Greagor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DANIEL GREAGOR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-1309-MMH-LLL

JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Cecil A. Grant III’s

Motion to Dismiss Count X of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Incorporated

Memorandum of Law (Doc. 39; Motion), filed July 23, 2025. In the Motion,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), Officer

Grant seeks dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

Plaintiff Daniel Greagor brings in his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

(Doc. 32; Amended Complaint), filed July 9, 2025. In opposition to the Motion,

Greagor timely filed Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Grant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 43; Response), filed August 8, 2025. Accordingly, this matter is

ripe for review.

I. Background1

On December 23, 2022, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO) dispatched

Officers Cecil Grant and Michael Dunneback to Daniel Greagor’s home. See

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 12, 17. “Upon arrival,” the officers “made contact with

[Greagor’s] wife, Jennifer Greagor.” Id. ¶ 13. Jennifer Greagor advised that

Greagor had thrown her mother’s belongings out and that he was screaming

and threatening to have her mother removed from the residence. Id. ¶ 14.

Jennifer Greagor also told Officer Grant that, although Greagor had been

violent in the past, he had not touched her on this occasion. Id. With respect to

his previous violence, Jennifer Greagor explained that, two years prior, she got

“an injunction against [Greagor] after he . . . put his hands on” her. Id. Greagor

completed an anger management program, and Jennifer Greagor allowed him

to return to the home. Id. Jennifer Greagor told the officers that Greagor “ha[d]

significant pain, so he [was taking] morphine and drink[ing] ‘way too much.’”

Id. “She asked the officers if she could obtain another injunction” against

Greagor “in the future if she felt [that he] was a danger[.]” Id. Officer Grant

explained that the officers could not force Greagor to leave the home because he

1 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the

Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to Greagor,

and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Miljkovic v.

Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and citations

omitted). As such, the recited facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and may differ

from those that ultimately can be proved.

had not committed a crime.” Id. ¶ 15. However, the officers suggested “Florida’s

Marchman Act[] . . . as an option to force [Greagor] to get help.” Id.

With the officers following her, Jennifer Greagor went into the bedroom

where Greagor was sleeping, woke him up, and then immediately exited the

room. Id. ¶ 16. Greagor, “upset to be woken up to two police officers in his

room[,]” asked why they were there and “asked [them] to leave[.]” Id. ¶ 17. The

officers asked Greagor if he had been arguing with his wife. Id. Greagor stated

that he had been sleeping and that he would not answer the officers’ questions.

Id. Greagor also “told [the officers] he wanted his lawyer.” Id. According to

Greagor, the officers ignored his request and kept asking if he had been arguing

with his wife. Id. When Greagor “continued to request that his attorney be

present for questioning[,]” Officer Dunneback responded, saying, “Sure, if you

want to call your attorney at, ah, let’s see 6:30 at night on a holiday and pay

. . . him . . . like $400 . . . an hour to answer questions.” Id. ¶ 18. Greagor then

“raised his voice[,]” and Officer Grant told Greagor that “he would be arrested

for resisting arrest[]” if he kept “rais[ing] his voice[.]” Id. The officers continued

asking Greagor questions, and he continued to refuse to answer them and asked

the officers “to leave his house.” Id.

Greagor laid down in his bed to go back to sleep, id., and the officers exited

the room, id. ¶ 19. After leaving the bedroom, Officer Dunneback told Jennifer

Greagor to call her husband’s employer and report that he had been drinking.

Id. Greagor “then exited his room[]” and “st[ood] next to [Officer] Grant.” Id. ¶

20. When Officer Grant said, “You said you were going to sleep[,]” Greagor “put

his right hand up[,]” without “ma[king] . . . contact with” Officer Grant, to

indicate that he posed “no threat.” Id. Officer Grant “then punched [Greagor] in

the upper chest,” causing Greagor to fall backward. Id. ¶ 21. As Greagor fell,

Officer Grant punched him in the face. Id. Greagor retreated to his bedroom. Id.

Officer Grant continued to hit Greagor in the face, saying, “You don’t touch me!”

and Officer Dunneback repeated, “Don’t touch him!” Id. Greagor fell to the

ground next to his bed. Id. ¶ 22. Officer Grant then jumped on top of Greagor,

continuing to hit him in the face. Id. As he was being punched, Greagor covered

his face with his hands and yelled, “STOP!” Id. ¶¶ 22–23. The officers repeatedly

ordered Greagor “to put his hands behind his back[,]” id. ¶ 22, but he could not

do so “because he was covering his face to protect [himself] from [Officer]

Grant’s punches[,]” id. ¶ 23.

Eventually, the officers placed Greagor’s “hands behind his back and took

him into custody.” Id. ¶ 24. When Officer Grant told Greagor, “You’re not gonna

put your hands on me[,]” id., Greagor “exclaimed, ‘You just beat the shit out of

me for no reason[,]’” id. ¶ 25. “While escorting [Greagor] to the [police] vehicle,”

Officer Grant bent Greagor’s “wrist in the form of a wrist lock,” which caused

Greagor “extreme pain[.]” Id. ¶ 26. Greagor “yelled, ‘You beat the shit out of me

in my own house!’” Id. ¶ 27. And Officer Grant replied, “Keep your hands to

yourself next time.” Id.

The officers “called rescue” for Greagor but made him wait outside in the

forty-one-degree weather while wearing his boxer shorts. Id. ¶ 28. When

Greagor requested clothes or a blanket, the officers joked about him being cold.

Id. Greagor stood outside in his underwear for “twenty minutes and fifty

seconds” until a larger police vehicle arrived to transport him to the jail. Id. ¶

29.

Sometime after the incident, Officer Grant resigned from JSO and was

arrested for official misconduct due to his treatment of Greagor. Id. ¶ 32. As a

result of Officer Grant’s actions, Greagor alleges that he suffered multiple

bruises and contusions on his chest and face, id. ¶ 54(a), “substantial pain and

suffering” stemming from facial bruising, swelling, and tenderness, id. ¶ 54(b),

and physical discomfort for “several days following the incident[,]” id. Today, he

continues to suffer from severe emotional distress, including “anxiety, fear,

humiliation, . . . psychological trauma[,] sleep disturbances, flashbacks, and a

heightened sense of vulnerability and mistrust toward[] law enforcement

officers[,]” id. ¶ 54(c), long-term psychological effects, including “chronic

anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder[,]” that have negatively

impacted his “daily life, work performance, and personal relationships[,]” id. ¶

54(d), adverse consequences in ongoing legal matters, id. ¶ 54(e), and damage

to family relationships and his reputation, id.

II. Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the Court must accept the factual allegations

set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also

Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002).

In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.

See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the

plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(citations and quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262

(explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or

legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal[]”) (citations

and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all

of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678–79. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine

whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570).

III. Discussion

“To state a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

under Florida law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: ‘(1)

the defendant’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was

outrageous, beyond all bounds of decency, and odious and utterly intolerable in

a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the

emotional distress was severe.’” Plowright v. Mia. Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th 1358,

1367–68 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036, 1053 (11th

Cir. 2015)). Greagor contends that Officer Grant intentionally inflicted

emotional distress on him when Officer Grant “entered [Greagor’s] bedroom

while [Greagor] was asleep[,]” see Amended Complaint ¶ 124; “question[ed

Greagor] despite repeated requests that [Officer Grant] leave and that

[Greagor] be allowed to contact an attorney[,]” id.; “struck [Greagor] in the chest

and face with a closed fist,” id. ¶ 125; “punch[ed Greagor] repeatedly while [he]

retreated, covered his face, and called out in pain[,]” id.; “applied a painful wrist

lock while escorting [Greagor] outside in freezing temperatures,” id. ¶ 126;

“le[ft] him handcuffed in his underwear for nearly twenty-one minutes[,]” id.;

and “mock[ed] his discomfort[,]” id. Greagor asserts that, as a result of Officer

Grant’s actions, he suffers from “severe emotional distress, including anxiety,

humiliation, sleep disruption, and trauma.” Id. ¶ 128.

In the Motion, Officer Grant argues that Greagor’s intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim fails because Greagor’s allegations regarding Officer

Grant’s conduct do not reach “the requisite level of ‘outrageousness.’” See

Motion at 2. Specifically, Officer Grant contends that his conduct on December

23, 2023, was insufficiently outrageous because “courts applying Florida law

have consistently held that isolated incidents of excessive force, even involving

physical strikes, do not rise to the level of ‘outrageous conduct.’” Id. at 5.

Additionally, Officer Grant asserts that Greagor “fails to allege any facts

showing the severity of the emotional distress suffered or an interference with

daily life beyond generalized boilerplate allegations and threadbare

conclusions.” Id. at 7.

Turning first to whether Officer Grant’s conduct was sufficiently

outrageous, the Court notes that this element of an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim can only be met by conduct that is “so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.” Moore, 806 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson,

467 So. 2d 277, 278–79 (Fla. 1985)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

observed that “[o]ne way to determine whether this standard is met is to

consider whether the recitation of the facts to an average member of the

community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to

exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1368 (internal quotation

omitted) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d at 279).

“In Florida, ‘[w]hether conduct is outrageous enough to support a claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law’ to be decided by

the court[] at the earliest opportunity, ‘not a question of fact[.]’” Id. (quoting

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).

And the conduct “must be evaluated on an objective basis.” Matsumoto v. Am.

Burial & Cremation Servs., Inc., 949 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). “The

subjective response of the person affected by the conduct does not control.” Id.

A review of Florida case law, as well as cases in this Circuit applying

Florida law, establishes that the standard for the requisite outrageous conduct

to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress “is particularly

high in Florida.” Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1368 (quoting Clemente v. Horne, 707

So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also Foreman v. City of Port St. Lucie,

294 F. App’x 554, 557 (11th Cir. 2008); Golden v. Complete Holdings, Inc., 818

F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“Although there is no definitive example

of what constitutes ‘outrageous conduct’ for the purposes of maintaining a cause

of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Florida case law on the

subject has evinced a comparatively high standard.”).2 Indeed, the tort is

recognized “only in the most outrageous circumstances.” Mundy v. S. Bell Tel.

and Tel. Co., 676 F.2d 503, 505 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Habelow v. Travelers

Ins. Co., 389 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). Moreover, the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “tortious or criminal intent, . . .

intent to inflict emotional distress,” and “conduct [that] has been characterized

by malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to

punitive damages for another tort[]” on their own are “not enough” to establish

2 The Court notes that, although decisions of district courts are not binding, they may

be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th

Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other

district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects”).

outrageousness. Moore, 806 F.3d at 1053 (internal quotations omitted) (citing

and quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d at 278).

Here, Greagor contends that his claim is viable because it does not

“involv[e] ‘mere’ excessive force[.]” See Response ¶ 8. Instead, Greagor explains

that “[t]he combination of an unprovoked assault, deliberate humiliation, and

falsification of criminal charges mirrors the sort of egregious misuse of

authority that courts have deemed actionable.”3 Id. ¶ 7. Although Greagor is

correct that this is not a case of mere excessive force, his argument is

unavailing. Indeed, courts applying Florida law have held that the combination

of unprovoked physical force, humiliation, and an allegedly wrongful arrest is

not sufficiently outrageous to support a cause of action. See Corbin v. Prummell,

655 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1166 (M.D. Fla. 2023); Geidel v. City of Bradenton Beach,

56 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1368 (M.D. Fla. 1999).

3 The only authority that Greagor cites to support this contention is Williams v. City

of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). See Response ¶ 7. Greagor contends that

this case shows that “police abuse during [an] arrest can meet [the] outrageousness

standard[.]” Id. However, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in Williams did

not involve “police abuse during [an] arrest[.]” See generally Williams, 575 So. 2d. Rather, the

plaintiff sued because police officers showed people video footage and photographs of a

fourteen-year-old, deceased boy’s autopsy. See id. at 685–86. The Williams court explained

that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims involving “improper behavior toward

the dead body of a loved one[]” are unique such that “behavior which in other circumstances

might be merely insulting, frivolous, or careless becomes indecent, outrageous, and

intolerable.” Id. at 691. Other cases confirm that this kind of conduct more easily rises to the

requisite level of outrageousness. See, e.g., Sherer v. Rubin Mem’l Chapel, 452 So. 2d 574,

574–75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that a funeral home dressing the wrong corpse, trying to

convince the deceased’s family that the wrong corpse was that of their loved one, and

improperly dressing the right, unprepared corpse in a way that exposed “numerous ugly

bruises” at the funeral was sufficiently outrageous). Thus, Williams is inapposite.

For example, in Corbin v. Prummell, the plaintiff’s intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim involved all three of the elements that, together,

Greagor contends make Officer Grant’s conduct outrageous. See generally

Corbin, 655 F. Supp. 3d. The plaintiff alleged that a police officer used physical

force when he kicked her with his booted leg, causing her to fall and break her

leg, double-lock handcuffed her, and forced her to walk to the police car on her

broken leg. Id. at 1153, 1165–66. Further, the plaintiff alleged that this force

was unprovoked because she was an “unarmed bystander,” and she only exited

her car to check on her husband, who was undergoing a field sobriety test

twenty-five feet away. Id. at 1153, 1165. The plaintiff also alleged humiliating

conduct because the officer handcuffed her in a pool of her own urine and forced

her to lie in it afterward. Id. at 1165. And the plaintiff alleged that the officer

wrongfully arrested her because she merely stepped out of her car to check on

her husband. Id. at 1153, 1165. Despite the confluence of these elements, the

court nonetheless held that the officer’s conduct was insufficiently outrageous

to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1166.

Similarly, in Geidel v. City of Bradenton Beach, the plaintiff alleged that

police officers used physical force when they handcuffed him in a manner that

restricted blood flow to his hands, threw him to the ground, dragged and jerked

his body, shackled his legs, and slammed his body into the patrol car. Geidel,

56 F. Supp. 2d at 1363–64. He also alleged that this force was unprovoked

because he fully complied with the officers’ orders. Id. at 1363. And he alleged

humiliating conduct because he asserted that, when he told the officers that his

handcuffs were too tight, the officers laughed at him. Id. at 1364. Additionally,

the plaintiff alleged that the officers—who were investigating a domestic

violence tip in the area—wrongfully arrested him because they knowingly

entered the incorrect house and arrested him without evidence of criminal

behavior. Id. at 1363. Again, the court held that the officers’ conduct was

insufficiently outrageous. Id. at 1368. Although Greagor correctly notes that

Geidel does not bind the Court, the Court nonetheless finds it—and Corbin—

persuasive.4

Viewed in the light most favorable to Greagor, Officer Grant entered

Greagor’s bedroom and used unprovoked physical force when he punched

Greagor in the face and chest multiple times and put him in a wrist lock “for no

reason[.]” See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 20–23, 25–27. He continued to question

Greagor despite Greagor’s request for an attorney. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. He humiliated

Greagor by forcing him to stand outside in the cold in his boxers while he and

Officer Dunneback laughed at Greagor. See id. ¶¶ 28–29. And he wrongfully

arrested Greagor. See id. ¶¶ 14–29. As in Corbin and Geidel, the conduct

4 Greagor’s only other rejoinder is that he “disagrees with the finding in Geidel.”

Response ¶ 17. Specifically, Greagor asserts that “[t]he facts of Geidel probably should have

met the standard,” and he questions “[h]ow far . . . law enforcement [can] be permitted to go[.]”

Id. Because Greagor cites no authority to support this critique, the Court finds Geidel no less

persuasive.

described by Greagor may well be egregious, but it is not “so extreme in degree,

as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Moore, 806 F.3d at 1053

(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d at 278–79. As a result, this conduct

does not clear the “particularly high” outrageousness bar necessary to support

a claim of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress under Florida law.

Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1368 (quoting Clemente, 707 So. 2d at 867).

While Greagor argues that “aggravating factors[,]” such as the “invasion

of the home, repeated strikes to a compliant suspect, forced public exposure in

near-nudity, and fabrication of charges[,]” distinguish this case from the

excessive force cases that Officer Grant cites, see Response ¶ 8, he cites no

authority to support the contention that these are “aggravating factors[,]” see

generally id. And, in any event, these factors largely overlap with the three

elements present in Corbin and Geidel, and they are insufficient to satisfy the

outrageousness standard. Notably, Geidel also featured the only distinct

factor—invasion of the home—and the court still held that the officers’ conduct

was insufficiently outrageous. Geidel, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1363, 1368. Upon

consideration of the allegations of the operative complaint, the Court concludes

that Greagor fails to plead facts sufficient to satisfy the outrageousness element

of his claim.

Because Greagor has not plausibly alleged that Officer Grant’s conduct

was outrageous, the Court need not analyze whether Greagor’s emotional

distress was severe.5 As such, the Motion is due to be granted, and Count X of

Greagor’s Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Cecil A. Grant III’s Motion to Dismiss Count X of Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 39)

is GRANTED.

5 “[S]evere emotional distress means emotional distress of such a substantial quality

or enduring quality[] that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to

endure it.” Kim v. Jung Hyun Chang, 249 So. 3d 1300, 1305 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (second

alteration in original) (quoting Kraeer Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Noble, 521 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla.

4th DCA 1988)); see also Brown v. Bellinger, 843 F. App’x 183, 188 (11th Cir. 2021). Greagor’s

conclusory allegations of emotional distress, devoid of factual support, are insufficient to

plausibly allege emotional distress severe enough to support a cause of action. See Amended

Complaint ¶¶ 54(a)–(e).

2. Count X of Daniel Greagor’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

(Doc. 32) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 26th day of

January, 2026.

United States District Judge

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