Cassimere

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAPHAEL CASSIMERE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-02047

PORTS AMERICA LOUISIANA, LLC, ET SECTION “O”

AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court in this case arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’

Compensation Act is a motion1 to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) by

Defendant Ports America Louisiana, LLC. Having considered the motion, Plaintiff’s

opposition,2 Defendant’s reply,3 and the applicable law, for the following reasons, the

motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint shall be dismissed without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an alleged breach of nonpecuniary accommodation terms

of a settlement agreement confected between an injured longshoreman and his

stevedore employer in pursuit of a compensation order, which issued by the

Department of Labor pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (the “LHWCA”), and promptly was paid by Defendant.

Because Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure

to state a claim, and the parties agree that the materials submitted to the Court are

1 ECF No. 19.

2 ECF No. 20.

3 ECF No. 21.

central to Plaintiff’s complaint and claims, the Court first summarizes the following

well-pleaded facts drawn from the complaint as well as the materials referred to

therein. See generally Porretto v. City of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469,

481 (5th Cir. 2024); PHI Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 838, 841 (5th Cir.

2023).

Raphael Cassimere has been a longshoreman for more than 20 years.4 Ports

America Louisiana, LLC (“Ports”) is a professional stevedore in the business of

loading and unloading cargo from and into seagoing vessels and river barges at

various locations along the Mississippi River in New Orleans, and elsewhere.5

In August 2018, while Mr. Cassimere was working for Ports, a piece of cargo

container fell on Mr. Cassimere, striking his left upper extremity and injuring him.6

As a result, Ports provided Mr. Cassimere with medical and compensation benefits

consistent with its statutory obligation under the LHWCA.7

Unfortunately, medical treatment did not fully resolve Mr. Cassimere’s work-

related injuries. The August 2018 incident caused Mr. Cassimere to suffer a frozen

shoulder and a permanent disability to his left hand, wrist, and arm, quantified as a

47% permanent partial disability of the left upper extremity.8 This prompted Mr.

Cassimere to file a disability claim against Ports in which he sought disability

benefits under the LHWCA administrative process.9

4 ECF No. 17 ¶ V.

5 Id. ¶ IV.

6 Id. ¶ VII.

7 Id. ¶ VIII.

8 Id. ¶ IX.

9 Id. ¶ X.

As part of that administrative process, Mr. Cassimere and Ports negotiated a

settlement of the disability benefits claim. For a settlement agreement among an

injured longshoreman and his employer to be binding, the LHWCA mandates that a

Section 8(i) settlement application must be approved by the U.S. Department of Labor

District Director of LHWCA Programs.10 In compliance with this process, Mr.

Cassimere and Port submitted for approval the one-page Settlement Approval

Request Section 8(i) form to which they attached a 21-page “fully executed 8(i)

settlement agreement” which contained a detailed stipulation of facts along with a

proposed order—drafted by the parties—inclusive of four proposed findings of fact:

that the settlement was not procured by duress, that the lump sum settlement of

$200,000 is approved, that liability will be discharged upon payment of the agreed-

upon sums, and that a $100,000 fee shall be paid to claimant’s attorney in addition

to the payable compensation.11

As for the monetary compensation, the Section 8(i) Settlement Approval

Request form states that $200,000 is the total settlement amount due to Mr.

Cassimere (plus an additional $100,000 due to Mr. Cassimere’s attorney), if the

settlement request is approved. Mr. Cassimere alleges that the District Director of

LHWCA Programs duly approved the parties’ 8(i) settlement approval request in an

10 Id. ¶ XVIII.

11 Id. ¶ IXX and ECF No. 17-1 (Ex. A thereto).

order approving agreed settlement (the “Compensation Order”).12 The Compensation

Order, signed by the District Director on July 6, 2022, provides:

Pursuant to agreement and stipulation by and between the interested

parties, and such further investigation in the above-entitled claim

having been made as is considered necessary, and no hearing have been

applied for by any party in interest or considered necessary by the

District Director, the District Director makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That the claimant alleges accidental injury arising out of and in the

course of employment with employer on or about 08/19/2018.

2. That liability of the employer for compensation under the above cited

Act was insured by Ports Insurance Company, Inc.

3. The parties have agreed on the pertinent issues and desire to settle the

claim on the following basis:

Lump sum of $185,000.00 for compensation,

Lum sum of $15,000.00 for medical benefits.

4. William S. Vincent, Jr. will receive $100,000.00 for fees and costs

associated with this claim.

5. The District Director, pursuant to the authority vested in him in Section

8(i) of the [LHWCA], as amended, finds this settlement to be adequate

and not procured by duress, approves the agreed settlement and effects

a final disposition of this claim, discharging the liability of the

Employer/Insurance Carrier for such compensation and medical

benefits.

ORDER

Pursuant to Section 8(i) of the [LHWCA], the District Director having

reviewed the attached agreement and stipulation by and between

interested parties hereby approves the agreed settlement. This approval

effects a final disposition of the claim, discharging the liability of the

employer and insurance carrier in accordance with the terms of the

settlement. The employer and insurance carrier are hereby ordered to

pay all amounts due.13

12 Id. ¶¶ IXX, XX. Mr. Cassimere alleges that he attached the Compensation Order as Exhibit

B to the operative complaint, but Exhibit A (the settlement approval request) is the sole exhibit

docketed with the complaint.

13 Ports attaches as Exhibit B to the motion to dismiss the Compensation Order referenced by

both parties. ECF No. 19-3.

Ports duly paid the settlement amounts owed to Mr. Cassimere and his

attorney as mandated by the Compensation Order.14 However, Mr. Cassimere alleges

that Ports “wrongfully refused and has continued to wrongfully refuse to abide by the

terms of the settlement agreement regarding the stipulated [non-monetary parking

and transportation] accommodations[.]”15 “Because of Ports’ breach of contract,” Mr.

Cassimere alleges, he “would be forced to carry his gear from parking facilities

available to him on the job site, which facilities are considerably further away,

causing him substantial pain and significant difficulties resulting from the additional

strain placed on his condition.”16

So Mr. Cassimere sued Ports and its insurer, Ports Insurance Company,17

alleging breach of contract, and seeking to enforce the settlement agreement under

the LHWCA.18 In response to Ports’ initial motion to dismiss the complaint, Mr.

Cassimere was granted leave to file a first supplemental and amending complaint.19

There, in the operative complaint, Mr. Cassimere advances the same breach of

settlement agreement claim, again invoking federal question jurisdiction and

alleging that this Court has “jurisdiction to enforce such agreements under 33 U.S.C.

§ 921(d).”20 Attached to the operative complaint is the Section 8(i) Settlement

14 ECF No. 17 ¶ XXII.

15 Id.

16 Id. ¶ XXV.

17 There is no indication that Ports Insurance Company was ever issued a summons or was

ever served with process. Nor has Ports Insurance Company appeared in this litigation.

18 ECF No. 1.

19 ECF No. 16.

20 ECF No. 17 ¶ III.

Approval Request.21 Mr. Cassimere alleges that Ports breached paragraphs 16 and

20 of the stipulations predicating the request for approval, which provide:

16.

Based on [specified] medical releases, Claimant may return to work for

Employer in any position he so chooses. Claimant has the option of using

the Employer-provided shuttle bus to transport him from the

longshoreman parking lot to his daily job site as a truck driver if he so

chooses. Employer and Carrier acknowledge the Claimant desires being

allowed to park on the terminal facilities closer to his job site at the

Employer’s sole discretion, and the Claimant understands that only the

Employer, not Carrier, can offer Terminal Facility Parking

accommodation alternative.

. . .

20.

It is agreed and understood that Claimant’s ability to work for all

Longshore employers is an integral part of this 8i settlement and

Employer and Carrier hereby agree not to take any actions to remove

Claimant from his position as a Longshoreman for Ports America

Louisiana based on this claim.22

For Ports’ alleged breach of these provisions, Mr. Cassimere seeks to recover $100,000

in damages as well as an order “requiring Ports to abide by the accommodations

contemplated in the settlement.”23

Ports now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and,

alternatively, for failure to state a claim for relief.

21 Id. (ECF No. 17-1, Exhibit A). Though Plaintiff purports to reference an Exhibit B, no such

exhibit was included with the first amended complaint. See ECF No. 17 ¶ XVII (suggesting that

Exhibit B would be an email between counsel for employer and counsel for plaintiff regarding parking

on the terminal “confirm[ing] the shuttle bus agreement as part of the settlement”); see also ¶ XX

(suggesting that Exhibit B is “attached approved written settlement agreement and compensation

order issued in connection with the settlement”).

22 ECF No. 17-1.

23 ECF No. 17 ¶¶ XXVII and XXVIII.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Procedural Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred

by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer

Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “Rule 12(b)(1) motions

challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.” McLin v. Twenty-First

Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023). “[A] claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional

power to adjudicate’ the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d at

286 (citation, quotation omitted). Courts are to consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional

argument before addressing any other arguments on the merits. Id. (citing Ramming

v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the plaintiff bears the

burden of proof in establishing that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” See Porretto v. City

of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 481 (5th Cir. 2024). To carry his burden

at the pleading stage, the plaintiff generally must “allege a plausible set of facts

establishing jurisdiction.” Burnett Specialists v. Cowen, 140 F.4th 686, 693 (5th Cir.

2025) (citing Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Where the jurisdictional question is confined to the pleadings, the Rule 12(b)(6)

standard, set forth more fully below, applies: “[a]ll well-pleaded facts are accepted as

true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Shemwell v. City of

McKinney, 63 F.4th 480, 483 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). However, in examining its jurisdiction, the Court may go beyond the

pleadings to find a plausible set of facts to support subject matter jurisdiction by

considering any of the following: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” See

Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).

If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action or claim, the action

or claim is properly dismissed without prejudice. See Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe of

La., 79 F.4th 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[I]t’s precisely because the jurisdiction-less

court cannot reach the merits that it also cannot issue with-prejudice dismissals that

would carry res judicata effect. So we’ve repeatedly insisted that a jurisdictional

dismissal must be without prejudice to refiling in a forum of competent jurisdiction.”)

(quotation omitted; emphasis in original). Because dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is

mandatory and without prejudice, “[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in

conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” See Ramming v.

United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also In re

FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d at 287 (prioritizing

jurisdictional inquiries “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely

dismissing a case with prejudice”).

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not

meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “[T]he pleading standard

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitations

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although courts “accept all well-pled facts as true,

construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions are not accepted as true.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up).

In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court is generally “limited to the contents

of the pleadings, including any attachments thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, there are two

limited exceptions to this general rule in which the Court may rely on evidence

beyond the complaint without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion

for summary judgment. George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022)

(citing Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2014)). First,

the Court “may consider ‘any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are

central to the claim and referenced [or incorporated] in the complaint.’” See PHI Grp.,

Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 838, 841 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lone Star Fund

V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)); see also Doe

v. Ferguson, 128 F.4th 727, 733-34 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see also

Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). Second,

the Court may consider “a matter subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of

Evidence 201.” George, 36 F.4th at 619.24

B. The Scope of Ports’ Motion to Dismiss

Ports moves to dismiss Mr. Cassimere’s complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for relief. First, Ports contends that

Plaintiff has failed to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court because he

24 If the Court considers materials outside the pleadings which are not central to the claim or

subject to judicial notice, then the motion to dismiss must be converted into a motion for summary

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, 369 F.3d 833,

839 (5th Cir. 2004). If conversion to summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must notify the

parties, then consider all evidence presented. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Scanlan v. Texas A&M

Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).

fails to allege facts that support a claim that Ports failed to comply with the U.S.

Department of Labor’s July 6, 2022 Compensation Order, as required by 33 U.S.C. §

921(d). Second, Ports contends that, by failing to request that the Court enforce a

provision of the Compensation Order, Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim for

relief under § 921(d).

Mr. Cassimere counters that the parties’ stipulations predicating an approved

8(i) settlement application are enforceable, notwithstanding that they were not

explicitly restated in the final Compensation Order, because, the argument goes,

either the terms of the settlement application became a part of the Compensation

Order, or a separate settlement contract was formed. If the former, then Plaintiff

contends that the Court has jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement

application. If the latter, then Plaintiff contends he may seek enforcement through a

breach of contract theory.

Ports replies that Mr. Cassimere has failed to identify any provision of the

Compensation Order with which Ports failed to comply and thus this Court lacks

jurisdiction over the claim. Insofar as Mr. Cassimere recasts his claim as breach of

settlement agreement terms, Ports notes that Mr. Cassimere fails to identify any

authority supporting his position or any basis for this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction over a LHWCA settlement application.

To facilitate resolution of the parties’ dispute, the parties have submitted25

materials—the Section 8(i) settlement approval request form with accompanying

documentation submitted to obtain a Compensation Order and the Compensation

Order itself—both of which fall within the limited exception for consideration on a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.

Unsurprisingly, no party objects to consideration of these materials, which indeed are

properly considered in resolving both the Rule 12(b)(1) ground for the motion as well

as the Rule 12(b)(6) ground, without converting the motion into one for summary

judgment.

C. The LHWCA Statutory Scheme Limits this Court’s Subject Matter

Jurisdiction to Enforcing Compliance with Compensation Orders.

1. The LHWCA Statutory Scheme

The LHWCA, which “creates an administrative apparatus for considering

claims and appeals for compensation” by certain covered maritime workers, was

passed to provide compensation coverage for maritime workers who were beyond the

reach of state compensation statutes. 14 A Wright & Miller, FED. PRAC. & PROC. §

3671.1 (4th ed. Apr. 2025 update). Put simply, the LHWCA establishes a no-fault

federal workers’ compensation program, providing covered maritime workers with an

exclusive remedy against their employer for “medical, disability, and survivor

25 Mr. Cassimere attached to the operative complaint, ECF No. 17, the Section 8(i) settlement

approval request form and accompanying documentation and ostensibly intended to attach the

Compensation Order. With its motion to dismiss, Ports submitted these same materials, including the

Compensation Order which forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claims and which Plaintiff purports to attach

to his complaint.

benefits for work-related injuries and death.’” MMR Constructors, Inc. v. Dir., Off. Of

Workers’ comp. Programs, 954 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

The statute affords employers full immunity from tort liability, providing that

compensation benefits “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such

employer to the employee . . . except . . . if an employer fails to secure payment of

compensation as required by this chapter[.]” See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a); see also id. § 904

(providing that the exclusive remedy for a covered worker against his employer is

compensation benefits, to which the injured worker is entitled without regard to

employer fault); see also Levene v. Pintail Enter., Inc., 943 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir.

1991) (observing that, under the first of two types of LHWCA liability, § 904, a

covered worker may receive compensation benefits from his employer without regard

to fault).26 “[I]f the LHWCA covers an employee’s injury, his only remedy against an

employer lies in workers’ compensation.” Rosetti v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 821

F.2d 1083, 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).

The relevant statutory scheme contextualizes Mr. Cassimere’s lawsuit and

Ports’ motion to dismiss it. Compensation for disability claims under the LHWCA is

governed by 33 U.S.C. § 908. Indeed, “[c]ompensation for disability shall be paid to

the employee” as set forth therein. 33 U.S.C. § 908. Subsection (i) governs the process

for settlements of disability claims for compensation. Thus, “[a] settlement reached

under Section 908(i) is commonly referred to as a Section 8(i) settlement.” Cooper v.

26 Because a vessel owner is not immune from suit, when an employer acts in a dual capacity,

the entity retains employer immunity for acts taken in its capacity as employer but may be sued “qua

vessel” for vessel negligence. See Levene, 943 F.2d at 531.

Int’l Offshore Servs., LLC, 390 F. App’x 347, 348 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). “A

settlement approved [by the deputy commissioner or administrative law judge] shall

discharge the liability of the employer or carrier, or both.” 33 U.S.C. § 908(i)(3).

Section 919 governs the procedure respecting a longshoreman’s claim for

compensation. Subsection (e) provides that “[t]he order . . . making the award

(referred to in this chapter as a compensation order) shall be filed in the office of the

deputy commissioner, and a copy thereof shall be sent by registered mail or by

certified mail to the claimant and to the employer[.]” Id. § 919(e).

Review of compensation orders is circumscribed. Section 921 governs.

Subsection (a) provides that a compensation order becomes final 30 days after it is

filed in the office of the deputy commissioner, unless a party institutes proceedings

seeking to suspend or set aside the order. If a party appeals a compensation order, a

Benefits Review Board determines substantial questions of law or fact. Id. § 921(b).

If a party is dissatisfied with the Benefits Review Board’s appellate determination,

subsection (c) authorizes review of a final Board order in the United States circuit

court of appeals for the circuit where the injury occurred, if such petition is filed

within 60 days after the Board’s decision. Id. § 921(c).

If, on the other hand, an employer “fails to comply with a [final] compensation

order making an award[,]” then the award beneficiary “may apply [to federal district

court] for the enforcement of the order[.]” Id. § 921(d).27 Finally, (e) plainly limits

27 Subsection (d) provides in full:

(d) District court; jurisdiction; enforcement of orders; application of

beneficiaries of awards or deputy commissioner; process for compliance with

orders

challenges to or enforcement of compensation orders to this LHWCA scheme. Id. §

921(e).28

Where a beneficiary claimant seeks review of the compensation order or seeks

relief beyond mere enforcement of the compensation order, the district court lacks

jurisdiction over such a challenge to the compensation order terms. See Cooper v. Int’l

Offshore Servs., LLC, No. 09-4816, 2009 WL 5175216, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2009),

aff’d, 390 F. App’x 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that “[t]he district court properly

found that it did not have jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] challenge” in which the

plaintiff challenged a factual finding made by the District Director). Critically, the

LHWCA claimant must ensure that the compensation order accurately reflects the

parties’ settlement agreement and—if it does not—the claimant must utilize the

LHWCA process by seeking reconsideration by the Director and exercising his option

to appeal to the Benefits Review Board. See Cooper, 390 F. App’x at 350 (citing 33

U.S.C. § 921(a)). In other words, errors or ambiguities in the language or scope of the

findings supporting an order or in the order itself would be “an issue to resolve on

If any employer or his officers or agents fails to comply with a compensation order

making an award, that has become final, any beneficiary of such award or the deputy

commissioner making the order, may apply for the enforcement of the order to the

Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred (or to the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the injury occurred in the

District). If the court determines that the order was made and served in accordance

with law, and that such employer or his officers or agents have failed to comply

therewith, the court shall enforce obedience to the order by writ of injunction or by

other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to enjoin upon such person and his

officers and agents compliance with the order.

28 Subsection (e) provides:

(e) Institution of proceedings for suspension, setting aside, or enforcement of

compensation orders

Proceedings for suspending, setting aside, or enforcing a compensation order, whether

rejecting a claim or making an award, shall not be instituted otherwise than as

provided in this section and section 918 of this title.

appeal from the Director” rather than an issue for district court enforcement. See id.

at 351.

2. Mr. Cassimere’s Complaint Fails to Invoke the Court’s

Jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 921(d).

Ports contends that 33 U.S.C. § 921(d) is limited to allowing a plaintiff to seek

enforcement of a final compensation order from the federal district in which the injury

occurred. Mr. Cassimere counters that this Court may go beyond the terms of the

compensation order to review the parties’ stipulations contained in the settlement

approval request because either the stipulations are part of the compensation order,

or they form a separate contract which Ports allegedly has breached. Mr. Cassimere

frames the singular issue presented to the Court as whether the stipulations

contained in an approved 8(i) settlement application, but not explicitly restated in

the District Director’s final Compensation Order, are enforceable.

Mr. Cassimere indeed frames an issue presented to the Court. However, the

Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that the issue must be resolved in

Plaintiff’s favor. Instead, the general statutory scheme set forth above and the specific

text of § 921(d) make clear that this Court’s jurisdiction is limited to enforcing

compensation orders. Because Mr. Cassimere seeks more that mere enforcement of a

compensation order, his lawsuit must be dismissed without prejudice.

As set forth above, Section 921(d) provides that “[i]f an employer . . . fails to

comply with a compensation order making an award, that has become final, any

beneficiary of such award . . . may apply for the enforcement of the order to the

Federal district court” in where the beneficiary was injured. This is the only available

proceeding for “enforcing a compensation order[.]” Id. § 921(e).

Here, Mr. Cassimere alleges that the parties submitted an application for a

compensation order, that a final Compensation Order was issued by the District

Director, and that Ports paid the compensation award as expressly ordered by the

Compensation Order. However, Mr. Cassimere complains that Ports has failed to

comply with the nonpecuniary accommodation stipulations which were submitted in

the application seeking a Compensation Order. Mr. Cassimere does not allege that

he endeavored under the statutory scheme to have these nonpecuniary terms

included in the Compensation Order (i.e., Plaintiff does not allege that he sought

review of the Compensation Order with the District Director, nor did he appeal the

Compensation Order to the Benefits Review Board). The non-monetary

accommodation terms which Mr. Cassimere seeks to enforce by his lawsuit are absent

from the Compensation Order.

Ports contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce terms that nowhere

appear in the Compensation Order. Applying the clear text of § 921(d), the Court

agrees. Once Mr. Cassimere availed himself of the exclusive LHWCA disability

settlement process and obtained a final Compensation Order, this Court’s jurisdiction

could be invoked only to enforce the terms contained in that final order. But Mr.

Cassimere does not seek to enforce the terms of the Compensation Order. Indeed, Mr.

Cassimere concedes that Ports and its insurer “pa[id] all amounts due” in compliance

with the terms of the Compensation Order.29

Mr. Cassimere instead seeks to recover monetary damages for Ports’ alleged

failure to comply with stipulations submitted to the District Director in the

settlement application seeking the Compensation Order. Regardless of whether these

damages are for breach of an alleged contractor or some other theory, Mr. Cassimere

cites no authority that would authorize this Court to exercise subject matter

jurisdiction over his claim seeking enforcement of nonpecuniary terms contained in

an application seeking a compensation order.

Cooper, on the other hand, supports Ports’ position and aptly illustrates the

statutory limit of district court enforcement of compensation orders. See 390 F. App’x

at 350-51. There, Cooper, the covered LHWCA plaintiff, settled his claim for benefits

under the LHWCA. Id. at 348. The DOL entered a formal award approving the

settlement and releasing the defendant from future liability. Id. at 348-49. Cooper

neither sought reconsideration from the District Director nor appealed the

compensation order to the Benefits Review Board. Id. at 349, 350. When Cooper sued

his employer and argued that the compensation order’s findings of fact included an

overly broad release that was not aligned with the parties’ agreement, his employer

29 See ECF No. 17 ¶ XXII (alleging that “Ports paid the sum agreed to in the Settlement”). The

Compensation Order provides:

Pursuant to Section 8(i) of the [LHWCA], the District Director having reviewed the

attached agreement and stipulation by and between interested parties hereby

approves the agreed settlement. This approval effects a final disposition of the claim,

discharging the liability of the employer and insurance carrier in accordance with the

terms of the settlement. The employer and insurance carrier are hereby ordered to pay

all amounts due.

ECF No. 19-3.

countered that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the LHWCA does not

permit an aggrieved party to challenge a final compensation order in district court,

only to enforce one. Judge Lemmon agreed, rejecting Cooper’s argument that the

compensation order’s findings of fact were overly broad insofar as the findings

included a release of all claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 350-51 (agreeing

with the district court’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction over such a challenge,

despite that “[t]here may well be a serious question about whether the District

Director went further than the parties intended”).

Applying § 921 and Cooper’s guidance compels the same outcome here. Mr.

Cassimere plainly does not seek enforcement of the Compensation Order, with which

Ports has complied. Mr. Cassimere resists Ports’ contention that Plaintiff had the

burden to pursue his statutory remedies by seeking reconsideration because, he

suggests, it was too late to attack the settlement “by the time it became evident that

Ports was in breach of contract.”30 But the Fifth Circuit indeed indicated that the

beneficiary must resort to the statutory process insofar as he challenges a

compensation order or its scope: “If Cooper believed the District Director’s order did

30 ECF No. 20 at 6. Mr. Cassimere also contends that it “makes no sense” that he should be

responsible for ensuring the nonpecuniary accommodations terms are included in the compensation

order because “the Department of Labor does not have jurisdiction to order Ports to do anything but

pay compensation by a certain date [such that] incorporating the workplace accommodations into the

Compensation Order’s explicit findings would have been legally ineffective[.]” Id. at 6-7. Even taking

Plaintiff’s argument at face value, the DOL’s lack of authority neither explains how, nor confers

jurisdiction on, this Court to render legally effective some term that appears outside a final

compensation order. Furthermore, and putting Plaintiff’s policy arguments aside, Mr. Cassimere does

not identify a single source supporting a statutorily authorized path for this Court to enforce anything

beyond the Compensation Order. Mr. Cassimere offers no binding or persuasive case law that would

support his contention that this Court indeed has jurisdiction to grant the relief he seeks. Ultimately,

this Court’s jurisdiction is statutorily limited to enforcing compensation orders; providing redress for

breach of settlement agreements predicating the same exceeds the scope of § 921(d), which is

prohibited by § 921(e).

not reflect the agreement the parties reached in the settlement agreement,” the Fifth

Circuit observed, “he could have sought reconsideration by the Director [and f]ailing

that, he had the option to appeal the order to the Benefits Review Board.” Cooper,

390 F. App’x at 350. Just like Mr. Cooper, Mr. Cassimere argues that the

Compensation Order was incomplete or erroneously failed to reflect nonpecuniary

terms that were integral to his LHWCA disability settlement but which were not

reflected in the Compensation Order. He fails to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, which

is strictly limited to enforcing the Compensation Order. Because Mr. Cassimere seeks

relief from the Court which is beyond that authorized by § 921, and he identifies no

authorities that overcome the statutory text limiting this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction to enforcement of a final Compensation Order, his lawsuit must be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.31

31 Insofar as Ports requests dismissal with prejudice, see ECF No. 19 at 2; 19-1 at 10, only

dismissal without prejudice is appropriate where, as here, the Court dismisses claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, given the Court’s finding that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the

Court need not reach Ports’ contentions that the Court is prohibited from considering the parties’

settlement negotiations and that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.

II. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion®? to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. Plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of March, 2026.

BRANDON S. LONG □□□

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32 ECF No. 19.

21