The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOAQUIN MURILLO, No. 25-225
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:15-cv-00266-DC-SCR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
K. HOLLAND, Warden; J. GUTIERREZ,
Deputy Warden,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
G. YBARRA, JORGE ANDRADE RICO,
MAHER CONRAD SUAREZ,
CHRISTOPHER LIPSEY, Jr.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dena M. Coggins, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026
San Francisco, California
Before: M. SMITH and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, Chief District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States Chief District Judge for
Wardens Holland and Gutierrez (Defendants) appeal the district court’s denial
of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. This case relates to a
decades-long class action related to mental health services provided to inmates in
the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).
See Coleman v. Newsom, No. 2:90-cv-0520-TLN-SCR (E.D. Cal.) (the Coleman
litigation). Plaintiff Joaquin Murillo brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
he suffered sleep deprivation in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights due to
excessive noise caused by Defendants’ implementation of CDCR’s Guard One
system, a protocol for welfare checks on inmates in administrative segregation and
security housing units, at California Correctional Institution (CCI). Defendants
moved for summary judgment arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity;
the district court denied their motion.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the “denial of a
motion for summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity” de novo. Felarca
v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment is granted
only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. On summary judgment, we “view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. “Our
interlocutory review jurisdiction is limited to resolving a defendant’s purely legal
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
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contention that his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution and, in any event,
did not violate clearly established law.” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726,
731 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). We reverse and remand to the district court for
dismissal of Defendants, who are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a
federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct
was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
62–63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A right is “clearly established” if,
“at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Id. at 63
(cleaned up). We must consider “whether the violative nature of [the defendants’]
particular conduct is clearly established,” and we must do so “in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821
F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis and alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
We have “discretion to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis
to address first.” West v. City of Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2019).
Because we conclude that our reasoning in Rico v. Ducart, extends to the
circumstances of this case, we begin and end our analysis with the clearly-
established prong. 980 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 2020).
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In Rico, an inmate incarcerated at CDCR’s Pelican Bay prison filed a lawsuit
pursuant to § 1983 alleging an “Eighth Amendment condition-of-confinement claim
for sleep deprivation caused by excessive noise” resulting from Pelican Bay’s
implementation of the same Guard One system, under the direction of the Coleman
court. Id. at 1295–97. We held that there was no clearly established law that creating
such noise was unlawful under the “specific facts presented” by the case before us.
Id. at 1299. We thus concluded that “every reasonable official would not have
understood that how they performed the court-ordered Guard One checks violated
the Constitution.” Id. We found no analogous case law and determined that “the
challenged noise arose from activity that was inherently noisy in a facility the very
construction of which made difficult quietly conducting round-the-clock welfare
checks that defendants were ordered by the Coleman court to perform.” Id. The
same is true of the circumstances here.
Plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish Rico are unavailing. Plaintiff overstates the
impact of Pelican Bay’s design on our reasoning in Rico. We noted that the activity
itself is “inherently noisy” when carried out at a “facility built of concrete, metal,
and steel.” Id. at 1299–300. That describes all prisons, including CCI, as the record
before us makes clear. And Plaintiff testified that even if correctional officers “are
being considerate,” there is still “loud noise” from the “opening and closing” of cell
doors “all night every half hour,” rendering the entire Guard One system
4 25-225
“disruptive.” We acknowledged as much in Rico, explaining that “the officers were
undoubtedly and unavoidably going to make noise simply by complying with the
court-mandated use of the Guard One system within the SHU at Pelican Bay,” and
that even “[a]ssuming perfect implementation of the system, inmates were still
susceptible to being awoken every hour each night when heavy entry doors to the
pods opened and closed.” Id. at 1302.
Plaintiff also alleges excessive noise by correctional officers in retaliation for
inmates’ complaints. We explained in Rico that even if “floor officers”
were “causing extra noise by running on the metal stairs, hitting the Guard One discs
with more force than necessary, and rushing through checks, it is not ‘beyond debate’
that every reasonable floor officer would be aware that this conduct violated the
law.” Id. at 1301. Given the breadth of Rico’s reasoning on excessive noise, we
cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s case is sufficiently different as to require the
opposite conclusion.
Plaintiff next argues that Rico is distinguishable due to “the number of
grievances and appeals filed by CCI prisoners,” compared with “only a handful of
grievances” filed in Rico. But even accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations that
Defendants were aware of all grievances filed against Guard One at CCI, that does
not compel the conclusion that a reasonable supervisory official would have been
“on notice” that the conduct of several unnamed floor officers “was illegal.” Inouye
5 25-225
v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). Rather, as we explained in Rico, “no
reasonable official would believe that creating additional noise while carrying out
mandatory suicide checks for prisoner safety clearly violated . . . constitutional
rights.” 980 F.3d at 1303.
In sum, Rico held that the clearly-established prong was not met where
correctional officers implemented an “inherently noisy” system for inmate welfare
pursuant to a court order. Id. at 1300. Plaintiff does not identify any case that
compels the conclusion that Defendants should have understood their supervisory
conduct was unlawful. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63. The cases Plaintiff cites in
support of his argument were specifically distinguished by Rico because none had
considered circumstances where “officials were carrying out a court order designed
to benefit at-risk inmates” and where the mandated “activity . . . is inherently noisy.”
980 F.3d at 1300. Plaintiff’s claim concerns implementation of the same “inherently
loud” policy, id. at 1303, “in a maximum security facility built of concrete, metal,
and steel.” Id. at 1299. Our reasoning in Rico therefore applies.
Accordingly, as in Rico, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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