The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOVELL A. RODGERS :
:
Appellant : No. 306 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 30, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0001204-2018
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 3, 2026
Lovell A. Rodgers (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his first
petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
In a prior appeal, this Court succinctly summarized the facts underlying
this appeal:
Appellant’s convictions resulted from his actions, with co-
conspirators,1 in defrauding Pennsylvania’s Workforce and
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1 Appellant was charged along with five co-conspirators, including his wife,
Marsha Rodgers (Marsha). The five co-conspirators ultimately entered guilty
pleas. See N.T. (Sentencing), 9/20/21, at 3; see also PCRA Court Opinion,
4/14/25, at 8-9 (stating that all of the co-conspirators were offered plea
bargains, and Appellant knew before jury selection started in his case that the
remaining co-defendants had pled guilty).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Economic Development Network (WEDnet). WEDnet is a state-
funded program that reimburses manufacturers and technology
companies for employee training.
… Appellant us[ed] a dormant corporation[, R1
Incorporated,] he formed to revive “the well-oiled WEDnet scam”
of one of his co-conspirators[, John Marino (Marino)]. The
WEDnet program specifically excludes restaurants and retail
employers. Appellant owned a restaurant, and used his dormant
corporation (with no revenue or employees) to submit fake
invoices to WEDnet for training that never occurred. In return,
Appellant received fraudulent training reimbursement from
WEDnet, deposited the funds into the [R1 Incorporated] account,
then distributed same to support the [r]estaurant and himself.
Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 281 A.3d 107, 2163 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super.
2022) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2) (one footnote added; citations,
footnote, and some quotation marks and brackets omitted). 2
Relevantly, the process for obtaining grant reimbursement is as follows:
To qualify for grant reimbursement, a company point of contact
(“POC”) must first execute an inquiry form on the WEDnet website
to determine eligibility for the program. If the company meets
the threshold requirements, the POC executes a Memorandum of
Agreement (“MOA”) through the WEDnet website certifying that
the business meets certain additional requirements. The MOA
includes a certification by the applicant that they are eligible to
receive the funds, and [advises] that providing knowingly false
information will result in legal action. …
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Notably, the judge who presided over the instant PCRA proceedings also
presided over Appellant’s trial, as well as the plea hearings for Appellant’s co-
defendants and their combined sentencing hearing.
2 In the Rule 1925(a) opinion written in connection with Appellant’s direct
appeal, the trial court summarized the fraudulent scheme in detail. See Trial
Court Opinion, 1/20/22, at 9-14.
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Once complete, the MOA is signed electronically and
submitted to WEDnet. Following this, the completed inquiry and
MOA are submitted to the local WEDnet partner for review. If the
partner approves the submitted information, it is sent to WEDnet
… for final approval. Once the MOA is executed and approved by
WEDnet, a contract is formed and the POC is authorized to submit
invoices for training…. In this case, East Stroudsburg University
[issued] the relevant reimbursement checks.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 15 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/22, at
9-10).
The MOAs submitted on behalf of R1 Incorporated identified Appellant
as POC, company executive, and the WEDnet system’s registered user, and
included Appellant’s home address as the contact address. Id. (citing Trial
Court Opinion, 1/20/22, at 11). The pertinent MOAs “were transmitted with
Appellant’s digital signature.” Id. At trial, the parties stipulated that all online
communications between WEDnet and R1 Incorporated (as well as companies
used by Marino in connection with the scheme) were made on a computer in
Marino’s home. N.T. (Jury Trial), 7/12/21, at 75-76.3
____________________________________________
3 Relevantly, after the parties stipulated that all communications were made
using a computer in Marino’s home, Janet Jackson, Esquire (Attorney
Jackson), stated she had no objection to Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4 (records
pertaining to R1 Incorporated), “with the understanding that the stipulation
indicates that the items that are contained therein were submitted by []
Marino or from the computer at [] Marino’s home.” N.T., (Jury Trial), 7/12/21,
at 76. The prosecutor promptly requested a sidebar, at which time the parties
discussed whether the stipulation meant Marino was the individual who
submitted the documents. Id. at 76-77; see also id. at 77 (Attorney Jackson
stating, “You stipulated that they were made from [Marino].”). The trial court
then ruled, “You stipulated that the communications were sent from [Marino’s]
computer. There’s no stipulation as to who did them. That’s up to the jury to
decide.” Id. at 77.
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On July 14, 2021, a jury convicted Appellant of one count each of dealing
in proceeds of unlawful activities, criminal conspiracy (dealing in proceeds of
unlawful activities), and corrupt organizations; four counts of theft by unlawful
taking; and ten counts of tampering with public records or information. 4 The
trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 2 to 5 years in prison, followed
by 3 years’ probation.
This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on June 14, 2022,
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied allowance of
appeal. Rodgers, 281 A.3d 107 (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied, 289 A.3d 42 (Pa. 2022).
On December 11, 2023, Appellant, through counsel, filed the instant
timely PCRA petition. Appellant alleged his trial counsel 5 were ineffective for
failing to (1) investigate and introduce evidence of Appellant’s timesheets; (2)
object to the prosecutor’s statement, during closing argument, regarding
specific text messages Appellant exchanged with one of his co-conspirators;
(3) object to testimony by certain Commonwealth witnesses that Appellant
signed several electronic documents; and (4) accurately disclose to and
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4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5111(a)(1), 903, 911(b), 3921(a), 4911(a)(2). The jury
acquitted Appellant of one count of theft by unlawful taking and four counts
of tampering with public records.
5 Appellant was represented by Attorney Jackson and Tyree A. Blair, Esquire
(Attorney Blair) (collectively, trial counsel), through his jury trial. Appellant
subsequently retained Timothy Tarpey, Esquire, to represent him at
sentencing and during his direct appeal.
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counsel Appellant concerning a plea deal offered by the Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth filed a response. Appellant subsequently filed an amended
PCRA petition, to which he attached as exhibits various timesheets and
paystubs from his employment with United Airlines.
The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 11, 2024,
during which Appellant, Attorney Jackson, and Attorney Blair testified. During
the hearing, Appellant withdrew his second ineffectiveness claim (concerning
the prosecutor’s statements about text message exchanges). After Appellant
and trial counsel testified, the PCRA court recessed the hearing until June 11,
2024. The PCRA court directed that (1) the hearing would be “limited to
presentation of the testimony of [Appellant’s w]ife[, Marsha,] and rebuttal by
the Commonwealth if any[;]” and (2) Appellant provide the Commonwealth a
proffer concerning Marsha’s testimony. PCRA Court Order, 3/11/24.
During the second day of the hearing, on June 11, 2024, Appellant
focused on his fourth ineffectiveness claim (concerning an alleged plea deal).
Marsha testified regarding her understanding of the alleged second plea offer.
Attorney Jackson also testified. At the close of the hearing, the PCRA court
ordered Appellant to request the transcripts from the hearing within five days,
and directed the parties to file any post-hearing briefs within 30 days after the
filing of transcripts.
Appellant and the Commonwealth each filed a post-hearing brief. On
December 30, 2024, the PCRA court entered an order denying Appellant’s
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PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the PCRA court err and abuse[] its discretion by dismissing
Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief, based upon the
ineffectiveness of prior counsel?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We adhere to the following standard of review:
Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is limited
to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported
by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. The
PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the
record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo
standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 317 A.3d 1070, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(citation omitted).
Further, “[a] court’s review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
begins with the strong presumption that counsel was effective.”
Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 340 A.3d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2025).
To overcome this presumption, [the PCRA petitioner] must
demonstrate that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has
arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being
challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions
or failure to act; and (3) the defendant suffered prejudice as a
result of counsel’s deficient performance. A claim of
ineffectiveness will be denied if the [petitioner’s] evidence fails to
meet any one of these prongs.
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 439 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations
omitted). “To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show that
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there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different but for counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Id.
Appellant offers three arguments to support his assertion that trial
counsel were ineffective; we address each one in turn. First, Appellant claims
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and
introduce as evidence timesheets from his job at United Airlines. Appellant’s
Brief at 19-20. According to Appellant, “the timesheets would have shown
that Appellant was working in a different state at the time of the alleged
criminal actions.” Id. at 21. Appellant avers that he asked Attorney Jackson
to obtain the timesheets, but she failed to do so. Id. at 22.
Appellant argues the timesheets
would have clearly demonstrated that Appellant himself was
incapable of having filed any documentation for the WEDnet scam.
Specifically, the time sheets support that Appellant worked for a
significant period of time, during the day, and had limited
opportunity to be involved in any extraneous activities.
Additionally, it demonstrates that Appellant was gainfully
employed, calling into question the motive of Appellant to commit
such a financial scheme. This strengthens Appellant’s testimony
that he had no knowledge of the fraudulent activities being
conducted by [co-defendant John] Marino.
Id. at 23. Appellant also contends trial counsel had no reasonable basis for
failing to seek this evidence. Id. at 24. Finally, Appellant claims trial counsel’s
failure to obtain the timesheets and offer them as evidence caused him
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prejudice, as such evidence would have substantiated his lack of involvement
in the scheme. Id. at 26.6
In addressing Appellant’s argument, the PCRA court first points out that
the underlying claim “contains echoes of the arguments he posited in his direct
appeal.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 18; see also id. (explaining that
on direct appeal, Appellant asserted the evidence did not establish that
Appellant was present in Marino’s home when the fraudulent documents were
submitted to WEDnet).
The PCRA court further rejected Appellant’s claim as follows:
Appellant presents this argument only as a general argument
without even attempting to correlate dates that he worked or was
out of town with the creation of any specific WEDnet application,
MO[A], or invoice, with any other action taken in furtherance of
the fraud scheme, with any specific count in the information, or
with any specific time frame. In this regard, fraudulent WEDnet
documents and invoices were submitted over the course of two
grant/fiscal years[,] from October of 2014 through the spring of
2016. … However, even though he had substantial time to gather
time sheets and employment information, Appellant did not[,]
during the PCRA proceedings[,] introduce timesheets for the
entire period or that correspond to all the fraudulent WEDnet
submissions. Instead, he presented only “clock-in” records for
selected dates in November 2015, April 2016, and October 2016,
and bi-weekly pay stubs, which do not indicate days worked, from
March 21 through November 13, 2015. Further, he did not fully
explain the records or show how they corresponded to any
significant date or action taken in furtherance of the fraud scheme.
____________________________________________
6 Appellant argues generally that he suffered prejudice as a result of trial
counsels’ failure to obtain and offer the timesheets. However, Appellant does
not detail how he believes the outcome of trial would have been different had
the timesheets been admitted (i.e., which charged offenses would have
reasonably resulted in an acquittal).
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Given the generality of the time record and of Appellant’s
argument, the employment records do not[,] on their face and as
presented during the PCRA proceedings[,] establish that Appellant
was at work on the dates that fraudulent WEDnet documents were
submitted[,] or actions in furtherance of the fraud scheme were
taken. Likewise, the documents[,] as generally presented[,] do
not explain and show that Appellant was not involved in the illegal
scheme perpetrated by [] Marino and his other co-defendants, do
not corroborate Appellant’s testimony that he had no
knowledge of, or involvement [in,] the submission of fake
invoices, MOA[s], or any other documentation relating to
the WEDnet[] scam, and do not show it was exceptionally
unlikely for Appellant to have carried out or taken part in such a
complicated scheme against the state government. Simply, on
this issue, Appellant failed to establish the requisite reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different
if the time records had been introduced.
Second, relatedly, as [the trial court noted in its opinion],
given the evidence presented, the jury was free to infer that
Appellant was present at Marino’s house when the relevant
documents were prepared and submitted. The general time
records that Appellant identified during the PCRA proceedings
would have done nothing to remove or even detract from the
inference that the jury could reasonably have drawn.
Third, as [t]rial [c]ounsel indicated, given the nature of this
case, [the] evidence presented by the Commonwealth, and the
parties’ stipulation that all fraudulent WEDnet documents were
sent from the home of [] Mari[no], the fraud scheme originator
and ringleader, the time records would not have furthered the
defense.
Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added; quotation marks and brackets omitted); see
also id. at 22 (emphasizing that, during trial, Appellant advanced the theory
that he was “duped” by Marino).
Moreover,
[t]he evidence showed that Appellant was in regular contact with
Marino through various technology. Therefore, Appellant did
not need to be physically present in Marino’s home to
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electronically sign documents or agree that the documents
could be signed and sent. He could have electronically signed
documents from remote locations, including work or his own
home, before the documents were ultimately transmitted to
WEDnet. Similarly, he could have approved execution of the
documents before he left the state for work[,] or from remote
locations[,] as the documents were being signed and sent.
Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added). The PCRA court also observed that Appellant
and Marsha both testified concerning Appellant’s work schedule, and
determined the timesheets “would not have added anything new or different
to either the evidence or the defense theory….” Id. at 23.
We agree with the reasoning of the PCRA court. As the PCRA court aptly
explained, the parties stipulated that all fraudulent communications were
transmitted from a computer in Marino’s home, but the Commonwealth was
not required to prove that Appellant was present in Marino’s home when the
relevant documents were submitted. 7 Thus, even if the timesheets proved
that Appellant was not at Marino’s house when the fraudulent documents were
transmitted to WEDnet, Appellant has failed to establish that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different
____________________________________________
7 We note that on direct appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions of tampering with public records. The trial
court emphasized that Appellant’s convictions under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
4911(a)(2) did not require proof that he was present at Marino’s home when
the documents were transmitted or that Appellant himself prepared the
documents. Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/22, at 16-17. Instead, the
requirements of section 4922(a)(2) were satisfied by Appellant’s knowledge
and use of the fraudulent submissions. See id.
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had trial counsel obtained the timesheets and offered them as evidence. As
Appellant failed to establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of trial
counsels’ alleged failure, his first ineffectiveness argument fails. See
Hanible, 30 A.3d at 439.
In his second argument, Appellant asserts trial counsel were ineffective
for failing to object to certain testimony by Commonwealth witness Thomas
Venditti (Venditti),8 which was elicited when the Commonwealth offered as
exhibits several documents that were submitted to WEDnet on behalf of R1
Incorporated. Appellant’s Brief at 29. Appellant claims Venditti improperly
testified that Appellant “signed” several documents; Venditti was not qualified
to offer such testimony under Pa.R.E. 901 (Authenticating or Identifying
Evidence)9; and trial counsel failed to object. Id. at 29, 32. Appellant
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8 Venditti is the state director of WEDnet. N.T. (Jury Trial), 7/12/21, at 45.
9 Generally, “to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item
of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a).
Pertinently, Rule 901(b)(11) provides as follows:
(11) Digital Evidence. To connect digital evidence with a person
or entity;
(A) direct evidence such as testimony of a person with personal
knowledge; or
(B) circumstantial evidence such as:
(i) identifying content; or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish he had access to or
control over the computer at Marino’s home from which the fraudulent
documents were submitted. Id. at 33. According to Appellant, “there is
simply no way to verify the true author of an electronic signature by the
signature alone.” Id. at 35. Appellant argues that permitting Venditti’s
testimony without objection allowed the jury to infer that Appellant personally
signed the documents, which is contradictory to the theory of the case he
presented at trial. Id. at 38.
Instantly, the PCRA court concluded trial counsel had a reasonable basis
for failing to object, and there is no reasonable probability that the outcome
of trial would have been different had trial counsel lodged an objection. PCRA
Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 24-25.10 The court reasoned as follows:
The parties stipulated that all transmissions came from a
computer located in Marino’s home. Throughout the trial[,] the
prosecutor freely acknowledged there was no direct
____________________________________________
(ii) proof of ownership, possession, control, or access to a
device or account at the relevant time when corroborated
by circumstances indicating authorship.
Pa.R.E. 901(b)(11).
10 The PCRA court also concluded Appellant failed to develop this claim during
the evidentiary hearing, and that he later “switched theories and argued that
trial counsel should have objected based on a ruling made at [a] sidebar
conference.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 24. The “ruling” Appellant
referenced in his post-hearing brief was merely the trial court’s clarification
that, although the parties stipulated that the communications originated from
Marino’s computer, the question of who sent the communications was for the
jury. Petitioner’s Post-Hearing Brief, 8/12/24, at 12 (unnumbered).
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evidence that Appellant was the person who electronically
signed the documents or pushed the “send” button.
Further, no documents or physical evidence demonstrating that
Appellant was the specific electronic signatory or transmitter were
found in Marino’s home, Appellant’s home[,] or elsewhere. The
evidence was clear, and the jury was aware, that when the
Commonwealth, through its witness or otherwise,
indicated that a document sent to WEDnet was “signed” by
Appellant, it means that his electronic signature had been
affixed to the document.
….
…[T]he Commonwealth was free to argue, as it did, that
circumstantial evidence suggested Appellant accessed the
WEDnet account using a computer in Marino’s home or was
present with Marino, in person or through technology, when
documents were signed or submitted. It was also free to argue,
in the alternative, that even if [Appellant] was not physically
present or did not electronically sign or send document[s] himself,
there was sufficient evidence to establish that he participated in
the fraud scheme. As discussed above, the jury, in turn, was free
to infer Appellant’s presence in Marino’s home, although such an
inference was not needed.
Id. (emphasis added).
Moreover, the PCRA court’s determination is further supported by
Attorney Jackson’s testimony during the evidentiary hearing:
There was never a suggestion that someone else had—I mean,
there was no suggestion that anything had been forged. I mean,
there were things that [Appellant] had acknowledged signing at
least—maybe all of the checks that were deposited in the
accounts. … [A]gain, our argument always was that [Appellant]
did not submit any of the documents that were submitted by
Marino. And we presented that not just through [Appellant’s]
testimony, but also through Annette Saylor’s [(Saylor)]11
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11 Saylor was employed as a bookkeeper for Marino between 2004 and 2016.
N.T. (Jury Trial), 7/13/24, at 48. At Marino’s direction, Saylor issued checks
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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testimony[,] who indicated that she never had any dealings with
[Appellant] about the things that were submitted to WEDnet.
N.T. (PCRA Hearing), 3/11/24, at 56. Attorney Jackson also testified that it
was clear from the testimony and from her closing argument that no evidence
was found in Appellant’s home. Id. at 56-57.
Upon review, we agree that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not
objecting to Venditti’s testimony. Under the circumstances of this case, where
it was repeatedly made clear to the jury that all fraudulent communications
had been sent to WEDnet from Marino’s home computer, Venditti’s statement
that Appellant “signed” certain documents merely indicated that Appellant’s
purported electronic signature appeared on the documents. Moreover, in light
of the clear acknowledgements by the Commonwealth that there was no direct
evidence that Appellant himself signed or sent the fraudulent documents,
Appellant failed to establish he suffered prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s
failure to object to Venditti’s brief statement that Appellant “signed” certain
documents. Accordingly, trial counsel were not ineffective in this regard. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1063-64 (Pa. 2006) (stating
that “a court will not find counsel to be ineffective if the particular course
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from the bank account associated with Marino’s business, YKT Corporation, to
other entities, including Appellant and Appellant’s business. See generally
id. at 50-67.
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chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
client’s interest.”) (citation omitted).
In his final argument, Appellant asserts trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to disclose to him a plea bargain offered by the Commonwealth. 12
Appellant’s Brief at 41. Appellant claims that he would have entered a guilty
plea if trial counsel had properly informed him of the offer. Id. at 41, 48.
According to Appellant, he was not informed of the plea deal until jury
selection, and (citing the “legalese employed by the Commonwealth’s
attorney[,]”) he did not understand the nature of the plea at that time. Id.
at 43. Appellant stated that he believed the offer recited at jury selection was
the same as the original offer that he had rejected. Id. at 45.13
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12 Immediately after jury selection, the prosecutor stated the following:
[J]ust for matter of the record, I want to state that a proposed
guilty plea offer was sent to [trial counsel] last Friday…. That offer
was to plead to one count of theft by deception, Title 18, Section
3922(a)(1). That would be graded as a felony of the third degree,
carrying an offense gravity score of 5, with a minimum standard
range sentence of restorative sanctions to 9 months. We are here
now. That offer—having just picked a jury, that offer is now
withdrawn.
N.T. (Jury Selection), 7/9/21, at 117 (paragraph break omitted). Thereafter,
Appellant replied, “Okay.” Id.
13 We observe that the argument presented in Appellant’s brief differs slightly
from the one raised in his amended PCRA petition. In his amended PCRA
petition, Appellant averred trial counsel had informed him of a plea offer, but
the information was inaccurately conveyed (i.e., trial counsel informed him
the Commonwealth’s offer included a one-year prison sentence, where in fact,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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It is well settled that “[a] criminal defendant has the right to effective
counsel during a plea process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 397 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.
Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Here, the PCRA court detailed the pertinent testimony from the PCRA
hearing and addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
In the week leading to the trial in this case, Appellant and his five
co-defendants were offered plea deals that were significantly
reduced from earlier plea offers. All co-defendants, including the
fraud scheme ringleader, [] Marino, … accepted the offers and pled
guilty before trial began. Before jury selection, Appellant knew
that all co-defendants had pled guilty and that only his case was
going to trial.
The offer to Appellant was a plea to one count of theft by
deception, a felony of the third degree, with an offense gravity
score of 5 and standard range of [restorative sanctions] to 9
months. It was an open plea as to sentencing but required
Appellant to pay restitution of $70,835. In exchange, the
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the offer included a probationary term). See Amended PCRA Petition, 3/5/24,
at ¶¶ 120-21. By contrast, Appellant now suggests the plea offer placed on
the record before jury selection was an entirely new plea offer. See
Appellant’s Brief at 44 (arguing his conversation with Attorney Blair following
jury selection demonstrates he was not aware of the potential sentence
connected with the plea offer, and “he was not aware of this new plea offer at
all.”).
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Commonwealth would nol pros all other counts. Appellant did not
accept the offer. Accordingly, after jury selection, the prosecutor
withdrew the offer on the record. In response to the prosecutor’s
recitation and withdrawal of the offer, Appellant said, “Okay.”
During the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified that Attorney
Jackson never conveyed the offer to him. He stated that the first
time he learned of the offer was when the prosecutor withdrew it
immediately after jury selection. Appellant also said he informed
Attorney Blair that Attorney Jackson had not conveyed the offer
to him[,] and Attorney Blair responded by saying the offer
“probably” would have resulted in no jail time, but it was now too
late. Appellant additionally stated that Attorney Jackson was too
busy to prepare him for trial after jury selection, but that if she
had met with him[,] he would have questioned her about the plea
offer. According to Appellant, he went to trial because Attorney
Jackson assured him that he could beat the charges; however,
had he known about the offer, he would “without a doubt” have
taken it rather than go to trial. Finally, Appellant indicated that
he did not believe the Commonwealth had previously tendered
any plea offers.
In contrast, Attorney Jackson testified that over the course
of this case[,] the Commonwealth extended to Appellant (and all
co-defendants) pretrial plea offers on two different occasions. She
stated that both offers were communicated to and rejected by
Appellant.
Specifically, Attorney Jackson testified that the first offer,
communicated during the early pretrial workup before Attorney
Blair had been retained as co-counsel, was “pretty aggressive.”
That offer was a plea to multiple felonies (two counts of conspiracy
to dealing in proceeds, a felony of the first degree with an offense
gravity score of eight, and a total of six counts of theft as felonies
of the third degree with offense gravity scores of six), which
subjected Appellant to substantial sentencing exposure. The offer
was open as to sentencing, except for restitution of $70,835. In
exchange, the Commonwealth would nol pros the remaining
charges. Attorney Jackson communicated the offer to Appellant,
but did not recommend that he accept it. Appellant rejected the
offer.
The second offer, summarized above, was communicated by
the Commonwealth to Attorney Jackson on Friday, July 2, 2021,
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one week before jury selection. Attorney Jackson testified that
the second offer was a “big deal” because it was far more
favorable to Appellant than the first and subjected him to far less
sentencing exposure. She spoke with Appellant about the offer
the day it was received, or the next day while meeting to prepare
for trial. [Attorney Jackson] explained to Appellant the differences
between the two offers, outlined his sentencing exposure if he was
convicted at trial of multiple felonies, and recommended that he
seriously consider taking the second offer, as it would have been
to only one felony as opposed to what he was facing at trial.
Appellant appeared to have understood the differences between
the first and second offers[ and] the potential consequences of
going to trial…. Ultimately, both [Appellant] and [Marsha] were
insistent that he not plead guilty and [] go to trial.
Attorney Jackson also testified that, from the beginning of
the case, Appellant was adamant that he was innocent, not
interested in a negotiated resolution, and wanted a trial to clear
his name. His rejection of the second offer (as well as the first)
was a reiteration of and consistent with that firmly held position.
The bottom line is that the testimony of Appellant and
Attorney Jackson was diametrically opposed. In summary,
Appellant testified that Attorney Jackson never communicated the
offer to him. In contrast, Attorney Jackson testified that there
was no doubt in her mind that she discussed the plea with
Appellant, but that he unequivocally declined the second offer and
wanted to go to trial. … [W]e found Attorney Jackson’s
testimony to be credible and Appellant’s contrary
testimony not to be credible.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 8-11 (some emphasis added; record citations
and one paragraph break omitted; some capitalization modified); see also
id. at 12 (stating that “Attorney Jackson’s testimony is credible and supported
by the testimony of Attorney Blair, the testimony of [Marsha], the record, and
[the PCRA court’s] real-time observations.”), 12-14 (summarizing the
testimony of Attorney Blair and Marsha, as well as the PCRA court’s own
recollections of the case history).
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The PCRA court’s determination and its credibility findings are supported
by the record. To the extent Appellant suggests Attorney Jackson’s testimony
during the PCRA hearing was incredible, we reiterate that this Court cannot
reassess the PCRA court’s sound credibility findings. See Miranda, 317 A.3d
at 1075 (a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding on this Court
so long as they are supported by the record). As the PCRA court aptly noted,
“Appellant is obviously displeased with the outcome of the trial and the
sentence he received. … ‘Buyer’s remorse’ is not grounds for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 14. For the
reasons stated by the PCRA court, we conclude Appellant’s underlying claim
lacks merit. Thus, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective on this basis.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying
Appellant’s first PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Date: 3/3/2026
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