collecting factors and rejecting any per se rules to limit a district court’s discretion to appoint counsel
How later courts described this case
- collecting factors and rejecting any per se rules to limit a district court’s discretion to appoint counsel
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CLEVELAND WASHINGTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:24-CV-1213-NCC
)
COMMISSIONER UNKNOWN )
ABDULLA and OFFICER UNKOWN )
JARDEN, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on self-represented plaintiff Cleveland Washington’s
motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 36). Defendants have filed no response. For the following
reasons, the motion to appoint counsel will be granted.
Background
Plaintiff Cleveland Washington, who is self-represented, is currently incarcerated at
Southeast Correctional Center (“SECC”). He brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they failed to protect him
from a jail riot and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. In his current motion,
Plaintiff alleges that he is currently serving a sentence in segregation and has limited access to
resources that would enable him to prosecute his claims.
On August 22, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum
in Support, and Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (Docs. 24-26). Defendants argue
that any deprivations Plaintiff underwent do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation, that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies. On October 6, 2025, Defendants filed a Notice of Plaintiff’s Failure
to Oppose Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Ruling (Doc. 29). They
argued that (i) under the current Case Management Order, Plaintiff has waived his right to file an
opposition brief to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and his right to file a motion for
summary judgment, and (i) the Court may consider their assertion of fact as undisputed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), and may grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials show that they are entitled to it. Defendants requested that the Court
consider their motion for summary judgment as unopposed, deem their statement of material fact
admitted, and enter judgment in their favor.
On October 15, 2025, after the deadline under the Case Management Order (Doc. 11) for
Plaintiff to respond had passed, the Court entered an order directing Plaintiff to file a
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and a Response to
Statement of Material Facts within 21 days of the Order. However, the mail containing the
Court’s Order was returned as undeliverable due to Plaintiff’s relocation to a new facility. (Doc.
32). After updating Plaintiff’s address, the Clerk’s Office resent the Order to Plaintiff on
October 29, 2025. (Docs. 32-33). On November 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for an
extended deadline to file a response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 33).
The Court granted him a 30-day extension. (Doc. 35).
On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed his third Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 36).
Plaintiff states that he has limited access to legal materials while placed in segregation. (Doc.
37). He further asserts that his current conditions of confinement limit his ability to investigate
the facts of his case; for example, he is unable to locate or interview other inmates who were
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eyewitnesses to the relevant events, or to consult a medical expert for issues relating to his
medical-needs claims. He states that he is a pro se litigant with no legal training and has not
received discovery pertaining to this case.
Discussion
In civil cases, a self-represented litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right
to appointed counsel. Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2013). Rather, a district court
may appoint counsel in a civil case if the court is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated
a non-frivolous claim…and where the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the
court will benefit from the assistance of counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th
Cir. 2018). When determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court
considers relevant factors such as the complexity of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to
investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant
to present his or her claim. Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006).
The Eighth Circuit recently articulated the standard for considering motions for
appointment of counsel in civil cases as follows:
While indigent civil litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to
appointed counsel, district courts may appoint counsel after considering, among
other factors, the factual and legal complexity of a case, the litigant’s ability to
investigate and present the claims, and the presence of conflicting evidence.
Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006). Additional factors
include whether an indigent plaintiff has stated a colorable claim, and whether the
court would benefit from assistance of counsel. In re Lane, 801 F.2d 1040, 1043-
44 (8th Cir. 1986) (collecting factors and rejecting any per se rules to limit a district
court’s discretion to appoint counsel). “In ruling on a request for counsel, the
district court must exercise ‘a reasoned and well-informed discretion’ and seriously
consider appointing counsel ‘whenever an indigent plaintiff establishes in his or her
pleadings a prima facie case which, if proven, would entitle him or her to relief.’”
Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
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Smith v. Walker, No. 23-3579, 2025 WL 2170323, at *2 (8th Cir. July 31, 2025).
After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is
warranted at this time. Plaintiff’s filings demonstrate that he is having difficulty pursuing his
claims through discovery and that such discovery is appropriate for his claims. The Court also
believes that appointment of counsel for Plaintiff would benefit the Court. Thus, the Court will
grant Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 36) is
GRANTED. The Court will enter a separate order appointing counsel.
Dated this 24th day of February, 2026.
/s/ Noelle C. Collins
NOELLE C. COLLINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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