The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:23 AM
v No. 366332
Alpena Circuit Court
GERALD LEE ARBUCKLE, LC No. 1994-004681-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and YATES and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Gerald Lee Arbuckle, appeals by right his April 20, 2023 judgment of sentence
following resentencing as required by People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301; 987 NW2d 85 (2022). On
appeal, defendant asserts—and the prosecution concedes—that the trial court failed to inform him
of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, rendering his waiver of the right
to the assistance of counsel ineffective. For the reasons that follow, we agree. We therefore vacate
defendant’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
In 1995, defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, possession of a
firearm in the commission of a felony, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun or rifle.
Defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole) for his second-
degree murder conviction, two years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction, and 3 to 5
years’ imprisonment for his short-barreled firearm conviction. Defendant’s convictions and
sentence were affirmed on appeal. People v Arbuckle, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals, issued July 22, 1997 (Docket No. 187368).
In 2022, our Supreme Court held in Stovall that parolable life sentences for second-degree
murder are unconstitutional when imposed for an offense committed by a defendant before the age
of 18. Stovall, 510 Mich at 322. Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of his offense, filed
a motion for relief from judgment shortly after Stovall was decided. See MCR 6.501 et seq. The
trial court agreed that defendant was entitled to be resentenced and convened hearings for that
purpose on January 3, April 12, and April 19, 2023. Defendant ultimately received a new sentence
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of 37 to 60 years for the second-degree murder conviction, two years’ imprisonment for the felony-
firearm conviction (to be served consecutively to the 37-year sentence), and 3 to 5 years’
imprisonment for the short-barreled firearm conviction.
Our resolution of this appeal concerns the trial court’s acceptance of defendant’s waiver of
his right to counsel. Whether defendant wanted to proceed without representation was first
discussed at the January 3, 2023 resentencing hearing. After defendant’s appointed attorney stated
that he believed defendant intended to proceed without counsel, defendant initially confirmed that
he wanted to represent himself. Soon after, however, defendant indicated uncertainty about this
decision, stating, for example, that he wanted “to have [a] consultation with counsel before
sentencing if appointed one.” The trial court thus clarified that defendant had not made a knowing
and voluntary waiver of counsel, and defendant’s appointed attorney continued to represent
defendant.
The April 12, 2023 resentencing hearing began with another discussion of whether
defendant wished to proceed without counsel. Defendant’s appointed attorney stated that he was
unsure what defendant wanted to do, and defendant complained that there had been “a breakdown
in communications” with his attorney, that “[t]he appointment was forced in the first place,” and
that he did not believe that the appointed attorney was qualified to represent him. Because
defendant did not know whether the appointed attorney “ha[d] the ability to properly represent”
him, defendant stated, “I guess I’m forced to proceed with representing myself.” The trial court
then asked defendant whether he wanted the appointed attorney to continue to represent him, to
which defendant responded, “No, I’ll go back and retain counsel before I do that.” The trial court
again asked defendant to confirm that he was “no longer in need of [the appointed attorney’s]
services,” and defendant responded, “I’ve asked him to be standby counsel and he doesn’t want to
do that.” After the trial court informed defendant that there was not funding for standby counsel,
it gave defendant three options: “You can either have [the appointed attorney] as your counsel, or
you can represent yourself. . . . Or you can hire your own attorney.” Defendant responded, “Sure.
At this point I will represent myself. Qualifications — at any time that I believe that I should
further retain counsel.” The court then told defendant’s appointed attorney, “Well so . . . I believe
that [defendant] has stated that he does not want your services. You are excused if you would like
to be excused.” Defendant proceeded through the rest of his resentencing hearings thereafter
without counsel.
Defendant filed a motion to correct an invalid sentence, which the trial court denied. This
appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings surrounding a defendant’s waiver
of his right to counsel. People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 187; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). “However,
to the extent that a ruling involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional
standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.” Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues, and the prosecution concedes, that the trial court committed a structural
error requiring reversal by failing to inform defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.1 We agree.
The Michigan Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
applicable to Michigan through the Fourteenth Amendment, protect both the right to self-
representation and “[t]he right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal
proceedings for an accused facing incarceration.” People v King, 512 Mich 1, 11; 999 NW2d 670
(2023) (citations omitted). To exercise the right to self-representation, a defendant must
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive the right to counsel. Id., citing Iowa v Tovar, 541
US 77, 87-88; 124 S Ct 1379; 158 L Ed 2d 209 (2004). And to ensure that a defendant’s waiver
is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, trial courts must substantially comply with MCR 6.005(D)
and the factors enunciated in People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), before
granting a defendant’s request for self-representation. King, 512 Mich at 11, citing Russell, 471
Mich at 191-192.
MCR 6.005(D) obligates trial courts to advise “ ‘the defendant of the charge, the maximum
possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and
the risk involved in self-representation’ ” and to offer “ ‘the defendant the opportunity to consult
with a retained [or appointed] lawyer.’ ” King, 512 Mich at 12, quoting MCR 6.005(D). Anderson
additionally requires trial courts to determine that: “(1) the defendant’s request to represent
themself is unequivocal, (2) the defendant is asserting the right knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily after being informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and (3)
the defendant’s self-representation ‘will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience and burden the court
and the administration of the court’s business.’ ” King, 512 Mich at 11-12, quoting Anderson, 398
Mich at 367-368. A trial court’s failure to substantially comply with these requirements results in
an ineffective waiver of the right to counsel. See Russell, 471 Mich at 191-192.
Defendant argues, and we agree, that the trial court did not inform him of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and thus did not comply with the second Anderson
requirement.2 In ensuring that a defendant is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily asserting
1
The prosecution concedes error in its brief, although it failed to file a formal confession of error
in accordance with MCR 7.211(C)(7).
2
Defendant also asserts that he did not unequivocally waive his right to counsel under Anderson’s
first prong. See Anderson, 398 Mich at 367. We need not address this argument given that
defendant is clearly entitled to relief under Anderson’s second prong. See id. at 368. Nonetheless,
we note that our Supreme Court’s decisions in People v Williams, 470 Mich 634; 683 NW2d 597
(2004), and People v Russell, 471 Mich 182; 684 NW2d 745 (2004), provide helpful guidance on
what constitutes an unequivocal request for self-representation. In Williams, the defendant had
initially conditioned his waiver of counsel on his ability to recall two excused witnesses for cross-
examination. Williams, 470 Mich at 643. During the waiver-of-counsel proceeding, however, the
trial court clarified that it would not permit the defendant to recall excused witnesses and asked
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their right to self-representation, a trial court is required to make a defendant “aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Anderson, 398 Mich at 368. Although “[t]here are
no exact guidelines regarding what warnings should be given to a defendant who wishes to proceed
in pro per,” People v Burden, 141 Mich App 160, 163; 366 NW2d 23 (1985), we have indicated
that a trial court should advise a defendant:
(a) That self-representation is almost always unwise and that he may conduct a
defense ultimately to his own detriment.
(b) That he is entitled to and will receive no special indulgence by the court, and
that he must follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal procedure
and evidence in the making of motions and objections, the presentation of evidence,
voir dire and argument. It should be made crystal clear that the same rules that
govern an attorney will govern, control and restrict him—and that he will get no
help from the judge. He will have to abide by the same rules that it took years for
a lawyer to learn.
(c) That the prosecution will be represented by an experienced professional counsel
who, in turn, will give him no quarter because he does not happen to have the same
skills and experience as the professional. In other words, from the standpoint of
professional skill, training, education, experience, and ability, it will definitely not
be a fair fight.
(d) That he is going to receive no more library privileges than those available to
any other pro per, that he will receive no extra time for preparation and that he will
have no staff of investigators at his beck and call. [People v Blunt, 189 Mich App
643, 649-650; 473 NW2d 792 (1991) (quotation marks, ellipses, and citations
omitted).]
We have found sufficient a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
when the trial court explained “that defending one’s self in a criminal case is analogous to acting
as one’s doctor and removing one’s own appendix” because “the analogy is a vivid, striking way
to tell a defendant that defending one’s self without professional assistance is a dangerous, unwise
thing to do.” People v Morton, 175 Mich App 1, 7; 437 NW2d 284 (1989). By contrast, we have
held that a trial court’s warnings that “proceeding pro se was perilous,” Blunt, 189 Mich App
at 650, and that a defendant would “be held to the same standards as an attorney who appears in
the defendant repeatedly whether, given this determination, he still requested to represent himself.
Id. “Defendant unequivocally answered, ‘Yes, ma’am.’ ” Id. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant unequivocally asserted his right to counsel. Id. at 644. By contrast, the Court held in
Russell that the defendant had not unequivocally waived his right to counsel when he sought the
appointment of substitute counsel and “steadfastly rejected the option of proceeding to trial without
the assistance of counsel.” Russell, 471 Mich at 192-193. If, on remand, defendant continues to
assert the right to self-representation, we caution the trial court to ensure that defendant’s request
to proceed without an attorney is unequivocal.
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court,” People v Kimber, 133 Mich App 184, 189; 348 NW2d 60 (1984), insufficiently explained
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
We need not thoroughly analyze the sufficiency of a warning of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation here, however, because there was no such warning at all. In
accepting defendant’s request to proceed without counsel, the trial court did not warn defendant
of the inadvisability of this decision, of defendant’s need to comply with technical legal and
procedural rules, nor of any other conceivable disadvantage of representing oneself. Upon hearing
defendant’s election of self-representation from the presented options of proceeding with
appointed counsel, self-representation, or retaining an attorney, the trial court immediately told
defendant’s appointed attorney, “Well so . . . I believe that [defendant] has stated that he does not
want your services. You are excused if you would like to be excused.” The trial court thus simply
granted defendant’s request without assuring itself that defendant was asserting this right
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Defendant hence ineffectively waived his right to
counsel. See Russell, 471 Mich at 191-192; Blunt, 189 Mich App at 650.
A “complete deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding
is a structural error requiring automatic reversal.” People v Willing, 267 Mich App 208, 224; 704
NW2d 472 (2005) (citations omitted). Because defendant proceeded without counsel through the
remainder of his resentencing proceedings, a critical stage of criminal proceedings, defendant’s
invalid waiver requires that he be resentenced. See People v Arnold, 477 Mich 852; 720 NW2d
740 (2006) (calling sentencing “a critical stage” of criminal proceedings), citing People v Pubrat,
451 Mich 589, 594; 548 NW2d 595 (1996). We therefore vacate defendant’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.3
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the case is
remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
3
Because we remand for resentencing, we decline to address defendant’s other issues raised on
appeal.
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