Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

NRRM, LLC, doing business as )

CarShield,, et al., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-CV-1566 HEA

)

Pelican Investment Holdings,

LLC, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the following motions: Motion for

Protective Order, filed by Defendants Pelican Investment Holdings, LLC (“Pelican”)

and National Administrative Service Co., LLC (“NASC”) (ECF No. 54); Motion to

Expedite and for Limited Discovery, filed by Plaintiff NRRM, LLC, d/b/a CarShield

(“CarShield”) and American Auto Shield, LLC (“AAS”) (ECF No. 10); and Motion

for Preliminary Injunction Hearing, filed by CarShield (ECF No. 86). For the

reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion

for Protective Order, and grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited and Limited

Discovery and CarShield’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Hearing.

Discussion

A. Motion for Expedited and Limited Discovery

Plaintiffs CarShield and AAS bring suit against Defendants Pelican, NASC,

and Sing for Service, LLC b/d/a Mepco for false advertising, unfair competition,

tortious interference, and trade secret misappropriation under the Lanham Act, the

Defend Trade Secrets Act, and state common law. Plaintiffs allege Pelican’s sales

agents have contacted CarShield’s customers and are making false and misleading

statements designed to induce them to cancel their existing vehicle protection plans

with CarShield and to switch to Pelican’s competing products. CarShield contends,

among other things, that Pelican’s agents have told consumers that repair shops no

longer accept CarShield plans, that CarShield does not administer its own claims,

and that CarShield is unreliable.

CarShield has filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Pelican

seeking to prohibit Pelican from making or disseminating any false or misleading

statements of fact about CarShield. The motion is pending before the Court.

CarShield and AAS filed a Motion for Expedited and Limited Discovery pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(d)(1), which they contend is necessary

to aid in pursuit of the preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs ask the Court allow them to

conduct limited discovery on “telephone call recordings of Pelican’s sales calls, sales

training scripts, information about how Pelican obtained CarShield’s customer lists

and related information.” (ECF No. 10 at 1). CarShield filed with the Court four

proposed written interrogatories and ten document requests, which are directed at

Pelican, (ECF No. 38), and it asks that it be allowed to take two depositions.

Defendant Pelican opposes the Motion. Pelican argues discovery is

inappropriate at this time, because it has filed a Motion to Dismiss, which is still

pending before the Court. It also argues that CarShield has not demonstrated good

cause for the expedited discovery, and that CarShield’s proposed discovery is not

narrowly tailored but rather the written discovery requests “go directly to the

underlying merits of the case, and inquire into Pelican’s proprietary business

operations.” (ECF No. 58).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) allows for discovery before a Rule

26(f) conference by court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). The Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit has not adopted a standard for expedited discovery, and district

courts use one of two standards to determine whether a party is entitled to conduct

expedited discovery. Some courts apply a “good cause” or “reasonableness”

standard, while others analyze a set of factors similar to those for obtaining a

preliminary injunction. Barton v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:22-CV-51 JAR,

2022 WL 2713107, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 13, 2022); Monsanto Co. v. Woods, 250

F.R.D. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 2008).

The Court will follow other judges in this District and apply the “good cause”

standard. Barton, 2022 WL 2713107, at *2; Monsanto Co., 250 F.R.D. at 413.

“Under the good cause standard, the party requesting expedited discovery must show

that the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of administration of justice,

outweighs prejudice to the responding party.” Barton 2022 WL 2713107, at *2

(citations omitted).

Here, the interests of justice weighs in favor of expedited discovery. As

discussed below, a preliminary injunction hearing is set for April, at which time

CarShield and Pelican are to present evidence in support of and in opposition to

CarShield’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court has reviewed CarShield’s

proposed discovery and finds that it is relevant to CarShield’s claims against Pelican

and, more specifically, its claim that Pelican is engaging in false and misleading

advertising in violation of the Lanham Act – the claim upon which CarShield’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction is based. The Court further finds that in the

interests of having a more complete record at the preliminary injunction hearing and

in order to conserve judicial and attorney resources and avoid duplicative efforts or

proceedings, limited, expedited discovery is warranted.

Further, the interest of justice outweighs any potential prejudice to Pelican.

First, a pending motion to dismiss does not stay discovery. See, e.g., LifeScience

Techs., LLC v. Mercy Health, No. 4:21-CV-1279 SEP, 2022 WL 2392966, at *2

(E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2022). And Pelican’s Motion to Dismiss does not challenge

threshold questions such as the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal

jurisdiction, or venue. Second, the discovery CarShield proposes is reasonably

limited in the number of interrogatories, requests, and depositions. Finally, Pelican’s

concerns regarding the disclosure of its proprietary business operations are

addressed by the issuance of a protective order, as discussed below.

Finding good cause shown, the Court grants CarShield’s motion for leave to

conduct limited discovery on an expedited basis. The Court will allow CarShield

and Pelican, the parties to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, to conduct limited,

expedited discovery. AAS joined in the Motion to Expedite and for Limited

Discovery, but AAS is not a party to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. To the

extent, AAS is seeking expedited discovery, its motion is denied.

B. Motion for Protective Order

Defendants Pelican and NASC move pursuant to Federal Rule Civil

Procedure 26(c) for the entry of a protective order. Defendants argue that a

protective order is necessary because the parties in this case are direct competitors,

and CarShield is seeking documents that would reveal Pelican’s customer lists,

sources of customer leads, sales and marketing record and strategies, and other

highly sensitive information. Defendants proposed a two-tier Protective Order under

which the parties can designate documents as Confidential and for Attorneys Eyes

Only (“AEO”).

Plaintiffs responded to Defendants’ Motion, and they do not dispute that a

protective order is warranted in this case. However, Plaintiffs represent that there is

a dispute over the scope of the AEO designation. Defendants represent in their

motion that CarShield will not agree to an AEO designation that excludes

CarShield’s “in house team.” Plaintiff CarShield responds that it has compromised,

and it now proposes that each party should be allowed to designate one in-house

attorney to access AEO material.

In support of its position, CarShield argues that its prosecution of this case

will be hampered unless its in-house counsel, Janet Crane, is allowed access to AEO

designated materials. CarShield represents that Ms. Crane is a litigation-focused

attorney for CarShield, and that she possesses institutional knowledge necessary to

interpret discovery accurately, to assess how Defendants’ materials impact

CarShield’s claims and requested injunctive relief, and to coordinate litigation

strategy with outside counsel and any experts. It argues that not allowing her to

review the documents Defendants produce would force outside counsel to evaluate

contextual evidence without access to the internal knowledge necessary to interpret

it accurately, which would slow the litigation, increase costs, and materially impair

Plaintiffs’ ability to respond efficiently issues and prosecute their claims.

In support of its position, CarShield submits Ms. Crane’s declaration, wherein

she attests that her role at CarShield is litigation or compliance-focused and separate

from business decision making; she does not advise on pricing, marketing strategy,

product design or development, customer acquisition, customer retention, or

competitive positioning; and she does not participate in regular board and executive

meetings where such topics arise. Defendants did not file a reply in response to

CarShield’s arguments and proposed compromise.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows for the issuance of a protective

order upon a showing of good cause. See Monsanto Co. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,

Inc., No. 4:12-CV-1090 CEJ, 2014 WL 1211111, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2014).

An order may require that trade secret or other confidential information may be

revealed only to certain categories of persons. Defendants, as the parties moving for

a protective order – as well as the party proposing a more onerous protective order

– bear the burden of demonstrating good cause. Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 1

v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 2, 197 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1999). Good

cause includes a showing of specific harm or prejudice that will result if protections

are not ordered, and a party must make “a particular and specific demonstration of

fact, as distinguished from stereotype and conclusory statements.” Gulf Oil Co. v.

Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981) (quoting 8C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2035 (1970)). In deciding whether to

issue a protective order, a district court must also consider the hardship to the non-

moving party if the order is granted. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481

F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973).

Defendants have not supported their arguments, with evidence from the

record, that this litigation was brought for an improper purpose and that Plaintiffs

seek a window into Defendants’ strategies and sales methods. Further, Defendants

failed to address CarShield’s proposal that one in-house attorney be allowed to view

AEO documents, and Defendants have not demonstrated – or even attempted to

demonstrate – that under CarShield’s proposed terms for the protective order,

specific harm or prejudice will result.

As for CarShield’s proposal for who can access AEO materials, the Court

finds CarShield has demonstrated it has a valid reason for wanting Ms. Crane to

review AEO documents. Further, based on Ms. Crane’s position and her represented

duties at CarShield, the Court finds that Defendants’ concerns regarding the potential

for improper use of their highly confidential information can be addressed under the

terms of the Protective Order.

In her declaration, Ms. Crane represents that her duties are focused on

litigation and compliance, and that she “do[es] not hold a business-facing role, and

[ does] not have authority over, or responsibility for, CarShield’s pricing, sales

strategy, marketing strategy, product development, customer acquisition, customer

retention, or competition positioning.” (ECC No. 70, Ex. 4 at 1). The Court finds

that Ms. Crane is not involved in “competitive decisionmaking” and there is little to

no risk that she will inadvertently reveal confidential information in the course of

her day-to-day activities at CarShield. Process Controls Intern, Inc. v. Emerson

Process Mgmt., No. 4:10-CV-645 CDP, 2011 WL 1791714, at *8 (E.D. Mo. May

10, 2011).

Further, the Court has carefully reviewed CarShield’s proposed terms and

procedures for the disclosure of AEO designated documents and information –

which include limitations as to who may be designated as in-house counsel for

accessing AEO materials and the procedures for objecting to such designations, as

well as sanctions for disclosure violations – and finds that they adequately protect

Defendants’ interest in guarding its highly sensitive information. The Court will

grant Defendants’ request for the entry of a protective order, but it will adopt

CarShield’s proposed terms for the disclosure of AEO materials.

C. Motion for Hearing

Finally, CarShield requests a hearing to present testimony and oral argument

in support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Pelican. The motion is

unopposed, and the Court will set a hearing after the parties have had an opportunity

to engage in limited discovery.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s NRRM, LLC, d/b/a CarShield

and American Auto Shield, LLC’s Motion to Expedite and for Limited Discovery is

GRANTED in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to Plaintiff

NRRM, LLC, d/b/a CarShield and denied as to American Auto Shield, LLC. [ECF

No. 10]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following expedited discovery

schedule shall apply in this case:

(a) Plaintiff NRRM, LLC, d/b/a CarShield, and Defendant Pelican

Investment Holdings, LLC shall serve written discovery no later than

February 27, 2026. Written discovery shall be limited to no more

than ten (10) requests for production of discovery and four (4)

interrogatories. All requests for written discovery shall be served

through electronic mail delivery to which written responses and all

non-privileged responsive documents and materials must be provided

on or before March 23, 2026.

(b) Plaintiff NRRM, LLC, d/b/a CarShield, and Defendant Pelican

Investment Holdings, LLC may notice up to two (2) depositions. The

parties shall confer with each other prior to issuance of notices in an

attempt to find dates for depositions that are reasonably convenient.

All depositions must be completed by March 27, 2026.

(c) The expedited discovery ordered herein shall be limited in subject

matter to those issues that are pertinent to the pending motion for

preliminary injunction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that consistent with the terms of this Opinion,

Memorandum and Order, Defendants Pelican Investment Holdings, LLC and

National Administrative Service Co., LLC’s Motion for Protective Order is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent

that the Court shall issue a separate Protective Order that adopts the language and

terms proposed by Plaintiffs. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED. [ECF

No. 54]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff NRRM, LLC, d/b/a CarShield,

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Hearing is GRANTED. A Preliminary

Injunction Hearing is set for hearing on April 2, 2026, at 1:30 p.m., in the

Courtroom of the undersigned. [ECF No. 86]

Dated this 20 day of February, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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