"The Discipline of the United Methodist Church is a religious document which this court cannot construe without usurping the rights of the UMC to construe its own law."
How later courts described this case
- "The Discipline of the United Methodist Church is a religious document which this court cannot construe without usurping the rights of the UMC to construe its own law."
- directing a trial court to "follow the 'neutral-principles- of-law' approach and examine the deeds, the Book of Discipline, and other extrinsic evidence to help settle the current property dispute"
- discussing the shortcomings of the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)
- "[A]djudication of Mills' claims would require this court to interpret various sections of the Book of Discipline, a constitutionally questionable endeavor at best, given the religious nature of the text."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Rel: March 6, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________
SC-2025-0347
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Mt. Zion of Autauga County, Inc.
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
(Autauga Circuit Court: CV-24-900221)
_________________________
SC-2025-0361
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Coffeeville Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Clarke Circuit Court: CV-24-900118)
_________________________
SC-2025-0367
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
2
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Armstrong Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Macon Circuit Court: CV-24-900141)
_________________________
SC-2025-0426
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Daleville First Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
3
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
(Dale Circuit Court: CV-24-900175)
_________________________
SC-2025-0431
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: United Methodist Church Westview Heights, Inc.
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Dale Circuit Court: CV-24-900170)
_________________________
SC-2025-0439
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
4
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Ham Chapel Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Coffee Circuit Court: CV-24-900035)
_________________________
SC-2025-0442
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Crawford Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
5
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
(Russell Circuit Court: CV-24-900269)
_________________________
SC-2025-0445
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Elba United Methodist Church, Inc.
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Coffee Circuit Court: CV-24-900032)
_________________________
SC-2025-0462
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
6
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Highland Park Methodist Church of Dothan
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Houston Circuit Court: CV-24-900521)
_________________________
SC-2025-0483
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Baggett Chapel United Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
7
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
(Conecuh Circuit Court: CV-24-900088)
_________________________
SC-2025-0514
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Pleasant Hill Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Dale Circuit Court: CV-24-900169)
_________________________
SC-2025-0543
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
8
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Trinity United Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Autauga Circuit Court: CV-24-900224)
_________________________
SC-2025-0643
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Gold Hill Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
9
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
(Lee Circuit Court: CV-24-900550)
_________________________
SC-2025-0720
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Sunflower United Methodist Church, Inc.
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Washington Circuit Court: CV-24-900024)
_________________________
SC-2025-0851
_________________________
Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc.
10
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Theodore United Methodist Church
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., and the Board of Trustees of the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.)
(Mobile Circuit Court: CV-24-902829)
SELLERS, Justice.1
The Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc. ("the Conference"), and its board of trustees have petitioned
this Court for writs of mandamus directing the trial courts in 15 separate
civil actions to vacate orders that dismissed counterclaims raised by the
Conference and its board of trustees. We issue the writs.
Fifteen local United Methodist Church congregations throughout
Alabama ("the local churches") commenced civil actions against the
Conference, seeking to quiet title to real property on which the local
1These cases were originally assigned to another Justice on this
Court; they were reassigned to Justice Sellers on December 5, 2025.
11
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
churches are located, conduct worship services, and facilitate other
church activities.2 The Conference's board of trustees joined in the
actions and, along with the Conference, filed counterclaims in each
action, seeking judgments declaring that the real property at issue is
owned not by the local churches but instead by the Conference's board of
trustees or is held in trust by the local churches for the benefit of the
board of trustees and/or the Conference.
The local churches filed motions to dismiss the counterclaims,
arguing that the trial court in each action lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over those counterclaims. The trial courts granted the local
churches' motions to dismiss, and the Conference and its board of
2The local churches are: Mt. Zion of Autauga County, Inc.;
Coffeeville Methodist Church; Armstrong Methodist Church; Daleville
First Methodist Church; United Methodist Church Westview Heights,
Inc.; Ham Chapel Methodist Church; Crawford Methodist Church; Elba
United Methodist Church, Inc.; Highland Park Methodist Church of
Dothan; Baggett Chapel United Methodist Church; Pleasant Hill
Methodist Church; Trinity United Methodist Church; Gold Hill
Methodist Church; Sunflower United Methodist Church, Inc.; and
Theodore United Methodist Church.
12
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
trustees ("the petitioners") filed the present mandamus petitions, which
were consolidated for our review.
In their motions to dismiss the petitioners' counterclaims, the local
churches argued that the trial courts lack jurisdiction over those
counterclaims based on the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, which "is
grounded in the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution" and "prohibits
civil courts from adjudicating disputes concerning spiritual or
ecclesiastical matters." Ex parte Alabama-W. Fla. Conf. of United
Methodist Church, Inc., 401 So. 3d 1123, 1126 (Ala. 2024) ("Harvest
Church"). According to the petitioners, however, the trial courts in these
actions must resolve the petitioners' counterclaims because, the
petitioners say, those counterclaims do not raise spiritual or
ecclesiastical disputes and instead can be resolved based on "neutral
principles of law." Id. at 1133.3
3In support of their claims to the real property at issue, the
petitioners rely on what they describe as secular real-property materials,
such as deeds, corporate documents, and trust provisions. The parties
have described the 15 independent civil actions involved in these
13
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
As an initial matter, the local churches oppose the idea that a
mandamus petition is a proper procedural vehicle for challenging the
trial courts' orders dismissing the petitioners' counterclaims; they claim
that an appeal in each action will suffice. But it is undisputed that the
local churches' motions to dismiss and the petitioners' mandamus
petitions present an issue of the trial courts' jurisdiction, and the parties
agree that, generally speaking, issues of subject-matter jurisdiction are
properly considered in mandamus proceedings. See Ex parte Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala. 2003) ("The question of
subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus."); Ex parte Alabama-W. Fla. Conf. of United Methodist
Church, Inc., [Ms. SC-2025-0259, Oct. 31, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
2025) ("Auburn Methodist Coalition") (indicating that the ecclesiastical-
abstention doctrine implicates a court's jurisdiction and considering a
mandamus petition in a dispute over church property).
mandamus proceedings as being practically "identical," and there does
not appear to be any assertion that 1 or more of the 15 actions should be
treated any differently than the others for purposes of the mandamus
petitions.
14
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
The local churches, however, suggest that mandamus review of
subject-matter jurisdiction is available only when a trial court has denied
a motion to dismiss that is based on an alleged lack of jurisdiction and
that this Court will not consider a mandamus petition challenging a trial
court's granting a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction.
According to the local churches, appeals after final judgments on the local
churches' quiet-title claims, which remain pending below in the early
stages of litigation, will be adequate means for the petitioners to
eventually challenge the trial courts' alleged errors in granting the local
churches' motions to dismiss. See, generally, Ex parte Cassimus, [Ms.
SC-2024-0284, Mar. 7, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2025) (noting that
the "general rule" is that mandamus will not lie from an order granting
a motion to dismiss).
The local churches rely on Cassimus and Ex parte Lindsey, 298 So.
3d 1061, 1064 (Ala. 2020), two cases in which this Court declined to
consider mandamus petitions challenging trial courts' judgments
dismissing actions. But Cassimus, which involved facts substantially
different than those of the present cases, considered a trial court's
15
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Alabama's abatement statute,
§ 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, which does not appear to be an issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction. See Baldwin Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCain, 260 So. 3d 801,
810 (Ala. 2018) (explaining that abatement is a waivable defense that is
not grounded on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Lindsey involved
a trial court's dismissal of some of the plaintiff's theories of liability in a
legal-malpractice action because those theories failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Lindsey did not involve questions of
subject-matter jurisdiction.4
The local churches candidly acknowledge the existence of one case
in which this Court at least suggested that a mandamus petition can be
4The local churches also provide a citation to Finley v. Jenkins, 264
Ala. 536, 88 So. 2d 329 (1955), which they assert held that mandamus
review was unavailable because the trial court's "determination [in
Finley] that it had no jurisdiction was a valid judgment for which appeal
was 'a clear and adequate remedy.' " The local churches' brief at 10
(emphasis omitted). The Court in Finley, however, held that a
mandamus petition filed in a circuit court, which challenged a judgment
of the "Intermediate Civil Court of Birmingham" dismissing an action for
lack of jurisdiction, was unavailable because the judgment of dismissal
was not interlocutory and was instead a final judgment that would have
supported an immediate appeal. Finley is not very helpful in the present
cases.
16
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
a proper method for challenging a trial court's refusal to exercise
jurisdiction over an action. See Ex parte Owens, 533 So. 2d 617 (Ala.
1988) (acknowledged by the local churches as affirming the Court of Civil
Appeals' issuance of a writ of mandamus directing a circuit court to
exercise jurisdiction over an action seeking compensation for property
damage resulting from a railroad-crossing accident). For their part, the
petitioners point to additional precedent that, they say, supports their
position that appellate courts can consider mandamus petitions
challenging a trial court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction. See Ex parte
Hoye, 324 So. 3d 1271 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (issuing a writ of mandamus
and directing the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction to enforce a
settlement agreement in a divorce case); Ex parte Jones, 896 So. 2d 553
(Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (issuing a writ of mandamus and directing the
family-relations division of a circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over a
paternity dispute in a divorce case). The petitioners also cite the Court
of Civil Appeals' decision in Ex parte CSX Transportation, Inc., 533 So.
2d 613 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987), in which that court issued a writ of
mandamus directing a trial court to exercise jurisdiction over an action.
17
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
The Court of Civil Appeals' decision in CSX Transportation was the
decision that this Court affirmed in Ex parte Owens, supra.
Notwithstanding the general rule that interlocutory judgments
dismissing some claims in an action typically are not reviewed by a
mandamus petition, our precedent does not create an absolute
prohibition on mandamus review of the granting of a motion to dismiss.
Simply because an issue implicated by an interlocutory order can
eventually be raised on appeal does not mean that it cannot be raised in
a mandamus petition. Ex parte Foremost Ins. Co., 403 So. 3d 142, 150-
52 (Ala. 2024). See also Ex parte Hodge, 153 So. 3d 734, 747-49 (Ala.
2014) (indicating that the availability of an eventual appeal does not
necessarily mean that that remedy is "adequate" for purposes of
determining the availability of mandamus relief and noting that,
"[a]lthough characterized as an extraordinary writ, this Court has
repeatedly recognized that mandamus may be appropriate in disputes
over subject-matter jurisdiction [and other specifically listed matters],"
id. at 749).
18
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
The petitioners note that, usually, when "a trial court grants a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the case is
typically over and therefore reviewed by way of a final appeal with no
need for a mandamus." Petitioners' reply brief at 15 (emphasis omitted).
But that is not the case here. In these consolidated cases, the petitioners'
compulsory counterclaims in 15 different actions were dismissed, while
the local churches' claims remain pending. The trial courts' orders
applied only to the compulsory counterclaims and did not effect a
dismissal of the actions that would give rise to appeals. If mandamus
relief is not available in these cases, the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction over the petitioners' counterclaims, which appear for the
most part to be allegedly supported by the same sort of secular materials
upon which the local churches rely in support of their quiet-title actions,
will not be considered until after the parties and the trial courts in each
action are, respectively, required to litigate and to preside over the local
churches' claims to their final resolution.
At play here is the substantial possibility of significantly wasting
the litigants' and the trial courts' time and resources. The unique
19
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
circumstances of these cases justify consideration of the jurisdictional
issue now. See Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d
880, 882 (Ala. 1983) (noting that, even in situations in which this Court
typically would not consider an issue via a mandamus petition, the Court
will do so when the issues "raise[] matters of substantial importance");
Ex parte Moore, 382 So. 2d 548, 550 (Ala. 1980) (" 'As a general rule,
mandamus does not lie where there is another plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available. The remedy which will supersede mandamus
may be described in general terms as one competent to afford relief on
the very subject matter in question, and which is equally convenient,
beneficial, and effectual. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 17(b).' " (citation
omitted)). Cf. Dorrough v. McKee, 264 Ala. 663, 667, 89 So. 2d 77, 80
(1956) ("We do not ordinarily entertain a petition or motion for
mandamus to review a ruling of the trial court on the sufficiency of a plea
in abatement, which is subject to review on appeal from a final decree.
But we have done so when adequate relief was not available on appeal
from the final decree.").
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will issue
20
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
" 'where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d
497, 499 (Ala. 1995)."
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So. 2d at 480.
"Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, Alabama courts may
not adjudicate disputes that are ecclesiastical in nature, including
matters of church doctrine, polity, or internal governance." Auburn
Methodist Coalition, ___ So. 3d at ___. Civil courts do, however, have the
power to resolve church-property disputes if they can be resolved
pursuant to "neutral principles of law." Harvest Church, 401 So. 3d at
1133. See also Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969) ("[N]ot every civil court decision as to property claimed by a
religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First
Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by
opening their doors to disputes involving church property.").
"The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right of civil courts
to decide disputes concerning church property in Presbyterian
21
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Church v. Mary E.B. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed. 2d 658 (1969) and in
Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 90 S.Ct. 499,
24 L.Ed. 2d 582 (1970). Both Hull and Sharpsburg clearly
indicate that civil courts have authority to decide disputes
concerning church property; however, civil courts cannot
resolve controversies involving religious doctrine or practice
in deciding such property disputes. In other words, the courts
must decide the property disputes by looking at so-called
'neutral principles of law' and not resolve the underlying
controversies over religious doctrine. Hull, 393 U.S. 440 at
449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed. 2d 658."
Trinity Presbyterian Church of Montgomery v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d
861, 865-66 (Ala. 1979).
"[U]nder the 'neutral principles of law' approach, civil courts
examine 'the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church
charters, the state statutes governing the holding of church property, and
the provisions in the constitution of the [denominational] church
concerning the ownership and control of church property.' " Harvest
Church, 401 So. 3d at 1132 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603
(1979)). Courts may " 'examine certain religious documents, such as a
church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the [denominational]
church,' " as long as courts " 'take special care to scrutinize the document
22
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts.' " Id.
(quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 604). Accordingly, a plurality opinion of this
Court in Haney's Chapel United Methodist Church v. United Methodist
Church, 716 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. 1998), recognized that Alabama
courts "will consider, in purely secular terms, the language of the deeds,
the charter of the local church, any applicable state statutes, and any
relevant provisions contained in the discipline of the national church as
a means of adjudicating the dispute." See also Ex parte Central Alabama
Conf., African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in Am., 860 So. 2d 865,
869 (Ala. 2003) (directing a trial court to "follow the 'neutral-principles-
of-law' approach and examine the deeds, the Book of Discipline, and other
extrinsic evidence to help settle the current property dispute").
In the present cases, the petitioners rely on secular materials in
support of their counterclaims, which appear to be the same secular
materials upon which the local churches themselves rely in support of
their quiet-title claims.5 It is true that the petitioners also point to trust
5As the petitioners point out, because the petitioners and the local
churches rely for the most part on the same or similar materials in
23
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
provisions set out in the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline,
which is the governing document of the United Methodist Church. But
that does not transform these actions from standard real-property
disputes to ecclesiastical disputes. Harvest Church, 401 So. 3d at 1133
("[T]he fact that a civil court must review ' "the language of the deeds, the
charter of the local church, any applicable state statutes, and any
relevant provisions in the discipline of the national church" ' does not
transform a controversy over church property into a dispute over issues
of ' "religious practice or doctrine." ' " (quoting Ex parte African Methodist
Episcopal Zion Church, 860 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Ala. 2003), quoting in
turn Central Alabama Conf. of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion
Church in Am. v. Crum, 746 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999))).
The petitioners' counterclaims, to the extent that they rely on the Book
of Discipline, do not appear to require resolution of a dispute over
support of their respective claims to the real property at issue and the
competing claims in each action rely on the same operative facts, the trial
courts' exercise of jurisdiction over the local churches' quiet-title claims
would seem to conflict with the refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the
petitioners' counterclaims.
24
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
doctrinal or ecclesiastical matters. Instead, the petitioners rely on
provisions of the Book of Discipline that, they say, call for the real
property at issue to be held in trust and that are referenced or implicated
by deeds and other secular legal documents. In construing those
provisions, the trial courts are required to examine and resolve issues of
real-property and trust law, not issues of an ecclesiastical or spiritual
nature. See, generally, Harvest Church, 401 So. 3d at 1132
(acknowledging that the neutral-principles-of-law approach "permits
'civil court[s] to examine certain religious documents, such as a church
constitution, for language of trust in favor of the [denominational]
church' but caution[ing] that 'civil court[s] must take special care to
scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on
religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that
the parties have intended to create a trust' " (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at
604)).6
6Thus, notwithstanding the involvement of religious entities and
associations, these actions essentially are ordinary quiet-title actions,
which are "frequently used to fix and determine the status of title to land
where some doubt or unasserted claim exists." 1 Jesse P. Evans III & J.
25
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery v. Alabama-
West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., 411 So.
3d 328 (Ala. 2024), does not call for a different conclusion. In that case,
Price Evans IV, Alabama Property Rights and Remedies § 10.6[a], p. 10-
56 (6th ed. 2024). Relevant statutes provide that quiet-title actions may
be commenced by plaintiffs who claim an interest in land. §§ 6-6-540 and
6-6-560, Ala. Code 1975. The plaintiff in such an action must identify
any persons or entities known to claim competing interests in the land
and name them as defendants. §§ 6-6-541 and 6-6-561, Ala. Code 1975.
Defendants may answer the plaintiff's claim of interest in the land and
may file counterclaims. §§ 6-5-542 and 6-5-565, Ala. Code 1975. The
court in such an action must then adjudge which party or parties have
ownership interests in the land, and that judgment is binding on the
parties to the action. §§ 6-5-543 and 6-5-569, Ala. Code 1975. See
Alabama Property Rights and Remedies, supra, at § 10.11, p. 10-109
("The judgment should establish, fix, and determine the ownership of the
plaintiff or defendant and should describe the property with
particularity."). See also Pogue v. White Stone Baptist Church, 554 So.
2d 981, 983 (Ala. 1989) (involving a real-property dispute between an
individual and a church, both of whom claimed ownership of the property,
and concluding that, "[a]lthough the plaintiff did not present the evidence
necessary to meet the statutory prerequisites of a quiet title action, the
defendant Church did, in its response, clearly present evidence that
entitled it to a judgment, as a matter of law, quieting title in it [based on
a deed or on principles of adverse possession]"). Thus, the relevant
statutes contemplate that, upon commencement of these actions by the
local churches, the petitioners were entitled to make their own claims of
ownership interests in the lands in question based upon secular
interpretations of the deeds and other materials that may be submitted
to the trial courts.
26
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
several local churches filed suit against the Conference, seeking a
judgment directing the Conference to allow the local churches to vote to
disaffiliate from the United Methodist Church and to retain the real
property used by the local churches for worship services and other church
activities. The local churches' claims were entirely grounded on a
particular provision in the Book of Discipline.
"Under the Book of Discipline – the [United Methodist
Church's] governing document -- the general rule is that a
local church may disaffiliate but the [United Methodist
Church] retains title to the associated church property.
Nevertheless, in 2019, amid increasing strife between local
churches and the [United Methodist Church] over issues of
sexuality, the [United Methodist Church] created an
exception to that rule by enacting ¶ 2553 [of the Book of
Discipline]. Under that provision, the [United Methodist
Church] gave local churches a 'limited right' to vote to
disaffiliate from the [United Methodist Church] and retain
their property if they were disaffiliating 'for reasons of
conscience' related to 'the practice of homosexuality or the
ordination or marriage of self-avowed practicing
homosexuals.' "
411 So. 3d at 329-30. At some point before the local churches in
Aldersgate sued, the Conference enacted an additional provision
requiring local churches to submit "eligibility statements" setting out the
"reasons of conscience" underlying the local churches' desire to
27
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
disaffiliate. Id. Because judicial resolution of the action in Aldersgate
would have required courts to resolve disputes of spiritual or
ecclesiastical matters, subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking.
"In order to grant the churches the relief they seek -- the
right to vote on disaffiliation -- the trial court would have to
survey the [United Methodist Church's ecclesiastical
tribunal's] ecclesiastical decisions, interpret the doctrinal
scope of ¶ 2553 of the Book of Discipline, and review
Conference determinations about the religious adequacy of
the churches' eligibility statements. That is, to decide any
property questions, the trial court would have to adjudicate
whether each of the churches had adequate 'reasons of
conscience regarding ... the practice of homosexuality or the
ordination or marriage of self-avowed practicing
homosexuals.' ¶ 2553. Resolving those issues would
'inherently entail inquiry ... into the substantive criteria by
which [courts] are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical
question' -- whether the churches' reasons of conscience were
sufficient for disaffiliation under ¶ 2553."
411 So. 3d at 331 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United
Sates & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)).
In Aldersgate, the local churches "exclusively relied on ¶ 2553 [of
the Book of Discipline], which they acknowledged is based on
ecclesiastical matters." Id. at 333. In contrast, the petitioners in the
28
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
present cases offer secular, not ecclesiastical, arguments and evidence in
support of their counterclaims. As the petitioners point out:
"In contrast [to Aldersgate], in this case, [the local
churches] seek[] to quiet title to the property based on the
deed[s]. Likewise, Petitioners seek in their Counterclaims to
quiet title to the same property based on language in the same
deed[s] and other records. Petitioners' Counterclaims
reference relevant provisions of the Book of Discipline only as
they provide a basis for the grantor[s'] inclusion of the trust
language in the deed[s], but the Counterclaims most certainly
do not rely exclusively on the Book of Discipline's provisions.
Unlike the claims in Aldersgate, the Counterclaims here do
not request any interpretation of any ecclesiastical issue in
the Book of Discipline; rather, they simply seek to quiet title
or a declaratory judgment regarding the Subject Property
based on real property records."
Mandamus petition in case no. SC-2025-0347 at 27 (citations to
supporting materials omitted).
These actions are not analogous to Aldersgate, in which resolution
of the dispositive issue turned on answering a purely ecclesiastical
question. Rather, the present actions are more in line with cases like
Harvest Church and the precedent discussed therein, in which disputes
over church-related property could be resolved based on secular legal
principles.
29
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
The trial courts in these cases dismissed only the petitioners'
counter arguments against the local churches' claims, made in the form
of counterclaims supporting the petitioners' alleged interests in the real
property at issue. The dismissal orders were inappropriate in actions
seeking to quiet title, in which the issue to be decided is the ownership of
property among competing claimants. Such actions contemplate that all
parties claiming an interest in the real property in dispute will offer
arguments and evidence to support their claimed superior interests in
the property. Here, the trial courts' orders dismissing the petitioners'
counterclaims will prevent the petitioners from proving their alleged
superior claims of ownership while allowing the local churches to pursue
their claims essentially unchallenged.
The trial courts erred in granting the local churches' motions to
dismiss the petitioners' counterclaims based on an alleged lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we grant the petitions for the writ of
mandamus and direct the trial courts to vacate the orders dismissing the
petitioners' counterclaims.
SC-2025-0347 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
30
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
SC-2025-0361 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0367 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0426 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0431 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0439 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0442 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0445 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0462 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0483 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0514 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0543 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0643 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0720 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
SC-2025-0851 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cook, J., concurs.
McCool, J., and Edwards and Minor, Special Justices,* concur in
the result.
Bryan, Acting C.J.,* and Mendheim, J., dissent, with opinions.
31
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, and Parker, JJ., recuse themselves.
*Because four members of the Alabama Supreme Court, including
the Chief Justice, recused themselves, on November 19, 2025, Acting
Chief Justice Bryan appointed Judge Christy O. Edwards of the Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals and Judge Richard J. Minor of the Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals to serve as Special Justices in these mandamus
proceedings.
32
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
BRYAN, Acting Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to issue the writs of
mandamus in these cases. The main opinion concludes that the
"counterclaims" asserted by the Alabama-West Florida Conference of the
United Methodist Church, Inc., and its board of trustees ("the
petitioners") do not present ecclesiastical concerns that deprive the trial
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over their counterclaims. I agree
with that conclusion.
However, as also explained in the main opinion, the only ground for
mandamus review cited by the petitioners is their argument that the
circumstances present an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.7 See Ex
parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala. 2003)("The
question of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a
writ of mandamus."). Obviously, this asserted basis for this Court's
7As the main opinion also notes, the petitioners' reply brief includes
additional argument and citations to authority regarding the availability
of mandamus review in these circumstances. However, " ' "we will not
consider an issue not raised in a [petitioner]'s initial brief, but raised only
in its reply brief." ' " Ex parte Burkes Mech., Inc., 306 So. 3d 1, 7 (Ala.
2019)(citations omitted).
33
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
mandamus review contradicts the petitioners' argument that their
counterclaims do not actually present an issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction. In other words, both of the petitioners' arguments cannot be
true.
This tension arises from the fact that, although this Court routinely
issues the writ of mandamus to stop a trial court from considering a claim
when the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim, we
do not frequently use the writ to require a trial court to consider a claim
when the trial court has determined that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to do so. The two scenarios present different problems.
When a trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim,
the trial-court judge, as an official, has a ministerial " 'imperative duty' "
to dismiss the claim and cannot refuse to do so. See Ex parte Liberty
Nat'l, 888 So. 2d at 480 (citation omitted). See also State v. Property at
2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999)(" 'Lacking subject
matter jurisdiction [a court] may take no action other than to exercise its
power to dismiss the action. ... Any other action taken by a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction is null and void.' " (citation omitted)); and
34
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
State v. Webber, 892 So. 2d 869, 871 (Ala. 2004)("The petition for a writ
of mandamus, if meritorious, merely prompts the appellate court to
exercise its supervisory power to tell the trial judge, as an official, as
distinguished from the trial court itself, to do his or her duty when that
duty is so clear that there are no two ways about it.").
By contrast, when a trial-court judge dismisses a claim based on a
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, such orders do not generally reflect a
similar " 'refusal to' " perform " 'an imperative duty' " by the trial-court
judge. See Ex parte Liberty Nat'l, 888 So. 2d at 480 (citation omitted).
In fact, by dismissing a claim on such grounds, the trial-court judge has,
in effect, decided the opposite -- that he or she has no choice but to dismiss
the claim. The trial-court judge may be wrong about that determination,
but
"[m]andamus is an extraordinary remedy and should not be
granted unless the petitioner's right to relief is clear and there
is no other adequate remedy. Ex parte Army Aviation Center
Federal Credit Union, 477 So. 2d 379 (Ala. 1985). The right
sought to be enforced must be a matter of peremptory duty
and not a matter of judicial discretion. Bank of Heflin v.
Miles, 294 Ala. 462, 318 So. 2d 697 (1975). The remedy of
mandamus will not lie to compel a trial court to exercise its
discretion in a particular manner, nor to review the trial
35
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
court's proceedings for error, nor as a substitute for appeal.
Ex parte Hooper, 453 So. 2d 1066 (Ala. 1984)."
Ex parte Rogers, 533 So. 2d 245, 246 (Ala. 1988).
As the main opinion notes, an appeal from a final judgment is
normally an adequate remedy when a trial court dismisses an action
based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, the writ of
mandamus is not needed for those situations. Ex parte Rogers, 533 So.
2d at 246.
Nevertheless, it remains possible that, as in these cases, trial courts
will sometimes enter interlocutory orders dismissing claims or
counterclaims that the trial court has determined it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate. However, the concern presented by that
scenario generally tends to be one of imperfect judicial economy and not
the impermissible use of judicial power. See ____ So. 3d at ____ ("At play
here is the substantial possibility of significantly wasting the litigants'
and the trial courts' time and resources.").
I acknowledge that, as recently as 2007, this Court has stated that
" '[m]andamus is "proper to compel a court to perform ministerial duties
36
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
and to entertain jurisdiction." ' " Cottrell v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 975 So. 2d 306, 354 (Ala. 2007)(quoting Ex parte Little, 837 So. 2d
822, 824 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn State v. Cannon, 369 So. 2d 32, 33
(Ala. 1979))(emphasis added). However, the petitioners have not
discussed this Court's precedent articulating that proposition or
explained when it is appropriately applied. " '[I]t is not the function of
this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal
arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not
supported by sufficient authority or argument.' Dykes v. Lane Trucking,
Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)." Ex parte Guaranty Pest Control,
Inc., 21 So. 3d 1222, 1228 (Ala. 2009).
In that same vein, I note that this Court does also issue the writ of
mandamus to address efficiency concerns in certain contexts. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 845 So. 2d 773, 776 (Ala.
2002)("[G]overned by the particular concerns of judicial economy raised
by the scenario involved here -- a trial court's pretrial decision to strike a
potentially determinative affirmative defense -- we have previously
issued the writ after holding that the trial court's decision was erroneous,
37
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
focusing mainly on the inherent prejudice on the petitioner."). However,
it is the petitioners' burden to demonstrate that these cases fall into one
of those categories. See Ex parte TruckMax, Inc., 381 So. 3d 1116, 1121
(Ala. 2023)("It is [the petitioner]'s burden to establish that such relief is
appropriate here.").
Rather than identify an appropriate use of the writ of mandamus
established by this Court, the petitioners have inconsistently argued that
these cases present an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not really.
I do not regard that argument as sufficient to meet their burden under
these circumstances. See Ex parte TruckMax, 381 So. 3d at 1120 n.2 ("By
providing a citation to one case in which this Court engaged in
mandamus review with respect to a trial court's ruling on a motion for
leave to amend an answer to raise a previously omitted affirmative
defense, [the petitioner] has not demonstrated that it is 'well established
that the issue being raised [in this case] is appropriate for mandamus
review.' [Ex parte] Gulf Health Hosps.[, Inc.], 321 So. 3d [629,] 632 [(Ala.
2020)].").
38
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Accordingly, I would deny the petitions for the writ of mandamus
in these cases. Therefore, I dissent.
39
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting).
In my view, the counterclaims asserted by the Alabama-West
Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., and its board
of trustees ("the Conference") ask our courts to wade into a doctrinal
principle of the United Methodist Church ("UMC") under the guise of
legal terminology. I understand the main opinion's desire to be helpful in
resolving these disputes, but we cannot do so without entangling the
courts in matters that are best left to the moral judgments of the parties
involved. Along the way, the main opinion adopts concepts and follows
precedents with respect to church disputes that I previously have noted
to be erroneous. For all those reasons, I dissent.
The main opinion begins by concluding that a mandamus petition
is a proper procedural vehicle for challenging the trial courts' orders
dismissing the counterclaims brought by the Conference against the
plaintiff churches. I agree with that conclusion, but I disagree with the
main opinion's reasoning that the churches' motions to dismiss implicate
subject-matter jurisdiction.
40
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
As I explained in my special writing in Sails v. Weeks, 401 So. 3d
1109, 1109 (Ala. 2024) (Mendheim, J., concurring specially),
ecclesiastical abstention is not synonymous with subject-matter
jurisdiction. See id. at 1116. That should be obvious from the terminology
employed: "abstention" necessarily means that courts avoid the issue
involved for particular reasons, not that courts lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over that type of case. See, e.g., Winkler v. Marist Fathers of
Detroit, Inc., 500 Mich. 327, 337, 901 N.W.2d 566, 572-73 (2017) ("As its
origins and operation make clear, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
informs how civil courts must adjudicate claims involving ecclesiastical
questions; it does not deprive those courts of subject matter jurisdiction
over such claims."); St. Joseph Catholic Orphan Soc'y v. Edwards, 449
S.W.3d 727, 736-37 (Ky. 2014) ("That all cases where ecclesiastical
abstention applies have similar characteristics, namely that they involve
ecclesiastical issues, does not render them a type of case any more than
cases invoking qualified governmental immunity are a case type for
purposes of precluding circuit-court jurisdiction. We, therefore, conclude
that ecclesiastical abstention does not divest Kentucky courts of subject-
41
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
matter jurisdiction because it does not render our courts unable to hear
types of cases, only specific cases pervaded by religious issues.").
Because this is a delicate area of law that often involves a mixture
of civil and ecclesiastical matters, not black-and-white jurisdictional
determinations,8 it is entirely possible for courts to conclude that they
may consider certain claims but not others because of distinctions based
on evidence or arguments. Indeed, the churches do not rely on the exact
same materials in support of their claims to the subject properties that
are relied upon by the Conference. The whole thrust of the churches'
motions to dismiss is that the Conference's counterclaims centrally rely
on the so-called "trust clause" in the UMC's Book of Discipline for
asserting ownership of the properties, while the churches rely upon
certain statutory law, articles of incorporation, and deeds to the
properties. The churches' claims purposefully make no reference to the
8Cf. Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conf. of United Methodist
Church, Inc., 401 So. 3d 1123, 1144 (Ala. 2024) (Parker, C.J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result) (noting that "church-dispute cases
involving purely civil affairs rarely arise"; that "[o]n the contrary, cases
that appear to be civil in nature are often ecclesiastical"; and that "[i]t is
an area fraught with danger, and we should usually stay out").
42
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Book of Discipline because they believe that was this Court's problem
with the local churches' claims in Aldersgate United Methodist Church
of Montgomery v. Alabama-West Florida Conf. of United Methodist
Church, Inc., 411 So. 3d 328 (Ala. 2024) ("Aldersgate"). As Trinity United
Methodist Church's complaint expressly argued, citing Aldersgate: "The
Alabama Supreme Court has held that this Court may not review the
Book of Discipline in resolving secular property disputes and, rather,
must rely only on the secular documents (e.g. deeds, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, etc.) and may not consider a religious text, like the
Book of Discipline." The main opinion -- as I will discuss in more detail
later in this writing -- disagrees with that argument based on a statement
made in the plurality opinion in Haney's Chapel United Methodist
Church v. United Methodist Church, 716 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Ala 1998),
but the main opinion cannot deny that the Conference, unlike the
churches, relies on the Book of Discipline for its claims of ownership of
the subject properties. Thus, the trial courts' rulings on the churches'
motions to dismiss were not incongruous with their exercise of
jurisdiction over the churches' claims; they simply made a legal
43
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
distinction based on the arguments and evidence presented by the parties
-- a distinction the main opinion -- erroneously, I believe -- finds
inconsequential.
But the main opinion's crucial conceptual misstep is its insistence
that we may resolve these disputes because we are able to use "neutral
principles of law." That conclusion relies on some of our previous cases,
such as Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of United Methodist
Church, Inc., 401 So. 3d 1123 (Ala. 2024) ("Harvest Church"),9 which
proclaimed that
"civil courts can properly exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate
church-related disputes as long as those disputes can be
resolved (1) based on 'neutral principles of law' and (2)
without resolving a religious controversy (that is, an issue of
' "religious practice or doctrine" '). Ex parte African Methodist
Episcopal Zion Church, 860 So. 2d [870,] 872 [(Ala. 2003)]
(quoting [Central Alabama Conf. of the African Methodist
Episcopal Zion Church in America v.] Crum, 746 So. 2d
[1013,] 1015 [(Ala. Civ. App. 1999)]) (emphasis added)."
401 So. 3d at 1133.
9I recused myself in Harvest Church.
44
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
In his special writing in Harvest Church, then-Chief Justice Tom
Parker pointedly disagreed with that test, stating:
"I find this test similar to the Lemon test, which 'ambitiously
attempted to find a grand unifying theory of the
Establishment Clause, [while in later decisions the United
States Supreme Court took] a more modest approach that
focuses on the particular issue at hand.' American Legion v.
American Humanist Ass'n, 588 U.S. 29, 60, 139 S.Ct. 2067,
204 L.Ed.2d 452 (2019) (discussing the shortcomings of the
test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct.
2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971)). In the same way, I believe that
the majority's test for determining whether we have
jurisdiction in every church-dispute case is an ambitious
attempt to find a grand unifying theory instead of focusing on
the particular type of case at hand, which is what our more
recent precedents have done."
401 So. 3d at 1140 (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result). Likening the test enunciated in Harvest Church to the United
States Supreme Court's infamous Lemon test was not a compliment. As
I noted in my special writing in Sails, the United States Supreme Court
abrogated the Lemon test in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597
U.S. 507 (2022), describing it as an "abstract[] and ahistorical approach
to the Establishment Clause." 597 U.S. at 534. See Sails, 401 So. 3d at
1113 (Mendheim, J., concurring specially).
45
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Indeed, in my special concurrence in Sails, I explained that the so-
called "neutral-principles-of-law approach," like the Lemon test, contains
a "lack of respect for religious ideas," whereas a proper understanding "of
the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to
protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious
ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence." 401 So. 3d at 1114. The
neutral-principles-of-law approach also fails to consistently identify
"what sources a court decides to consider in reaching a decision." Id.
Additionally, in looking at those sources, that approach asks courts to do
the impossible: interpret church practices and guidelines through a
"secular" lens.
Those latter two problems -- what sources are acceptable and
attempting to employ a "secular" lens to read church documents -- are
readily seen in the analysis for these consolidated cases. The parties
primarily argue about the Court's holding in Aldersgate. The Conference
contends that this Court in Aldersgate held that the claims of the plaintiff
churches in that case were subject to ecclesiastical abstention because of
"the plaintiff churches' exclusive reliance on the Book of Discipline as the
46
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
basis for their claims regarding the right to vote and the lack of any deed
or other secular property record on which a determination could be
made." Petition in case no. SC-2025-0347, p. 26. In contrast, the churches
in the present consolidated cases argue that in Aldersgate "[t]his Court
held that courts may look at secular documents (such as property deeds,
articles of incorporation, etc.) but may not decide a claim based solely on
a provision of a religious doctrinal book." Answer, pp. 11-12.
At first glance, the parties' foregoing conclusions about what should
be gleaned from Aldersgate seem very similar, so it is striking that the
parties should differ so vehemently as to whether Aldersgate supports
either of their positions. However, the problem is not really with the
parties but, rather, with the tightrope this Court has attempted to walk
in claiming that our courts may consult the UMC's Book of Discipline so
long as the courts only look at its "secular" portions and not its "doctrinal"
portions. As the main opinion in Aldersgate attempted to explain it:
"The 'neutral principles of law' approach allows Alabama
courts adjudicating church-property disputes to 'consider, in
purely secular terms, the language of the deeds, the charter
of the local church, any applicable state statutes, and any
relevant provisions contained in the discipline of the national
47
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
church' without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Haney's Chapel [United Methodist Church v. United
Methodist Church], 716 So. 2d [1156,] 1158 [(Ala 1998)]. But
that doctrine has limits: when deciding such property
disputes, civil courts 'cannot resolve controversies involving
religious doctrine or practice.' [Trinity Presbyterian Church of
Montgomery v.] Tankersley, 374 So. 2d [861,] 865-66 [(Ala.
1979)]."
411 So. 3d at 332 (emphasis added).
In Aldersgate, the local churches took issue with how the
Conference had applied paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline to them.
Paragraph 2553 "gave local churches a 'limited right' to vote to
disaffiliate from the UMC and retain their property if they were
disaffiliating 'for reasons of conscience' related to 'the practice of
homosexuality or the ordination or marriage of self-avowed practicing
homosexuals.' " Aldersgate, 411 So. 3d at 330. The Aldersgate Court
concluded that it could not adjudicate the local churches' claims because
"[i]n order to grant the churches the relief they seek --
the right to vote on disaffiliation -- the trial court would have
to survey the [UMC's] Judicial Council's ecclesiastical
decisions, interpret the doctrinal scope of ¶ 2553 of the Book
of Discipline, and review Conference determinations about
the religious adequacy of the churches' eligibility statements.
That is, to decide any property questions, the trial court would
48
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
have to adjudicate whether each of the churches had adequate
'reasons of conscience regarding ... the practice of
homosexuality or the ordination or marriage of self-avowed
practicing homosexuals.' ¶ 2553. Resolving those issues would
'inherently entail inquiry ... into the substantive criteria by
which [courts] are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical
question' -- whether the churches' reasons of conscience were
sufficient for disaffiliation under ¶ 2553. [Serbian Orthodox
Diocese for the United States and Canada v.] Milivojevich,
426 U.S. [696,] at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 [(1976)]. 'But [that] is
exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits. Id.' "
Id. at 331.
In the present consolidated cases, the main opinion admits that the
Conference "also point[s] to trust provisions set out in the United
Methodist Church's Book of Discipline, which is the governing document
of the United Methodist Church." __ So. 3d at __. But we are assured that
this is not a problem because
"[t]he [Conference's] counterclaims, to the extent that they
rely on the Book of Discipline, do not appear to require
resolution of a dispute over doctrinal or ecclesiastical matters.
Instead, the [Conference] rel[ies] on provisions of the Book of
Discipline that, [it] say[s], call for the real property at issue to
be held in trust and that are referenced or implicated by deeds
and other secular documents. In construing those provisions,
the trial courts are required to examine and resolve issues of
49
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
real-property and trust law, not issues of an ecclesiastical or
spiritual nature."
Id. at __ (emphasis added).
Thus, comparing the explanations provided in Aldersgate and in
the main opinion here, the apparent difference between the local
churches in Aldersgate relying on paragraph 2553 of the Book of
Discipline for their claims and the Conference's reliance in these
consolidated cases on the trust clause in the Book of Discipline for its
counterclaims is that paragraph 2553 contains "doctrinal or ecclesiastical
matters" but the trust clause does not because we can use "secular" real-
property law and trust law to interpret and apply it. But the simplicity
of that distinction belies the complexity of the assertion.
To begin with, the Book of Discipline is, first and foremost, a
governing church document. See, e.g., United Methodist Church,
Baltimore Ann. Conf. v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C. 1990) ("The
Discipline of the United Methodist Church is a religious document which
this court cannot construe without usurping the rights of the UMC to
construe its own law."); Oklahoma Ann. Conf. of the United Methodist
50
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
Church, Inc. v. Timmons, 538 P.3d 163, 166 (Okla. 2023) ("The Book of
Discipline includes both matters of doctrine and policy, and procedures
for implementing them."); Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426
S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014) ("The United Methodist Church's The Book
of Discipline[] [is] the denomination's official book of church law and
doctrine ...."); Wisconsin Conf. Bd. of Trs. of United Methodist Church,
Inc. v. Culver, 214 Wis. 2d 394, 399, 627 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Wis. 2001)
("[T]he Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church … sets forth
the doctrinal law of the denomination."); Mills v. Standing Gen. Comm'n
on Christian Unity, 39 Misc. 3d 296, 307, 958 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sup. Ct.
2013) ("[A]djudication of Mills' claims would require this court to
interpret various sections of the Book of Discipline, a constitutionally
questionable endeavor at best, given the religious nature of the text.").
The Conference's counterclaims state:
"[T]he Trust Clause is an important requirement of The [Book
of] Discipline and has been for 250 years. It is an essential
element to the connectional nature of the UMC. ...
"....
51
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
"20. The [Book of] Discipline constitutes the governing
law and doctrine of the UMC and the written rules by which
all UMC churches worldwide operate and are governed.
"....
"25. The Trust Clause reflects the connectional and
hierarchical structure of the UMC by providing that all local
church properties are held in trust for and will forever be used
solely for the purpose consonant with the mission of the entire
UMC denomination as set forth in The [Book of] Discipline."
Despite the clearly religious nature of the Book of Discipline and
the apparently pivotal role the trust clause plays in the UMC's
hierarchical structure, the main opinion overlooks any
ecclesiastical-abstention concerns by quoting Aldersgate's statement that
"[t]he 'neutral principles of law' approach allows Alabama courts
adjudicating church-property disputes to 'consider, in purely secular
terms, ... any relevant provisions contained in the discipline of the
national church' without running afoul of the First Amendment. Haney's
Chapel, 716 So. 2d at 1158."10 411 So. 3d at 332.
10The quote from Haney's Chapel about courts being allowed to use
"any relevant provisions contained in the discipline of the national
52
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
church" seems to have originated from a passage in Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595, 604 (1979), in which the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in
Georgia, requires a civil court to examine certain religious
documents, such as a church constitution, for language of
trust in favor of the general church. In undertaking such an
examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize
the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on
religious precepts in determining whether the document
indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust. In
addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate
charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates
religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership
of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the
instruments of ownership would require the civil court to
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to
the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body. Serbian Orthodox Diocese [for the United
States and Canada v. Milovojevich], 426 U.S. [696,] 709
[(1976)]."
(Emphasis added.)
It is worth noting that Jones was decided in the wake of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and its progeny, which perpetuated the
"secular" distillation of law that is no longer favored. Indeed, the Jones
majority seems to have been enamored with embracing the "neutral-
principles-of-law" approach and downplaying the idea that consulting the
Book of Discipline necessarily involves courts in religious controversy
because the Book of Discipline sets up the doctrinal structure of the
UMC. But as Justice Powell observed in his dissent in Jones (which was
joined by three other Justices): "The constitutional documents of
churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious precepts. Attempting to
53
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
But if the trust clause contained in the Book of Discipline is "an
essential element to the connectional nature of the UMC," as the
Conference states in its counterclaims, how is it not part and parcel with
the UMC's religious doctrine and practice? In other words, the
Conference asserts that the property of local churches being held in trust
by the UMC is part of the fabric of what it means to be a UMC church.
Indeed, the portion of the Book of Discipline that the Conference quotes
in its counterclaims -- the trust-clause paragraph -- seems to emphasize
that point:
"23. While each local UMC church is allowed to acquire
and own property in its own legal name, Para. 2501 of The
[Book of] Discipline provides, in furtherance of the
connectional and hierarchical structure of the UMC, that:
" 'All properties of United Methodist local
churches and other United Methodist agencies and
institutions are held, in trust, for the benefit of the
entire denomination, and ownership and usage of
read them 'in purely secular terms' is more likely to promote confusion
than understanding." 443 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., dissenting). Moreover,
the Jones majority's description of "cases where ... the constitution of the
general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating
to the ownership of property" aptly describes reliance on the trust clause
and, under Jones's paradigm, would warrant abstention.
54
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
church property is subject to the Discipline. This
trust requirement is an essential element of the
historic policy of The United Methodist Church or
its predecessor denominations or communions and
has been a part of the Discipline since 1797. It
reflects the connectional structure of the Church
by ensuring that the property will be used solely
for purposes consonant with the mission of the
entire denomination as set forth in the Discipline.
The trust requirement is thus a fundamental
expression of United Methodism whereby local
churches and other agencies and institutions
within the denomination are both held
accountable to and benefit from their connection
with the entire worldwide Church.
" 'The United Methodist Church is organized
as a connectional structure, and titles to all real
and personal, tangible and intangible property
held at jurisdictional, annual, or district
conference levels, or by a local church or charge, or
by an agency or institution of the Church, shall be
held in trust for The United Methodist Church and
subject to the provisions of its Discipline. Titles are
not held by The United Methodist Church, but
instead by the incorporated conferences, agencies,
or organizations of the denomination, by boards of
trustees established for the purpose of holding and
administering real and personal, tangible and
intangible property.'
"The [Book of] Discipline at ¶ 2501."
55
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, according to the Book of Discipline, "[t]he trust requirement
is ... a fundamental expression of United Methodism." If that is true, then
a court becomes entangled in the UMC's religious doctrine or practice by
interpreting that paragraph of the Book of Discipline. In other words,
asking a court to enforce the trust clause essentially constitutes using
government power to enforce UMC doctrine. How could it be otherwise if
the trust requirement is designed to "ensur[e] that the property will be
used solely for purposes consonant with the mission of the entire
denomination"?
However, instead of acknowledging that fact, the main opinion
clings to the idea " 'that "civil court[s] must take special care to scrutinize
the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious
precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties
have intended to create a trust." ' " __ So. 3d at __ (quoting Harvest
Church, 401 So. 3d at 1132, quoting in turn Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
604 (1979)). But scrutinizing a document like the Book of Discipline "in
purely secular terms" is not possible because it is the foundational
56
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0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
organizing document of the UMC. Directing the trial courts in these cases
to read the Book of Discipline through a wholly secular lens will require
the trial courts to engage in doctrinal judgments because separating
what is religious from what is secular in the Book of Discipline will
necessarily require an understanding and appreciation of fundamental
UMC religious principles, then deciding if those religious principles may
be translated into wholly secular terms. Pretending to divorce the Book
of Discipline from its religious nature is like saying that the United
States Constitution can be interpreted apart from its role as the
organizing document of federal law. It cannot be done -- at least not
without violating the very "neutral principles" the Court claims to be
upholding.
If the courts elect to enter this fray between local churches and a
church denomination's organizing bodies, they should do so absent any
reference to the Book of Discipline and its trust clause because there is
no way to read that document or that paragraph "in purely secular
terms." Courts should not determine whether ecclesiastical abstention
applies in a case based on the false notion that there is a distinct bright
57
SC-2025-0347; SC-2025-0361; SC-2025-0367; SC-2025-0426; SC-2025-
0431; SC-2025-0439; SC-2025-0442; SC-2025-0445; SC-2025-0462; SC-
2025-0483; SC-2025-0514; SC-2025-0543; SC-2025-0643; SC-2025-0720;
SC-2025-0851
line between what is "secular" and what is "religious." The main opinion
expresses a contrary position, and therefore I dissent.
58