Johnston

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PATRICK J.,1 Case No. 6:25-cv-00073-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Patrick J. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of Social

Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)

under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the

Commissioner’s decision and remands for the calculation and payment of benefits.

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1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last

name of the non-governmental party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is

limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). That is

because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a claimant’s entitlement to

disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of

uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their

discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621

(1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important rules” in reviewing social

security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015).

First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the

testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).

Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at

1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is

harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or

that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency

explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see

also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest

[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the

error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded

on other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.

2022))).

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BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION

Plaintiff filed a DIB application on September 27, 2021, alleging a disability onset date of

November 1, 2018.2 (Tr. 17.) In his application, Plaintiff alleged disability due to schizoaffective

disorder. (Id. at 225.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially on November 30,

2022, and upon reconsideration on September 1, 2023. (Id. at 17, 106-09, 118-21.)

On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 122-23.) Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at an

administrative hearing on May 2, 2024. (Id. at 33-60.) On July 29, 2024, the ALJ issued a written

decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Id. at 17-27.) On November 27, 2024, the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s written decision the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s

decision.

II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS

A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

2 To be eligible for DIB, “a worker must have earned a sufficient number of [quarters of

coverage] within a rolling forty quarter period.” Herbert v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-01016 TAG,

2008 WL 4490024, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citation omitted). Workers accumulate

quarters of coverage based on their earnings. Id. Typically, “the claimant must have a minimum

of twenty quarters of coverage [during the rolling forty-quarter period to maintain insured

status]. . . . The termination of a claimant’s insured status is frequently referred to as the ‘date

last insured’ or ‘DLI.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) of

September 30, 2024 (Tr. 19) reflects the date on which his insured status terminated based on the

previous accumulation of quarters of coverage. If Plaintiff established that he was disabled on or

before September 30, 2024, he is entitled to DIB. See Truelsen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-

cv-2386-KJN, 2016 WL 4494471, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016) (“To be entitled to DIB,

plaintiff must establish that he was disabled . . . on or before his date last insured.” (citing

Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998))).

which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential

process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those five

steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed

impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the

claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

at 724-25.

The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Bustamante v.

Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any

of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. See id. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of

proof at step five, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is

disabled. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954.

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the process described above. (Tr.

17-27.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since November 1, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 19.) At step two, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe medically determinable impairments:

schizoaffective disorder with psychotic features and bipolar disorder. (Id.)

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or

medically equals a listed impairment. (Id. at 20-21.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff had

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform “medium work, . . . with performing only

short, simple, routine, repetitive tasks in two-hour intervals; having only occasional, superficial

interaction with the general public; occasional, direct interaction with co-workers providing it

does not requires him to work in teams or in tandem; and occasional, direct interaction with

supervisors” and “[h]e is limited to working in occupations that are not fast-paced assembly line

and non-production rate, and he is best suited for working in an environment[] in which there is

little changes in structure.” (Id. at 21.)

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Id. at 25.) At step

five, the ALJ found that, based on the VE’s testimony, there were jobs that existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including floor waxer medium,

groundskeeper, and meat clerk. (Id. at 26.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific, clear, and convincing

reasons based on substantial evidence to discount his testimony. (Pl.’s Opening Br. (“Pl.’s Br.”)

at 1-14, ECF No. 12; Pl.’s Reply at 1-5, ECF No. 18.) For the reasons explained below, the Court

agrees.

I. SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOM TESTIMONY

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting his subjective symptom testimony.

(Pl.’s Br. at 7-12; Pl.’s Reply at 1-5.) Defendant responds that substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptoms. (Def.’s Br. at 1-9, ECF No. 17.)

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A. Applicable Law

The Ninth Circuit has “established a two-step analysis for determining the extent to

which a claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited[.]” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,

678 (9th Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective

medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce

the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). Second, “[i]f the

claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the

claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives specific, clear and

convincing reasons for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted).

B. Analysis

There is no evidence of malingering here and the ALJ determined that Plaintiff provided

objective medical evidence of underlying impairments which might reasonably produce the

symptoms alleged. (Tr. 22.) The ALJ was therefore required to provide clear and convincing

reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163.

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff testified that he was thirty-eight years old and lived at home

with his retired parents. (Tr. 37-38.) He earned a bachelor’s degree in business and had a valid

driver’s license. (Id. at 39.) He had not worked since 2020, but had attempted to work at three

different jobs following his alleged onset date and experienced panic attacks during training and

abruptly left each job as the result of his paranoia. (Id.) Prior to his alleged onset date, he had

worked as an account executive for a software company where he sold software products to

doctors and was the most successful salesperson on his team. (Id. at 40-42.) Plaintiff testified that

a “nervous breakdown” ended his employment in 2018 as the result of his belief that his

coworkers were plotting again him. (Id. at 43.)

Plaintiff testified that he could not work at any job because he was experiencing

bedridden depression and his paranoia “gets really, really bad.” (Id. at 44-45.) For example, he

has a reoccurring belief that he is in the “Truman Show” and everyone around him is an actor

and watching him. (Id. at 45.) He lives with that paranoia “100% of the time” and even out in

public, such as at restaurants, he glances around to determine if someone is watching him. (Id.)

Plaintiff noted he has had five suicide attempts in the past but was no longer suicidal at

the time of the hearing. (Id. at 46.) He experiences psychotic symptoms and even at the hearing

he was glancing out the window to check the cars driving by. (Id.) He experiences paranoia to

the point of panic attacks during which he runs around his house, and he recently took off all his

clothes and ran outside. (Id. at 46-47.)

In response to the ALJ’s question about any recent criminal behavior, Plaintiff testified

that he recently became paranoid and tackled his dad and held him down based on a delusion that

the singer “Billie Eilish was in charge.” (Id. at 48.) The police tased and arrested Plaintiff and he

spent time in jail banging his head against his cell door. (Id.) Prior to his alleged onset date,

Plaintiff spent six months in jail for stealing a car during a manic episode, and spent time in

prison and at a maximum security state hospital after a delusional episode during which he

believed he was a preacher and swung a knife at someone. (Id. at 49.)

Plaintiff testified that he has tried several medications over the years and was currently

taking Latuda, Lamictal, Cymbalta, and Xanax to manage his symptoms. (Id.) He previously

tried Risperidone, but it increased his depression. (Id. at 49-50.) Plaintiff testified that stress is

the primary trigger for his paranoia, as well as grief and he was “completely psychotic for six

months” following his recent divorce. (Id. at 50.) During that psychotic episode, he believed that

his parents were trying to steal his dog and lock him up at a local psychiatric hospital. (Id.)

Plaintiff testified that he was involuntarily hospitalized in the past, and was voluntarily

hospitalized once since his alleged onset date following a psychotic panic attack. (Id. at 51.)

2. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on his “admissions of

improvement in his symptoms with appropriate treatment, his limited compliance with

prescribed and recommended therapies, and his reported regular activities” (id. at 25) and on the

ground that Plaintiff’s “mental status exams were mostly unremarkable except for variable

moods.” (Id. at 24.)

3. Disposition

The Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by

substantial evidence in the record, to discount Plaintiff’s testimony.

a. Improvement with Treatment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting his testimony based on his

improvement when complying with appropriate treatment. (See Pl.’s Br. at 10-11.)

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony based on evidence that the claimant’s

symptoms improved with treatment or medication. See Walker v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35351, 2023

WL 3017946, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (concluding that the ALJ had provided specific,

clear, and convincing reasons for discounting the plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony where

substantial evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff’s pain improved with treatment and

medication); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical

treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”) (citations

omitted). That rationale assumes that “[i]mpairments that can be controlled effectively with

medication are not disabling[.]” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th

Cir. 2006).

However, the Ninth Circuit has consistently recognized that some individuals with severe

mental impairments are unable to control their symptoms effectively with medication because

their impairments impact their medication compliance. For example, in Garrison, the Ninth

Circuit held that “we do not punish the mentally ill for occasionally going off their medication

when the record affords compelling reason to view such departures from prescribed treatment as

part of claimants’ underlying mental afflictions.” 759 F.3d at 101 n.24 (further holding that the

claimant’s “occasional decisions to go ‘off her meds’ were at least in part a result of her

underlying bipolar disorder and her other psychiatric issues”) (citations omitted). Thus, the Ninth

Circuit cautions not “to chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment

in seeking rehabilitation.” Id. (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Here, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony in part because Plaintiff acknowledged

improvement in his symptoms with appropriate treatment but he was not always compliant with

prescribed therapies. (Tr. 25.) As an initial matter, the record supports that Plaintiff found only

limited success in controlling his symptoms with medication despite trying many different

medications over the years:

• See id. at 395, “The patient has been on numerous medications. Most recently, the

patient was treated with Effexor, Trileptal, and Risperdal. He reports feeling manic

and delusional and believing that he was Jesus while he was taking these medications.

Other medications he has taken in the past include Abilify, which he does not believe

had any effect, Geodon (does not recall the effect), Depakote which worked until he

started using illicit drugs, lithium which made him depressed, Zyprexa which did not

make him feel like ‘myself,’ and Lamictal, during which time he continued being

delusional. The patient was also treated with Lexapro and Paxil and does not recall

the effect of either of these medications.”

• Id. at 476-78, on June 18, 2021, Plaintiff “report[ed] he’s struggling with paranoia”

and “he [wa]s currently in a depressed episode” and “report[ed] frequent insomnia

due to worries, fidgetiness . . . despite being on 5mg Risperdal.”

• Id. at 472, on August 16, 2021, Plaintiff was gaining weight on Risperdal, including

gaining ten pounds in the last month, and reported that “Geodon did not help with

delusions” and “Latuda . . . did not help with depression.”

• Id. at 458, on February 2, 2022, despite taking Risperdal, Xanax, and Propranolol,

Plaintiff was “getting overwhelmed easily” and “still having some paranoia.”

• Id. at 736, on November 30, 2022, Plaintiff was “[o]n antipsychotics” but had

“paranoia, agoraphobia and depression.”

• Id. at 734-35, on December 1, 2022, Plaintiff had “uncontrolled symptoms and failed

the [two] visits with new psychiatrist” and “request[ed] to raise the dose of

[R]isperidone to 3 mg per night and to keep Xanax as well as Lamictal”; a “[l]engthy

discussion was held regarding the nature and management and his paranoid

obsessions” but “[h]e unfortunately has extremely strong belief of the dangers he is

facing with no room of doubt” and “[h]e is in extreme anxiety and seems doing better

on high dose Xanax.”

• Id. at 735, also on December 1, 2022, Plaintiff “said he has tried almost every

atypical antipsychotic[] including Seroquel, Geodone, Abilify, Latuda and only

[R]isperidone is doing a little better” and “Hydroxyzie did not work and he has quit

[P]ropranolol.”

• Id. at 749, at his January 12, 2023 psychiatric diagnostic evaluation, Plaintiff “became

agitated” and “he ran out of the room crying [and] could be heard sobbing [and]

screaming in the next room,” reported “paranoid delusions,” and was diagnosed with

“acute agitation,” psychosis, mania, depression, and anxiety.

• Id. at 745, also at his January 12, 2023, psychiatric diagnostic evaluation, Plaintiff

reported that he switched providers and is “still psychotic” despite being “currently

on 3mg of [R]isperidone.”

• Id. at 890, on September 15, 2023, Plaintiff reported that he “struggle[s] with

paranoid depression every day” and has “thoughts that groups of people are after

me[,]” including “people I don’t know that seem to know me especially sometimes

feels people in the grocery store are actors” and rating his depression and anxiety as

eight out of ten and paranoid ideation as seven earlier in the day, all while taking

Risperidone, Lamictal, Cymbalta, and Xanax, and noting he has previously tried

Abilify, Geodone, Vraylar, lithium, Effexor, Risperidone, Zyprexa, Abilify,

Depakote, Lamictal, Seroquel, Latuda, Risperidone, Gabapentin, Prozac, Lexapro,

and Propranolol.

• Id. at 897-98, on October 20, 2023, Plaintiff reported he “has been mostly in bed

because [of] depression” and he thinks “people are after me” and he “just want[s] to

not have paranoid thoughts” and had “[four] periods [during the prior month] when

[he] thought people were after [him]” despite taking several medications.

• Id. at 903, on December 14, 2023, Plaintiff reported waking up at 3:30am and

knocking on his parents’ door in a panic attack that people were after him and he felt

like filming was going on in the Truman Show and he reported being “extremely

depressed” and “l[]ying in bed all the time” but he could not “watch tv because of

paranoia and feels like things are directed at me on tv.”

• Id. at 916-21, on February 22, 2024, Plaintiff reported he “has been really depressed”

and the provider “pointed out to patient that he was on high or above recommended

doses for many of his mediations” and “warned patient that being on high dose of

Cymbalta was not a good idea given his diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar

type as likely to destabilize his mood like it seems to have done since last

appointment after increasing” dose and “patient wants to taper off [R]isperidone

while starting Latuda because states his depression is much worse.”

In light of this longitudinal record, the Court finds that the record lacks substantial evidence that

Plaintiff experienced any sustained improvement with medication during the relevant period,

even when he was compliant with taking his medications. The ALJ therefore erred by finding

that Plaintiff’s “bipolar and schizoaffective disorders have significantly improved since prior to

November 2018 on medications[.]” (Id. at 24.)

The record further supports that Plaintiff was not always fully compliant with his

medications in large part as the result of his mental impairments:

• See id. at 468, on September 28, 2021, Plaintiff was “feeling energetic but he has

been l[]ying in bed over three days” and “has stopped lithium” because “he is worried

about his kidney health.”

• Id. at 464, on November 24, 2021, Plaintiff “ha[d] stopped taking Vraylar and [was]

having paranoia,” reporting that “he sometimes feels that others are watching him and

following him” and he “reports he is having persistent paranoia but does not want to

take antipsychotics at this time.”

• Id. at 462, on January 5, 2022, Plaintiff was “experiencing psychosis at this time” and

was “recording this conversation with his phone and [wa]s delusional” and “he

reports he has been contacted by various government agencies and has been in

contact with Demi Lovato” and “refuses to take medications and is unwilling to go to

the hospital.”

• Id. at 734-35, on December 1, 2022, Plaintiff “said he has tried almost every atypical

antipsychotic[] including Seroquel, Geodone, Abilify, Latuda and only risperidone is

doing a little better” and he “has been resistant to the idea of trying new medicines”

and does not “want to try Invega as it suppresses prolactin making man’s breast grow

bigger” and “Hydroxyzie did not work and he has quit propranolol.”

• Id. at 745, on January 12, 2023, Plaintiff reported that he “stopped trusting” his prior

psychiatrist because of “paranoia” and therefore switched providers.

• Id. at 904-907, on December 14, 2023, Plaintiff’s provider noted that “patient refuses

to leave the house so can’t get lab draws” and he did not want to try several other

medications because they were ineffective in the past.

In light of this record, the Court finds that there are compelling reasons to view Plaintiff’s

departures from trying new or taking prescribed medication as a function of Plaintiff’s mental

impairments. See, e.g., Alfredo C. v. Saul, No. 6:18-cv-1460, 2020 WL 836833, at *5 (D. Or.

Feb. 20, 2020) (holding that the ALJ erred in discounting the paranoid schizophrenic claimant’s

symptoms where the claimant’s “doctors tried to treat his psychiatric needs with an array of

medications: Adderall, Ritalin, Risperdal, loxapine, Wellbutrin, clonazepam (Klonopin),

lamotrigine (Lamictal), Abilify, and quetiapine (Seroquel)” and noting that “the Ninth Circuit

has cautioned that ‘it is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental impairment for the

exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation’ ‘because mental illness is notoriously

underreported’” (quoting Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 166 F.3d 1294, 1299-300

(9th Cir. 1999))). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff’s

testimony based on medication noncompliance.3

For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to cite clear and convincing reasons,

supported by substantial evidence, to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony due to his

improvement with appropriate medication and limited compliance.

b. Activities of Daily Living

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony as

inconsistent with his activities of daily living. (See Pl.’s Br. at 11-12.)

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom testimony based on activities that are

incompatible with the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See Burrell

v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[i]nconsistencies between a

claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s reported activities provide a valid reason for an adverse

credibility determination” (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)));

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016 (stating that a claimant’s activities have “bearing on [the claimant’s]

3 Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ also erred by not expressly considering the possible

reasons for Plaintiff’s medication noncompliance. See Hornsby v. Bisignano, No. 24-5422, 2025

WL 3187355, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2025) (“The ALJ’s approach also diverged from the Social

Security Administration’s guidance, which provides that the agency will not use a claimant’s

failure to seek treatment to establish inconsistency without considering the possible reasons for

that failure.” (citing SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. 49462, 49466-67 (Oct. 25, 2017))).

credibility” if the reported “level of activity” is “inconsistent with [the claimant’s] claimed

limitations” (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998))). Notably, there must

be a meaningful inconsistency between the claimant’s daily activities and the symptom

testimony. See Harris v. Kijakazi, No. 21-35136, 2022 WL 1262011, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 28,

2022) (holding that the ALJ committed harmful error in discounting the plaintiff’s symptom

testimony and explaining that the plaintiff’s “limited daily activities were not meaningfully

inconsistent with her symptom testimony”) (citation omitted).

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony in part based on Plaintiff’s activities of daily

living, citing that Plaintiff could prepare sandwiches and frozen food, wash dishes, do laundry

and light cleaning, drive a car, go out alone sometimes, shop in stores, read on the computer,

count change, and spend time with others in person, on the phone, and by email and texting. (Tr.

24, also acknowledging that Plaintiff required reminders to take his medications and to take a

bath, shower, and eat; had trouble getting along with others due to his “acute social phobia”; was

very paranoid about other people and did not go anywhere; could only pay attention for ten

minutes and did not finish what he started; had difficulty concentrating on written instructions

and did not follow spoken instructions well; and handled stress and changes in routine poorly).

However, the ALJ did not explain how any of these limited basic daily activities were

incompatible with Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the persistent severity of his paranoid

schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.

Further, Plaintiff’s only activity that is arguably inconsistent with his testimony is his

ability occasionally to leave his home and spend time with others, but those occasional forays

into the world do not contradict his testimony about his struggles to perform those basic limited

activities nor the extreme episodes during which he cannot leave his home for days. Accordingly,

the Court finds that the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff’s testimony based on his activities of

daily living. See Nicole N.-M. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 649 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035-36 (D.

Or. 2022) (holding that the ALJ erred in discounting the paranoid schizophrenic claimant’s

symptom testimony based on inconsistency with activities of daily living where “the majority of

the activities in which Plaintiff engaged—performing adequate self-care, preparing simple meals,

driving a car, paying her bills, handling her finances, performing household chores, and going

grocery-shopping—are limited basic daily activities that are legally insufficient to support the

ALJ’s conclusion” where “Plaintiff report[ed] struggling to perform these activities,” “[d]uring

extreme episodes [Plaintiff] will not leave house,” and “during an episode, she needs reminders

to take care of basic hygiene”) (citation omitted); Alfredo C., 2020 WL 836833, at *6 (holding

that the ALJ erred in discounting the paranoid schizophrenic claimant’s symptoms based on his

reported daily activities where “[t]he ALJ identified Plaintiff’s ability to ‘perform adequate self-

care, prepare simple meals, do household chores and go out to the store,’ as well as his ability to

go swimming, as daily activities inconsistent with Plaintiff’s symptom testimony” but “[t]he ALJ

overstated the relevance of these daily activities to Plaintiff’s ability to work” where “the ability

to perform adequate self-care and do household chores is the kind of routine activity that is

insufficient to justify discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony[,]” “the ability to ‘prepare

simple meals’ apparently refers to nothing more than Plaintiff’s capacity to microwave frozen

food,” and “Plaintiff’s ability to swim is not relevant to his capacity to work, particularly as a

janitor, the job the ALJ found Plaintiff was able to perform”).

c. Medical Evidence

The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony on the ground that Plaintiff’s

“mental status exams were mostly unremarkable except for variable moods.” (Tr. 24.)

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom testimony based on objective medical

evidence in the record. See Young v. Saul, 845 F. App’x 518, 520 (9th Cir. 2021) (“An ALJ may

consider inconsistency between a claimant’s symptom testimony and the objective medical

evidence in the record in determining whether to discount the claimant’s symptom testimony.”

(first citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)-(2); and then citing Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113)); Valdez v.

Berryhill, 746 F. App’x 676, 677 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he ALJ may properly include lack of

supporting medical evidence in the reasons to discredit claimant testimony as long as it is not the

only reason[.]” (citing Burch, 400 F.3d at 680)); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d

1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the ALJ’s discounting of the claimant’s testimony, in part,

because it conflicted with the objective medical evidence).

Based on the medical records summarized above, the Court finds that there is not

substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s reasoning that “unremarkable” mental

status exams called Plaintiff’s symptom testimony into question. Rather, the record clearly

supports that Plaintiff frequently presented with altered mental status exams. (See, e.g., Tr. 749,

noting that at a January 12, 2023, visit, Plaintiff was “agitated” and “ran out of the room crying

and could be heard sobbing and screaming in the next room” and presented with “paranoid

delusions”). Further, even when Plaintiff’s mental status exams were relatively normal, he

continued to report suffering from paranoid delusions, depression, and anxiety. (See, e.g., id. at

906, noting Plaintiff’s normal mental status exam, including congruent affect, fair eye contact,

alert orientation, normal speech, local thought processes, and intact memory and attention, but

also reported that Plaintiff was suffering from “paralyzing depression” and waking up with panic

attacks because he was “fearful of people after him”). The Court finds that the ALJ erred by

discounting Plaintiff’s testimony based on his mental status exams. See, e.g., Terry B. v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:21-cv-01438-JR, 2022 WL 17667221, at *6 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2022)

(holding that the ALJ erred by discounting the paranoid schizophrenic’s symptoms as

inconsistent with his medical records based on routine examinations where the claimant was

“alert,” “pleasant,” and “in no acute distress” during mental status exams but “viewed as a

whole, the record lacks substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s

subjective symptom testimony is contradicted by his medical records”).

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ committed harmful error in

discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

II. REMEDY

Plaintiff asks the Court to remand for an award of benefits. (Pl.’s Br. at 10-14; Pl.’s Reply

at 5.) The Commissioner responds that “there are many reasons that cast doubt as to whether

Plaintiff was disabled[,]” citing the “unchallenged prior administrative medical findings.” (Def.’s

Br. at 8.)

A. Applicable Law

“Generally when a court of appeals reverses an administrative determination, ‘the proper

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or

explanation.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In

several cases, however, the Ninth Circuit “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of

discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when [the three-part credit

as-true standard is] met.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted).

The credit-as-true standard is met if three conditions are satisfied: “(1) the record has

been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2)

the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant

testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as

true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. (citations omitted).

Even when the credit-as-true standard is met, the court retains the “flexibility to remand for

further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant

is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021.

B. Analysis

The Court concludes that the credit-as-true standard is satisfied here and remand for the

payment of benefits is appropriate.

The Court concluded above that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for

discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. The record has been fully developed, including treatment notes

spanning the relevant time period and Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity and effects of his

impairments. The Court finds that further proceedings would serve no useful purpose here.

Further, if Plaintiff’s testimony is credited as true, the record reflects that Plaintiff is

disabled. The ALJ’s first hypothetical, on which he relied in finding Plaintiff not disabled,

limited Plaintiff to “occasionally have superficial interaction with the general public, occasional

direct interaction with coworkers[,] . . . and occasional direct interaction with supervisors.” (Tr.

55.) However, in the ALJ’s second hypothetical, which is more consistent with Plaintiff’s

testimony, he limited Plaintiff to occasional superficial interaction with the general public,

coworkers, and supervisors and noted Plaintiff would routinely miss more than one day of work

per month, and the VE testified that “[e]ach of these items, independent of the other, would

preclude employment.” (Id. at 58.) The VE explained that “the fact that a person can only have

occasional superficial interactions with supervisors alone would preclude . . . competitive

employment” because “[a] person needs to be able to communicate with their supervisor when

needed, at any time.” (Id., “[Y]ou need to be able to say more than good morning. . . . You need

to be . . . able to take feedback, and you need to be able to receive instructions about what to do

and how to do things and where to do that and where to go, and you need to be able to

communicate more than superficially with the supervisor.”). The VE added that “my threshold

for someone being absent is one day per month” and “[m]ore than that, the person is no longer

competitively employable.” (Id. at 59.) As a result of the VE’s testimony, the ALJ would be

required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022 n.28 (explaining

“there is no need to develop the record or convene further administrative proceedings” where

“the VE answered a question describing a hypothetical person with the RFC that the claimant

would possess were the relevant opinion or testimony taken as true”); Alfredo C., 2020 WL

836833, at *8 (“If credited as true, Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony establishes that

Plaintiff is disabled, because he describes severe symptoms of psychiatric illness that prevent

him from getting to work regularly, working under supervision, and remaining in the workplace

for a full day on a regular, continuous basis.”).

Finally, the Court does not have any serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff is disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. On the contrary, the record supports that Plaintiff

has suffered from schizoaffective disorder with psychotic features and bipolar disorder since well

before his alleged onset date, and his debilitating symptoms of paranoid delusions and paralyzing

depression and anxiety persisted throughout the relevant period despite taking a wide range of

anti-psychotic, anti-depressant, and anti-anxiety medications.

For all of these reasons, the Court remands this case for the calculation and payment of

benefits. See, e.g., Leitz v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35356, 2023 WL 4342114, at *3 (9th Cir. July 5,

2023) (“The Government argues that we should remand for further proceedings rather than

remand for an award of benefits. However, remand would serve no legitimate purpose . . . and

permitting the Government to introduce additional evidence on remand would provide the

Government with an unfair second opportunity to present its case. ... We therefore remand to

the district court with instructions to remand to the agency for an award of benefits.”) (citations

omitted); Hoffschneider v. Kijakazi, No. 18-15504, 2022 WL 3229989, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 10,

2022) (“Once the improperly discredited evidence is credited as true, the vocational expert’s

testimony forecloses a determination that [the claimant] can work. Because no ‘serious doubt’

remains that [the claimant] is disabled, there is nothing left to decide. We therefore reverse and

remand with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for a calculation and award of

benefits.”) (citations omitted); Smith v. Saul, 820 F. App’x 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing

district court opinion affirming the denial of benefits and instead remanding “with instructions to

remand to the ALJ for calculation and award of benefits” where “[t]he vocational expert

concluded that an individual with [the claimant’s] limitations, as described in the improperly

discredited testimony . . . would be unable to perform competitive employment”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and

REMANDS for the calculation and payment of benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 6th day of March, 2026. 7 Kee

Staey } oe me]

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

PAGE 21 —- OPINION AND ORDER