleges that on March 1, 2024, he was attacked by inmate Michael

Casabianca, who had a well-known history of mental health and behavior issues.30

He alleges that he sustained serious injuries to his jaw and teeth, with a surgical

quote of $30,000 to repair the damage.31

Roland’s amended complaint plausibly states a failure-to-protect claim

against Warden Williams, Deputy Warden Masco, and Lieutenant Soccodoto. He

alleges that he and other prisoners repeatedly alerted these prison officials to the

danger posed by Michael Casabianca, that they were actually aware of the risk

posed by this inmate, and that they failed to take any action to prevent the March 1

assault.32

Roland’s failure-to-protect claims against Acting Sergeant Jaycox and

Correctional Officer Carney fall short. Roland alleges that on the day of the

assault, he was “left in the day room” by Carney, “instead of being secured

according to established prison policy.”33 This single allegation fails to show that

28 Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)).

29 Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

30 See Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 16 ¶¶ 11, 24, 26.

31 See Doc. 16 ¶¶ 26-28.

32 See id. ¶¶ 11-23.

33 Id. ¶ 24.

Carney was subjectively aware of the danger posed by Casabianca to Roland, or

that Carney acted with deliberate indifference to that danger. At most, Roland’s

allegation against Carney sounds in negligence, which does not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation.

Roland next alleges that Acting Sergeant Jaycox was the “supervising

sergeant” and “failed to ensure that CO Carney followed proper security protocols,

contributing to the unsafe environment.”34 This allegation, too, is insufficient to

plead a failure-to-protect claim. Again, it does not show that Jaycox knew of the

danger posed by Casabianca to Roland, nor does it show that Jaycox acted with

deliberate indifference toward that danger. Additionally, Roland’s single

allegation against Jaycox attempts to assert respondeat superior liability (or

vicarious liability) for the actions of Carney, which liability does not exist for

Section 1983 claims.35

Roland’s failure-to-protect claims against Carney and Jaycox, therefore, will

be dismissed under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. His Eighth Amendment claims against Williams,

Masco, and Soccodoto may go forward.

34 Id. ¶ 25.

35 See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020).

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”36 Further leave to amend will be

denied because Roland has failed to cure the deficiencies with his pleadings even

after “amendments previously allowed.”37 This case, therefore, will continue only

as to Roland’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against defendants

Williams, Masco, and Soccodoto.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss in part Roland’s amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

36 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

37 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”).