Randall

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

STACI R.,1 Case No. 6:24-cv-01849-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Staci R. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of Social Security’s

(“Commissioner”) denial of her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. For

the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands for

the calculation and payment of benefits.

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1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last

name of the non-governmental party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is

limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). That is

because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a claimant’s entitlement to

disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of

uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their

discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621

(1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important rules” in reviewing social

security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015).

First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the

testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).

Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at

1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is

harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or

that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency

explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see

also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest

[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the

error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded

on other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.

2022))).

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BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS

Plaintiff filed DIB2 and SSI3 applications on December 5, 2014. (Tr. 16, 59.) In her

applications, Plaintiff alleged disability due to bipolar II disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder (“ADHD”), severe social anxiety, depression, seasonal affective disorder, severe

premenstrual syndrome, and severe migraines. (Id. at 59.)

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and upon reconsideration. (Id.

at 103, 117.) Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) appeared and testified at a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April 18, 2017. (Id. at 34-56.) On July

18, 2017, the ALJ issued a partially favorable written decision finding Plaintiff disabled as of

December 5, 2014, her application date. (Id. at 12-26.) On June 4, 2018, the Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s written decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.)

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2 To be eligible for DIB, “a worker must have earned a sufficient number of [quarters of

coverage] within a rolling forty quarter period.” Herbert v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-01016 TAG,

2008 WL 4490024, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citation omitted). Workers accumulate

quarters of coverage based on their earnings. Id. Typically, “the claimant must have a minimum

of twenty quarters of coverage [during the rolling forty-quarter period to maintain insured

status]. . . . The termination of a claimant’s insured status is frequently referred to as the ‘date

last insured’ or ‘DLI.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) of

December 31, 2009 (Tr. 16, 611) reflects the date on which her insured status terminated based

on the previous accumulation of quarters of coverage. If Plaintiff established that she was

disabled on or before December 31, 2009, she is entitled to DIB. See Truelsen v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 2:15-cv-2386-KJN, 2016 WL 4494471, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016) (“To be

entitled to DIB, plaintiff must establish that [she] was disabled . . . on or before his date last

insured.” (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998))).

3 “[T]he earliest an SSI claimant can obtain benefits is the month after which [s]he filed

h[er] application[.]” Schiller v. Colvin, No. 12-771-AA, 2013 WL 3874044, at *1 n.1 (D. Or.

July 23, 2013) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff sought and obtained judicial review, and the Court remanded in December 2022

with instructions for the ALJ to (1) determine the onset date of Plaintiff’s disabling impairment

with the assistance of a medical expert; (2) reassess Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony;

and (3) reassess the lay witness testimony of Plaintiff’s mother. (Tr. 714-24); see Staci R. v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:18-cv-01453-AA, 2022 WL 17485583, at *11 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2022).

Accordingly, on March 23, 2023, the Appeals Council vacated the unfavorable portion of

the Commissioner’s decision and remanded to an ALJ for further proceedings and to issue a new

decision relating to the period prior to December 5, 2014.4 (Tr. 729.) On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff,

medical expert Michael Greenberg, PsyD (“Dr. Greenberg”), and an impartial VE testified

before an ALJ. (Id. at 631-69.) On July 11, 2024, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision,

again finding Plaintiff disabled as of December 5, 2014 but not prior to that date. (Id. at 610-21.)

That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner and Plaintiff now seeks judicial

review.

II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS

A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve]

months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential

process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those

five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

4 The Appeals Council’s remand order referred to December 5, 2019 as the relevant date,

but the ALJ correctly determined that was a “scrivener’s error.” (Tr. 673-74, 729.)

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed

impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the

claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

at 724-25.

The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Bustamante v.

Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any

of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. See id. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of

proof at step five, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is

disabled. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954.

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION

The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff was

disabled. (Tr. 610-21.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2005, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 613.) At step two,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe, medically determinable

impairments: ADHD, bipolar type two disorder, and anxiety disorder not otherwise specified.

(Id.)

At step three, the ALJ concluded that before December 5, 2014, Plaintiff did not have an

impairment that meets or medically equals a listed impairment. (Id.) The ALJ then concluded

that before December 5, 2014, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform

a full range of work at all exertional levels subject to the following nonexertional limitations: (1)

understand, remember, carry out, and persist and simple routine repetitive tasks, (2) make simple

work-related decisions, (3) perform work with few, if any, workplace changes, (4) perform no

assembly line pace work, and (6) have no more than occasional interaction with coworkers and

the general public. (Id. at 615.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant

work. (Id. at 618.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled before

December 5, 2014, because a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy Plaintiff

could perform, including hotel/motel housekeeper, wall cleaner, and bagger. (Id. at 619.) The

ALJ also determined that beginning on December 5, 2014, the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments

met the criteria of section 12.04 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (depressive,

bipolar and related disorders) and she was therefore disabled as of that date. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues on appeal that the ALJ erred by assigning no weight to testifying medical

expert Dr. Greenberg’s hearing testimony.5 (Pl.’s Opening Br. (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 3-13, ECF No. 14;

Pl.’s Reply at 2-4, ECF No. 17.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court reverses the

Commissioner’s decision and remands for the calculation and payment of benefits.

I. TESTIFYING MEDICAL EXPERT’S OPINION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by assigning no weight to the testifying medical expert’s

opinion on remand. (Pl.’s Br. at 3-13.) The Court agrees.

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5 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to identify specific, clear, and convincing

reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and erred

by discounting the lay testimony of Plaintiff’s mother but the Court does not reach those

arguments herein. (See Pl.’s Br. at 13-18.)

A. Applicable Law6

“There are three types of medical opinions in social security cases: those from treating

physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th

Cir. 1995)). In the event “a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, the ‘[ALJ] must determine credibility and resolve the conflict.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2001)). An ALJ may only reject a physician’s

“contradicted opinions by providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by

substantial evidence.’” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528

F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)).

“An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial evidence’ requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating [her] interpretation

thereof, and making findings.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d

715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). Merely stating conclusions, however, is insufficient: “The ALJ must

do more than state conclusions. [She] must set forth [her] own interpretations and explain why

they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Id. “[A]n ALJ errs when [she] rejects a medical

opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without

explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate

language that fails to offer a substantive basis for [her] conclusion.” Id. at 1012-13 (citation

omitted).

6 The recently amended regulations governing the evaluation of medical opinion evidence

do not apply here because Plaintiff filed her applications prior to March 27, 2017. See Woods v.

Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787-92 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that “[t]he new regulations apply to [a

claimant’s Social Security case if] she filed her claim on or after March 27, 2017”).

“Although [the reviewing court] will not fault the agency merely for explaining its

decision with less than ideal clarity, we still demand that the agency set forth the reasoning for its

decision in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492

(simplified). “A clear statement of the agency’s reasoning is necessary because we can affirm the

agency’s decision to deny benefits only on grounds invoked by the agency.” Id. (citing Stout v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)).

The ALJ must consider the medical record as a whole, rather than isolating a “specific

quantum” of evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1455

(9th Cir. 1984); see also Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1164 (holding cherry-picking is improper (citing

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2001))); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009

(An ALJ “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply

by identifying a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”) (citation omitted).

“[A]n ALJ may give greater weight to the opinion of a non-examining expert who

testifies at a hearing subject to cross-examination.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i) (“State agency medical

and psychological consultants and other program physicians, psychologists, and other medical

specialists are highly qualified physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists who are

also experts in Social Security disability evaluation.”).

B. Analysis

The Court concludes that the ALJ erred by assigning no weight to the testifying medical

expert’s opinion on remand and that the ALJ’s error was harmful.

The Court remanded this case on December 7, 2022, with instructions to “determine the

onset date of Plaintiff’s disabling impairment with the assistance of a medical expert.” Staci R.,

2022 WL 17485583, at *11. Dr. Greenberg testified as “an impartial and neutral” medical expert

at Plaintiff’s hearing to assist the ALJ in determining the onset date of Plaintiff’s disability. (Tr.

642-56.) Dr. Greenberg testified that there was “sufficient objective evidence” in Plaintiff’s

medical record to allow him “to form medical opinions about the nature and severity of

[Plaintiff]’s impairments during [the relevant] time period[.]” (Id. at 643.)

Dr. Greenberg testified that he reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and found that

Plaintiff met paragraph A criteria for bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and

ADHD combined type. (Id. at 643-44.) With respect to paragraph B criteria, Dr. Greenberg

testified that Plaintiff had a “moderate” limitation in her ability to understand, remember, or

apply information, concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, and adapt or manage herself, and a

“marked” limitation in her ability to interact with others. (Id. at 644-47.)

With respect to Plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday and work week, Dr.

Greenberg testified that “when fully and compliant with medication, I believe they would be able

to engage with a full . . . work week” but only “with reasonable accommodations.” (Id. at 650.)

He clarified that “reasonable accommodations” would be necessary due to Plaintiff’s “significant

anxiety” and by reasonable accommodations he meant “stepping away for a brief period of time

and collecting oneself and then returning.” (Id.) Dr. Greenberg testified that Plaintiff would

likely need fifteen to twenty minutes to address her symptoms before returning to work, but he

was unable to testify about how frequently Plaintiff would need such a break in a normal

workday. (Id. at 651.)

The ALJ assigned Dr. Greenberg’s opinion “no weight” because she found that Dr.

Greenberg did not understand the vocational language he used in his testimony and that his

opinion was internally inconsistent:

[I]t was clear in his testimony that he did not understand the vocational language

used under the Social Security regulations specific to mental residual functional

capacity (MRFC). He went back and forth between “seriously” and “marked” when

describing the claimant’s mental limitations but stated that they did not preclude

her from attending school, completing daily activities, and raising her children.

Thus, Dr. Greenberg’s opinion is given no weight as he was unable to offer a

vocationally termed MRFC as he misunderstood “moderate” and “marked” as

defined under the regulations. As well, his testimony was inconsistent because he

opined that the claimant could have contact with the public and coworkers despite

saying that she is markedly limited in social functioning, which is inherently

inconsistent, thus given no weight.

(Id. at 617.)

The Court finds that the ALJ erred by assigning no weight to Dr. Greenberg’s testimony

based on his terminology. First with respect to the vocational language Dr. Greenberg used, his

use of “marked” and “seriously limited” are consistent with Social Security regulations. (See id.

at 645, testifying that Plaintiff had “marked” limitations in interacting with others because she

was “seriously limited” in her ability to interact with others; see also id. at 614, “A marked

limitation means functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a

sustained basis is seriously limited,” but cf. id., “An extreme limitation is the inability to function

independently, appropriately or effectively, and on a sustained basis.”) Thus, Dr. Greenberg’s

definition of a “marked” limitation as one that is “seriously limited” was not erroneous nor a

reason to discount his opinion. Similarly, Dr. Greenberg’s opinion that Plaintiff could have some

contact with the public and coworkers despite being “markedly” limited in social functioning

was not “inherently inconsistent,” where he was accurately contrasting a marked limitation

allowing “some” contact from an “extreme” limitation reflecting a “complete inability” to have

contact with the public and coworkers. (Id. at 614, 617.) Accordingly, the ALJ erred by

discounting Dr. Greenberg’s opinion based on the language he used.

The Court also finds that the ALJ erred by assigning no weight to Dr. Greenberg’s

opinion that Plaintiff required a “reasonable accommodation” of unscheduled breaks due to her

documented history of panic attacks. (Id. at 618.) The ALJ assigned no weight because Dr.

Greenberg could not estimate how many unscheduled breaks Plaintiffs would require, but Dr.

Greenberg was clear that Plaintiff would require unscheduled breaks upon the occurrence of a

panic attack and substantial evidence in the record supports Dr. Greenberg’s opinion. (See, e.g.,

id. at 273, 275, 281, documenting Plaintiff’s disability accommodations while attending Lane

County Community College as a part-time student; id. at 273, 281, 285, 291, 293-94, 363, 366,

treatment notes pre-dating December 5, 2014, reflecting Plaintiff’s ADHD and anxiety

symptoms and panic attacks; id. at 637-39, 657-60, Plaintiff testified about daily panic attacks

while attending community college part-time and an inability to attend college without

accommodations). The Court finds that it was error to disregard a medical expert’s opinion about

Plaintiff’s need for reasonable accommodations. See, e.g., John M. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,

No. 3:20-cv-02133-AR, 2023 WL 155550, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2023) (holding that the ALJ

erred in failing to address the medical opinion evidence that the claimant “would need frequent

unscheduled breaks” where the medical record demonstrated that the claimant’s impairments

would “require him to lay down and rest periodically” (citing Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1166));

French v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-0092-BLM, 2022 WL 3362276, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2022)

(finding that the ALJ erred by “ignoring [the medical provider’s] findings of limitations

regarding [the p]laintiff’s need to shift at will and take unscheduled breaks”); Rick W. v.

Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-01435-YY, 2019 WL 3046120, at *7-8 (D. Or. May 22, 2019) (finding

that “the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion evidence of”

the testifying expert who opined “that [the] plaintiff’s symptoms would cause unscheduled

breaks throughout the workday”), findings and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3037043 (D.

Or. July 11, 2019); cf. Bronson v. Berryhill, No. 316CV00319LRHWGC, 2017 WL 2972331, at

*11 (D. Nev. July 12, 2017) (“The court finds that the ALJ erred in failing to sufficiently address

how much time of a workday would be taken up by Plaintiff using the restroom during

unscheduled breaks, and whether or not this would preclude employment. Therefore, the matter

should be remanded.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3427963 (D. Nev. Aug.

9, 2017).

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ harmfully erred by assigning no

weight to Dr. Greenberg’s opinion.

II. REMEDY

Plaintiff asks the Court to remand for further administrative proceedings or an immediate

award of benefits. (Pl.’s Br. at 18-19; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 3-4.) The Commissioner does not

address the appropriate form of remand in the event of error. (See generally Def.’s Br.)

A. Applicable Law

“Generally when a court of appeals reverses an administrative determination, ‘the proper

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or

explanation.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In

several cases, however, the Ninth Circuit “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of

discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when [the three-part credit

as-true standard is] met.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted).

The credit-as-true standard is met if three conditions are satisfied: “(1) the record has

been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2)

the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant

testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as

true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. (citations omitted).

Even when the credit-as-true standard is met, the court retains the “flexibility to remand for

further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant

is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021.

B. Analysis

The Court concludes that the credit-as-true standard is satisfied here and remand for the

payment of benefits is appropriate.

The Court concluded above that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for

assigning no weight to Dr. Greenberg’s medical opinion. The record has been fully developed,

including treatment notes spanning the relevant time period, opinions from several medical

sources, and Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity and effects of her impairments. In addition,

the Court previously found that “the ALJ inadequately supported the decision to assign

December 5, 2014 as the onset date for Plaintiff’s disabling impairments” (Staci R., 2022 WL

17485583, at *4), and the Court provided the Commissioner an opportunity to reevaluate the

onset date with the assistance of a testifying medical expert but the ALJ disregarded the medical

expert’s testimony in its entirety. The Court finds that further proceedings would serve no useful

purpose here.7

Further, if Dr. Greenberg’s medical opinion is credited as true, the record reflects that

Plaintiff would require reasonable accommodations in the form of additional unscheduled breaks

to work a normal workday and work week. (Tr. 638, 650-51.) The VE testified that “[i]f a person

takes more than the standard[] breaks . . . that would not be competitive.” (Id. at 668.) Indeed,

the ALJ acknowledged that “reasonable accommodations such as stepping away and collecting

herself within [fifteen] to [twenty] minutes . . . would certainly preclude sustaining regular full-

7 The Commissioner did not argue or identify any useful purpose for further proceedings.

(See generally Def.’s Br.)

time employment based on how often she had to step away.” (Id. at 618.) As a result of the VE’s

testimony (and the ALJ’s acknowledgment of the impact of Plaintiff’s need for

accommodations), the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on remand. See Garrison,

759 F.3d at 1022 n.28 (explaining “there is no need to develop the record or convene further

administrative proceedings” where “the VE answered a question describing a hypothetical

person with the RFC that the claimant would possess were the relevant opinion or testimony

taken as true”).

Finally, the Court does not have any serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff is disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled as of

December 5, 2014, as a result of Plaintiff’s ADHD, bipolar type two disorder, and anxiety

disorder. (Tr. 613.) The medical record does not reflect that Plaintiff’s mental impairments

materially changed on December 5, 2014, i.e., the date she applied for benefits. See Staci R.,

2022 WL 17485583, at *4 (finding that “the ALJ inadequately supported the decision to assign

December 5, 2014 as the onset date for Plaintiff’s disabling impairments”). On the contrary, the

record supports that Plaintiff suffered from the same severe mental impairments for many years

prior to that date and that she required significant accommodations to attend community college

even on a part-time basis and still continued to experience frequent panic attacks.

For all of these reasons, the Court remands this case for the calculation and payment of

benefits. See, e.g., Leitz v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35356, 2023 WL 4342114, at *3 (9th Cir. July 5,

2023) (“The Government argues that we should remand for further proceedings rather than

remand for an award of benefits. However, remand would serve no legitimate purpose . . . and

permitting the Government to introduce additional evidence on remand would provide the

Government with an unfair second opportunity to present its case. . . . We therefore remand to

the district court with instructions to remand to the agency for an award of benefits.”) (citations

omitted); Hoffschneider v. Kijakazi, No. 18-15504, 2022 WL 3229989, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 10,

2022) (“Once the improperly discredited evidence is credited as true, the vocational expert’s

testimony forecloses a determination that [the claimant] can work. Because no ‘serious doubt’

remains that [the claimant] is disabled, there is nothing left to decide. We therefore reverse and

remand with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for a calculation and award of

benefits.”) (citations omitted); Varela v. Saul, 827 F. App’x 713, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2020)

(reversing district court opinion remanding for further proceedings and instead remanding with

instructions to “remand to the Commissioner of Social Security for an award of benefits” where

“crediting [the treating physician’s] opinion as true, there is no doubt that [the claimant] was

disabled”); Smith v. Saul, 820 F. App’x 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing district court opinion

affirming the denial of benefits and instead remanding “with instructions to remand to the ALJ

for calculation and award of benefits” where “[t]he vocational expert concluded that an

individual with [the claimant’s] limitations, as described in the improperly discredited testimony

... would be unable to perform competitive employment”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and

REMANDS for the calculation and payment of benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 2nd day of March, 2026. Nf. Kee

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

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