Miami-Dade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-cv-22286-ALTMAN

TARIK SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIAMI-DADE, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS

I. The Plaintiff’s Duplicative & Meritless Motions

Our Plaintiff, Tarik Smith, has filed several duplicative, meritless motions. See Motion to

Disqualify and Recuse Magistrate Judge and to Vacate Ultra Vires Orders [ECF No. 106]; Emergency

Demand to Vacate Orders Issued without Authority [ECF No. 107]; Final Motion to Strike and Vacate

All Magistrate Judge Orders Entered Without Jurisdiction and to Restore Article III Control of this

Case [ECF No. 119]. For several reasons, we DENY these three motions.

First, Smith failed to confer with the Defendants on any of these motions, as required by Local

Rule 7.1. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3) (“Prior to filing any motion in a civil case, except [for limited

inapplicable exceptions] . . . counsel for the movant shall confer (orally or in writing), or make

reasonable effort to confer (orally or in writing), with all parties or non-parties who may be affected

by the relief sought in the motion in a good faith effort to resolve by agreement the issues to be

raised.”); see also McCarthy v. Forbes, 2025 WL 3211033, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2025) (Ruiz, J.) (“Local

Rule 7.1[] clearly contemplates that all parties (even affected non-parties) will confer before an

affirmative motion for relief is brought to the district court. The rule makes no distinction regarding

whether the party is represented by counsel or proceeding pro se. Courts in this District agree that the

conferral requirement, like all other Local Rules, applies in cases involving pro se parties.”). If Smith

continues to disregard our Local Rules, he may be subject to sanctions, including the dismissal of his

case without further warning.

Second, these motions are duplicative and vexatious. Smith has repeatedly sought the same

relief—the disqualification of Magistrate Judge D’Angelo and the vacatur of her orders. See generally

Docket. This is nothing more than a repeated effort to sidestep the effects of adverse rulings, as

Magistrate Judge D’Angelo already found when she denied one of Smith’s previous motions to

disqualify. See Order Denying Motion to Disqualify [ECF No. 105] at 4 (“Plaintiff has failed to allege

any meritorious basis to justify disqualification. Plaintiff takes issue with the rulings the undersigned

made after Plaintiff verbally stated that he consented to the undersigned’s jurisdiction at the December

11, 2025 hearing. Indeed, the only basis for disqualification that Plaintiff offers is his disagreement

with the undersigned’s rulings, which Plaintiff claims ‘repeatedly granted procedural relief to

Defendants while denying Plaintiff relief[.]’”). Smith’s deluge of motions seeking the same relief

“unnecessarily encroach[es] on the judicial machinery needed by others.” Edwards v. Darden Grp., Inc.,

2025 WL 2598402, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2025) (Damian, J.), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 3532398 (11th

Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) (cleaned up). If Smith files any further duplicative or vexatious motions regarding

Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s jurisdiction or prior orders, we may dismiss his case without further

warning. See ibid. (“A litigant is considered vexatious when [he] has repeatedly abused the judicial

process through a series of actions brought in state and federal courts and attempted to relitigate these

issues, which were decided adversely to [him].” (cleaned up)).

Third, and most importantly, these motions are completely meritless. Despite Smith’s

unhappiness with Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s prior rulings in this case, and his alleged refusal to

consent to her jurisdiction, it’s beyond peradventure that “[a] district court may designate a magistrate

judge to issue nondispositive orders and make recommendations on dispositive issues, even without

the parties’ consent.” Wright v. Brown, 817 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2020) (first citing 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); and then citing Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512-13 (11th Cir. 1990)).

Here, the district court designated Magistrate Judge D’Angelo to handle Smith’s case pursuant

to Administrative Order 2025-11, see Order on Jurisdiction [ECF No. 5], and, upon Smith’s request,

assigned a district judge to rule on any dispositive motions, see Order Granting Motion for Case

Reassignment [ECF No. 96]; see also Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D’Angelo for

Pretrial Non-Dispositive Matters and Report and Recommendation on Dispositive Matters [ECF No.

101]. Moreover, Smith was given the opportunity to object to Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s jurisdiction

at the outset of this case, see Order Regarding Jurisdiction at 2 (“If no party objects within fourteen

(14) days from the date of this Order Regarding Jurisdiction (or in the case of a defendant, 14 days

from the filing of any document with the Court), nothing more needs to be done by the parties as to

this issue, and this case shall proceed in full before the undersigned Magistrate Judge[].”), and failed

to do so, see generally Docket. So, we’ll deny these three motions and reiterate our warning to Smith: If

he continues disregarding our local rules and filing motions that lack legal support, we’ll dismiss his

case without further warning.

II. Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s Report & Recommendation

We next turn to Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) [ECF No.

115], in which she suggests that we: (1) deny Smith’s Emergency Petition for Temporary Restraining

Order (“TRO Motion”) [ECF No. 95] and his Supplemental Emergency Notice of Imminent

Enforcement Risk and Request for Immediate Action [ECF No. 97]; and (2) construe Smith’s Motion

to Dismiss Unserved Defendants [ECF No. 89] as a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal and grant his request

to dismiss those defendants. When she issued her R&R, Magistrate Judge D’Angelo cautioned the

parties as follows:

The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and

Recommendation to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Rodney Smith,

United States District Judge. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from

a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in this Report and

shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions contained in this Report, except upon grounds of plain error, if necessary,

in the interest of justice.

R&R at 6. District courts must review de novo any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). Although Rule 72 itself is silent on the standard of

review, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress’s intent was to require a de novo review

only where objections have been properly filed—and not when neither party objects. See Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court

review of a magistrate [judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when

neither party objects to those findings.”). “If no objection or only [a] partial objection is made to the

magistrate judge’s report, the district judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.” Macort

v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734,

739 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)).

When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district

judge must make a de novo determination “of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Leonard v.

Polk Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2019 WL 11641375, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2019) (Jung, J.). “Parties filing

objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must specifically identify those findings

objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.”

United States v. Tardon, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (Lenard, J.) (quoting Marsden v.

Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)). The “[f]ailure to object to the magistrate [judge]’s factual

findings after notice precludes a later attack on these findings.” Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th

Smith filed a Motion to Strike Unsupported Factual Finding in Report and Recommendation

(“Objection”) [ECF No. 117], which we’ll construe as an objection. But Smith’s only argument in

support of that objection is his claim that “[t]he R&R asserts that Plaintiff Tarik Smith had knowledge

of a license suspension/warrant since August 2023.” Objection at 1. This objection appears to be

based on a mistaken reading of the R&R. In Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s explanation as to why

Smith’s TRO Motion wasn’t a true emergency, she quoted case language discussing a different defendant’s

knowledge of a scheme since “August 2, 2023.” R&R at 3 (quoting Spimerica Access Sols., LLC v.

Palazzani Industrie, S.P.A., 2023 WL 5748160, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2023) (Scola, J.)). This language

is completely unrelated to our case and was not a factual finding on which Magistrate Judge D’Angelo

based her R&R. We therefore DENY Smith’s Motion to Strike Unsupported Factual Finding in

Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 117].

Absent any other objections, and after careful review of the record and the relevant authorities,

we ADOPT the Report & Recommendation [ECF No. 115] in full. The Plaintiff’s TRO Motion and

Supplemental Emergency Notice of Imminent Enforcement Risk and Request for Immediate Action

are DENIED. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Unserved Defendants is GRANTED.

III. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Finally, we’ll turn to the Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) [ECF No. 108]. Smith

advances four claims in his Amended Complaint [ECF No. 84]: (1) an unlawful-seizure claim (Count

I); (2) a “municipal liability” claim, which alleges that “Miami-Dade County maintained policies

causing violations” (Count II); (3) a due-process claim, which asserts only that “a driver’s license is a

protected interest” (Count III); and (4) a “supervisory liability claim” (Count IV). Amended Complaint

¶¶ 25–29. In their MTD, the Defendants argue that the entire Amended Complaint is “subject to

dismissal on shotgun grounds[.]” MTD at 2 (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d

1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015)). The Defendants also argue that Smith “fails to sufficiently allege that his

constitutional rights have been violated.” Id. at 4.

Smith (in a way) responded to the MTD, but he didn’t challenge any of the Defendants’ legal

arguments and insisted only that we strike the MTD because: (1) it was filed “while magistrate

authority and consent were actively disputed”; (2) the Defendants didn’t confer with the Plaintiff

before filing the MTD; and (3) granting the MTD would “prejudice plaintiff and improperly bootstrap

contested magistrate rulings into dispositive relief.” Motion to Strike MTD [ECF No. 113]. These

arguments are meritless. First, as we’ve said, a magistrate judge may “issue nondispositive orders and

make recommendations on dispositive issues, even without the parties’ consent.” Wright, 817 F. App’x

at 799. Second, parties aren’t required to confer on “a motion . . . to dismiss[.]” S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(a)(3).

Third, we think it’s fair to say that any successful motion to dismiss necessarily prejudices a plaintiff’s

case.

Smith otherwise entirely failed to respond to the merits of the Defendants’ MTD. See generally

Docket. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “a party’s failure to respond to any portion or claim in a

motion indicates such portion, claim or defense is unopposed.” Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., 564 F.

App’x 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). “When a party fails to respond to an argument or

otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim abandoned.” Ibid. So, we’ll grant

the Defendants’ MTD.

We recognize (of course) that Smith is proceeding pro se and that courts “should show leniency

to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). Still, for two reasons, we conclude that dismissing

Smith’s Amended Complaint, without prejudice, is the proper outcome here. First, Smith did file a timely

response to the Defendants’ MTD (by filing his Motion to Strike). He simply elected not to engage

with the merits of the MTD. Second, we agree with the Defendants that Smith’s Amended Complaint

is a shotgun pleading.

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, a complaint is a shotgun pleading if it: “(1) contains

multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) is replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3)

fails to separate into a different count each cause of action; or (4) asserts multiple claims against

multiple defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which act.” Embree v.

Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 779 F. App’x 658, 662 (11th Cir. 2019). All shotgun pleadings share two

characteristics. First, they “fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the

defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Second, they “waste scarce

judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets,

and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295

(11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Here, the Amended Complaint fails to give the Defendants “adequate notice of the claims

against them” because each count is only 1–2 sentences long and utterly fails to outline any factual

basis for its assertions. All we know is that Smith was stopped and cited while driving his vehicle. His

allegations that “[the] stop lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause” and that “Officer Ruadez

violated the Fourth Amendment” are far too conclusory to provide the Defendants with notice of the

grounds on which Smith’s claims rest. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 15, 26.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:

1. Smith’s Motion to Disqualify and Recuse Magistrate Judge and to Vacate Ultra Vires

Orders [ECF No. 106] is DENIED.

2. Smith’s Emergency Demand to Vacate Orders Issued without Authority [ECF No. 107]

is DENIED.

3. Smith’s Final Motion to Strike and Vacate All Magistrate Judge Orders Entered Without

Jurisdiction, and to Restore Article III Control of this Case [ECF No. 119] is DENIED.

4. Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s Report & Recommendation [ECF No. 115] is ADOPTED.

a. Smith’s Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Unserved Defendants [ECF No. 89] is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE any Defendant that was

not served as of December 18, 2025, as a party to this matter.

b. Smith’s Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 95] is

DENIED.

c. Smith’s Supplemental Emergency Notice of Imminent Enforcement Risk and

Request for Immediate Action [ECF No. 97] is DENIED.

d. Smith’s Motion to Strike Unsupported Factual Finding [ECF No. 117] is

DENIED.

5. The Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 108] is GRANTED.

a. Smith’s Demand to Strike the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 113] is

DENIED.

b. The Defendants’ Motion to Stay [ECF No. 114] is DENIED as moot.

c. Smith’s Amended Complaint [ECF No. 84] is DISMISSED .

d. Smith may file a Second Amended Complaint by March 21, 2026.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on March 6, 2026.

ROY K. ALTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Tarik Smith (p70 se)

counsel of record