Schnackenberg

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JARED SCHNACKENBERG,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:24-cv-324-MMH-PDB

TOLL BROTHERS MORTGAGE

COMPANY,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 149; Motion), filed September 30, 2025. Plaintiff,

Jared Schnackenberg, filed his Response to Defendant’s Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 150; Response) on October 28, 2025. On the same

day, Schnackenberg also filed his Notice of Filing Additional Evidence in

Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 151),

attaching several exhibits. On November 12, 2025, Defendant, Toll Brothers

Mortgage Company, filed its Reply in Support of its Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 152). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Background1

On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff, Jared Schnackenberg, entered into a

contract with Toll FL XIII Limited Partnership (the Seller) to purchase a new

home in St. Johns, Florida (the Property). See Agreement of Sale (Doc. 46-2;

Purchase Agreement), filed December 9, 2024. In connection with this purchase,

on April 6, 2022, Plaintiff applied for a new home mortgage loan from

Defendant, Toll Brothers Mortgage Company (TBMC), an affiliate of the Seller.

See Affidavit of Jared Schnackenberg in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Liability (Doc. 49-1; Plaintiff’s First Affidavit), filed

December 9, 2024, ¶ 4; Uniform Residential Loan Application (Doc. 65-1; Loan

Application), filed January 17, 2025. Both TBMC and the Seller are wholly

owned subsidiaries of Toll Brothers Inc. Compare Amended Complaint and Jury

Demand (Doc. 33; Amended Complaint), filed September 3, 2024,2 ¶ 67, with

Defendant’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 36), filed September 19,

2024, ¶ 67.

On April 27, 2022, Schnackenberg and TBMC entered into the Mortgage

Loan Commitment (Doc. 33-1; Loan Commitment). Under the terms of the Loan

1 For the purpose of resolving the Motion, the Court views all disputed facts and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Jared Schnackenberg. However,

the Court notes that these facts may differ from those that can ultimately be proved at trial.

See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002).

2 Schnackenberg attaches many relevant documents to the Amended Complaint filed

on September 3, 2024; the Court references these as exhibits to “Doc. 33” on the Court’s docket.

Commitment, Schnackenberg’s application for a loan of $647,200 was

conditionally approved, but it remained subject to certain terms and conditions.

See id. at 1. For example, upon TBMC’s request, the Loan Commitment

required Schnackenberg to provide specified documentation, including “copies

of cancelled checks and the corresponding bank statement(s) to source” earnest

money deposits paid to the Seller. See id. at 2. After entering into the Loan

Commitment, Schnackenberg and TBMC worked to acquire the documentation

necessary to obtain final approval. See Affidavit of Jared Schnackenberg in

Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 151-

3; Plaintiff’s Second Affidavit), filed October 28, 2025, ¶ 5. Notably, during this

time, Schnackenberg paid the Seller a total of $67,344 in pre-closing deposits

(the Deposits).3 See id. ¶ 4.

Before the scheduled closing of the Loan Commitment and the underlying

property purchase, Schnackenberg and one of TBMC’s loan officers discussed

increasing the amount of Schnackenberg’s loan. See id. ¶ 6. In April 2023,

3 It appears that Schnackenberg attempts to manufacture a dispute of material fact by

stating that he paid the Deposits to “TBMC and/or Seller.” See, e.g., Response ¶¶ 12, 33;

Plaintiff’s Second Affidavit ¶¶ 4, 18. But the evidence shows that the Deposits were paid to

the Seller. See, e.g., Loan Commitment at 2 (referencing “earnest money deposits paid to the

builder”); Letter Dated August 24, 2023 (Doc. 33-4; Default Notice) (advising Schnackenberg

that the Seller would retain his Deposits should he fail to close on the Property). And

Schnackenberg’s vague phrasing constitutes no more than a mere scintilla of evidence

insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger

v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support

of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986))).

TBMC issued loan estimates reflecting increases of Schnackenberg’s loan to

$725,000 and $726,200. See Plaintiff’s Second Affidavit ¶¶ 7–9; see also

Plaintiff’s Second Affidavit Exhs. A–C (Doc. 151 at 6–17; Increased Loan

Estimates). And, on July 21, 2023, TBMC sent Schnackenberg a “Closing

Disclosure” setting forth the final loan terms for a loan of $726,200. See

Plaintiff’s Second Affidavit ¶ 10; Closing Disclosure (Doc. 33-2).

On July 25, 2024, Schnackenberg and his family traveled from Colorado

to Jacksonville, Florida, expecting to move into their new home. See Plaintiff’s

First Affidavit ¶ 17. However, before they arrived, TBMC informed

Schnackenberg that it could not offer the increased loan amount reflected in the

Increased Loan Estimates and Closing Disclosure. See id. ¶ 18. TBMC remained

willing to offer a loan under the terms the parties agreed to in the Loan

Commitment. See Exhibit 3 (67-2; Comment Log), filed January 22, 2025, at 3.

But Schnackenberg declined to move forward with the Loan Commitment under

these terms. See id. at 2–3.

Unable to move into their intended home upon arrival in Florida,

Schnackenberg and his family checked into a hotel and their belongings

remained packed away in rental trucks. See Plaintiff’s First Affidavit ¶ 18. In

the meantime, TBMC attempted to set Schnackenberg up with a lender that

appeared willing to offer a loan on his desired terms. See Comment Log at 2–3;

Exhibit 8 (Doc. 67-7; Email Exchanges), filed January 22, 2025, at 10–11. But

Schnackenberg refused to submit an application with this alternate lender,

believing that the process would be lengthy, expensive, and futile. See Email

Exchanges at 13; Email from Jared Schnackenberg dated August 9, 2023 (Doc.

33-3; Email Proposal) at 2. Ultimately, Schnackenberg failed to close on the

underlying property purchase, and the Seller retained the Deposits in

accordance with the terms of the Purchase Agreement. See Email Proposal at

3; Letter Dated August 24, 2023 (Doc. 33-4; Default Notice). Schnackenberg

asked TBMC and the Seller to return the Deposits. See Email Proposal at 3.

But neither TBMC nor the Seller responded to this request. See Plaintiff’s

Second Affidavit ¶ 17. As such, Schnackenberg initiated this action in state

court on February 15, 2024. See Complaint and Jury Demand (Doc. 8), filed

April 1, 2024, at 1.

On March 29, 2024, TBMC removed this action to this Court. See

generally Defendant’s Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). In the Amended Complaint,

Schnackenberg asserts several claims under federal and state law. See

generally Amended Complaint. On December 9, 2024, both parties filed motions

for summary judgment. See Toll Brothers Mortgage Company’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 44); Plaintiff’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability as to Counts I & II of Amended

Complaint (Doc. 47). After hearing oral argument on the motions, the

Honorable William G. Young, sitting by designation, entered summary

judgment in favor of TBMC on all but one of Schnackenberg’s claims. See

Minute Entry (Doc. 118), entered April 15, 2025; see also Order (Doc. 140;

Clarification Order), entered July 23, 2025, at 2–3. As a result, Schnackenberg’s

only remaining claim, and the only claim presently before the Court, is his claim

arising under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).

On August 12, 2025, the Court held a status conference to discuss pending

pre-trial motions. See Clerk’s Minutes (Doc. 146). In Defendant’s Omnibus

Motion in Limine (Doc. 100; Motion in Limine), filed March 31, 2025, TBMC

sought to exclude all evidence of Schnackenberg’s damages, arguing that the

alleged damages are not recoverable under FDUTPA and are therefore

irrelevant. See Motion in Limine at 10–22. At the status conference, TBMC

furthered this argument, seeking to dismiss Schnackenberg’s FDUTPA claim

via a motion in limine.4 See Transcript of Status Conference (Doc. 148;

Transcript), filed September 8, 2025, at 4. To provide Schnackenberg with

notice and an opportunity to be heard on this potentially dispositive issue, to

4 “A motion in limine seeks to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before it is

actually offered, not to determine the sufficiency of the evidence or merits of an issue.” See

Jean-Louis v. Clear Springs Farming, LLC, No. 8:13-CV-3084-T-30AEP, 2016 WL 6838497, at

*3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2016) (internal citation omitted). As such, “the typical in limine practice

of federal courts does not include the dismissal of claims.” See Gold Cross Ems, Inc. v.

Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 309 F.R.D. 699, 700 (S.D. Ga. 2015) (noting that at least two

circuit courts of appeal have held the dismissal of claims on a motion in limine to be improper).

The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310

(11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any

other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”).

prevent a waste of the parties’ and judicial resources, and with the agreement

of the parties, the Court directed TBMC to file a renewed motion for summary

judgment addressing only the issue of whether Schnackenberg’s alleged

damages are recoverable under FDUTPA. See id. at 14–15, 21.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for

summary judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A).5 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that

5 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 Advisory Committee’s Note 2010 Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The

language of subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing development

of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not binding, they

are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus,

case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable and is applicable

here.

In citing to Campbell, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished opinions as

binding precedent, but that they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them

persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir.

2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. See Mize v.

Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston

v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere

scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient

to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Est. of Kesinger v.

Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine

issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark,

Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). For the moving party to meet its initial

burden, it may “‘point out to the district court … that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty.

Housing Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)) (alteration omitted). “When a moving party

has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the

pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

“If the non-moving party fails to ‘make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ then the

court must enter summary judgment for the moving party.” Gonzalez, 161 F.3d

at 1294 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In determining whether summary

judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves

v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l,

S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Discussion

The only issue before the Court is whether Schnackenberg’s damages are

“actual damages” within the meaning of the FDUTPA. TBMC contends that

Schnackenberg’s alleged damages, specifically the Deposits retained by the

Seller and Schnackenberg’s substitute housing and storage costs, are

consequential damages not recoverable under FDUTPA.6 See Motion at 6–11.

In response, Schnackenberg asserts that the Deposits are actual damages as

they constitute the “amount he paid for a ‘valueless good or service,’ in this case

6 At the August 12, 2025 Status Conference, Schnackenberg stated that he believes the

only damages that remain viable under FDUTPA are the Deposits and his housing and storage

costs. See Transcript at 18.

a valueless mortgage loan commitment.”7 See Response at 11–12. Upon review,

the Court finds Schnackenberg’s alleged damages are not “actual damages” as

measured under FDUTPA. As such, Schnackenberg’s claim fails as a matter of

law.

To state a claim under FDUTPA, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a deceptive

act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.” See Marrache v.

Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1097 (11th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added)

(quoting Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 985–86 (11th Cir. 2016)).

As such, “actual damages are a required element of a FDUTPA claim.” HRCC,

Ltd. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (USA), Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1323 (M.D. Fla.

2016), aff'd, 703 F. App'x 814 (11th Cir. 2017); see also Macias v. HBC of Fla.,

Inc., 694 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (affirming the dismissal of a FDUTPA

claim because the plaintiff suffered no actual damages). “To survive summary

judgment, therefore, [Schnackenberg] must proffer some evidence of actual

damages.” See A&E Adventures LLC v. Intercard, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 3d 1333,

7 While Schnackenberg requested to be heard as to his damages for substitute housing

and storage expenses, see Transcript at 18–19, Schnackenberg does not address this category

of damages in his Response. See generally Response. Accordingly, the Court considers this

argument abandoned. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (“When a

party moves for final, not partial, summary judgment, ... ‘it [becomes] incumbent upon the

[nonmovant] to respond by, at the very least, raising in their opposition papers any and all

arguments or defenses they felt precluded judgment in [the moving party's] favor.’... Failure

to do so may result in waiver or abandonment of the issue.” (second, third and fourth alteration

in original) (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th

Cir. 2001))); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.

1995) (“[T]he onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the

complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”).

1345 (S.D. Fla. 2021).

Under FDUTPA, the measure of actual damages is “the difference in the

market value of the product or service in the condition in which it was delivered

and its market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered

according to the contract of the parties.” Tri-Cnty. Plumbing Servs., Inc. v.

Brown, 921 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting H & J Paving of Florida,

Inc. v. Nextel, Inc., 849 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). But, when the

product or service “is rendered valueless as a result of the defect—then the

purchase price is the appropriate measure of actual damages.” Id.; see also

HRCC, Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1323 (“[T]here are only two possible ways to

measure actual damages in a FDUTPA claim: (1) the value between what was

promised and what was delivered; or (2) the total price paid for the valueless

good or service.”). Notably, “FDUTPA ‘does not provide for the recovery of

nominal damages, speculative losses, or compensation for subjective feelings of

disappointment.’” See Marrache, 17 F.4th at 1098 (quoting City First Mortg.

Corp. v. Barton, 988 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)). Likewise, special,

incidental, and consequential damages are not available under FDUTPA. See

Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Petsch, 872 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Here, Schnackenberg has alleged no actual damages as measured under

FDUTPA. Indeed, it is undisputed that TBMC was ready and willing to provide

Schnackenberg with a loan in accordance with the terms the parties agreed to

in the Loan Commitment.8 See Comment Log at 3. As such, TBMC delivered

exactly what “should have been delivered according to the contract of the

parties.” See Tri-Cnty. Plumbing Servs., 921 So. 2d at 22. As a result,

Schnackenberg did not suffer actual damages as measured under FDUTPA.

Moreover, Schnackenberg’s assertion that the Loan Commitment was

“valueless” is unavailing. Indeed, aside from the fact that Schnackenberg never

accepted financing from TBMC, it is unclear how the Loan Commitment was

“valueless.” Again, although Schnackenberg never received financing, TBMC

was willing to provide a loan in accordance with the terms of the Loan

Commitment. See Comment Log at 3. But Schnackenberg declined to accept the

loan under these terms. See id. The Court is not convinced that Schnackenberg’s

refusal to accept a loan under the terms the parties contractually agreed to

renders the Loan Commitment “valueless.”

However, even if the Loan Commitment was a “valueless good or service,”

Schnackenberg’s damages are still not recoverable under FDUTPA. Indeed,

despite Schnackenberg’s contention otherwise, the Deposits were not the

“purchase price” of the Loan Commitment. While Schnackenberg was required

to provide documentation showing that the Deposits were paid to the Seller

8 The Honorable William G. Young, sitting by designation, previously held that the

Increased Loan Estimates and Closing Disclosure did not modify or alter the terms of the Loan

Commitment and were not enforceable contracts. See Clarification Order at 2–3.

before he could obtain final loan approval, see Loan Commitment at 2, this

money was not paid to “purchase” the loan. Rather, this money was paid to the

Seller and applied toward the costs associated with the underlying property

purchase. See Default Notice (stating that the Seller would “retain all monies

paid on account of the purchase price and convey the Property to others”

(emphasis added)). Therefore, the Deposits were part of the purchase price of

the Property, not the purchase price of the Loan Commitment.9 In fact, it does

not appear that Schnackenberg paid anything for the Loan Commitment.

Indeed, he did not take out any financing and presents no evidence that he paid

TBMC any interest or fees in relation to the Loan Commitment. As a result, it

cannot be said that Schnackenberg “purchased” the Loan Commitment.

No matter which FDUTPA formula is used, Schnackenberg’s lost

Deposits are more appropriately categorized as consequential damages.

Consequential damages are those that “do not arise within the scope of the

immediate buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the

9 Schnackenberg asserts that Florida law allows for “the recovery of deposits under

FDUTPA.” See Response at 11–12. In support, Schnackenberg primarily relies on Tri-County

Plumbing Services, Inc. v. Brown, 921 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). But this case is

inapposite. Indeed, in Tri-County Plumbing Services, the plaintiff’s deposits were paid to the

defendant and went toward the underlying service that the plaintiff contracted for. See, e.g.,

Tri-Cnty. Plumbing Servs., 921 So. 2d at 21–22 (affirming the award of damages equal to the

amount plaintiff deposited with the defendant where plaintiff paid defendant to repair her

plumbing and defendant refused to complete the job). Here, Schnackenberg’s Deposits were

paid to a third-party, not TBMC. Moreover, the Deposits were to be applied toward the

underlying property purchase, not the cost of the Loan Commitment. As a result, while lost

deposits may be actual damages under FDUTPA in some cases, they are not here.

non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a

proximate result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the

breaching party at the time of contracting.” Keystone Airpark Auth. v. Pipeline

Contractors, Inc., 266 So. 3d 1219, 1222–23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (internal

quotation omitted) (emphasis omitted) (finding that the plaintiff’s damages

were consequential because they stemmed from loss incurred by plaintiff in its

dealings with third parties and were not the direct or necessary consequence of

the defendant’s failure to perform under the parties’ contract); see also Morgan

v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Fla., LLC, No. 9:21-CV-80549, 2021 WL 4709787, at *5

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2021) (noting that “consequential damages are ‘[l]osses that

do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious act’” (citing Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019))).

Here, Schnackenberg paid the Deposits to the Seller, a third party, and

in relation to a separate agreement.10 See Default Notice; Purchase Agreement.

10 Schnackenberg does not attempt to pierce the corporate veil, but he suggests that

the Court should overlook the fact that TBMC and the Seller are separate legal entities,

arguing that “[t]here is no reasonable basis under the facts of this case to make a significant

distinction between the building division and the mortgage division of Toll Brothers.” See

Response at 12. Schnackenberg further contends that “veil piercing is irrelevant” because he

“alleges how TBMC directly participated in improper dealings that caused his damages.” See

id. at 15. In support, Schnackenberg cites several cases addressing whether an individual who

effectuates a corporate entity’s FDUTPA violations can be held personally liable for such

violations. See, e.g., Anden v. Litinsky, 472 So. 2d 825, 826–27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (holding

that a corporate officer could be held liable under FDUTPA where he directly negotiated with

plaintiff and effectuated the corporation’s FDUTPA violations); KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972

So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that a corporate officer could be held liable

under FDUTPA where the officer directly participated in the corporation’s FDUTPA

violations). But these cases are inapplicable here. Schnackenberg does not allege that the

TBMC was not a party to this transaction. See Purchase Agreement. In fact,

Schnackenberg entered into the Purchase Agreement before he applied for a

loan from TBMC. Compare Purchase Agreement at 11, with Loan Application.

In addition, the Seller’s retention of the Deposits was not a necessary or direct

consequence of TBMC’s refusal to provide financing on Schnackenberg’s desired

terms. For example, if Schnackenberg had still closed on the Property, using his

own funds or a loan from an alternate lender, Schnackenberg would not have

lost the Deposits. Thus, the Deposits retained by the Seller are more

appropriately categorized as consequential damages not recoverable under

FDUTPA. See Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. DelGuidice, 790 So. 2d 1158,

1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (noting that FDUTPA does not provide for the

recovery of “actual consequential damages”).

Overall, Schnackenberg fails to show that he suffered actual damages.

Actual damages are a necessary element of a FDUTPA claim; therefore, the

Motion is due to be granted. See A&E Adventures LLC, 529 F. Supp. 3d at 1345

Seller committed any FDUTPA violation, let alone that TBMC effectuated such a violation.

And he “does not allege that Toll Brothers, Inc. used either [TBMC or the Seller] to perpetrate

a wrong.” See id. at 14. Moreover, TBMC’s participation in the alleged improper dealings does

not magically transform the nature of Schnackenberg’s damages from consequential into

actual. Accordingly, Schnackenberg’s argument that veil piercing is “irrelevant” is unavailing.

See Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114, 1120–21 (Fla. 1984) (“Those who

utilize the laws of this state in order to do business in the corporate form have every right to

rely on the rules of law which protect them against personal liability unless it be shown that

the corporation is formed or used for some illegal, fraudulent or other unjust purpose which

justifies piercing of the corporate veil.” (citing Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So. 2d 718,

721 (Fla. 1963)).

(“To survive summary judgment... the plaintiff must proffer some evidence of

actual damages.”).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 149) is

GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of

Defendant, Toll Brothers Mortgage Company, and against Plaintiff,

Jared Schnackenberg.

3. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to terminate any remaining

pending motions and deadlines as moot and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 26th day of

January, 2026.

United States District Judge

Le35

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