Paulinski v. Link

2026 IL App (1st) 250326

SECOND DIVISION

March 17, 2026

No. 1-25-0326

DAVID PAULINSKI, as the Administrator of the Estate of ) Appeal from the

Madalyne Lattuca, Deceased, ) Circuit Court of

) Cook County.

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

v. ) No. 2024-L-241

)

LAURA LINK, SYLVESTER FULCHER, VONZI ANDERSON, )

FLORA AMEZUCA, KRISTIN TEMPLE, MICHAEL ENU- )

ENWOSU, STACY SLOAN, CANDACE WILLIAMS, ARIANA )

ACEVEDO, TAMMY BROWN-ZIELKE, ELIZABETH )

COLLIER, MICHAEL CASEY, OLUBUNMI ODUTOLA, )

JOHNNIE GULLET-DIAZ, and CHRISTINE PAULINSKI, )

)

Defendants, )

)

(Laura Link, Sylvester Fulcher, Vonzi Anderson, Flora Amezuca, )

Kristin Temple, Michael Enu-Enwosu, Stacy Sloan, Candace )

Williams, Ariana Acevedo, Tammy Brown-Zielke, Elizabeth )

Collier, Michael Casey, and Olubunmi Odutola, )

) Honorable

) Maire Dempsey,

Defendants-Appellants). ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred with the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2022, Madalyne Lattuca died at the age of 15, after overdosing on heroin and

fentanyl. Plaintiff David Paulinski, as administrator of Madalyne’s estate, filed a wrongful death

and survival action against employees of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS

No. 1-25-0326

defendants), in their individual capacities, and against Madalyne’s mother, Christine. 1 The

complaint alleged that Christine brought the drugs into her home where Madalyne and her younger

siblings also resided.

¶3 The complaint further alleged that the DCFS defendants conducted improper investigations

of neglect and abuse allegations at the home prior to Madalyne’s death, and they failed to take “all

reasonable steps to uncover and obviate dangers presented by child abuse and/or neglect.” Plaintiff

alleged that in providing services to Madalyne’s family, the DCFS defendants failed to adhere to

the professional standard of care of a child welfare employee. Plaintiff sought money damages.

¶4 The DCFS defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1

of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2024)), arguing that plaintiff’s

claim was actually against the State of Illinois and, thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to

hear the case. Plaintiff responded that sovereign immunity did not apply where the DCFS

defendants were required to hold a Direct Child Welfare Service Employee license (CWEL

license), and as a result, they owed a duty to Madalyne independent of their employment with

DCFS.

¶5 The circuit court held that sovereign immunity did not apply and denied the motion to

dismiss. Relevant here, the court found that “because DCFS employees operate with CWEL

licenses, they are beholden to a professional standard of care that exists regardless of their state

employment.” As support for its finding, the court cited Griffin v. Poynter, No. 20-cv-1427, 2022

WL 16836605 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2022), an unreported federal district court case.

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Plaintiff named DCFS employee Johnnie Gullet-Diaz as a defendant but failed to serve him. Here,

“DCFS defendants,” thus, refers to all party defendants except Gullet-Diaz.

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No. 1-25-0326

¶6 The circuit court thereafter granted the DCFS defendants’ motion to certify a question for

interlocutory review under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). This court granted

the DCFS defendants’ application for leave to appeal the following certified question:

“Whether the statutory immunity provided in the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS

5, giving exclusive jurisdiction over actions against the State to the Illinois Court of Claims,

applies to cases alleging state law claims against DCFS employees based on their work for

DCFS when those employees hold a Child Welfare Employee License, so as to bar

jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the State of Illinois.”

¶7 II. ANALYSIS

¶8 Rule 308 allows a trial court to make an otherwise interlocutory order immediately

appealable if there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and an appeal could materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). Our

review in such an appeal is generally confined to the certified question. De Bouse v. Bayer AG,

235 Ill. 2d 544, 550 (2009). Since certified questions under Rule 308 are issues of law, our review

is de novo. Doe No. 2 v. Boy Scouts of America, 2016 IL App (1st) 152406, ¶ 67.

¶9 The 1970 Constitution abolished sovereign immunity in Illinois “[e]xcept as the General

Assembly may provide by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4. Pursuant to this authority, the

General Assembly revived the doctrine by enacting the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS

5/0.01 et seq. (West 2024)). This statute provides that except as provided in the Court of Claims

Act (705 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2024)) and other specified statutes, “the State of Illinois shall

not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2024). Relevant here, the

Court of Claims Act states that the Court of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

determine “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any law of the State of Illinois or upon any

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regulation adopted thereunder by an executive or administrative officer or agency.” 705 ILCS

505/8(a) (West 2024). Accordingly, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine

claims against the State.

¶ 10 Although plaintiff filed his claim against the DCFS defendants in their individual

capacities, rather than as state employees, sovereign immunity may still apply. The circuit court

lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim if the State of Illinois is “the party vitally interested,” and thus,

the claim is actually against the State itself. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Healy v. Vaupel,

133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990). In general, courts consider a claim based on an employee’s actions as

one against the State if the employee acted within his or her scope of authority and the challenged

acts were within the employee’s normal and official functions. Id. at 309.

¶ 11 There are two recognized exceptions to this general rule. First, “when a state officer

performs illegally or purports to act under an unconstitutional act or under authority which he does

not have, the officer’s conduct is not regarded as the conduct of the State.” Leetaru v. Board of

Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 46. Second, sovereign immunity does not

apply if “the employee is charged with breaching a duty imposed on him independently of his State

employment.” (Emphasis in original.) Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 159 (1992).

¶ 12 The question certified for appeal asks whether sovereign immunity applies where “the

claims against DCFS employees are based on their work for DCFS” and “those employees hold a

Child Welfare Employee License ***.” The circuit court below reasoned that sovereign immunity

did not apply “because DCFS employees operate with CWEL licenses, [and thus] they are

beholden to a professional standard of care that exists regardless of their state employment.” To

answer the certified question, we must determine whether the employees’ CWEL license provides

an independent source of duty outside of their employment so that the second exception applies to

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No. 1-25-0326

preclude sovereign immunity.

¶ 13 The circuit court cited to Griffin, which found that the DCFS employees in that case “had

a duty of professional conduct through their CWEL licensing standards *** and not solely by

virtue of their State employment.” Griffin, 2022 WL 16836605, at *4. Griffin, however, relied

primarily on Currie and Healy, cases that did not consider licensure as a state employee’s source

of duty. It is also notable that another federal case from the same district, Williams v. Haleighs

Hope, Inc., No. 22-cv-3090, 2025 WL 777637 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2025), declined to follow Griffin.

Nonetheless, lower federal court decisions are not binding on this court, especially where the issue

involves a matter of state law. State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836,

¶ 34.

¶ 14 On the subject of professional licensure and duty, we find Jinkins v. Lee, 209 Ill. 2d 320

(2004) instructive. In that case, George Jinkins was found face down in a puddle of muddy water

“with his pants down.” Id. at 322. After he tried to run in front of a car, he was taken to Christ

Hospital, which was a private hospital. Dr. Daniel Sachs treated Jinkins in the emergency room

and diagnosed him with acute psychosis and suicidal behavior. Jinkins’s blood alcohol content

was 0.203, and he tested positive for marijuana. Dr. Sachs planned to have Jinkins evaluated and

potentially admitted by a psychiatrist. Id.

¶ 15 While staying overnight at Christ Hospital, Jinkins became disruptive and tried to escape.

Id. at 324. Later that morning, he was transferred in restraints to Madden Center, a state mental

health care facility operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services. At Madden, Dr.

Choong Lee, a board-certified psychiatrist, examined Jinkins. Id. Paulette Medlin a licensed

clinical counselor, assisted Dr. Lee. Id. at 325. After the examination, Dr. Lee decided not to admit

Jinkins because he was not “ ‘certifiable.’ ” Id. at 326. He believed that drugs and alcohol were

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the primary causes of Jinkins’ psychiatric symptoms. Jinkins left the Madden Center with his

mother and his wife, but soon after arriving home, he shot himself in the head. Id.

¶ 16 Jinkins’ wife filed an action alleging wrongful death, naming as defendants Dr. Lee and

Medlin, among others. Id. at 327. The complaint alleged that both Lee and Medlin breached their

respective duty of care to use their professional knowledge and skill when treating patients. Id. at

328. In a deposition, an expert witness testified that the standard of care applicable to private and

state hospitals was identical. Id. at 327. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

finding that sovereign immunity barred the action. The appellate court reversed, ruling that the

duty owed by Dr. Lee and Medlin existed independently of their state employment so that

sovereign immunity did not apply. Id. at 328.

¶ 17 On appeal to the supreme court, the court utilized the “source-of-the-duty test.” Id. at 333.

The court noted that the mere fact Dr. Lee was employed by the State was not dispositive when

considering whether the action was against the State. Id. Rather, it found that Dr. Lee “was not

performing a uniquely governmental function” when he treated Jinkins. Id. at 335. The supreme

court held that Dr. Lee’s duty to exercise reasonable care when treating patients was “derived from

[his] status as a licensed physician” and not dependent on his employment by the State. Id. at 336.

In other words, “the duties inherent in the doctor-patient relationship emanate from the standards

imposed by the profession itself” and not from Dr. Lee’s government employment. Id. As such,

sovereign immunity did not preclude the circuit court from hearing the claim. Id. at 340.

¶ 18 Although the supreme court determined that sovereign immunity did not apply because Dr.

Lee’s duty of reasonable care arose from the fact that he was a licensed physician, it did not hold

that all licensed professionals who work for the state are similarly excluded. Instead, the court

emphasized the fact that licensed physicians are obligated to treat all patients with the same

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standard of care, regardless of whether they are in a state hospital or a private hospital. Significant

here, the court also found that while Dr. Lee treated Jinkins in a state hospital, he was not

performing a uniquely governmental function when doing so.

¶ 19 Unlike Dr. Lee, the licensed DCFS defendants in this case were performing a uniquely

governmental function. Section 7.3(a) of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act provides

that DCFS “shall be the sole agency responsible for receiving and investigating reports of child

abuse or neglect made under this Act.” (Emphasis added.) 325 ILCS 5/7.3(a) (West 2024). To

fulfill its responsibility, DCFS “shall be capable of receiving reports of suspected child abuse or

neglect 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.” Id. § 7.4(a). Upon receiving a report, DCFS “shall

determine whether to conduct a family assessment or an investigation as appropriate to prevent or

provide a remedy for child abuse or neglect.” Id. § 7.4(a-5).

¶ 20 DCFS also developed and implemented the CWEL license, which “all child protective

investigators and supervisors and child welfare specialists and supervisors employed by [DCFS]

or its contractors shall *** obtain and maintain.” 20 ILCS 505/5c(a) (West 2024). Relevant here,

the CWEL license is “solely for the purpose of employment with the Department or with a POS

agency or a temporary services agency as a direct child welfare service employee.” (Emphasis

added.) 89 Ill. Adm. Code § 412.40(f)(4) (2015). A CWEL license holder cannot “represent herself

or himself as a licensed social worker or licensed clinical social worker as defined under the

Clinical Social Work and Social Work Practice Act [225 ILCS 20].” Id.

¶ 21 It is true that the DCFS defendants were required to possess a CWEL license and that

certain knowledge and skills are associated with maintaining that license. It does not follow,

however, that the license created an independent duty on the part of these defendants to take

reasonable care when conducting investigations of child neglect and abuse. Unlike Dr. Lee in

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Jinkins, who had an independent duty as a licensed physician to exercise reasonable care in treating

patients whether or not they were in a state hospital, the DCFS defendants had no independent

duty outside of their government employment to investigate child abuse/neglect cases. Moreover,

DCFS developed the CWEL license solely for the purpose of employment with DCFS. It is only

by virtue of their employment at DCFS that these licensed defendants had an obligation to

investigate Madalyne’s case according to certain articulated standards.

¶ 22 When determining whether sovereign immunity applies, courts must also consider whether

a judgment in plaintiff’s favor would operate to control the actions of the state or subject it to

liability. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 158. Here, DCFS is the sole agency charged with investigating

reports of child abuse and neglect. Therefore, it is solely responsible for the development of “the

safety-based child welfare intervention system, training curriculum, method for demonstration of

proficiency in application of the safety-based child welfare intervention system, and method for

evaluation of the reliability and validity of the safety-based child welfare intervention system.” 20

ILCS 505/21(e)(4) (West 2024). DCFS is also the agency that developed “guidelines or criteria

for educational and professional requirements and a curriculum in child protection investigation

and child welfare services.” 225 ILCS 420/4 (West 2024).

¶ 23 Plaintiff alleged that CWEL license holders have a duty to take “all reasonable steps to

uncover and obviate dangers presented by child abuse and/or neglect” and that the DCFS

defendants breached that duty when they conducted improper investigations of neglect and abuse

allegations prior to Madalyne’s death. Given the fact that DCFS is the sole agency responsible for

investigating reports of child abuse and neglect and, to that end, DCFS has set forth educational

requirements and professional standards for employees who work as investigators, a judgment in

plaintiff’s favor could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability. We find

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that the action is one against the State and sovereign immunity applies. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 158.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and find that

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claim against the DCFS defendants. We

remand the cause to the circuit court for dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with this

ruling.

¶ 26 Certified question answered; cause remanded.

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No. 1-25-0326

Paulinski v. Link, 2026 IL App (1st) 250326

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2024-L-

241; the Hon. Maire Dempsey, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,

for Solicitor General, and Leigh J. Jahnig, Assistant Attorney

Appellant: General, of counsel), for appellants.

Attorneys Thomas Stewart, The Deratany Law Firm LLC, of Chicago, for

for appellee.

Appellee:

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