Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ATLANTIC MARITIME SERVICES, CIVIL ACTION

LLC

VERSUS NO. 20-3097

C/W: 20-3099

ECOPETROL AMERICA, LLC ET AL. SECTION: “J”(1)

Applies to: 20-3097, 20-3099

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss filed by Intervenor-Defendant

Talos QN Exploration LLC and Defendant Talos Energy Offshore LLC (Rec. Doc.

78), Defendant Ecopetrol America, LLC (Rec. Doc. 79), and Defendants Ridgewood

Katmai, LLC and ILX Prospect Katmai, LLC (Rec. Doc. 81). Plaintiff Atlantic

Maritime Services, LLC opposed these motions (Rec. Docs. 85, 95), and Defendants

filed replies (Rec. Docs. 87, 91, 104).

Having considered the motions and legal memoranda, the record, and the

applicable law, the Court finds that the motions to dismiss should be DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This consolidated matter arises from two offshore oil leases for which Plaintiff

Atlantic Maritime Services, LLC performed drilling services in 2020. Plaintiff

undertook these services pursuant to a contract between Plaintiff and the designated

operator on the two leases at the time, Fieldwood Energy LLC (“Fieldwood”).

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Subsequently, Fieldwood filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, and Plaintiff alleges that it is

still owed the following principal amounts: (1) $5,824,743.68 for services performed

on mineral lease OCS-G-28030 located in the Mississippi Canyon Area, Block 948, of

the Outer Continental Shelf adjacent to the coast of Louisiana (“the Gunflint Lease”),

a lease in which Defendants Ecopetrol America, LLC (“Ecopetrol”) and Talos Energy

Offshore LLC (“TEO”), along with Intervenor-Defendant Talos QN Exploration LLC

(“Talos QN”), are interest owners; and (2) $7,111,706.55 for services performed on

mineral lease OCS-G-34536 located on the Green Canyon Area, Block 40 (“the Katmai

Lease”), in which Defendants Ridgewood Katmai, LLC (“Ridgewood”) and ILX

Prospect Katmai, LLC (“ILX”), again with Intervenor-Defendant Talos QN, are

working interest owners. After completing the drilling services, Plaintiff took steps

to perfect and preserve its privileges (or liens) against the two leases pursuant to the

Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”).

Because Plaintiff could not recover the amounts it was owed from Fieldwood,

the former operating interest owner on both leases, Plaintiff sought to recover the

amounts from the working interest owners (“WIOs”) in the leases. To this end,

Plaintiff initiated two in rem actions (pertaining to the two leases) in this Court on

November 13, 2020, against the WIOs, Defendants Ecopetrol, Ridgewood, and ILX.1

Shortly thereafter, Ecopetrol, Ridgewood, and ILX filed Notices of Bankruptcy into

1 Plaintiff later named TEO as a defendant in its first amended complaint, which was filed in July of

2021.

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the records, and the Court issued an automatic stay of both cases. In April of 2021,

Fieldwood sought a declaratory judgment from the Bankruptcy Court holding that

Plaintiff’s LOWLA privileges would be extinguished by Fieldwood’s bankruptcy plan.

Also during this time, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Fieldwood’s Eighth Amended

Joint Chapter 11 Plan, under which QuarterNorth, which is now Talos QN

Exploration LLC, purchased Fieldwood’s assets. In February of 2022, the Bankruptcy

Court permanently enjoined Plaintiff’s in rem actions against Defendants, the WIOs,

an order which Plaintiff appealed and which the Fifth Circuit reversed. Pursuant to

the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the stays in the cases before this Court were lifted, and

the suits were consolidated.

In the instant motions, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the

following grounds: (1) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(5) for

untimely service of process;2 and (2) under Rule 12(b)(6) because Defendants claim

that (i) Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Louisiana is the

adjacent state to the oil leases for Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”)

purposes; (ii) Plaintiff failed to perfect its privileges as to Defendants; and (iii)

because federal law precludes the relief that Plaintiff seeks. Lastly, Defendants move

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 for failure to join the United

States Department of the Interior, which Defendants claim is an indispensable party.

The Court previously considered and rejected all of these arguments except for the

2 Two Defendants, Ridgewood Katmai, LLC and ILX Prospect Katmai, LLC, did not advance this

argument regarding untimely service of process in their motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 81) but instead

relied on the other grounds for dismissal, all of which the Court has previously rejected.

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first (untimely service of process) when it ruled on Defendants’ motions to vacate and

dissolve the writs of sequestration in this matter. See Rec. Doc. 110. Therefore, the

Court will consider only Defendants’ first argument in ruling on the motions to

dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure challenges the mode of delivery or lack of delivery of the summons and

complaint. A 12(b)(5) motion turns on the legal sufficiency of the service of process.

When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(5) challenge, the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that service of process was valid. Carimi v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line,

Inc., 959 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A district court has broad

discretion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of

process. Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 645 (5th Cir. 1994)

(citing George v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)).

The procedural requirements for proper service are set forth in Rule 4 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4(m) gives a plaintiff ninety days after

filing the complaint to serve the defendant. Under Rule 4(m), when a plaintiff fails to

serve a defendant within the ninety-day period, the court “must dismiss the action

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a

specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If, however, the plaintiff shows good cause for

the failure, “the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Id.

To establish good cause, the party who allegedly made insufficient service of process

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must show “at least as much as would be required to show excusable neglect, as to

which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules usually

does not suffice.” Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Washington, D.C., 903

F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, even absent a good cause finding, the Fifth Circuit has counseled

that a district court may still assess the fairness of an extension for proper service.

See Thompson v. Brown, 91 F.3d 20, 22 (5th Cir. 1996). To that end, the Court may

exercise its “broad discretion” to construe a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(5) as a motion to quash service. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 2002 WL

31886812, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 2002) (citing 5B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice

& Procedure § 1353 (2d ed.1990)). When there is “a reasonable prospect that plaintiff

ultimately will be able to serve defendant properly,” the appropriate course of action

is to quash service and allow the plaintiff an opportunity to effect proper service, thus

preserving the matter before the court. Thomas v. New Leaders for New Schs., 278

F.R.D. 347, 352 (E.D. La. 2011) (citing 5B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &

Procedure § 1354 (3d ed. 2004)); see also Amir El v. Louisiana State, No. 16-2125,

2016 WL 6563403, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2016) (citation omitted) (refusing to dismiss

action where service is “insufficient but curable”).

DISCUSSION

Defendants in this matter filed separate motions to dismiss, as did Intervenor-

Defendant and Operator on the leases, Talos QN Exploration LLC. Because

Defendants make identical arguments, except that Ridgewood and ILX did not move

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to dismiss for untimely service of process, the Court has consolidated the motions for

consideration.

Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) based on untimely service of process.

Specifically, Defendants allege, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that they were not

served until September of 2025, which was more than five years after Plaintiff filed

the initial complaints in these consolidated matters. Clearly, Plaintiff’s service of

process on Defendants did not occur within ninety days of Plaintiff’s filing its initial

complaints and, therefore, was not timely. Plaintiff argues, however, that good cause

exists for its failure to serve Defendants timely.

In looking at the record, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed its initial

complaints against Ecopetrol (in 20-3097) and Ridgewood and ILX (in 20-3099) on

November 13, 2020, and subsequently filed motions for writs of sequestration

pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act on November 19th. Defendants filed their

oppositions to Plaintiff’s motions for writs of sequestration on November 20, 2020,

which is the same day that Plaintiff requested that summonses be issued for

Ecopetrol, Ridgewood, and ILX. The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of

Louisiana issued the requested summonses as to Ridgewood and ILX on November

20, 2020, and as to Ecopetrol on November 23. Only two days later on November 25,

Defendants filed Notices of Bankruptcy into both records. In these notices,

Defendants emphasized that the order by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern

District of Texas “specifically restrain[ed] and enjoin[ed] the above-referenced matter

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from proceeding for the duration of the Stay.” (No. 20-3097, Rec. Doc. 12, at 1; No. 20-

3099, Rec. Doc. 15, at 1). Apparently, this notice was filed before Plaintiff had effected

service against any of the defendants. At the same time, however, Defendants

indisputably had actual notice of the proceedings because they had made more than

one appearance on the records at that point.3

In February of 2022, the Bankruptcy Court issued a permanent injunction

against Plaintiff’s in rem actions against Defendants, an order which Plaintiff

appealed and which the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded on June 11, 2025. On

remand, the Honorable Judge Marvin Isgur issued his ruling on September 4, 2025,

thus allowing the instant cases to proceed. In Defendants’ motions to dismiss, they

claim that Plaintiff served them with process in September of 2025, which would have

been shortly after the permanent injunction was vacated.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to serve Defendants within the ninety-day

period required by Rule 4(m). However, the Court finds that good cause existed for

Plaintiff’s delay, namely the automatic stay of the proceedings and eventually the

permanent injunction. Defendants contend the automatic stay did not prevent

Plaintiff from (1) effecting service of process, (2) seeking an extension of the service

deadline from this Court, or (3) from seeking an order from Judge Isgur to modify the

stay to allow Atlantic Maritime to serve Defendants. While all of these contentions

3 “The defendant’s actual notice of the litigation . . . is insufficient to satisfy Rule 4’s requirements.”

Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court considers Defendants’ actual

notice as only one factor in determining whether to exercise its discretion regarding service of

process in this matter.

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might be true, the fact remains that Plaintiff was enjoined from proceeding in the

matters before this Court for the duration of the stay. Furthermore, while actual

notice does not obviate the need for proper and sufficient service of process, all

Defendants had actual notice and had made appearances on the records of both cases,

suggesting that Defendants have not been prejudiced by Plaintiff’s failure to

effectuate timely service.

Finally, when the permanent injunction issued by the Bankruptcy Court was

vacated, Plaintiff had Defendants served almost immediately, according to the

parties’ memoranda. The Court cannot verify the date of service because Plaintiff

neglected to file proof of service into the record; however, because Defendants aver

that they were served in September 2025, the Court will assume that is when service

took place. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff’s failure to timely

serve Defendants constitutes, at worst, excusable neglect, and it seems clear that

“simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules” was not

involved. Moreover, as Plaintiff acknowledges, allowing Defendants to use a stay that

was instituted on their behalf to defeat Plaintiff’s claims based on a procedural

deficiency would constitute a grave miscarriage of justice. See Rec. Doc. 85, at 20 (“It

bears emphasis that the years-long injunction of these cases was at the urging of

some of the very same parties who now raise delay in service as a defense.”)

In ruling on a typical Rule 12(b)(5) motion, the Court would treat the motion

as a motion to quash service and allow Plaintiff another opportunity to effectuate

service on Defendants. However, according to Defendants, they were already served

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in September of 2025. Therefore, the Court will simply deny the motions to dismiss

and order Plaintiff to file proof of service into the record not later than Tuesday,

March 17, 2026. Defendants will have 21 days from the date of this Order to file their

answers to Plaintiffs verified consolidated complaint.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Rec. Docs.

78, 79, 81) are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file proof of service on all

Defendants into the record not later than Tuesday, March 17, 2026.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of March, 2026.

(wala

Uk fal

CARL J. iyfas

UNITED STAVES DISTRICT JUDGE