Powell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

SAMUEL H. POWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-3105-TDC

DANIEL KRILL and

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

POLICE HEADQUARTERS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented Plaintiff Samuel H. Powell, currently confined at the Maryland

Correctional Training Center in Hagerstown, Maryland, has filed this action against Defendants

Detective Daniel Krill and the “Montgomery County Police Headquarters” in which he alleges

violations of his federal and state constitutional rights arising out of an incident in which his

vehicle, which had been seized by Detective Krill upon execution of a search warrant, was released

to an unauthorized party, found wrecked and abandoned in West Virginia, and then retitled and

sold by a towing company. Detective Krill has filed a Motion to Dismiss, which is fully briefed,

and Powell has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Upon review of the submitted

materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons

set forth below, Detective Krill’s Motion will be GRANTED, Powell’s Motion will be

DISMISSED AS MOOT, and this case will be DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

In the operative Amended Complaint, Powell alleges that on October 1, 2021, he was

arrested in a parking lot outside of his former residence in Gaithersburg, Maryland. His vehicle, a

black 2017 Chevrolet Malibu, was towed to the Montgomery County Police Headquarters and

impounded, with instructions not to release the vehicle pending a search warrant. On October 5,

2021, Detective Krill applied for and received a search warrant for the vehicle from a judge of the

Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland (“the Circuit Court”). Although the car was

searched, nothing was seized from it. Powell’s sibling, who had power of attorney for him,

attempted to retrieve the vehicle on several occasions, but Detective Krill refused to release the

vehicle.

On October 27, 2021, without Powell’s consent, Detective Krill released the vehicle to

Melvin G. Ellis, Jr., who had been a government witness against Powell, and issued a “Receipt for

Property Returned to Owner” form reflecting that the vehicle was “returned to Melvin Gary Ellis

at the owner[”|s request.” Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 14. In December 2021, the vehicle “was

found wrecked and abandoned” in West Virginia and was subsequently retitled and sold by a

towing company. /d. 411. Powell asserts that at the time of its seizure, the vehicle was subject to

a lien of $10,455.00, which he will be required to pay upon his release from custody.

In the Amended Complaint, Powell alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”)

for a deprivation of his rights to equal protection of the law and due process of law under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and a claim under Article 19 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights. He seeks declaratory relief, $10,455.00 in compensatory

damages, and $75,000.00 in punitive damages.

DISCUSSION

I. Montgomery County Police Headquarters

Although Defendant Montgomery County Police Headquarters, construed as the

Montgomery County Police Department (“MCPD”), is not a party to the Motion, because Powell

is self-represented and proceeding in forma pauperis, and because he is incarcerated and has sued

government actors, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss claims that are (1) frivolous,

malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). Upon review, the Court

finds that any claim against MCPD must be dismissed. Section 1983 provides that a plaintiff may

file suit against any “person” who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the

United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For purposes of § 1983, a “person” includes individuals and

“bodies politic and corporate.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688 (1978). As it is

Montgomery County, and not its departments and agencies, that is a proper body politic for

purposes of § 1983, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed as to any claims against MCPD.

See Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1068 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (finding that naming a

county police department was improper because police departments “are not legally cognizable

entities subject to suit in [their] own name” and that the proper defendant was the county itself).

Even if Powell had identified Montgomery County (“the County”) as a defendant, any

claim against the County would fail because there are no specific allegations against the County,

and there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir.

2004) (holding that there is no vicarious liability under § 1983). Moreover, a municipal

government may be held liable under § 1983 only for violations of federal law caused by a

“custom” or “policy” of the government, but Powell has provided no allegations demonstrating

that any such custom or policy caused the alleged violations. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The

claim against MCPD will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b).

Il. Detective Krill’s Motion to Dismiss

Detective Krill seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on

the arguments that Powell has failed to state a claim for a violation of his constitutional rights

under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts

to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements

do not suffice. /d. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations

in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson

Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed

liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not

mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v.

Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).

B. Equal Protection

Detective Krill seeks dismissal of the equal protection claim on the grounds that Powell

has not sufficiently alleged disparate treatment from a similarly situated person. In his

memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Powell clarifies that his equal protection

claim is based on the allegation that Ellis received more favorable treatment from Detective Krill

in relation to the release of the vehicle because he had served as a government witness. The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally requires the government to treat

similarly situated people alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985). To show that equal protection rights were violated, a plaintiff “must first demonstrate that

he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal

treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d

726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Upon such a showing, the court must “determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified

under the requisite level of scrutiny.” /d. at 731 (quoting Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654). Where the

claim of differential treatment does not relate to a protected class subject to a higher level of

scrutiny, such differential treatment is constitutional if the challenged policy serves a legitimate

state interest and there is a rational basis for the policy. Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir.

1989).

Here, Powell fails to state a plausible equal protection claim because the Amended

Complaint does not allege facts showing that he was treated differently from similarly situated

individuals due to discriminatory animus. Although Powell has alleged in his brief on the Motion

that Detective Krill improperly rewarded Ellis “with [the] vehicle as a personal gift for his role”

in Powell’s prosecution, Opp’n at 8, ECF No. 22-1, a plaintiff may not amend the complaint

through additional allegations in a brief on a Motion. Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741,

748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997) (citing Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1994)),

aff'd, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998).

Even if he were permitted to amend, Powell has not identified facts showing that Ellis was

a similarly situated individual, which in this case would be another criminal defendant whose

property had been seized and who was treated differently in relation to whether the property was

returned intact. Instead, Powell asserts facts showing that Ellis was differently situated in that he

was a cooperating witness who did not own any seized property. Powell’s allegations therefore

describe not a potential equal protection violation, but an alleged deprivation of property without

due process of law. Because Powell’s allegations are insufficient to state a plausible equal

protection claim, that claim will be dismissed.

C. Due Process

As for Powell’s due process claim, the Due Process Clause guarantees that no State shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. To state a due process claim, a plaintiff must first show the existence of a protected

property or liberty interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Detective Krill acknowledges that Powell has sufficiently

alleged a deprivation of a property interest based on the failure to return his vehicle to him.

Detective Krill, however, seeks dismissal of the due process claim on the grounds that

sufficient state remedies were available to Powell. Generally, a deprivation of property by a state

official does not violate due process if there are adequate state remedies available to redress the

deprivation. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (holding that a deprivation of

property that “occurred as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow

established state procedure” does not violate the Due Process Clause where “[t]here is no

contention that the procedures themselves are inadequate” and a meaningful post-deprivation state

remedy is available), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (clarifying that the holding of Parratt

applies to intentional deprivations of property); Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230

(4th Cir. 2008) (holding that because the Due Process Clause is “simply a guarantee of fair

procedures,” a federal due process claim for deprivation of property cannot succeed if there are

available state remedies to address the deprivation). As to a deprivation of property, a

“constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it

is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process.” Mora, 519 F.3d at 230

(quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990)).

In Mora, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Maryland

law generally provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy to recover property lawfully seized

pursuant to a law enforcement search, such that there is no Fourteenth Amendment due process

violation absent a showing that the state procedures are inadequate. /d at 230-31 & n.2.

Specifically, the court held that a plaintiff could not advance a § 1983 due process claim seeking

the return of his property from the police because he could instead pursue Maryland tort claims of

conversion and trespass to chattels, or invoke the Maryland statutory right to “the return of property

‘rightfully taken under a search warrant’ but ‘wrongfully withheld after there is no further need

for retention of the property’” under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 1—203(d)(1) (LexisNexis

2025). Jd. at 230 & n.2.

In the Amended Complaint, Powell alleges that Detective Krill refused to release the

vehicle to Powell’s sibling and erroneously released it to Ellis in October 2021. However, the

Amended Complaint does not reference any attempt by Powell to seek redress through available

state remedies. In his brief on the Motion, Powell states that on October 1, 2024, he filed a Motion

for Return of Property in the Circuit Court, including in relation to the vehicle, and that on January

21, 2025, the court ordered that such property be returned to him. Powell has attached to his brief

copies of his Motion, the State’s response, and the Order of the Circuit Court. Although Powell

has obtained relief from the Maryland court, he does not state whether he has sought enforcement

of the Circuit Court’s Order in relation to the vehicle. He also does not state whether he sought to

pursue state tort claims such as those referenced in Mora. Where Maryland law generally provides

adequate procedures to address a deprivation of property such as that alleged by Powell, and

Powell has not alleged facts showing that those state remedies are inadequate, his due process

claim must be dismissed without prejudice.

As Powell’s federal claims will be dismissed, and where the Court lacks original

Jurisdiction over Powell’s state law claim, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, Powell’s claim under Article 19 of

the Maryland Declaration of Rights will be dismissed without prejudice. Powell may file any state

law claims relating to this issue in state court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the claims against the Montgomery County Police Headquarters

will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b),

Detective Krill’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED in that the claims against him will be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Powell’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be

DISMISSED AS MOOT. A separate Order shall issue.

THEODORE D. CHU

United States District