Opinion

Godeka

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Mar 2, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

“Exhaustion requires the petitioner to ‘fairly present’ his claims to the highest court of the state.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Exhaustion requires the petitioner to ‘fairly present’ his claims to the highest court of the state.”
  • “A procedural default may be caused by a failure to exhaust federal claims in state court.”
  • holding that an untimely state post- conviction petition is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2242(d)(2)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JAIRUS CHEGERO GODEKA, Case No. 6:25-cv-01515-AA

Petitioner, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

OREGON STATE HOSPITAL,

Delores Matteucci-Superintendent,

Respondent.

________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge.

Petitioner brings this federal habeas Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his

1998 state court convictions on grounds that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Respondent argues that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner’s claims are untimely

and barred from review through procedural default. As explained below, Petitioner did not file

his § 2254 Petition within the one-year statute of limitations and his claims are unexhausted and

barred from federal review. Accordingly, the Petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

On October 3, 1996, Petitioner was charged with numerous criminal offenses, including

Attempted Aggravated Murder, Kidnapping in the First Degree, Arson in the First Degree,

Assault in the First Degree with a Firearm, Assault in the Second Degree with a Firearm,

Burglary in the First Degree, and Intimidation in the Second Degree. Resp’t Ex. 102. The

charges arose after Petitioner entered the Church of Scientology in Portland, shot four people,

and attempted to set fire to the church. Resp’t Ex. 114 at 2.

On April 2, 1998, after a stipulated facts trial, the trial court found Petitioner guilty

except for insanity on all charges and remanded Petitioner to the supervision of the Psychiatric

Security Review Board (PSRB) for 120 years, or six consecutive 20-year sentences. Resp’t Exs.

101, 103. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

In June 2005, Petitioner obtained a conditional release. Resp’t Ex. 114 at 1. In early 2021,

the PSRB revoked Petitioner’s release after finding that Petitioner violated the terms of his

conditional release. Resp’t Ex. 114 at 2-3, 8.

On April 1, 2022, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (PCR) in state court and

alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. Resp’t Exs. 105-

06. The State moved for summary judgment on grounds that the PCR petition was not filed

within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Resp’t Ex. 116; Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(3).

On March 20, 2023, the PCR court granted the motion and dismissed the PCR petition. Resp’t

Ex. 119. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion and the Oregon

Supreme Court denied review. Resp’t Exs. 125-26.

On August 20, 2025, Petitioner signed the federal habeas initiating this action.

DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the Petition is untimely because Petitioner did not pursue federal

habeas relief within one year after his convictions became final. Alternatively, Respondent

contends that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from federal review.

Generally, a petitioner must file a federal habeas petition challenging a state court

conviction within one year after the challenged conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)

(providing that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”). A state court

conviction becomes final, and the one-year statute of limitations begins to run, when direct

review proceedings have concluded. Id. § 2244(d)(l)(A). The limitations period is tolled,

however, during the time in which “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2).

The trial court entered judgment in Petitioner’s criminal case on April 2, 1998, and

Petitioner did not appeal. Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction became final and the statute of

limitations began to run on May 1, 1998, after the thirty-day period for filing an appeal expired.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.071(1); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (explaining that a

conviction becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) “when the time for pursuing direct

review” expires).

Petitioner did not seek PCR relief until 2019, more than twenty years after his conviction

became final. Even then, Petitioner’s PCR proceeding did not toll the statute of limitations,

because his untimely PCR petition was not “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410, 415 (2005) (holding that an untimely state post-

conviction petition is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2242(d)(2)). Accordingly,

almost twenty-seven years elapsed between May 1, 1998, the date on which Petitioner’s

conviction became final, and April 20, 2025, the date on which he filed his federal habeas

Petition. Thus, the Petition is untimely and barred from federal review.

Petitioner did not file a supporting brief and provides no basis to support equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (explaining that

equitable tolling is available only if the petitioner “shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely

filing”). Even if Petitioner could overcome the untimeliness of his Petition, his claims are also

barred from review through procedural default.

“Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available

state remedies, thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly

present his federal constitutional claims to the State’s highest court before seeking federal habeas

relief. Id.; Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Exhaustion requires the

petitioner to ‘fairly present’ his claims to the highest court of the state.”). “A petitioner fully and

fairly presents a claim to the state courts if he presents the claim (1) to the correct forum; (2)

through the proper vehicle; and (3) by providing the factual and legal basis for the claim.” Scott

v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).

If a claim was not fairly presented to the state courts and no state remedies remain

available for the petitioner to do so, the claim is barred from federal review through procedural

default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 735 n.1 (1991); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314

F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A procedural default may be caused by a failure to exhaust

federal claims in state court.”). A federal court may consider unexhausted and procedurally

barred claims only if the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice, or if

the lack of federal review would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Edwards v.

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451(2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction, and his PCR petition was dismissed as untimely.

As a result, Petitioner did not fairly present his federal habeas claims to Oregon’s highest court

in a manner that would allow their review on the merits. Petitioner provides no basis to excuse

the default, and his claims are barred from federal review.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is DENIED. A Certificate of

Appealability is DENIED on the basis that Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _2_n_d_ day of March, 2026.

/s/Ann Aiken

ANN AIKEN

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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