The opinion
J-A28015-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUNIUS P. LEISURE, II :
:
Appellant : No. 874 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 2, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0006046-2015
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 11, 2026
Junius P. Leisure, II, appeals pro se from the order denying as untimely
his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-46. We affirm.
This Court has previously summarized the pertinent facts and procedural
history as follows:
In Commonwealth v. Leisure, 281 A.3d 1061 (non-
precedential decision) (Pa. Super. filed June 10, 2022), this Court
reviewed Leisure’s pro se collateral appeal from the lower court’s
order denying relief on his first PCRA petition. We set forth the
relevant procedural history observing that on June 23, 2016,
Leisure entered an Alford plea to two counts of indecent assault
– person less than 13 years of age and one count each of
corruption of minors and unlawful contact with a minor. On that
same date, after Leisure waived his right to defer sentencing until
after the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (“SOAB”) made its
sexually violent predator (“SVP”) assessment, the trial court
sentenced Leisure to an aggregate term of three to 10 years’
incarceration pursuant to the plea agreement, imposed $1,000
restitution, and directed Leisure to pay the costs of prosecution.
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[Following a hearing on November 12, 2016, the trial court
concluded that the Commonwealth met its burden and Leisure was
designated an SVP.] Leisure did not file a direct appeal.
On October 26, 2020, Leisure filed his first PCRA petition.
Court-appointed counsel did not file an amended PCRA petition
but filed, instead, a motion to withdraw and a “no-merit” letter
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988)
and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(en banc) asserting that Leisure’s petition was patently untimely
and ineligible for a time-bar exception. The PCRA court issued
notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. After receiving Leisure’s pro se
amended petition and “supplemental pleading,” the PCRA court
entered an order granting counsel leave to withdraw and denying
Leisure’s PCRA petition as untimely filed. Leisure at *1.
Leisure filed a pro se appeal with this Court, and we affirmed
upon concluding that the PCRA [court] lacked jurisdiction to
address the issues raised in Leisure’s untimely petition. We
explained that his petition failed to plead and prove one of the
three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar provided in
Section 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) and that, even if it had, he had not met
his burden to prove that he filed the petition within one year of
the date the claim first could have been presented. Leisure at
**2-3.
***
Almost two years later, on April 4, 2024, Leisure initiated
the present PCRA matter by filing his self-styled “Petition for Leave
to File a Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc,” the content of which led
the lower court to deem it an untimely serial PCRA petition subject
to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. Consequently, the PCRA
court entered an order dated June 24, 2024, dismissing Leisure’s
serial petition as untimely. This appeal followed.
Commonwealth v. Leisure, 344 A.3d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(nonprecedential decision at *1-2) (footnotes omitted). On July 22, 2025, we
affirmed the PCRA court’s order denying his second PCRA petition as untimely
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because Leisure was “incapable of satisfying the conditions necessary to
qualify under a newly-discovered fact exception to the time-bar.” Id. at *5.
Meanwhile, on January 21, 2025, Leisure filed the pro se PCRA petition
at issue, his third.1 On June 2, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed this third
petition “[f]or the reasons outlined” in the court’s “Notice Pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 dated December 12, 2024” (filed in response to Leisure’s
second untimely PCRA petition).2 This appeal followed. Both Leisure and the
PCRA court have complied with Appellate Rule 1925.
Leisure raises the following two issues on appeal:
A defendant whose “SVP hearing” occurs after sentencing
can obviously appeal from that order regardless of whether it
makes the . . . judgment of sentence final. However, the question
remains whether the defendant who has other issues unrelated to
his “SVP” status should await for his post-sentence SVP Hearings
final order before filing his “Direct Appeal”?
Did the Trial Court, the PCRA counsel, and the
Commonwealth by incorrectly treating the defendant’s pro se
fillings as [] untimely PCRA Petitions, effectively deny the
Defendant of his right to file post-sentence motions and a Direct
Appeal?
____________________________________________
1 While Leisure stated that this was an “amended petition” the record clearly
establishes that his prior appeal had been dismissed, and therefore there was
no pending petition to amend.
2 Although the PCRA court did not filed a Rule 907 notice prior to dismissing
this third petition, we note that the court’s failure to do so does not constitute
reversible error when, as here, the record is clear that the petition is untimely.
Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 851 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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Leisure’s Brief at 1.3
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s determination and is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d. 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). The
PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
findings in the certified record. Id.
After review, we conclude that the PCRA court properly denied Leisure’s
third petition for two reasons. First, Leisure filed the petition at issue before
review of his second petition was finalized. As this Court has summarized:
In Commonwealth v. Lark, [746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000)], our
Supreme Court held that a “subsequent PCRA petition cannot be
filed until the resolution of review of the pending PCRA petition by
the highest state court in which review is sought, or upon the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. at 588. The
[Lark] Court reasoned that “[a] second appeal cannot be taken
when another proceeding of the same type is already pending.”
Id. (citation omitted). Where a petitioner attempts to raise a
subsequent, independent claim for relief during the pendency of
____________________________________________
3 By letter dated September 15, 2025, the Commonwealth informed this Court
that it would not be filing an appellate belief but instead would rely on the
PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Additionally, on February 4, 2026, Leisure filed an application for leave
to file a supplemental brief, and attaches what he identifies as his
supplemental brief. According to Leisure, “[s]ubsequent procedural
developments and review of the record have revealed a discrete appellate
issue that was not fully presented in the initial briefing.” We grant Leisure’s
application. However, review of the one-page supplemental brief reveals no
specific issue; rather, he states only that his appeal “has been repeatedly
resolved on technical grounds without consideration of a discrete legal error
that goes to the integrity of the proceedings.” This generalized claim does not
overcome the fact that Leisure’s third PCRA petition is clearly untimely.
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an earlier PCRA petition, his or her “only option is raise it within a
[subsequent] PCRA petition within [60] days of the date of the
order that finally resolves the [pending] PCRA petition[.]”
Commonwealth v. Steele, [961 A.2d 786, 808-09 (Pa. 2008)].
Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
banc).4
As noted above, Leisure filed the petition underlying this appeal before
resolution of his 2024 petition was completed. Thus, the PCRA court could
have dismissed it on this basis alone. Lark, 746 A.2d at 588.
Second, the PCRA court properly denied Leisure’s third petition because
it was untimely. The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year
of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the
petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
____________________________________________
4 The PCRA now provides a one-year period in which to file a subsequent
petition once the prior petition is resolved. See Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
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on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Moreover, a PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory exceptions must be
filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely, and the petitioner has not pled
and proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has
jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the
legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Leisure’s judgment of sentence became final on July 25, 2016,
when the time for filing a direct appeal with this Court expired. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Leisure had until July 25, 2017 to file a
timely petition.5 Because Leisure filed the petition at issue almost eight years
later, it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and
____________________________________________
5 In his first PCRA petition, Leisure had argued his judgment of sentence was
final only after the SOAB designated him an SVP on October 12, 2016, which
would result in his judgment of sentence becoming final on November 11,
2016, and making November 11, 2017 the date by which Leisure would have
had to file a timely PCRA petition. Regardless, we correctly observed that
under either calculation of time, the first PCRA petition filed in 2020 was
patently untimely by approximately three years. Leisure, at *2.
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proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez,
supra.
Leisure has failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s time
bar. In the petition at issue, Leisure asserted the governmental interference
exception. See PCRA Petition, 1/21/25, at 3. In its order denying the petition,
the PCRA court stated that although “[Leisure] continues to allege that
governmental interference prevented him from filing his petition on time” he
failed to prove any time-bar exception. Order, 6/2/25, at 1 n.1. In his brief,
Leisure does not even mention this time-bar exception let alone argue that he
satisfied it.
In sum, because Leisure’s third PCRA petition was untimely, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider its merits. Derrickson, supra. We therefore
affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Leisure’s third petition.
Application for Leave to file Supplemental Brief granted. Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/11/2026
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