Helvey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TERRY MATTHEW HELVEY,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-00837-NJR

ACTING WARDEN OF FCI

GREENVILLE,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Petitioner Terry Matthew Helvey has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the denial of his request for mandatory parole.

(Doc. 1). The petition remains under consideration. This order addresses several pending

motions.

BACKGROUND

In 1993, Petitioner, who was an active-duty member of the United States Navy,

was convicted by a general court-martial under the Uniform Code Military Justice for the

murder of U.S. Navy Sailor Allen Schindler Jr. (Doc. 20-2). He also was convicted of

assaulting two other Navy personnel and making false statements under oath to

investigators. (Id.). Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison and dishonorably

discharged. In 1995, his sentence was affirmed by the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of

Criminal Appeals. (Docs. 20-2, 20-3). Petitioner initially served his sentence at the

U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. (Doc. 1 p. 15). In February

2003, he was transferred to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) pursuant

to an agreement between the BOP and the military. He has been housed at FCI Greenville

in this district since September 2008. (Doc. 1 p. 16).

Petitioner filed the present petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 1, 2025, alleging

that he has been unlawfully denied mandatory parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). He also

claims that Respondent has violated his due process rights by depriving him of parole,

has violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause by releasing similarly situated

offenders, and has violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment. The Court screened the petition and directed the Acting

Warden to file a response. (Doc. 14). Respondent contends that § 4206(d) does not apply

to Petitioner and even if it did, the Government adequately justified its denial of parole.

(Doc. 20). Respondent adds that none of Petitioner’s other claims have merit. Petitioner

filed a reply brief on October 17, 2025. (Doc. 28).

DISCUSSION

During the pendency of this matter, Petitioner filed several motions:

e Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2)

e Motion for Judicial Notice (Doc. 3)

e Motion for Discovery (Doc. 4)

e Motion to Clarify (Doc. 9)

e Motion to Expand the Record for 2241 Petition (Doc. 10)

e Motion for Judicial Notice of Motion to Expand Record for Exhibit Y

(Doc. 11)

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e Motion to Expand the Record (Doc. 13)

The Court addresses each of Petitioner’s motions as follows.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Concurrent with the filing of his petition, Petitioner moved for a temporary

restraining order (TRO) seeking immediate release on parole so that he can reside at a

house he owns with his wife.

A TRO may issue without notice to the opposing party: only if “specific facts in an

affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss,

or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition”

and “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the

reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The standard for issuing

a temporary restraining order is identical to that governing the issuance of a preliminary

injunction. See Mays v. Dart, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2020). A preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy requiring the movant to carry the

burden of persuasion by a clear showing. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to a TRO. For one, his motion failed

to explain why the Court should grant relief before Respondent could be heard in

opposition, and he did not include the required certification under Rule 65(b)(1)(B). True,

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Respondent has responded to the petition during the period the motion for a TRO

remained pending before the Court, but this development does not alter the assessment.

That is because Petitioner would not be entitled to the order of immediate release he

seeks, even if he were to prevail on the merits of his claim. In cases where inmates

challenge parole proceedings, courts have held that appropriate relief typically takes the

form of a conditional release order permitting the appropriate parole authority to provide

a new statement of reasons supporting its decision or offer the petitioner a new hearing.

See Furnari v. Warden, Allenwood Fed. Corr. Inst., 218 F.3d 250, 258 (3d Cir. 2000); Simoy v.

McKinney, No. 22-02211, 2024 WL 3350557, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2024) (noting that a

petitioner would only be entitled to a determination about whether he meets the

conditions for release in § 4206(d)). Under those circumstances, the undersigned does not

find that Petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable harm while the Court considers his claim,

particularly where the Parole Commission—purportedly applying the mandatory parole

provision that Petitioner seeks—found that he was not eligible on at least one occasion.

(Doc. 1-3 pp. 26-27). Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order

(Doc. 2) will be denied.

Motions Regarding Additional Evidence

Petitioner also has filed several motions asking the Court to consider various

documents and materials beyond his initial filing.

First, he asks the Court to take judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201

of certain information regarding his § 2241 petition. (Doc. 3). Under Rule 201, the Court

may do so if a fact is not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, judicial notice is

an “adjudicative device that substitutes the acceptance of a universal truth for the

conventional method of introducing evidence.” Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resol. Corp.,

128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997). Examples of materials properly the subject of judicial

notice include population data, geographic facts, weather records, and government

records. See 21B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure Evidence § 5106.3

(2d ed.).

On review, Petitioner essentially asks the Court to take notice of various facts

derived from exhibits to the petition and certain legal conclusions that he believes those

materials support. The Court declines that invitation. As a general matter, the materials

he cites are not generally known nor are they the sort of facts readily determinable by resort

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. They are matters that may—

or may not—be contested by the Government. The Court understands Petitioner’s

allegations and legal arguments and will determine whether further factual development

is necessary in due course.

On May 21, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to expand the record to include the

Navy Council of Review Boards’s denial of his parole appeal. (Doc. 10). The Acting

Warden has not responded in opposition to that request. The Court will grant the motion

and deem the materials properly filed. In a related motion, Petitioner asks the Court to

take judicial notice of several factual and legal conclusions he derives from that

document. (Doc. 11). That request must be denied. As was the case above, Petitioner

appears to misunderstand Federal Rule of Evidence 201. For instance, he says the Court

should take judicial notice that “the Navy agrees that the Law dictates that the Petitioner

should be paroled . . . .” (Doc. 11 p. 2). That may be his interpretation of the document,

but it undoubtedly is not shared by Respondent. Almost by definition, interpretations of

documents are not subject to judicial notice.

On July 14, 2025, Petitioner moved to expand the record to include certain

additional documents regarding his most recent parole request. (Doc. 13). The Acting

Warden has not responded in opposition. The Court will grant the motion and deem the

materials properly filed.

Motion for Discovery

Petitioner also has filed a motion seeking discovery in support of his petition. He

asks the Court to order Respondent to produce (1) a list of all military offenders in BOP

custody that have been granted parole under § 4206 and (2) copies of emails and phone

calls received by the relevant parole authorities regarding his case.

“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled

to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997).

Under Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,1 the Court may authorize

petitioner to conduct discovery “for good cause.” Good cause exists if a petitioner makes

1 Petitioner invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but the Rules govern petitions brought under that provision also.

See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

a “colorable claim showing that the underlying facts, if proven, constitute a constitutional

violation.” Hubanks v. Frank, 392 F.3d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Court declines to order discovery at this time. Petitioner’s first request appears

to relate to his equal protection claim. He alleges that other military offenders have been

granted parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4206, and he avers “firsthand” knowledge of their

identities. (Doc. 1 p. 39). Yet Petitioner does not offer any additional information about

these individuals. Absent further detail, the Court views the allegation as too speculative

to warrant discovery. See Famous v. Fuchs, 38 F.4th 625, 632 n. 24 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting

that factual allegations must not be “speculative or conclusory because discovery is not

intended to be a fishing expedition.”). Moreover, this theory appears to presuppose that

§ 4206 applies in this case, a question that will first require resolution by this Court.

Petitioner also seeks copies of emails and phone calls that the relevant parole

authorities received regarding his case. He says that certain news reports suggest the

existence of approximately 100 emails and phone calls to the Parole Commission

regarding his case “from the LGBT Community,” but records of these communications

are not in his file. (Doc. 4 p. 3). Petitioner suggests these records could show the Parole

Commission was improperly influenced by the LGBTQ community.

This request also will be denied at this time. The articles cited by Petitioner do not

give any reason to believe that any individual or group exercised improper influence over

members of the Parole Commission. Rather, they describe how relatives of the victim,

Mr. Schindler, encouraged others to send email messages and letters to the Parole

Commission regarding Petitioner’s case. (Doc. 1-3 pp. 8, 21). Petitioner does not explain

how these letters amount to improper influence. After all, “[t]he [Parole] Commission

encourages the submission of relevant information concerning an eligible prisoner by

interested persons,” 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(b)(1), and these individuals may meet with

representatives of the Commission, id. § 2.22. There is no reason to think that the baseline

procedures permitting broad input from interested parties were abused in this instance,

and discovery based on mere speculation is not permitted. See Famous, 38 F.4th at 632

n. 24. Petitioner therefore has not established good cause for discovery, and his motion

will be denied.

Motion for Clarification

Also pending before the Court is a motion filed by Petitioner seeking clarification

on several matters. First, Petitioner asks about the status of the Court’s ruling on his

motion for a temporary restraining order. As discussed above, that motion is denied.

Petitioner also notes that he filed a motion seeking appointed counsel, but that

motion does not appear on the docket. The Court likewise is unable to locate that filing.

Nevertheless, the Court would deny such a motion at this time.

“[T]here is no constitutional right to counsel on collateral review, i.e., on review of

a petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241.” Andreozzi v. Warden, USP Marion,

No. 22-2466, 2023 WL 12053714, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2023) (citing Lavin v. Rednour,

641 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2011)). When presented with a request to appoint counsel in a

civil case, a court must make the following inquiries: “(1) has the indigent [petitioner]

made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing

so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the [petitioner] appear competent to

litigate it himself?” Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Pruitt v. Mote,

503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007)). Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

in the United States District Courts requires appointment of counsel where an evidentiary

hearing is found to be warranted.

In his present motion, Petitioner notes that he has been receiving pro bono

assistance from attorney Maurice B. Graham for many years.2 He says that his family has

attempted to locate counsel to assist him in litigating this matter, but all options were

beyond his ability to afford. The Court is satisfied that Petitioner has made sufficient

efforts to recruit counsel on his own but nevertheless sees no need to appoint counsel at

this time. Petitioner’s briefing is cogent and thorough. He has comprehensively set out

the factual and legal issues that govern his claims. In the event a hearing proves

necessary, the Court may revisit the issue of counsel at that time.

Finally, Petitioner also questions the status of Exhibit X to his petition, which he

believes was not filed on the electronic docket. The Court observes that Exhibit X appears

on the docket at Doc. 1-3 pp. 78-79.

Other Matters

After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the Court finds that one matter requires further

attention. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to release under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d), which

provides that a prisoner shall be released on parole “after serving thirty years of each

consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years including any life term” unless

2 It appears that an attorney by that name recently passed away. See In Memoriam,

https://www.grgpc.com/newsroom/news/in-memoriam (last visited Feb. 25, 2026).

the United States Parole Commission determines the prisoner “has seriously or

frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that there is a reasonable

probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d).

The Commission appears to have evaluated Petitioner’s case under that standard on at

least one occasion. (See Doc. 1-3 pp. 26-27, 52-53).

Respondent takes the view that a 2022 agreement between the BOP and

Department of Defense re-vested authority for parole determinations in the relevant

military bodies. (Doc. 20 p. 9). The Government adds that in making parole

determinations, the Navy considers “the nature and circumstances of the prisoner’s

offenses; the prisoner’s military and civilian history; the prisoner’s confinement file and

offense-related rehabilitation programs; the prisoner’s personal characteristics, including

age, education, marital and family status, and psychological profile; the impact of the

prisoner’s offense on the victim and the prisoner’s efforts to make restitution to the

victim; the protection and welfare of society; the need for good order and discipline in

the Service; and other matters, as appropriate.” (Id. at p. 9).

These factors seem to differ materially from the factors that would be considered

by the Parole Commission under § 4206(d). One of Petitioner’s primary claims is that the

shift from one standard to the other raises due process concerns. The Court does not

believe Respondent adequately addressed that issue. The undersigned therefore will

direct Respondent to file a supplemental brief.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has raised complex issues involving parole procedures for military

prisoners who are serving their sentences in civilian custody. The Court is diligently

reviewing his claims and will issue a decision in due course. With regard to the pending

motions, the following is ORDERED:

e Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 2),

motion for judicial notice dated May 1, 2025 (Doc. 3), motion for

discovery (Doc. 4), and motion for judicial notice dated May 21, 2025

(Doc. 11) are DENIED.

e Petitioner’s motions to expand the record (Docs. 10, 13) are

GRANTED. The attached materials are deemed properly filed.

e Petitioner’s motion for clarification (Doc. 9) is DISMISSED as moot.

It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file a supplemental brief addressing

the issue mentioned above on or before March 13, 2026. Petitioner may file a response

on or before March 27, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 27, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL □

United States District Judge

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