The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARTAZ COLEMAN, UNPUBLISHED
March 05, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:47 AM
v No. 366547
Wayne Circuit Court
MAGNI INDUSTRIES, INC., LC No. 22-010380-NO
Defendant-Appellee.
ON REMAND
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and SWARTZLE and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (July 31, 2025)
(Docket No. 163989). Coleman v Magni Indus, Inc., 26 NW3d 407 (Mich 2025) (Coleman II).
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case was set forth in our prior opinion, Coleman v Magni
Indus, Inc., unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 24, 2024
(Docket No. 366547) (Coleman I), pp 1-2:
Plaintiff began to work for defendant in August 2018, at which point he was
17 years old. Plaintiff signed the following agreement:
As a condition of employment or continued employment,
unless otherwise provided for by law, I agree not to file any action
or suit relating to my employment more than 180 calendar days after
the event and/or employment practice or action complained of
including, but not limited to, employment termination and
discrimination claims, claims for wages, salary, commissions, or
expenses, and to waive any state or federal statutes of limitations to
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the contrary. I understand that the statu[t]e of limitations for claims
arising out of an employment action may be longer than 180
calendar days, and agree that any employer action that is the subject
of a lawsuit or action is barred if it is not filed within the 180 day
period unless otherwise provided for by law. This provision does
not prohibit the timely filing of a charge with a federal
administrative agency under federal law, but unless filed within 180
days (or in less time if any applicable law requires), I waive the right
to recover money damages or other relief. Filing a charge or claim
with an administrative agency or internally with the employer does
not toll the 180 calendar day period for filing a civil suit.
Plaintiff also signed a Statement of Employment that provided: “The undersigned
expressly disclaims any reliance upon written statements of firm policy or
procedure or any oral or written promises regarding continued employment.”
Plaintiff turned 18 years old in November 2018. In October 2019, plaintiff
was seriously injured in an explosion at work. Plaintiff ultimately needed more
than 20 surgical procedures and rehabilitation. At one point, plaintiff was placed
in a medically induced coma because of the pain he was experiencing. Plaintiff
was discharged from the hospital in January 2020, at which point he went to a
rehabilitation center until February 2020. Plaintiff’s parents were granted co-
guardianship and co-conservatorship of plaintiff in January 2020, which expired in
January 2021.
According to affidavits from plaintiff and his mother, in the first 180 days
after sustaining his injuries, plaintiff could “not walk more than a few steps without
having to sit down,” use the bathroom or bathe on his own, scratch himself, hold a
cup, or use a phone. Plaintiff required full-time care, and, because he was
“extremely distraught and mentally drained from [his] injuries,” he could only think
about his health during that period. Further, plaintiff “could barely speak for about
a year after the incident due to a paralyzed vocal cord.” Plaintiff was unable to
work and received workers’ compensation benefits.
In August 2022, plaintiff sued defendant. In answer to discovery in
November 2022, plaintiff asserted that he was a minor when he signed the
agreement and lacked the capacity to sign it. Defendant moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), arguing that plaintiff’s action was
time-barred by the 180-day contractual-limitations period. In response, plaintiff
argued that it was impossible for him to sue within 180 days; the terms of the
agreement did not apply to this action; plaintiff did not ratify the contract upon
turning 18; and the policy violated public policy because it undermined the
intentional-tort exception to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA)
and undermined the Legislature’s intent to protect a minor’s interests.
The trial court found that the shortened limitations period applied and that
plaintiff did not repudiate the contract after turning 18. Further, the trial court found
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that plaintiff could not perform under the contract from the time of the accident
until his parents became his guardians and conservators in January 2020, but his
parents did not repudiate the contract. As to public policy, the trial court found that
the shortened period of limitations did not violate public policy because a minor
could ratify a contract by continuing to work and receive benefits after reaching the
age of majority, and plaintiff worked for 11 months after turning 18 before the
accident occurred. Because plaintiff did not repudiate the contract until his
November 2022 discovery answers, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and
dismissed the case. [Brackets in Coleman I.]
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Id. at 5. We
rejected plaintiff’s arguments that (1) the limitations provision was inapplicable because the term
“employment action” concerns specific suits related to employment, not intentional torts; (2) the
limitations provision was invalid because plaintiff signed the Statement of Employment; (3)
plaintiff’s contractual duty to pursue his claim within 180 days was “discharged on the basis of
impossibility/impracticability.” Id. at 3-4. We held plaintiff’s argument—that the limitation was
unenforceable as contrary to public policy—was waived because plaintiff failed to assert the
argument in the trial court. Id. at 4. We further noted that, even if the issue was not waived, it
lacked merit because the contractual provision was permissible under Clark v DaimlerChrysler
Corp, 268 Mich App 138, 142; 706 NW2d 471 (2005), overruled by Rayford, ___ Mich at ___.
Coleman I, unpub op at 4-5. Our Supreme Court vacated our opinion and remanded the case for
us to consider it in light of Rayford. Coleman II, 26 NW3d at 407.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Burton
v Macha, 303 Mich App 750, 754; 846 NW2d 419 (2014). “Summary disposition is properly
granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when the plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the applicable statute
of limitations or repose.” Id. “All well-pleaded allegations are viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party unless documentary evidence is provided that contradicts them.”
Haksluoto v Mt Clemens Regional Med Ctr, 500 Mich 304, 309; 901 NW2d 577 (2017). “A motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), on the other hand, tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil v
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (emphasis omitted). “When
considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might
differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. RAYFORD
After this Court rendered its decision in Coleman I, our Supreme Court decided Rayford.
Rayford overruled Clark and disavowed its extension of Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457;
703 NW2d 23 (2005), to employment contracts. Rayford, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2, 18. It
emphasized that it had “never ruled on the application of Rory outside of insurance contracts[,]”
yet Clark impermissibly did so. Id. at 19. The Court explained that:
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Rory involved a shortened limitations period in an insurance policy. Employment
disputes are wholly different. As Judge NEFF highlighted in her dissent: Unlike
other contracts contexts, an employer and employee often do not deal at arm’s
length when negotiating contract terms. An employee in plaintiff’s position has
only two options: (1) sign the employment contract as drafted by the employer or
(2) lose the job. The economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most
sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the inequitable term stands
between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a
position to refuse a job because of such a term. [Id. at 20 (quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted).]
Rejecting the application of Rory in the employment context, the Rayford Court held that
the reasonableness test in Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 410 Mich
118, 127; 301 NW2d 275 (1981), overruled by Rory, 473 Mich at 457, was the appropriate test to
determine whether a contractually shortened limitations period in an employment contract is
enforceable. Rayford, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 25. The Camelot test requires: “[1] that the
claimant have sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action, [2] that the time not be so
short as to work a practical abrogation of the right of action, and [3] that the action not be barred
before the loss or damage can be ascertained.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted, brackets
in Rayford). Moreover, Rayford held that “[a]dhesion contracts with provisions shortening the
statute of limitations in the employment context are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to
determine whether the provisions are reasonable.” Id. at ___; slip op at 28. In sum, “courts must
now first determine whether a challenged employment agreement is adhesive and, if so, apply
Camelot to determine whether a shortened limitations period is reasonable.” Id. at ___; slip op at
30.
IV. APPLICATION
An adhesion contract is a “standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by
another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who must essentially either accede
(adhere) to the terms or not have a contract at all.” Id. at ___; slip op at 34, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed). Rayford recognized that the unequal bargaining power between an employer
and a potential employee can often result in the potential employee having to accept the
employment contract terms or not get the job. Rayford, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 34. Plaintiff
entered into the employment contract in this case when he was 17 years old. There is no indication
he had the power to push back against the terms imposed by defendant. Accordingly, we conclude
that the contract in this case qualifies as an adhesion contract subject to close judicial scrutiny. Id.
As a preliminary matter, we recognize that, as we held before, under the “raise or waive”
rule, plaintiff’s failure to raise this issue in the trial court renders it unpreserved and therefore
waived. Coleman I, unpub op at 4, citing Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg,
347 Mich App 280, 289; 14 NW3d 472 (2023). But, considering the specific directive from our
Supreme Court to reconsider this case in light of Rayford, as well as our ability to overlook
preservation requirements in various situations, we now address the issue. See Coleman II, 26
NW3d at 407; Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co, 347 Mich App at 289-290.
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It is undisputed that neither this Court nor the trial court engaged in the Camelot
reasonableness analysis of the shortened limitation period in this case. It is, thus, appropriate to
remand this case to the trial court for such consideration. We note that, notwithstanding the direct
applicability of Rayford to this case, defendant argues that (1) this Court already impliedly
addressed the issue when addressing plaintiff’s impossibility/impracticability argument, and (2)
Rayford should only be applied prospectively because retroactive application impairs the parties’
contractual rights. Both arguments lack merit.
First, while this Court may have considered the reasonableness of plaintiff’s efforts to
comply with the limitations period, the pertinent fact remains that neither this Court nor the trial
court analyzed the reasonableness of the limitations period itself. As for the retroactivity of
Rayford, it has long been recognized that “the general rule is that judicial decisions are to be given
complete retroactive effect.” Hyde v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d
847 (1986). “However, where injustice might result from full retroactivity, this Court has adopted
a more flexible approach, giving holdings limited retroactive or prospective effect.” Lindsey v
Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). “For example, a holding that overrules
settled precedent may properly be limited to prospective application.” Pohutski v Allen Park, 465
Mich 675, 696; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).
In determining whether to give a holding retroactive or prospective effect, the “threshold
question [is] whether the decision clearly established a new principle of law.” Id. “A rule of law
is new for purposes of resolving the question of its retroactive application . . . either when an
established precedent is overruled or when an issue of first impress is decided which was not
adumbrated by any earlier appellate decision.” League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of
State, 508 Mich 520, 566; 975 NW2d 840 (2022). Rayford did not overrule prior precedent or
decide an issue of first impression. It merely corrected this Court’s overextension of Rory to the
employment context and reaffirmed its reasoning in Camelot. Even to the extent that the Rory
Court stated its analysis applied beyond the insurance sphere, Rayford held this was mere dicta.
Rayford, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 24. Because Rayford did not create a new rule, the threshold
question for the retroactive analysis is not satisfied. Thus, the “general rule that judicial decisions
are to be given complete retroactive effect[]” controls. Hyde, 426 Mich at 240.1 Rayford is
retroactive, and its holding warrants reversal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
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Indeed, a contrary holding would be in direct conflict with our Supreme Court’s order. Moreover,
the Court has remanded numerous cases to this Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford,
indicating that it intended Rayford to have retroactive effect. See Gabrielson v Woods Condo
Ass’n, Inc, 349 Mich App 478, 495-496; 28 NW3d 747 (2024).
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