Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi

Case: 25-40126 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

March 13, 2026

No. 25-40126 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Priscilla Tryon Cambric,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Corpus Christi,

Defendant—Appellee.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:24-CV-41

______________________________

Before Richman, Higginson, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Priscilla Tryon Cambric sued the City of Corpus

Christi (the “City”) and two City employees, alleging that defendants selec-

tively enforced the City’s building code regarding disrepair, in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, Plaintiff

pleaded a “class of one” equal protection violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim. For the

reasons explained below, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.

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I.

Plaintiff purchased the property at issue in 2003. 1 The building,

constructed around 1940, was known as the Ebony Recreation Spot and, at

other times, the Skylark Club and the Fabulous Lounge. It was also “host to

innumerable luminaries in the Black music and entertainment space.”

Prior to this lawsuit, the City’s Code Enforcement Division issued a

number of citations on the property and requested Plaintiff’s appearance

before the Building Standards Board (the “Board”) multiple times. The

City’s code-enforcement staff, citing defects with the roof and structural

issues with the building, found Plaintiff’s property to be “substandard” and

ultimately recommended that the Board vote for demolition. Plaintiff

consistently advocated for her plan to pursue historical preservation of the

property.

The Board set a final hearing date on September 28, 2023, despite

Plaintiff’s counsel’s request for a continuance due to work travel. At this

final hearing, the Board heard from Tracey Cantu, who was the Assistant

Director of Development Services, Code Compliance Division, and Al

Raymond, the Director of Development Services. Cantu and Raymond

advocated, as they had done before, for the demolition of the building. In the

absence of Plaintiff and her counsel, the Board voted that day to recommend

demolition of the building.

Plaintiff appealed this decision, emphasizing “the importance of

preserving such an important cultural landmark in this community, and

specifically to the Black community.” The City then modified and

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1

In the motion to dismiss posture, we are cabined to the facts alleged in the

complaint, which we assume are true and construe in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009).

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temporarily suspended its prior demolition order from September and now

required Plaintiff to erect a fence around the property by January 24, 2024,

and to board up and secure the first floor to prevent entry to the property.

Thereafter, on January 25, 2024, Cantu notified Plaintiff that the City

found her to be noncompliant with the conditions for suspending demolition,

specifically that the perimeter fencing was insufficient. The City gave

Plaintiff 30 days to demolish the building, or else the City would take further

action. Plaintiff filed suit against the City, Cantu, and Raymond in state court

to prevent demolition. Plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order

against any demolition to her property by the state court, which the parties

have agreed to continue. Defendants removed the case to the Southern

District of Texas on February 15, 2024.

Plaintiff alleged a § 1983 claim against all defendants, claiming they

violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by

selectively enforcing the City’s building code. As to the City, Plaintiff alleged

that it was liable for its “policies, customs, and/or practices” of selective

enforcement under a theory of municipal liability. Plaintiff pled these

allegations in two separate counts: Count One addressed the substantive

Fourteenth Amendment violation under § 1983, and Count Two was limited

to the facts relating to municipal liability for the same alleged Fourteenth

Amendment violation.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following an initial pretrial conference, wherein the district court expressed

concerns with the sufficiency of the pleadings, Plaintiff submitted her first

amended complaint on August 5, 2024. Plaintiff’s amended complaint did

not address the deficiencies the district court identified and instead included

allegations substantially similar to those in her original complaint.

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Defendants again filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6), to which Plaintiff did not file a response.

In February of 2025, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint

for failure to state a claim, finding that Plaintiff had not adequately pleaded a

substantive constitutional violation, as required to sustain her claims against

both the individual defendants and the City. Finding no constitutional

violation, the district court did not reach whether Plaintiff had adequately

pled facts required to impose municipal liability on the City.

Plaintiff timely noticed her appeal. Her opening brief did not address

or challenge the dismissal of her claims as to Cantu and Raymond, so the

parties agreed to dismiss those defendants from the appeal. The City is the

only remaining defendant and responded as Appellee in the present appeal.

II.

“We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting all well-

pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Jackson v. City of Hearne, 959 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir.

2020) (quotation marks omitted). Dismissal is appropriate when the

complaint fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face” and to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Moreover, “the

pleaded facts must allow a reasonable inference that the plaintiff should

prevail.” Favre v. Sharpe, 117 F.4th 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation

marks omitted).

While we review the dismissal de novo, using the same standard as the

district court in consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we are not

constrained to the district court’s approach or reasoning. We may “affirm a

district court’s dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim ‘on any basis

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supported by the record.’” Id. (quoting Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d

776, 780–81 (5th Cir. 2007)).

III.

Because Plaintiff agreed to discontinue her appeal as to Cantu and

Raymond, we review Plaintiff’s only remaining claim: a § 1983 claim against

the City for selective enforcement in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

As a threshold matter, to hold the City liable, Plaintiff must have

adequately pleaded facts to support a theory of municipal liability

under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). There, the

Supreme Court held that a local government entity may be sued under § 1983

for the actions of its employees only if the employees acted in accordance

with an official “policy or custom” of the municipality. Id. at 694. “To

establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) an

official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the

moving force behind the violation of the constitutional right.” Peterson v.

City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Piotrowski v. City

of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691

(requiring plaintiffs to prove that an “action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort”). We begin by addressing

the first requirement.

Our court has identified three routes to establishing an “official

policy” for the purposes of municipal liability. First, “a policy statement

formally announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita

Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). Second, a “persistent widespread

practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by

officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as

to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Webster v.

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City of Hous., 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). And third, a single

unconstitutional act by a final policymaker. Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169.

Plaintiff did not plead that a written policy statement or “formal

directive” controls the City’s selective enforcement. Id. She also did not

plead a single unconstitutional act by a final policymaker as a basis for her

claim. On appeal, Plaintiff raises this issue for the first time. The City

contends, correctly, that Plaintiff forfeited this issue by failing to plead it in

her complaint or raise it before the district court. With no pleading to support

this contention, we find that Plaintiff forfeited this issue and do not consider

it further. Id. at 170 (citing LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d

383, 387 (5th Cir. 2007)).

Thus, the only route Plaintiff alleged in her complaint—and thus the

only route before us—is that the City, acting through its agents (namely,

Raymond), “has a pattern, practice, and custom of selective enforcement,

demonstrated by its non-enforcement on many properties throughout the

City and seemingly insatiable enforcement on Plaintiff’s property.” Thus,

we consider whether there is a sufficiently pleaded custom or pattern that

rises to the level of an official policy.

“A customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long

and with such frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the

governing body’s knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct.” Id.

at 169 (citing Webster, 735 F.2d at 842); see also Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851 (“A

pattern also requires ‘sufficiently numerous prior incidents,’ as opposed to

‘isolated instances.’” (quoting McConney v. City of Hous., 863 F.2d 1180,

1184 (5th Cir. 1989))).

Plaintiff pleaded that the City has (or ratified) policies, customs, or

practices that include:

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a. Selective enforcement of allegedly substandard

properties.

b. Selective allowance of certain historic properties to

have adequate time to seek historic preservation status,

while not affording others the same reasonable time to

seek such status.

c. Selective application of criteria for demolition.

Beyond this general allegation of a selective enforcement policy, Plaintiff

provides only one example to support her claim. She discusses the City’s

treatment of the Ritz Theatre project and its historical restoration, which the

City allegedly supported or, at the very least, did not attempt to bring

enforcement actions against for disrepair. This is a singular counterpoint to

Plaintiff’s experience with the City and the Board or, as the City contended

in its motion to dismiss, “a single instance of arguably uneven enforcement.”

This single instance cannot support an actionable custom for municipal

liability purposes. Additionally, as the City notes, at the Board Meeting in

September of 2023, 2 when Plaintiff’s property was discussed, four other

properties were considered for demolition, three of which were also voted to

be demolished. Plaintiff does not address nor argue that those building

owners received different treatment from the City like she did.

Thus, Plaintiff’s factual allegations of a pattern condense to an

“isolated” incident. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850–51 (“Where prior

incidents are used to prove a pattern . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘a

pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case.’” (quoting

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 582)). But “a single incident doesn’t establish a

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2

The district court considered the minutes from this Board Meeting in its order on

the motion to dismiss. This consideration was valid at the 12(b)(6) stage because the

minutes were referenced in the complaint and attached to the motion to dismiss. See Funk

v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011).

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custom or policy.” Jackson, 959 F.3d at 204. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not

pleaded factual allegations sufficient to show a pattern or practice that

satisfies the requirements for municipal liability under § 1983.

While we agree with Plaintiff that historic preservation is an important

and vital task for our Nation’s history, our inquiry begins and ends with

whether the pleadings sufficiently support the allegations. Even if this were

a matter of “uneven” enforcement, it falls short of demonstrating a pattern

of constitutional violations. As such, we find that Plaintiff did not sufficiently

plead a municipal policy or custom, so she has failed to state a claim against

the City under the requirements for municipal liability. Because Plaintiff’s

pleadings do not satisfy this requirement, we need not address the substance

of Plaintiff’s constitutional claim as well. See Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington

Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 863 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); G.M.

ex rel. Lopez v. Shelton, 595 F. App’x 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2014).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order

granting the City’s motion to dismiss.

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Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to clarify our

Monell precedents.

Priscilla Tryon Cambric sued the City of Corpus Christi and two City

employees for enforcing the City’s building code against her property. Her

complaint brings a “class of one” selective enforcement claim under the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. She seeks to hold

the City liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978). She claims that the City had “policies, customs and/or practices in

place” that encouraged selective enforcement of the code against historic,

minority-owned properties. ROA.957.

To plead a Monell claim, plaintiffs must allege “(1) an official policy

(2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) [that] was the moving

force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort

Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff can satisfy the “policy

or custom” requirement in three ways. First, she can show that the City’s

decisionmaker “officially adopted and promulgated” a “policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision” that violates her constitutional rights.

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

Second, she can allege that a “persistent, widespread practice of city

officials,” though “not authorized by officially adopted” policy, is “so

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy.” Ibid. Finally (and relevant here), if the plaintiff has neither

proof of a formal policy nor a pattern of constitutional violations, she may

allege that a “final policymaker took a single unconstitutional action.” Zarnow

v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). I call this third

option the “single incident” approach.

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Traditionally, plaintiffs who pursue the “single incident” approach

can establish municipal liability only in “very narrow” circumstances. Littell

v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018). That’s because

it’s difficult to infer from a single event that a municipality is not just

negligent, but deliberately indifferent to its employees’ unconstitutional

conduct. So we only allow “single incident” claims to move forward if the

incident is “proof of the possibility of recurring situations that present an

obvious potential for violation of constitutional rights.” Burge v. St. Tammany

Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). We are willing to

hold a municipality liable in those situations because “it should have been

apparent to the policymaker that a constitutional violation was the highly

predictable consequence.” Ibid.

Recently, we departed from the traditional rule. See Hershey v. City of

Bossier City, 156 F.4th 555 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Hershey I”). In Hershey, the

plaintiff was arrested for distributing leaflets on a sidewalk outside a private

events center. There was “no allegation” that Bossier City officers had “ever

previously” engaged in viewpoint discrimination “against someone engaging

in free exercise of religion or free speech.” Id. at 567 (Richman, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor was it “highly predictable”

that officers would have “recurring encounters with individuals paid to

distribute literature outside a large, ticketed event.” Ibid. But because the

officers received “no training whatsoever . . . regarding the application of the

First Amendment,” Hershey’s arrest was enough evidence to state a claim

that the City was deliberately indifferent. Id. at 561 (Ho, J., concurring).

After reading Hershey I, one might think we are duty-bound to hold

that Cambric’s Monell claim survives Rule 12(b)(6). After all, a single

incident should be enough to prove that the City was deliberately indifferent,

even if “the ex ante risk of a constitutional violation was infinitesimal.”

Hershey v. City of Bossier City, 165 F.4th 292, 305 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Hershey

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II”) (Oldham, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). And

here, Cambric (at least sort of) alleges that the City’s enforcement of the

building code against her proves the City was deliberately indifferent. Her

complaint states that the City’s policymaker, Director Al Raymond, and his

staff “were all deliberately indifferent to the natural byproducts” of

enforcing the building code against her property, but not other white-owned

properties in the area. ROA.957. So you might reasonably think that under

Hershey, that “single incident” of selective enforcement would be enough to

get to discovery.

But applying Hershey I here would wrongly extend that precedent

“beyond its context.” FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 396

(2024). Hershey I only allows a plaintiff’s Monell claim to survive a motion to

dismiss on a failure-to-train theory, 156 F.4th at 561 (Ho, J., concurring),

not a theory that City policymakers selectively enforced a statute or

ordinance, ROA.957. The policymaker must have provided “no training

whatsoever with respect to the relevant constitutional duty,” and that failure

to train must have “caused the violation in question.” Hershey I, 156 F.4th at

561 (Ho, J., concurring) (quotation omitted). And Hershey I only applies

when officers receive “literally zero training” on the “application of the First

Amendment.” Ibid. (quotation omitted). *

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*

There are other reasons to be wary of extending Hershey to new contexts. Hershey

I held the plaintiff stated a claim under Monell but granted qualified immunity to the officers

because circuit precedent apparently required that result. 156 F.4th at 559–60 (Ho, J.,

concurring). We had a chance to fix that deeply inconsistent result, but the panel defeated

the en banc rehearing effort. Compare Hershey II, 165 F.4th at 293–304 (Ho, J., concurring

in the denial of rehearing en banc), with id. at 304–09 (Oldham, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc). After the en banc vote failed, one panel member then tried

and failed to grant panel rehearing to deny qualified immunity. Hershey v. City of Bossier City

(“Hershey III”), 163 F.4th 976, 977 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (Ho, J., concurring). Hershey

III is bizarre on at least three levels. First, the panel apparently was bound by precedent for

Hershey I but then somehow became unbound for Hershey III? Second, if the correct answer

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Thus, Hershey is inapplicable here. With these observations, I concur.

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was to deny qualified immunity, why not vote for en banc rehearing? And third, Hershey III

apparently was issued as a 1–1 quorum decision. See id. at 976 n.1 (per curiam) (noting

Judge Dennis did not participate); 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (quorum). If the vote was tied 1–

1, why not allow a third judge to break the tie? And if that wasn’t bizarre enough, the panel

then issued its mandate with yet another opinion. Hershey v. City of Bossier City, No. 21-

30754 (5th Cir. Feb. 5, 2026), ECF 140 (Ho, J., statement respecting issuance of the

mandate) (“Hershey IV”). I have searched in vain for another example of an opinion

attached to the mandate like this. And the issuance of a mandate is a ministerial task

accomplished by the panel and the clerk’s office. See Fed. R. App. P. 41; 5th Cir. R.

41 I.O.P. So why pretend that it was circulated to the court for an en banc vote and that

the court broke “its word” by allowing the mandate to issue? See Hershey IV, ECF 140, at

2 (Ho, J., statement respecting issuance of the mandate). All a long way of saying: relying

on Hershey here would invite confusion in more ways than one.

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