FEHNEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

_________________________________________

:

JEFFERY FEHNEL and :

AFRDITA KRASNIQI as h/w, :

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. : Civil No.: 5:25-cv-04783-JMG

:

COUNTY OF NORTHAMPTON, :

BOROUGH OF BANGOR, :

BANGOR POLICE DEPARTMENT, :

WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP :

POLICE DEPARTMENT, :

OFFICER DANIEL DIETER, :

OFFICER ROBERT DELEON, :

POLICE CHIEF KEVIN JONES, and :

POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOES #1-10, :

Defendants. :

_______________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gallagher, J. January 30th, 2026

Plaintiffs Jeffery Fehnel and Afrdita Krasniqi (collectively “Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendants

Chief Kevin Jones, Officer Robert DeLeon, Officer Daniel Dieter, the Bangor Police Department, and the

Washington Township Police Department (collectively, the “Defendants”) used excessive force against

Plaintiff Fehnel during his apprehension and forcibly assaulted Plaintiff Krasniqi while she attempted to

record the incident. Plaintiffs have brought claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

excessive force, failure to train, state created danger, and Monell liability, as well as state law tort claims

for assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Defendants

Washington Township Police Department (“WTPD”) and Officer Dieter (together “Moving Defendants”)

move to dismiss the Complaint. Moving Defendants’ Motion is granted in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND1

On July 29, 2023, Plaintiffs Fehnel and Krasniqi2 were walking in Bangor, Pennsylvania, with

their infant child. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 14–15. Following an altercation between Plaintiff Fehnel and another

individual, which Plaintiff Fehnel allegedly did not instigate or escalate, officers from the Bangor and

Washington Township Police Departments arrived. Id. ¶ 14. These officers, including Officers Robert

DeLeon and Daniel Dieter (the “Officers”) and Chief Kevin Jones, directed Plaintiffs to leave the area. Id.

As Plaintiffs were walking away, Chief Jones instructed the Officers to follow the Plaintiffs, which they

did for approximately one block. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs allege that the Officers then abruptly apprehended

Plaintiff Fehnel, who informed them of a serious pre-existing back condition. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs allege

that Officer DeLeon, at Chief Jones’s instruction, deployed a taser against Plaintiff Fehnel’s back and

slammed him to the ground. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff Fehnel reportedly informed the Officers of severe back

pain while being moved to the police vehicle, but he alleges these complaints were ignored. Id. ¶ 18.

Plaintiff Fehnel alleges that the force used during the arrest caused acute neurological symptoms and

aggravated preexisting spinal injuries. Id. ¶ 19. During the encounter, Plaintiff Krasniqi attempted to film

the incident. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs allege that Officer Dieter, under Chief Jones’s direction, forcibly assaulted

Plaintiff Krasniqi to prevent her from recording. Id. Plaintiffs maintain that this conduct resulted in

physical injuries, emotional distress, and violations of their civil rights. Id. ¶ 24.

Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas on July 21, 2025. See

generally id. On August 20, 2025, Defendants Chief Kevin Jones and Officer James DeLeone filed a

Notice of Removal. ECF No. 1. Subsequently, on September 5, 2025, Defendants Borough of Bangor,

Chief Jones, and Officer DeLeone filed an Amended Notice of Removal. ECF No. 6. Defendants WTPD

and Officer Dieter were served on October 24 and October 25, 2025, respectively, and filed a Notice of

Consent to Join in Removal on November 19, 2025. ECF Nos. 15, 17, 28. On December 1, 2025, WTPD

1 The Court accepts Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, as we must at this early stage.

2 Plaintiff Krasniqi was approximately nine months pregnant at the time of the incident.

and Officer Dieter filed the pending Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition

on December 19, 2025. ECF Nos. 32-33.3

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Although the plausibility

standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d

Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted

inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Wheeler v. Wheeler, 639 F. App’x 147,

149 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Plaintiff Krasniqi’s Excessive Force Claim (Count II) is Dismissed

Claims that an officer used excessive force in executing an arrest fall within the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74,

78 (3d Cir. 2021). “‘To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show that

a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting El v. City of

Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020)). The Court cannot make the determination whether a

3 Plaintiffs Opposition to Moving Defendants Motion to Dismiss was due on December 15, 2025, yet was

filed four days late on December 19, 2025. The Court will address the merits of the opposition

notwithstanding this untimeliness.

seizure occurred or if the force used was reasonable under the circumstances based on the conclusory

allegations set forth in the Complaint.

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs assert that “Defendant Dieter . . . physically attempted to restrict

[Plaintiff Krasniqi’s] ability to record the arrest of Plaintiff Jeffrey Fehnel by grabbing her cellphone and

forcibly shoving Ms. Krasniqi.” ECF No. 32-2 at p. 3. However, this allegation does not appear in the

Complaint. Instead, the Complaint alleges only that Plaintiff Krasniqi was “assaulted,” and even that she

was “assault[ed] multiple times.” ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 20–21. Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts describing what

conduct constituted the alleged assault. Although the Complaint later states that Plaintiff Krasniqi was

“shov[ed],” it provides no additional context or factual detail from which the Court could assess the

reasonableness of the force used. Id. ¶ 72.

These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible excessive-force claim.

Accordingly, Count II is dismissed without prejudice against both Moving Defendants.

However, in the Third Circuit it is a well-accepted principle that “in civil rights cases district

courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure

to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete

Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017).

Therefore, Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend the Complaint as to Count II.

b. Plaintiff Krasniqi’s Failure to Train Claim (Count IV) is Dismissed

Plaintiffs attempt to assert a municipal liability claim based on a failure-to-train theory, alleging

that Officer Daniel Dieter had a known history of excessive force and police brutality against other

members of the community, and that WTPD knew or should have known of this history but failed to

prevent him from engaging in unconstitutional conduct. See ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 22–23.

“[A] plaintiff advancing a claim predicated on a municipality’s failure or inadequacy in training,

supervision, or otherwise is spared from demonstrating the existence of an unconstitutional policy or

custom” but must make a showing that the municipal policymakers acted with deliberate indifference.

Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 117 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “A supervising authority may be

liable under § 1983 for failing to train [municipal employees] when the failure to train demonstrates

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those with whom the [employees] may come into

contact.” Medina v. Allentown Police Dep’t, No. 23-2055, 2023 WL 7381461, at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 8,

2023) (citations omitted); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To establish

liability on a failure-to-train claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify a specific deficiency in training

that is causally linked to the alleged injury and must show that the lack of such training amounts to

deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional violations. See id.

Plaintiffs’ failure-to-train claim is insufficient because they have not alleged facts showing that

Defendant WTPD acted with deliberate indifference. “Usually, ‘a pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees is necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of

failure to train.’ . . . This is because ‘[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular

respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause

violations of constitutional rights.’” Hargrove v. City of Phila., 671 F. Supp. 3d 595, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2023)

(quoting Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222, 223 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Plaintiffs have not put forth specific allegations of a pattern of similar constitutional violations

that would have put Defendant WTPD on notice of the consequences of its actions. Although Plaintiffs

assert that “Officer Daniel Dieter had a known history [of] excessive force and police brutality against

other members of the community,” they fail to show that Defendant WTPD was aware of this “practice”

and failed to do anything to prevent that outcome. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 22. Further, Plaintiffs have not

explained what specific training, supervision, or discipline would have prevented her injury. Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is deficient of facts which show deliberate indifference, an essential element of a

claim of municipal liability based on failure to train.

Accordingly, Count IV is dismissed without prejudice against Defendant WTPD. Pursuant to well

established law in the Third Circuit, Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend the Complaint as to Count

IV against Defendant WTPD.

c. Plaintiff Krasniqi’s State Created Danger Claim (Count VI) is Dismissed

According to the Third Circuit, the “state-created danger” exception allows for liability when

state actions directly harm an individual or leave them more exposed to harm from others than they would

have been without the state’s involvement. See Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir.

2006); see also Schieber v. City of Phila., 320 F.3d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 2003). To state a claim for state-

created danger under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must plausibly allege four

elements: “(1) [t]he harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a

degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff

existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete

class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a

member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that

created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not

acted at all.” Bright, 443 F.3d at 281 (citations omitted).

Here, in Plaintiffs Opposition, Plaintiffs attempt to satisfy each element of a state-created danger

claim, but in doing so rely on factual allegations that do not appear in the Complaint. Specifically,

Plaintiffs assert in their Opposition that Officer Dieter “attempt[ed] to forcibly seize [Ms. Krasniqi’s]

phone” and “shoved [Ms. Krasniqi] multiple times.” ECF No. 32-2 at p. 10. These allegations are absent

from the Complaint. Instead, the Complaint contains only conclusory assertions that Officer Dieter

“assaulted Plaintiff Afrdita Krasniqi in an effort to prevent her from recording the incident,” that she was

“physically shoved,” and that she was assaulted “multiple times.” ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 21, 72, 100. The

Complaint does not specifically allege that Officer Dieter shoved Ms. Krasniqi multiple times, nor does it

allege that he attempted to seize her phone. Such generalized and conclusory allegations of “assault,”

without supporting factual detail, are insufficient to permit the Court to determine whether Officer Dieter

affirmatively created a danger or rendered Ms. Krasniqi more vulnerable to harm for purposes of a state-

created danger claim.

Accordingly, Count VI is dismissed without prejudice. Consistent with well-established Third

Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Complaint as to Count VI.

d. Plaintiff Krasniqi’s Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Monell) Unconstitutional Policy,

Practice or Custom Claim (Count VIII) is Dismissed

Plaintiff Krasniqi brings a claim against Defendant WTPD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an

unconstitutional policy, practice or custom. Defendant WTPD has moved to dismiss Count VIII against

them on the ground Plaintiff Krasniqi has failed to establish a policy, practice, or custom exists to support

Monell liability. A § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed where “[a] plaintiff may put forth

that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries . . .” Forrest, 930

F.3d at 105 (citations omitted). Under this theory of liability, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a

custom or policy and demonstrate the “‘affirmative link between the policy or custom and the particular

constitutional violation [they] allege[].’” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir.

2019) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Policy is made when a

decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues

an official proclamation, policy, or edict,” and “[c]ustom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing

that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled

and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs fail to allege any policy or custom that Defendant WTPD has violated but instead

attempts to argue that the lack of a custom or policy resulted in Plaintiff Krasniqi being subjected to

“excessive force and a deprivation of her clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments.” ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 83-84. The lack of identification of a policy, custom, or

practice is insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability as Plaintiffs have not “‘specif[ied] what

exactly that custom or policy was’” that allegedly caused the violation of her constitutional rights. Carr v.

City of Phila., 560 F. Supp. 3d 845, 849 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d

636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy,

and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.”)) (emphasis added).

“Where a complaint contains only conclusory allegations, it ‘fail[s] to satisfy the ‘rigorous

standards of culpability and causation’ required for municipal liability.’” Leathers, 2025 WL 327313, at

*5 (quoting Young v. City of Chester 764 F. App’x 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2019)); see Oliver v. City of Phila.,

2025 WL 1902298, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636,

659 (3d Cir. 2009)) (“Allegations that ‘simply paraphrase[]’ the standard for municipal liability are too

vague and generalized to support a Monell claim.”).

Therefore, Count VIII is dismissed without prejudice against Defendant WTPD. Again, pursuant

to well established law in the Third Circuit, Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend their Complaint as to

Count VIII against Defendant WTPD.

e. This Court Declines to Exercise Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State Law Claims

(Counts X, XI, and XIII)

This Court initially had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a), which provides supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “within such original jurisdiction

that they form part of the same case or controversy.” After dismissing Counts II, IV, VI, and VIII, the

only claims that remain are the state law claims against Defendants Dieter and WTPD which allege

“Negligent Assault and Battery” (Count X), Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count XI), and

Loss of Consortium (Count XIII). At this point, as the federal claims have been dismissed, this Court

exercises its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as

there is no affirmative justification to do otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“district courts may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); see also Stone v. Martin, 720 F. App’x 132,

135 (3d Cir. 2017) (directing that district courts “must decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in

such circumstances unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties

provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the remaining state law claims

are dismissed without prejudice. 4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29) is granted in its

entirety. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John M. Gallagher

JOHN M. GALLAGHER

United States District Court Judge

4 Further, since none of Plaintiffs’ claims survive this motion to dismiss, the Court will not address

Defendants’ claims of qualified immunity.