United States v. Jerome Brown

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 23-3184

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEROME BROWN, a/k/a Jerome F Brown,

Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 2:21-cr-00374-001)

District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan

__________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on February 3, 2025

Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 6, 2026)

Donovan J. Cocas

Laura S. Irwin

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

Western District of Pennsylvania

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellee

Ray Kim

Renee Pietropaolo

OFFICE OF FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Western District of Pennsylvania

1001 Liberty Avenue

1500 Liberty Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellant

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OPINION OF THE COURT

_________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

A plea agreement is a negotiated contract between the Government and a

defendant.1 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs criminal pleas

and expressly forbids judicial participation in plea negotiations.2 But improper judicial

participation is not enough to vacate a plea. A defendant must also show that, as a result,

he suffered prejudice.3 Although the District Court improperly intervened in the parties’

plea negotiations, we will affirm because Brown cannot show a violation of his substantial

rights.

I.

Jerome Brown was indicted for drug trafficking and illegally possessing a firearm

after law enforcement raided his car, home, and storage unit as part of a drug-trafficking

investigation near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Police found over 13 kilos of fentanyl, a

handgun, and ammunition, as well as $136,000 in cash. Shortly after his arrest, Brown

1

United States v. Cruz, 95 F.4th 106, 110 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing United States v.

Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989)).

2

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in [plea agreement]

discussions.”).

3

United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 612 (2013) (“Davila I”).

2

confessed. Instead of going to trial, Brown entered into plea negotiations with the

Government.

The parties presented two different stipulated plea agreements to the District Court.

In the first plea agreement, the parties negotiated the mandatory minimum sentence of 180

months’ imprisonment. But the District Court rejected the plea, finding the sentence to be

inconsistent with the guidelines4 and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). So,

Brown withdrew his plea.

The parties went back to the drawing board to negotiate a second plea agreement.

The new agreement proposed a sentence of 198 months—18 months longer than the

original deal. Instead of simply rejecting the plea as permitted under Rule 11,5 the District

Court proposed its own “sentence [of] no greater than 235 months.”6 Brown postponed his

scheduled change-of-plea and filed a supplemental memorandum to address the District

Court’s continued concerns. But the District Court remained doubtful and reiterated its

proposed sentence of 235 months.

The Government and Brown proceeded to request a sentence of 198 months, noting

Brown’s early cooperation and acceptance of responsibility. Ultimately, the District Court

rejected the second plea and presented Brown with three options: (1) try to renegotiate a

third plea agreement; (2) enter an open guilty plea with the promise of a sentence not less

4

Given Brown’s criminal history and the charges, his Sentencing Guidelines range was

292–365 months imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of 180 months’

imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(2), 4B1.1(b).

5

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3), (5).

6

JA 140.

3

than 235 months; or (3) go to trial. After discussing the options with his attorney, Brown

chose to proceed directly to an open plea with the understanding of the District Court’s

position.7 His plea was knowing and voluntary, and he ultimately received a sentence of

235 months’ imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. This appeal

followed.

II.8

Brown argues that the District Court’s promise of a sentence of not less than 235

months violated Rule 11(c)(1), which should result in a vacatur of his plea. To resolve this

issue, we must decide two questions: First, did the District Court violate Rule 11(c)(1)? If

so, can Brown show substantial prejudice because of the violation? Because he failed to

raise the objection below, we review for plain error.9

Rule 11’s mandate against judicial participation in plea negotiations is clear: “The

court must not participate in these discussions.”10 Such interference raises concerns for

7

JA 180 (“Mr. Brown is prepared to proceed with a change of plea without a plea

agreement today in light of the Court’s, I guess, preliminary ruling on the plea agreement

and proceed without a plea and just do an open plea to Counts One and Two of the

indictment.”).

8

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court has appellate

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

9

See United States v. Davila, 749 F.3d 982, 993 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Davila II”) (finding

that plain-error review applies when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object to a

Rule (11)(c)(1) violation); see also United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 519 (3d Cir.

2010) (“To succeed under this standard of review, a defendant must demonstrate that (1)

the asserted violation of Rule 11(c)(1) was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error

affected the defendant’s substantial rights; if these three conditions are met, than a court

may exercise its discretion to notice the forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (internal

quotation and citations omitted)).

10

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added).

4

coerced guilty pleas and strips the process of judicial neutrality. The Supreme Court has

recognized that the prohibition was adopted “out of concern that a defendant might be

induced to plead guilty rather than risk displeasing the judge who would preside at trial.”11

The District Court unquestionably violated Rule 11(c)(1)’s bright-line rule

prohibiting judicial interference. Here, the violation is straightforward: the court engaged

in plea negotiations and induced Brown to accept a plea of not less than 235 months. On

more than one occasion, the District Court proposed its own sentence and therefore

unquestionably “took the lead in orchestrating the plea agreement ultimately entered into

by [Brown] and the government”12—a point the Government concedes.13 But the District

Court’s error alone is not enough to vacate Brown’s plea,14 as he suggests. Brown must

also show that “the error affected [his] substantial rights.”15 He bears the burden of making

this showing yet fails to meet this burden. Indeed, in his briefing before the panel, he never

claimed that he would have rejected a 235-month sentence if the government had offered

it.

Instead, the record demonstrates Brown’s consistent intent to plead guilty on

whatever terms he could get. From the outset, Brown admitted the drugs belonged to him,

reaffirming that admission under oath at his guilty plea. Before the District Court rejected

the second plea agreement, both parties made it clear that Brown intended to plead guilty.

11

Davila I, 569 U.S. at 606.

12

United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014).

13

See Appellee’s Br. at 23 (“[T]he United States believes that the court’s Rule 11(c)(1)

violation in Brown’s case is obvious.”).

14

See Davila I, 569 U.S. at 609–10

15

Brown, 595 F.3d at 519.

5

Brown’s attorney told the District Court, “He intends to plead guilty today. He intends to,

like he did on the day of his arrest, to accept full responsibility for his actions and he

understands the gravity of this offense . . . .”16 Likewise, the prosecutor urged the District

Court to accept the below-guideline sentence due to Brown’s “very early”17 cooperation:

“[W]ithin six months of this all happening, Mr. Brown said, I’ll plead guilty, I’ll go away

with the plea agreement for 15 years.”18 The parties shared a mutual understanding from

the beginning, one that Brown did not refute: “it was relatively clear this would be a plea,

that Mr. Brown was not really going to fight this.”19 Because Brown has not borne his

burden of showing that the error affected his substantial rights by resulting in a heavier

sentence, we must affirm despite the District Court’s violation of Rule 11(c)(1).

III.

Alternatively, Brown also argues that his plea must be vacated because 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. But we need not address this argument, because our

precedent is clear: Ҥ 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to convicts on parole or

probation”20 and “[a] convict completing his sentence on supervised release does not have

a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.”21 Because Brown was on probation at

the time of the offense, he does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.

16

JA 157.

17

JA 173.

18

JA 174.

19

JA 177.

20

United States v. Quailes, 126 F.4th 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2025).

21

United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2024).

6

IV.

The District Court erred by violating Rule 11(c)(1) when participating in plea

negotiations. But the error did not affect Brown’s substantial rights, so we will affirm.

7