Protest Filed by B&L Tire Service Inc., T/A B&L Towing Regarding Prequalification of Noll Brothers Inc., Etc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1411-24

PROTEST FILED BY B&L TIRE

SERVICE INC., T/A B&L

TOWING REGARDING

PREQUALIFICATION OF NOLL

BROTHERS INC. FOR ROUTINE

TOWING SERVICES IN ZONE 10

ON THE GARDEN STATE

PARKWAY.

______________________________

Submitted December 8, 2025 – Decided March 11, 2026

Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.

On appeal from the New Jersey Turnpike Authority.

Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for appellant Noll

Brothers Towing, LLC (Fruqan Mouzon and Bridget

Sykes on the briefs).

Decotiis Fitzpatrick Cole & Giblin LLP, attorneys for

respondent New Jersey Turnpike Authority (John

Profita and Hannah Cunning Valente, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Noll Brothers Inc. ("Noll"), a towing company, appeals from a December

3, 2024 final decision of respondent the New Jersey Turnpike Authority's

("Authority"), rescinding Noll's prequalification status to submit a bid to

perform towing services on a portion of the Garden State Parkway ("GSP").

Because the Authority's determination relied upon findings and conclusions that

were not supported by substantial evidence in the record, we reverse and

remand.

I.

The relevant facts are not in dispute, except where specifically mentioned.

On August 16, 2022, the Authority issued a Prequalification of Contractors for

Routine Towing Services on the New Jersey Turnpike and Routine Towing

Services and Emergency Services on the Garden State Parkway to provide

towing services within Zone 10 of the GSP.

Prequalification candidates were required to meet criteria outlined in

section III of the Authority's prequalification document,1 which provided in

relevant part:

A. Experience of Applicants/Personnel for Services

1. Applicant must have a minimum of

three (3) years of general towing

1

The prequalification criteria are found in section III of the preprinted form

completed by Noll, entitled "Prequalification Applicant Information."

2 A-1411-24

experience at the [g]arage [f]acility for

which this [a]pplication is submitted, and a

minimum of three (3) years towing

experience at the [g]arage [f]acility on one

or more of the following Interstate

highways within New Jersey: I-80, I-280,

I-287, I-295, I-195, I-78, I-676, New

Jersey State Routes 18, 30, 40, 50, 72 and

47, the Atlantic City Expressway, the New

Jersey Turnpike or the [GSP]. The

Authority may also consider any other

experience, within the past five years, as a

towing contractor for the New Jersey State

Police. At the discretion of the Authority,

the requirement of three (3) years of towing

experience at that [g]arage [f]acility may

be satisfied by similar towing experience at

another location.

....

D. Garage Facility

....

FOR ROUTINE TOWING SERVICES

AND EMERGENCY SERVICES ON THE

[GSP] (only)

6. The [g]arage [f]acility must be capable

of safely storing at least fifty (50)

passenger vehicles and one (1) bus. The

[g]arage [f]acility must also be zoned

accordingly to allow for these storage

requirements. Satellite (off-site) storage

yards will not be considered. All storage

must be at the [g]arage [f]acility listed on

the [a]pplication. Under no circumstance

will patron's vehicles be stored on city

streets or in an unsecured location. . . .

3 A-1411-24

[(Emphasis added).]

Noll sought prequalification by submitting a timely application, and in

January 2023, the Authority inspected Noll's garage facility and determined that

it satisfied the prequalification requirements. 2 Noll was subsequently advised

via letter from the Authority's Director of Procurement and Materials

Management that it was prequalified to submit a bid for services. Noll had been

operating as a towing business since 1976, servicing both private customers and

municipalities, and maintains a tow facility in Iselin, Woodbridge Township.

Bidding for the towing services opened on August 1, 2024, at which time

prequalified applicants were able to ascertain the identity of competing bidders.

The Authority subsequently issued a request for bids, which were received and

publicly opened on August 1, 2024. Among the companies submitting bids were

Noll and B&L Tire Service, Inc. ("B&L").

Shortly thereafter, B&L protested Noll's prequalification status, asserting

it was not a responsive bidder because "Noll abjectly fail[ed] to meet [the]

minimum of three (3) years towing experience on any of the listed highways or

with the New Jersey State Police," and "Noll's storage facility is deficient and

2

The inspector of Noll's facility was William G. McDonough, the manager of

Emergency Services and members of his staff.

4 A-1411-24

fails to meet the [Authority's] [p]requalification [r]equirements [of safely

storing at least fifty vehicles and one bus]."3

B&L claimed Noll's facility was inadequately zoned to accommodate fifty

passenger vehicles and one bus, as it was zoned for "police towing [and fifty

vehicle?] car storage."

Following notice to Noll and B&L, the Authority convened a hearing on

B&L's protest of Noll's prequalification before hearing officer John La Bella,

the Authority's Director of Toll Collections.4 The hearing commenced with

McDonough testifying regarding the basis upon which Noll's prequalification

was approved, followed by testimony from the protester, B&L and then Noll.

More particularly, McDonough testified repeatedly that Noll's storage

facility satisfied the prequalification requirement based on his inspection.

Mark Margiotta, B&L's representative, challenged Noll's ability to meet

the prequalification requirement as to zoning, arguing "what wasn't pointed out

in the testimony, and what is contained in the prequalification requirement, is

that the garage facility be zoned accordingly to allow what is required , [fifty]

3

Under N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.12, "[a]ny actual or prospective bidder . . . who is

aggrieved in connection with the solicitation . . . of a contract or its

prequalification status or classification may protest to the Authority."

4

The hearing was informal and non-adversarial; witnesses were neither sworn

nor cross-examined, and the rules of evidence did not apply.

5 A-1411-24

vehicles and a bus." He further argued Noll's zoning permit clearly stated that

it's zoned for police storage, and did not have the capacity at its facility to add

fifty cars and a bus and satellite locations were impermissible. B&L further

challenged Noll's towing experience through the testimony of its owner, Sean

Cody, who testified that on the GSP alone, B&L tows "approximately 30 to 40

vehicles" on a single weekend.

Jeffrey Noll, owner of Noll, also testified about Noll's towing experience,

stating that Noll had "occasionally" towed on the GSP, New Jersey Turnpike,

and I-287, and that the last such occurrence was about a month before the

hearing, when the Woodbridge Police Department requested Noll tow a vehicle

from the GSP that had crashed after a high-speed police chase. Noll confirmed

he had the ability to store a minimum of fifty cars and room for additional buses

for the Parkway, and clarified that he is "maintaining a business right now

running used cars. But in the event [that he] got the Parkway [contract], [he]

own[s] [eleven] acres in Old Bridge for [his] other stuff."

On December 2, 2024, the hearing officer issued a decision recommending

rescission of Noll's prequalification status, effectively removing Noll from

consideration for the Authority's towing services contract for which it had

submitted a bid. The hearing officer found Noll lacked the requisite three-years'

experience, stating that Noll's towing from I-287 was "limited, sporadic and

6 A-1411-24

incidental to [Noll's] municipal towing services," and that Jeffrey Noll's

testimony regarding his own experience "falls far short of three years[']

experience on the [GSP]." He further concluded that "while Noll may have

significant experience at the municipal level, it lacks experience necessary to

tow on a major, limited access high-speed roadway such as the [GSP]."

The hearing officer also found that while McDonough determined Noll's

storage facility was adequate for prequalification, Noll in fact "had not

possessed the necessary zoning approval to use the [s]torage [a]rea in the manner

required by the [p]requalification [d]ocuments." More particularly, the hearing

officer found:

the zoning permit issued by the Township of

Woodbridge limited Noll's storage capacity to "police

storage and [fifty] car storage." . . . . Given Noll's

municipal towing contract with Woodbridge, the

reference to "police storage" can only relate to vehicles

towed at the request of the Woodbridge Police

Department. Thus, only "[fifty] car storage" was left to

accommodate vehicles towed from or at the direction of

another jurisdiction—such as the Authority here.

Accordingly, [he found] that Noll did not have zoning

approval to store a bus, in addition to [fifty] passenger

vehicles, as required by the [p]requalification

[d]ocuments.

On December 3, 2024, the Authority's Executive Director adopted the

hearing officer's recommended decision, without modification, and invalidated

Noll's prequalification status. Noll appealed.

7 A-1411-24

II.

Our State Constitution provides for judicial review of administrative

agency actions as of right. In re Protest Filed by El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp.,

260 N.J. 362, 373 (2025) (citing N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 4); see also R. 2:2–

3(a)(2). Although our review of an administrative agency's legal conclusions is

de novo, our role in reviewing agency actions is otherwise limited. Ibid. (first

citing Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992); then

citing In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996)).

The judicial role is restricted to four inquiries: (1)

whether the agency's decision offends the State or

Federal Constitution; (2) whether the agency's action

violates express or implied legislative policies; (3)

whether the record contains substantial evidence to

support the findings on which the agency based its

action; and (4) whether in applying the legislative

policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in

reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have

been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J.

8, 27 (1994).]

"The 'fundamental consideration' in reviewing agency actions 'is that a

court may not substitute its judgment for the expertise of an agency . . . . '" In re

Distrib. of Liquid Assets upon Dissolution of Reg'l High Sch. Dist., No. 1 , 168

N.J. 1, 10 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 116 N.J. 102, 107

(1989)). "When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes

8 A-1411-24

substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a

particular field." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). Therefore, "[a]n

administrative agency's final [] decision will be sustained unless there is a clear

showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair

support in the record." Id. at 27-28. "Deference controls even if the court would

have reached a different result in the first instance." Id. at 28.

"The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,

capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative

action." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (alteration in original)

(quoting In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 2013)). "Arbitrary and

capricious action of administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action,

without consideration and in disregard of circumstances." Worthington v.

Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 204 (1982) (citing Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep't, Env't,

Prot. 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)). "Only when the agency's

findings are clearly mistaken and 'so plainly unwarranted that the interests of

justice demand intervention and correction' should a reviewing court 'make its

own findings and conclusions.'" In re Adamar of N.J., Inc., 401 N.J. Super. 247,

265 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)); see

also Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587-88 (2001).

9 A-1411-24

Prequalification requirements and bidding specifications are the type of

matters within the Authority's area of technical expertise and are thus entitled to

deference. See In re Protest of Award of On-Line Games Prod. & Operation

Servs. Cont., Bid No. 95-X-20175, 279 N.J. Super. 566, 593 (App. Div. 1995)

("Treasurer's decisions as to responsibility of the bidder and bid conformity are

to be tested by the ordinary standards governing administrative action."). "The

underlying and foundational purpose of public bidding in New Jersey is 'to guard

against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance and corruption, and . . . to secure

for the public the benefits of unfettered competition.'" El Sol, 260 N.J. at 374

(quoting Keyes Martin & Co. v. Dir., Div. of Purchase & Prop., Dep't of

Treasury, 99 N.J. 244, 256 (1985) (modification in original)). "The conditions

and specifications must apply equally to all prospective bidders. Otherwise,

there is no common standard of competition." Hillside Twp., Union Cnty. v.

Sternin, 25 N.J. 317, 322 (1957).

Likewise, a "bid[] must not materially deviate from the specifications and

requirements set forth by the local contracting unit." Ernest Bock & Sons-

Dobco Pennsauken Joint Venture v. Twp. of Pennsauken, 477 N.J. Super. 254,

264 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Meadowbrook Carting Co. v. Borough of Island

Heights, 138 N.J. 307, 314 (1994)). Therefore, "[a]ny material departure

10 A-1411-24

invalidates a nonconforming bid as well as any contract based upon it." Ibid.

(citing Meadowbrook, 138 N.J. at 314); see also Hillside, 25 N.J. at 323.

The Authority's procurement of routine towing services is controlled by

N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.13, the objective of which is to "establish procedures for the

award of contracts for routine towing services on the . . . [New Jersey] Turnpike

and [GSP], to be provided on a rotational basis, utilizing a competitive bid

process open to prequalified bidders," with "[o]nly bids submitted by contractors

who have been prequalified pursuant to a prequalification process . . .

considered." N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.13(b), (c). The code further provides that:

[t]he criteria to be used by the Authority in determining

prequalification shall include the following, the

specific requirements of which shall be set forth in the

request for prequalification: reliability, experience,

response time, . . . ; equipment; location and condition

of storage facilities to safeguard the personal property

of patrons and their towed and stored vehicles; . . . and

such other factors as the Authority may deem relevant

and which shall be specified in the request for

prequalification.

[N.J.A.C. 19:9-2.13(d).]

The Authority, however, "does not have 'unbridled power to reject bids,

even where such right is served in the invitation for bidding' because such power

would violate public policy and competitive-bidding laws." George Harms, 137

N.J. at 20 (quoting Cardell, Inc. v. Woodbridge, 115 N.J. Super. 442, 450 (App.

Div. 1971)).

11 A-1411-24

III.

Before us, Noll raises two principal arguments. First, it challenges the

Authority's decision to "count" as experience towing services on some but not

all roadways and routes, including "well-traveled highways . . . Route[s] 1 [and]

9" and to vacate Noll's prequalification on the basis of inexperience operating

on Routes 13, 30, 40, 50, 72 or 47. Second, Noll contests the Authority's finding

it was unqualified based on its interpretation of the Woodbridge's zoning permit,

which stated that Noll was authorized for "police storage and fifty (50)

passenger vehicles"; and the hearing officer's conclusion that Noll would violate

the zoning ordinance if it were to house fifty cars and a bus. We address these

arguments seriatim.

A.

Noll maintains the Authority's exclusion of Routes 1 and 9 from the list

of roadways on which a bidder must have sufficient towing experience and its

finding that towing from I-287 was insufficient to satisfy the prequalification's

experience requirement is not supported by substantial credible evidence. Noll

highlights its more than forty years of experience picking up and towing vehicles

from Routes 1 and 9, "dealing consistently with congestion, speeding vehicles,

and the restriction on access from either direction," as indicative of its

experience and qualifications.

12 A-1411-24

Additionally, Noll maintains that Routes 1 and 9 are comparable to Route

18, which is expressly included in the Authority's prequalification list, and

further argues that its experience on Routes 1 and 9 "should count for

something."

On the other hand, the Authority urges us not to be persuaded by Noll's

arguments, which are rooted in the similarity of Routes 1 and 9 to those

mentioned in the prequalification list, arguing instead that it is "certainly in the

best position to determine what qualifications are necessary to provide routing

towing services." And, "[p]roviding routine towing services on the [GSP] is a

highly dangerous task, and is critical to the efficient functioning of the

Authority." Relying on In re Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. at 10-11, the

Authority posits that its prequalification requirements and bidding

specifications are the type of matters within the Authority's area of technical

expertise and thus are entitled to deference. And, it concludes that Noll's

recitation of its towing experience on Routes 1 and 9 is "of no moment, as these

roadways were not on the list of roadways enumerated in the Prequalification

Documents."

The hearing officer rejected Noll's argument highlighting its experience

on Routes 1 and 9, concluding that "none of those roadways were on the list of

enumerated roadways in the [p]requalification [d]ocument."

13 A-1411-24

On this point, we are satisfied that the Authority's prequalification criteria

requiring towing experience on specifically enumerated roadways falls within

the scope of its authority and reflects a proper exercise of its discretion. Stated

differently, the Authority is well within its right to determine the criteria

necessary to achieve its ultimate goal of contracting with qualified applicants.

See Campbell, 169 N.J. at 588 (citing Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599

(1965)) (granting deference to agency expertise on technical matters); In re N.J.

Transit, 473 N.J. Super. 261, 275-76 (recognizing the Authority's broad

discretion in its decision-making). Such an exercise of discretion includes

establishing "requirements . . . in bidding specifications [that] by their nature

may be relinquished without there being any possible frustration of the policie s

underlying competitive bidding." Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic Cty.

Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 412 (1975) (upholding agency authority to set and

enforce material bid conditions as a means to promote fairness and integrity in

public contracts).

Nevertheless, we note that the prequalification criteria expressly permits

the Authority to also consider any experience, within the past five years, as a

towing contractor for the New Jersey State Police. Although Noll does not assert

experience particularly with the State Police, he does explain his lengthy

experience towing for local police on roadways including the Turnpike. We are

14 A-1411-24

satisfied that a broad reading of the experience provision of the prequalification

criteria is warranted, consistent with the Legislative purpose of promoting

fairness and integrity in the awarding of public contracts. Ibid. We further

recognize that to conclude otherwise, would be to the perpetual advantage of

those companies who are already qualified, chilling competition and effectively

removing from consideration other tow operators no matter how long they have

been in operation; the proverbial cat chasing its tail scenario.

We, therefore, part ways with the Authority's determination Noll's towing

experience on I-287 was insufficient to satisfy the prequalification requirements.

On this point, we discern that the hearing officer's reasoning and conclusion

reflect too narrow of a reading of the experience criteria and imposed additional,

unwarranted requirements.

In addressing this issue, the hearing officer determined that:

the fact that I-287 may traverse one or more of the local

municipalities for which Noll's tows does not evidence

three (3) years' towing experience on I-287. At best,

even assuming Noll provided any towing service on I-

287 as a result of his municipal contracts, his

experience on I-287 would be limited, sporadic and

incidental to Noll[']s municipal towing services.

Indeed, that tangential experience does not satisfy the

requirements set forth in the [p]requalification

[d]ocuments.

Jeffrey Noll, however, testified that in the forty-plus years of the

company's history, it has rescued vehicles from the GSP, Turnpike, and I-287,

15 A-1411-24

thereby satisfying the experience requirement. In addition, he further testified

that Noll has the requisite number of spaces available to store the minimum level

of cars with room for additional buses that satisfied the prequalification

requirements.

The hearing officer surmised that Noll had only limited, sporadic and

incidental experience towing on I-287, which he then categorized as "tangential"

and therefore insufficient to satisfy the three years' towing experience required

in the prequalification documents. We note, however, that the prequalification

document is silent as to the precise definition of experience necessary; and does

not quantify or otherwise elaborate on the extent of towing experience needed

to satisfy this criterion. In other words, nowhere in the record before us does

the Authority define experience in terms of number of hours, days, months or

years needed. Under these circumstances, the hearing officer's conclusion Noll's

experience was insufficient because it was "tangential" is without merit.

Therefore, in applying the deference we must accord to our review of agency

determinations, we are satisfied that the Authority's adoption of the hearing

officer's reasoning and conclusion regarding Noll's insufficient experience on I-

287 lacks support in the record.

16 A-1411-24

B.

We next turn to Noll's final argument that the Authority abused its

discretion in concluding that it did not have "the necessary zoning approval to

use [its] [s]torage [a]rea in the manner required by the [p]requalification

[d]ocuments."

The Authority requires its prequalification applicants to have a garage

facility, "capable of safely storing at least fifty [] passenger vehicles and one []

bus," and the facility "must . . . be zoned accordingly to allow for these storage

requirements. . . . "

In its decision, the Authority determined that Noll's facility met its

standards but was not zoned in accordance with the prequalification

requirements. The hearing officer stated:

[w]hile Noll's [s]torage [a]rea may have met the

physical requirements for storage capacity, I cannot

find that Noll unequivocally possessed the necessary

zoning approval to use the [s]torage [a]rea in the

manner required by the [p]requalification [d]ocuments.

Specifically, the zoning permit issued by the Township

of Woodbridge limited Noll's storage capacity to

"police storage and [fifty] car storage."

And, further that:

Given Noll's municipal towing contract with

Woodbridge, the reference to "police storage" can only

relate to vehicles towed at the request of the

Woodbridge Police Department. Thus, only "[fifty] car

storage" was left to accommodate vehicles towed from

17 A-1411-24

or at the direction of another jurisdiction - such as the

Authority here. Accordingly, I find that Noll did not

have zoning approval to store a bus, in addition to

[fifty] passenger vehicles, as required by the

[p]requalification [d]ocuments.

[(Emphasis added).]

Although the Authority found that Noll met the "physical requirements

for storage capacity," consistent with the testimony provided by McDonough, 5

it misconstrued the language of the zoning permit, which states "POLICE

TOWING & 50 CAR STORAGE," effectively assuming Noll could only accept

storage for the Woodbridge Police Department. The prequalification

specification provides that the garage facility "must also be zoned accordingly

to allow for these storage requirements." In our view, Noll has the capability of

storing fifty vehicles and one bus, as required by the prequalification standards.

Thus, Noll satisfies the spatial and zoning requirements.

Because we conclude the Authority's determination that Noll lacked the

requisite experience, storage capability and necessary zoning approval is not

based on substantial evidence in the record, we reverse the decision to rescind

Noll's prequalification status. Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 27-28.

Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

5

McDonough testified based upon his inspection of Noll's facility that it met

the prequalification requirement for storage capability for fifty cars and one bus.

18 A-1411-24