Carroll D Brown

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN RE: C/A No. 25-03486-jd

Chapter 13

Carroll D. Brown,

Debtor(s). ORDER DENYING

CONFIRMATION, ORDERING

AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULES,

AND CONTINUING HEARING

ON DISMISSAL

THIS MATTER came before the Court on the motion to dismiss

(“Motion”) filed by creditor John Marion Baker (“Movant”) filed on November

13, 2025,1 and for confirmation of the modified chapter 13 Plan2 filed by Debtor

Carroll D. Brown (“Debtor”) on November 25, 2025. A hearing on the Motion

and on confirmation of the modified Plan was held on January 8, 2026. Debtor,

Counsel for Debtor, Counsel for Movant, and the Chapter 13 Trustee were

present, and Debtor was placed under oath for testimony and cross-

examination. Following Debtor’s testimony, and the legal arguments presented

by Debtor, Movant, and the Chapter 13 Trustee, the Court took the Motion and

confirmation under advisement.

This Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A)

and (L), and the Court may issue a final order.

1 ECF No. 13.

2 ECF No. 20. A Plan was filed on the same day the petition was filed. See ECF No. 3.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beginning in 2006, Debtor and Movant allegedly entered into a

“handshake agreement” to operate a mobile home park. Debtor and Movant

appear to have had different understandings about the nature of their

business arrangement. Debtor believed he and Movant were in a partnership,

and Movant believed Debtor was employed by Movant to manage the mobile

home park. In 2020, after Movant informed Debtor of his intention to sell the

mobile home park, Debtor sued Movant to enforce their alleged partnership

agreement, under which Debtor argued he was entitled to a certain

percentage of proceeds from the sale.3 Movant filed counterclaims for a

breach of fiduciary duties and conversion. Therein, Movant asserted that

Debtor was not his partner, but an employee tasked with managing the

mobile home park. Movant alleged Debtor failed to carry out various duties

entrusted to him as property manager, including: leasing, collecting rent

from, and maintaining mobile homes under Debtor’s management;

accounting for various fees Debtor collected from tenants, including rent, late

fees, pet deposits, and security deposits; and purchasing mobile homes with

business funds and then registering those mobile homes in Movant’s name.

In addition, Movant alleged Debtor registered mobile homes purchased with

business funds in his own name and converted rental fees and tenant fees to

his own use. Movant was granted summary judgment on his counterclaims

3 See Brown v. Maker, South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Lee County, Case No.

2020CP3100237.

for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion on June 27, 2023, and awarded

damages of $301,150.00 on June 4, 2024.

After Movant was granted a judgment against Debtor, Debtor

transferred the titles of certain mobile homes to his girlfriend, Chassity

Wallace (“Wallace”), in July 2024. Debtor apparently received no

consideration from Wallace when the titles were transferred. After Debtor

transferred title to the mobile homes to Wallace, an Execution Against

Property was signed by the Lee County judge stating that Movant’s judgment

be satisfied “out of personal property of [Debtor], within [Movant’s] county; if

sufficient personal property cannot be found, then [Movant is] to satisfy the

judgement out of real property in [Movant’s] county belonging to [Debtor] on

the date the judgment was docketed in [Movant’s] county or from real

property thereafter regardless of the person now claiming ownership or

possession, and to duly return this Execution according to the law to the

Clerk of Court.”4

Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition, including certain

schedules and statements (the “Original Schedules”),5 and a Plan (the

“Original Plan”) on September 5, 2025.6 The Original Schedules list the value

of Debtor’s assets as $169,917.46, comprised of $89,961.46 in real property,

$9,600.00 in vehicles, $3,530.00 in household items, and $66,826.00 in

4 See Brown v. Maker, South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Lee County, Case No.

2020CP3100237, Execution Against Property (Aug. 7, 2024).

5 ECF No. 1.

6 ECF No. 3.

financial assets, with liabilities of $303,582.00. Specifically, Debtor lists a

legal or equitable interest in the following real property:7

1. 1655 Raccoon Rd., Mayesville, SC 29104, Parcel Number 058-

00-00-082-001 (Part 1.1.)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home;

not retired, not with land.”

b. Current value of entire property: $32,590.00

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $32,590.00

i. The Original Schedules note that this property

secures Movant’s judgment lien and states the

secured value of the judgment lien is limited to

$32,590.00.8

2. 1655 Raccoon Rd., Mayesville, SC 29104, Parcel Number 058-

00-00-082-000 (Part 1.2)

a. Nature of ownership interest: Not listed.

b. Current value of entire property: $5,000.00

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $5,000.00

3. 1677 Raccoon Rd., Mayesville, SC 29104, Parcel Number 058-

00-00-083-000 (Part 1.3)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that his

daughter has a remainder interest in the

property pursuant to a life estate.

b. Current value of entire property: $15,000.00

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $5,700.00

4. 1577 Springhill Rd., Mayesville, SC 29104, Parcel Number

042-00-00-084-000 (Part 1.4)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

b. Current value of entire property: $65,856.00

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $25,025.28

5. 1739 Raccoon Rd., Mayesville, SC 29104, Parcel Number 058-

00-00-088-000 (Part 1.5)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that his

daughter has a remainder interest in the

property.

7 ECF No. 1, pp. 10–16 (Schedule A/B: Property).

8 ECF No. 1, p. 25 (Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property).

b. Current value of entire property: $12,770.00

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$4,852.60

6. Three mobile homes located at Parcel Number 058-00-00-

193-000 on Raccoon Road (Part 1.6)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

b. Current value of entire property: $13,416.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that

current value of the entire property is Debtor’s

estimate of its “taxable value,” which Debtor

believes is $1000.00 per acre, as the parcel is

located on “swamp land.”

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$5,098.08

7. Parcel Number 058-00-00-194-000 on Raccoon Rd.,

Mayesville, SC 29104 (Part 1.7)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

b. Current value of entire property: $5,225.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that Lee

County estimates the parcel is valued at

$26,500.00. Debtor states his estimate of the

current value of the property is what he

considers the land’s taxable value.

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$1,985.50

8. Lot on Cedar Lane, Parcel Number 030-02-00-221-000 (Part

1.8)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

b. Current value of entire property: $4,500.00

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$1,710.00

9. 50 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-007 (Part

1.9)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home;

not retired, not with the land”

b. Current value of entire property: $2000.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that Lee

County estimates the value of the mobile home

on this parcel is $3540.00, but that the mobile

home is only worth $2000.00.

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$2000.00.

10. 31 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-00 (Part

1.10)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home;

not retired, not with land”

b. Current value of entire property: $2000.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that Lee

County estimates the value of the mobile home

on this parcel is $4950.00, but Debtor believes

the mobile home is only worth $2000.00.

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$2000.00.

11. 45 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-004 (Part

1.11)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home;

not retired, not with land”

b. Current value of entire property: $2000.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that Lee

County estimates the value of the mobile home

on this parcel is $4400.00, but Debtor believes

the mobile home is only worth $2000.00.

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$2000.00.

12. 59 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-003 (Part

1.12)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home;

not retired, not with land”

b. Current value of entire property: $2000.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to

add about this item, such as local property

identification number”, Debtor notes that Lee

County estimates the value of the mobile home

on this parcel is $6190.00, but Debtor believes

the mobile home is only worth $2000.00.

c. Current value of the portion owned by Debtor:

$2000.00.

The Original Schedules list Movant as Debtor’s lone secured creditor and

note Movant’s judgment lien of $301,150.00 is secured by the $32,590.00

value of the property located at 1655 Raccoon Rd., Mayesville, SC 29104. The

other debts listed by Debtor are the priority unsecured claims of $0.00

belonging to the IRS and the South Carolina Department of Revenue,

respectively;9 the non-priority unsecured claim of $1,562.00 belonging to

Affirm, Inc.;10 the non-priority unsecured claim of $0.00 belonging to Kevin

Barth, Esq.;11 and the nonpriority unsecured claim of $870.00 belonging to

MUSC Health.12 The claims register reflects unsecured claims filed by

Carolina Pines Regional Medical Center and Affirm, Inc., of $150.00 and

$1,483.95, respectively, and a secured claim filed by Movant of $348,385.17.

Movant’s claim reflects post-judgment, pre-petition interest of $47,235.17.

According to the Original Schedules,13 Debtor is employed by and

earns $3,325.29 in monthly take-home pay through traditional employment;

earns -$75.00 per month of income from rental property and operating a

business; and ultimately nets $953.49 per month after expenses.14 The

Original Schedules also disclose15 Debtor’s transfer of the title to 14 mobile

homes, each valued at $2,000.00, for “no [money] exchanged[,] love and

9 ECF No. 1, p. 26.

10 ECF No. 1, p. 27.

11 Id.

12 ECF No. 1, p. 28.

13 ECF No. 1, pp. 31–32 (Schedule I: Your Income).

14 ECF No. 1, pp.33–34 (Schedule J: Your Expenses).

15 ECF No. 1, p. 41 (Official Form 107, Statement of Financial Affairs for Individuals Filing

for Bankruptcy).

affection only” to Wallace. Debtor notes that “only non-exempt values are

listed on Schedule A/B as still listed as Carroll Brown[‘s] property in

ASSESSORS office because of on property owned by Daughter and Debtor

(life Estate).”

The Original Plan states Debtor will pay the Chapter 13 Trustee

$839.00 per month for 60 months.16 Part 3.2 of the Original Plan estimates

Movant’s total claim at $301,150.00, and the secured amount of Movant’s

claim at $32,590.00, and proposes Movant make 60 monthly payments of

$677.00 at 9.00% interest to the Trustee.17 Section 5.1 of the Original Plan

estimated Debtor will pay unsecured creditors less than 100% of their

claim.18

Movant19 and the Chapter 13 Trustee20 filed objections to the Original

Plan on November 13, 2025. Movant asserts that the Original Plan cannot be

confirmed because it was not filed in good faith. Instead, Movant avers the

Original Plan was filed as an attempt to hinder, delay, or frustrate the

enforcement of Movant’s judgment in violation of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3) and

1325(a)(7).

Movant contends the Original Plan fails to pay Movant’s secured claim

in full, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5), despite Debtor’s ability to pay;

16 ECF No. 3, p. 2.

17 ECF No. 3, p. 3.

18 ECF No. 3, p. 5.

19 ECF No. 14.

20 ECF No. 15.

that the Original Schedules do not disclose all of Debtor’s assets or income—

specifically, the rental income and tenant fees Debtor continues to earn from

the mobile homes he owns, and the mobile homes titled under Wallace’s

name; and that the Original Plan is not feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).

Similarly, the Trustee expresses concern that the Original Plan was

not filed in good faith because it is not clear that the Original Plan complies

with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)21 or 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).22 The Trustee’s

Objection further raises the question of whether Debtor’s July 2024 transfer

of the mobile homes to Chassity Wallace was fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. §

548.

In addition to his objection, Movant filed the Motion on November 13,

2025.23 Therein, Movant asserts Debtor’s case is a two-party dispute that was

filed solely to avoid enforcement of Movant’s judgment and therefore should

be dismissed under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). Debtor thereafter filed the modified

Plan (“Modified Plan”)24 and amended schedules A/B, I, and J, and Form

122C2 (“Amended Schedules”).25 Neither Movant nor the Trustee have filed

21 “The court shall confirm a plan if the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property

to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than

the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated

under chapter 7 of this title on such date.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).

22 “If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of

the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan .

. . the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the

applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the

plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. §

1325(b)(1)(B).

23 ECF No. 13.

24 ECF Nos. 18 and 26.

25 ECF No. 27.

an additional or amended objection in response to the Amended Schedules

and Modified Plan. In the Notice of Amendments, Debtor states:

In accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 1009, the undersigned

hereby amends her petition as follows: TO AMEND

SCHEDULES A/B clarif[ies] that 59 Herbert Lane includes bulk

of [mobile homes] and address of 1577 Springhill, 1579 Springhill,

10 Herbert Lane, 11 Herbert Lane, etc -9 in total value of [mobile

homes] included as improvements in tax assessment and overall

value of the land and removes duplicate values of [mobile homes]

as sublots as original schedules represented. I and J amended and

amended business income expense shows income per 341

testimony of additional $400.00 per month beyond what was

originally calculated per records & schedule E tax forms, 122C

revised.

In the Amended Schedules, Debtor estimates his assets have a total value of

$161,917.46. Regarding Debtor’s interests in real property, the Amended

Schedules reflect the following changes26:

1. 59 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-000 (Part

1.4)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Life Estate”

i. In the street address of the property, Debtor states

“[t]his property contains 1577, 1579 [Springhill],

10, 11, 30, 50 Herbert Lane [mobile homes].”

b. Current value of the entire property: $65,856.00

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $25,025.28

2. 50 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-007 (Part

1.9)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home; not

retired, not with land.”

b. Current value of the entire property: $0.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to add

about this item, such as local property

identification number,” Debtor states that the

value of the mobile home on the parcel is “already

included in 042-00-00-084-000.”

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $0.00

3. 31 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-005 (Part

26 ECF No. 27, pp. 2–8 (Schedule A/B: Property).

1.10)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Title to Mobile Home; not

retired, not with land.”

b. Current value of entire property: $0.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to add

about this item, such as local property

identification number,” Debtor states that the

value of the mobile home on the parcel is “already

included in 042-00-00-084-000.”

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $0.00

4. 42 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-004 (Part

1.11)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Improvement thereon”

b. Current value of entire property: $0.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to add

about this item, such as local property

identification number,” Debtor states that the

value of the mobile home on the parcel is “already

included in 042-00-00-084-000.”

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $0.00

5. 59 Herbert Lane, Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-003 (Part

1.12)

a. Nature of ownership interest: “Improvement thereon”

b. Current value of entire property: $0.00

i. In the field for “Other information you wish to add

about this item, such as local property

identification number,” Debtor states that the

value of the mobile home on the parcel is “already

included in 042-00-00-084-000.”

c. Current value of portion owned by Debtor: $0.00

In Parts 1.9–1.12 of Amended Schedule A/B, Debtor now asserts that the

value of the mobile homes located on the parcels at 50 Herbert Lane, 31

Herbert Lane, 42 Herbert Lane, and 59 Herbert Lane have been accounted

for in the valuation of the parcel located at 59 Herbert Lane; however, while

the mobile homes on the parcels at 50, 31, 42, and 59 Herbert Lane were each

valued at $2,000.00 in the Original Schedules—totaling $8,000.00—the

valuation of the parcel at 59 Herbert Lane remains the same in the Amended

Schedules as it was in the Original Schedules. Additionally, the Amended

Schedules list $400.0027 of monthly net income from rental property and/or

operating a business, combined monthly income of $3,725.49,28 and monthly

net income of $1,190.49.

In the Modified Plan, Debtor states he will pay the Chapter 13 Trustee

$839.00 per month for three months, followed by 57 monthly payments of

$1,089.00. From that amount, $766.00 is to be paid to Movant by the Trustee

every month at 9.00% interest. The Modified Plan proposes Movant’s secured

claim be treated as follows: (A) as non-governmental claims in Part 3.2; (B) as

other secured claims excluded from 11 U.S.C. § 506 in Part 3.3; and (C) by

avoiding the remainder of Movant’s judgment in Part 3.4. Debtor first asks

the Court to determine the secured amount of Movant’s claim in Part 3.2 as

follows:

1. Debtor asks the Court to confirm the secured amount of

Movant’s claim as it pertains to Parcel Number 042-00-00-

084-000, which Debtor states is $23,125.00.

a. Debtor proposes this secured claim may be treated via 60

monthly payments of $481.00 at 9% interest.

2. Debtor asks the Court to confirm the secured amount of

Movant’s claim as it pertains to Parcel Number 042-00-00-

084-007, which Debtor states is $0.00.

3. Debtor asks the Court to confirm the secured amount of

Movant’s claim as it pertains to Parcel Number 042-00-00-

084-005, which Debtor states is $0.00.

4. Debtor asks the Court to confirm the secured amount of

Movant’s claim as it pertains to Parcel Number 042-00-00-

084-004, which Debtor states is $0.00.

5. Debtor asks the Court to confirm the secured amount of

Movant’s claim as it pertains to Parcel Number 042-00-00-

27 ECF No. 27, p. 15 (Schedule I: Your income).

28 Id.

084-003, which Debtor states is $0.00.

Next, Debtor proposes the following portion of Movant’s claim be paid in full,

without valuation or lien avoidance, as follows:

1. Debtor estimates the amount of Movant’s claim that is

secured by Parcel Number 058-00-00-194-000 is $1,985.00

and proposes that the Trustee disburse monthly payments of

$42.00 to Movant through the life of the Modified Plan.

2. Debtor estimates the amount of Movant’s claim that is

secured by Parcel Number 030-02-00-221-000 is $1,710.00

and proposes that the Trustee disburse monthly payments of

$36.00 to Movant through the life of the Modified Plan.

3. Debtor estimates the amount of Movant’s claim that is

secured by Parcel Number 058-00-00-088-000 is $4,852.00

and proposes that the Trustee disburse monthly payments of

$101.00 to Movant through the life of the Modified Plan.

4. Debtor estimates the amount of Movant’s claim that is

secured by the three mobile homes located on Parcel Number

058-00-00-193-000 is $5,098.08 and proposes that the

Trustee disburse monthly payments of $106.00 to Movant

through the life of the Modified Plan.

Finally, Debtor asserts that Movant’s judicial lien, as secured by the

following properties, be avoided and treated as an unsecured claim:

1. Debtor asks that the Court avoid the $5,700.00 of the

judgment lien as it pertains to Parcel Number 058-00-00-083-

000, which corresponds with the stated value of Debtor’s

interest in this collateral property.

2. Debtor asks that the Court avoid $1,900.00 of the judgment

lien as it pertains to Parcel Number 042-00-00-084-000, with

an amount of lien not avoided (and paid in Part 3.2) of

$23,125.00.

3. Debtor asks that the Court avoid $32,590.00 of the judgment

lien as it pertains to Parcel Number 058-00-00-082-001,

which corresponds with the stated value of Debtor’s interest

in this collateral property.

In addition to the Amended Schedules and the Modified Plan, Debtor filed a

reply to Movant’s motion to dismiss, asserting that Debtor’s bankruptcy case

was filed in good faith and does not constitute a two-party dispute.29 Debtor

asserts that DMV records may30 reflect that Debtor transferred 14 mobile

homes to Wallace, but the tax assessor records for Lee County indicate the

mobile homes are held either by Debtor or by the life estate. Debtor argues

that his attempt to transfer ownership of those mobile homes to Wallace

failed because the mobile homes, despite not having been retired, are

improvements that have attached to the land on which they are located and

cannot be conveyed.

In addition, Debtor asserts that his interest in the parcels that make

up the life estate, and his payment of taxes on those parcels, indicate that

Debtor holds title to the parcels in the life estate and the mobile homes

attached to those parcels, and, therefore, Debtor’s attempt to transfer mobile

homes to Wallace failed, and therefore did not diminish the value of Debtor’s

estate. Debtor’s objection further notes, with the exception of Parcel No. 058-

00-00-082-000 and Parcel No. 058-00-00-082-001, the parcels of land disclosed

in the Amended Schedules are part of a life estate established in 2018, with a

remainder interest to Debtor’s daughter, and that the schedules reflect his

38% interest in each of the parcels comprising the life estate.31

29 ECF No. 22.

30 Debtor did not provide the Court with DMV records pertaining to the title of the mobile

homes in question.

31 Debtor’s other parcels are: 058-00-00-194-000 and 058-00-00-193-00, a life estate with

remainder to Kayla Brown, his daughter; parcel 030-02-00-221-000, Cedar Lane Mayesville

SC, a life estate with remainder to Kayla Brown, his daughter; 058-00-00-088-000, at 1739

Raccoon Rd. Mayesville, a life estate with remainder to Kayla Brown, his daughter; and

Parcel 042-00-00-084-000 59 Herbert Lane, a life estate with remainder to Kayla Brown, his

daughter. ECF No. 22, p. 4.

After Debtor’s reply to the objections was filed, Movant opened an

adversary proceeding, alleging his judgment lien is non-dischargeable on the

basis of fraud, fraud and defalcation, and willful and malicious injury.32

Debtor filed a motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding.33

At the hearing, Debtor provided testimony contradicting his counsel’s

assertion that the mobile homes were not actually transferred to Wallace.

Debtor testified that he intended to convey certain mobile homes to Wallace

by having the title to each mobile home, as administered by the Department

of Motor Vehicles, transferred to Wallace; such a transfer of title could not

occur if the mobile homes were affixed to real property titled in the name of

another. Debtor also asserted that the mobile homes were still listed in his

name in Lee County records, that he continues to pay personal property taxes

on and collect rents from the mobile homes, and that after he passes away,

Wallace could go to Lee County and have the mobile homes registered as

personal property in her name.34 Debtor offered no other testimony that the

mobile homes were affixed to the land.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary

32 C/A No. 25-80069-jd, ECF No. 1.

33 C/A No. 25-80069-jd, ECF No. 5.

34 The location of the mobile homes transferred do not appear to match the real property

accounted for in the schedules Debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs discloses that he

transferred mobile homes located at the following addresses: 1599 Springhill Road, 1745,

1241, 1231, 1221, 1211, 1201, 1260, and 1226 Raccoon Road. It is possible that the location of

these mobile homes are on parcels disclosed in the Schedules but that is not evident from the

Schedules or the testimony.

or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.

§ 105(a). The court shall confirm a plan if “[t]he plan complies with the

provisions of this chapter and with the other applicable provisions of this

title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). “For a Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, the

Court must find that it satisfies the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).” In

re Kemmerlin, 659 B.R. 741, 748 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2024) (internal citation

omitted). “Debtor has ‘the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that [his] plan meets the confirmation requirements of § 1325(a). . .

.’” In re Morris, 628 B.R. 824, 828 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2021) (quoting In re

Martinelli, 482 B.R. 537, 541-42 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012)) (internal citations

omitted).

I. Are the Original Plan or the Modified Plan Confirmable?

The Court shall confirm a plan that “has been proposed in good faith and

not be any means forbidden by law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). The Court shall

confirm a plan if “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to

be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is

not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the

debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date.” 11 U.S.C. §

1325(a)(4).

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) governs the treatment of secured creditors and

sets forth the three options a debtor has when dealing with secured claims.

Because Movant has not accepted the plan, see § 1325(a)(5)(A), and because

Debtor has not surrendered the property securing the judgment lien, see §

1325(a)(5)(C), the present controversy concerns § 1325(a)(5)(B), which is often

referred to as the “cram down” option. Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S.

953, 957 (1997):

A plan's proposed treatment of secured claims can be confirmed if

one of three conditions is satisfied: The secured creditor accepts

the plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A); the debtor surrenders the

property securing the claim to the creditor, see § 1325(a)(5)(C); or

the debtor invokes the so-called “cram down” power, see §

1325(a)(5)(B). Under the cram down option, the debtor is

permitted to keep the property over the objection of the creditor;

the creditor retains the lien securing the claim, see §

1325(a)(5)(B)(i), and the debtor is required to provide the creditor

with payments, over the life of the plan, that will total the present

value of the allowed secured claim, i.e., the present value of the

collateral, see § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). The value of the allowed secured

claim is governed by § 506(a)35 of the Code.

Id. Debtor’s asset holdings are complex. He holds title to numerous parcels of

land, but his description of his interest in these parcels in the Schedules varies

from his described interest in the Statement of Financial Affairs. Debtor

utilizes different approaches to valuation—shifting between market value,

assessed value, and his opinion of value. Some parcels contain mobile homes;

however, as this Order will explain in greater detail, the Court finds that those

mobile homes are personal property, and not real property. The inconsistencies

35 “An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an

interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the

extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to

the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to

the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less

than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the

purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in

conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's

interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).

in Debtor’s disclosures and testimony render the task of assessing the overall

value of his property and the secured value of Movant’s claim quite impossible.

First, Debtor’s Counsel contends that the value of the mobile homes was

accounted for in the value of the real property. This cannot be true based on

Debtor’s testimony, Schedules, and the Statement of Financial Affairs. For

example, the Statement of Financial Affairs indicates the mobile homes located

on parcels of land on Raccoon Road are worth $2,000.00 each. In the Amended

Schedules, which do not include a modified or amended Statement of Financial

Affairs, Debtor assigns a total value of $5,225.00 to Parcel 058-00-00-194-000

on Raccoon Road and states that the value of his portion is $1,985.00; Parcel

058-00-00-194-000 contains a mobile home and his life estate in the real

property comprised of 16.62 acres. In the Statement of Financial Affairs,

Debtor asserts that while he attempted to transfer the title to the mobile home

on that parcel to Wallace, the mobile home and land remain in his name.

Debtor’s ownership of the mobile home alone would make the value of his

portion of Parcel 058-00-00-194-000 $2,000.00. Further, there are numerous

addresses of mobile homes in the Statement of Financial Affairs that appear

to have no corresponding address in the Schedules.

Second, Debtor’s descriptions of his ownership interest in the properties

disclosed are unclear or unsubstantiated. In the Statement of Financial Affairs

included in the Original Schedules, he states title to certain mobile homes were

transferred to Wallace but does not provide evidence of the change in title, say,

via DMV records. Debtor also appears to assert that he has only a 38%

ownership interest in the life estate property in the Modified Plan, but does

not provide any justification or support for this purported percentage of

ownership.36 In short, the Schedules do not make clear which property

disclosed actually belongs to Debtor or how much any of this property is

actually worth. Debtor has not met his burden of proof as to the value of the

disclosed property. Therefore, the Court cannot assess whether the Original or

Modified Plan provides unsecured creditors with a distribution equal to or

greater than what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation, as required

by § 1325(a)(4). Similarly, the Court cannot accurately determine whether the

Original or Modified Plan provide Movant with payments, over the life of the

plan, that total the present value of Movant’s claim. Neither the Original nor

Modified Plan fulfill the requirements of § 1325(a)(5)(B).

Debtor’s representations concerning his income and expenses also

indicate that neither the Original Plan nor the Modified Plan are confirmable.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) restricts the Court from confirming a plan where all

the debtor’s projected disposable income is not applied to making payments to

unsecured creditors:

If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects

to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve

the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan, the plan

provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be

received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the

date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied

to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.

36 ECF No. 22, p.4.

§ 1325(b)(1)(B). The schedules utilized in Chapter 13 cases advise debtors

reporting net income from renting property, or operating a business,

profession, or farm t“[a]ttach a statement for each property and business

showing gross receipts, ordinary and necessary business expenses, and the

total monthly net income.” The Original Schedules state that Debtor earns net

income of -$75.00 from renting some 14 mobile homes, and provide no

information to substantiate this figure. The Amended Schedules, in contrast,

state that Debtor earns $400.00 in net income from renting those mobile

homes, and offer some description of how Debtor reached this figure.

The discrepancies in the Amended Schedules and Modified Plan raise

additional questions about whether Debtor actually transferred ownership of

certain mobile homes to Wallace and whether the mobile homes allegedly

transferred from Debtor to Wallace were fraudulently conveyed. Debtor

submitted a form for business income and expenses with the Amended

Schedules stating Debtor’s estimated average future gross monthly income

from renting the mobile homes is $5,140.00, and listing Debtor’s estimated

future monthly expenses as follows: $341.00 in other taxes (excluding payroll

taxes, unemployment taxes, or workers compensation); $3,631.00 in repairs

and maintenance; and $768.00 in insurance. Debtor provides no

documentation for these figures. Even though the Amended Schedules

provide a better accounting of Debtor’s net rental income, the Court finds

that without gross receipts for rental payments and fees and maintenance

expenses, it cannot determine what Debtor’s monthly disposable income is,

and whether all of it is devoted to paying his unsecured creditors as required

by § 1325(b)(1)(B). For these reasons, neither the Original Plan nor the

Modified Plan are confirmable.

II. Were the Mobile Homes Transferred to Wallace Fixtures of

or Improvements on the Life Estate Property?

Debtor’s Amended Schedules state that the mobile homes transferred

to Chassity Wallace in July 2024 add no value to the estate on their own

because they are improvements and are therefore affixed to the parcels of

land on which they are located. The S.C. De-titling Statute, S.C. Code Ann. §

56-19-500, et seq., of the South Carolina Code of Laws, provides:

(A) An owner of a manufactured home may affix the home to

real property by:

(1) installing the home in accordance with the required

installation standards and removing the wheels, axles, and

towing hitch; and

(2) filing with the register of deeds or clerk of court, as

appropriate, for the county in which the manufactured home is

located the Manufactured Home Affidavit for the Retirement of

Title Certificate in the form prescribed in this article together

with proof of ownership as evidenced by a copy of the most

recent deed of record or other instrument vesting title, and

paying the filing fee required for affidavits by Section 8-21-310.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-19-510 (2025). In addition, the statute provides:

(1) “Affixed” means that the manufactured home is installed in

accordance with the state required installation standards, with

wheels, axles, and towing hitch removed, and with the owner of

the home having an intention that the manufactured home

becomes an improvement to the real property whereon it is

situated as evidenced by the filing of the affidavits provided in

this article. The filing of the affidavits provided for in this article

is conclusive proof of the intent to affix the manufactured home

to real property.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-19-500 (2025). “South Carolina courts employ a common

law test that considers the following factors to determine whether a mobile

home is personal property or real property by virtue of becoming a fixture: (1)

mode of attachment; (2) character of the structure or article; (3) the intent of

the parties making the annexation; and (4) the relationship of the parties.” In

re Lloyd, Case No. CV 18-02936-JW, 2018 WL 6984813, at *4 (Bankr. D.S.C.

Nov. 19, 2018) (citing Smith v. Com. Credit Plan, Inc. (In re Avery), 7 B.R. 28,

31 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980)) (internal citations omitted). This Court also

recognizes the common law test for retirement of mobile homes, as set forth

in South Carolina case law and previously relied upon by this Court, is

applicable in situations where the Statute is not followed. Lloyd, 2018 WL

6984813, at *5. That said, “the failure to follow the statutory procedure may

be significant in the Court’s determination of the parties’ intent to affix a

manufactured home to real property. . . .” Id.

Debtor concedes that he has not undertaken the processes described in

the de-titling statute to retire or affix the subject mobile homes to the life

estate real property. Therefore, the Court will evaluate Debtor’s claim that

the mobile homes he attempted to transfer to Wallace are affixed to real

property, and cannot have been conveyed by title, under the common law

test:

a. Mode of Attachment: Debtor has not presented any

evidence to the Court concerning the manner or mode by

which the relevant mobile homes were installed on the

property. See, e.g., City of N. Charleston v. Claxton, 315 S.C.

56, 63, 431 S.E.2d 610, 614 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the

lack of permanent foundations or additions to trailers

indicated that the trailers were not fixtures). This factor is

therefore neutral.

b. Character of Structure: Other than stating37 that at least

some of the mobile homes at issue have been “on the

properties for over 35 years as the only livable or rental units

thereon,” Debtor has not presented any evidence concerning

the character of the mobile homes. See, e.g., In re Rebel Mfg.

& Mktg. Corp., 54 B.R. 674, 676 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985)

(describing the character of the property as “a single

structure not readily adaptable for movement without the

expenditure of substantial funds and causing great damage

to it and to its surroundings.”). This factor is therefore

neutral.

c. Intent of the Party Making the Annexation: In Avery,

the Court found that the owner’s decision to sell a parcel of

real property after placing a mobile home on that property

indicated the owner’s intent that the mobile home be

personal property, and not a fixture. In re Avery, 7 B.R. 28,

31 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980). Debtor has an interest in the life

estate that owns the underlying land, in which his daughter

has a remainder interest. Conversely, Debtor has conveyed

the mobile homes on the life estate land to Wallace. Debtor

testified that he conveyed the mobile homes to Wallace so she

would have something when he passed away. It stands to

reason that, if Debtor intended for the mobile home to be

fixtures of the land, he would have conveyed the land and the

homes to one person or entity. It appears that Debtor’s intent

for the mobile homes is that they will become the personal

property of Wallace, to do with as she wishes.

d. The Relationship of the Parties: Debtor has not presented

evidence speaking to the relationship between Debtor,

Movant, Wallace, and his daughter. See, e.g., In re Lloyd, No.

CV 18-02936-JW, 2018 WL 6984813, at *7 (Bankr. D.S.C.

Nov. 19, 2018) (noting that the debtor did not deal directly

with the party who held the mortgage on the underlying land

when he purchased mobile homes located on said land). That

said, it appears that the title to the land and the mobile

homes are held either by Debtor directly or by the life estate.

This factor is therefore neutral. See, e.g., In re Rebel Mfg. &

37 ECF No. 22, p. 6.

Mktg. Corp., 54 B.R. 674, 676 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985) (holding

“[b]ecause title to the land and to the mobile home was in the

debtor, the fourth factor of Avery is irrelevant here.”).

The record in this case indicates that the mobile homes conveyed to Wallace

by Debtor are not fixtures on the real property where they are located.

III. Was Debtor’s July 2024 Transfer of Mobile Homes to

Wallace a Fraudulent Conveyance?

In both the Motion and his objection to confirmation, Movant asserts

that the transfer to Wallace was made with intent to hinder, delay, or

defraud creditors. The Trustee’s objection similarly notes her concerns that

the mobile home transfers were fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548. Debtor has

claimed that his attempt to transfer the titles of various mobile homes to

Wallace failed because the mobile homes were affixed to the land and could

not be separately conveyed. The Court has found that the subject mobile

homes were not affixed to the land38 and Debtor successfully transferred the

titles of these mobile homes to Wallace via the South Carolina Department of

Motor Vehicles.

38 Debtor concedes that the mobile homes were transferred to Wallace as a gift, for no

consideration, but asserts that under In re Genesis Press, Inc., a transfer may only be set aside

when it is established that (1) the grantor was indebted to the creditor at the time of the

transfer, (2) the conveyance was voluntary, and (3) the grantor failed to retain sufficient

property to pay his indebtedness to the creditor in full, not merely at the time of transfer, but

in the final analysis when the creditor seeks to collect the debt. 559 B.R. 445, 453 (Bankr.

D.S.C. 2016) (internal citations omitted). The Court notes that these factors are derived from

this Court’s application of the state of South Carolina’s Statute of Elizabeth. See S.C. Code

Ann. § 27-23-10 (2025). In the Genesis Press case, the Statute of Elizabeth was considering in

the context of the Trustee’s attempt to avoid a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 544, which “does not

establish substantive provisions for the avoidance of transfers; rather, it merely gives the

Trustee the status of a creditor under state law and allows nonbankruptcy law to determine

the rights that accrue as a result of that status.” In re Genesis Press, Inc., No. CV 6:16-3762-

TMC, 2018 WL 11672750, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018) (quoting In re J.R. Deans Co., Inc., 249

B.R. 121, 129 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000)). In re Genesis Press is not on point.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), a trustee may find a transfer made

within two years before the date of the petition, if the debtor made the

transfer “with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to

which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was

made ... indebted,” is actually fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), and

thereby avoid that transfer. The Court may consider and examine “badges of

fraud” and infer intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. In re Jones,

397 B.R. 765, 770 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). This Court has previously recognized

the “badges of fraud” include: the insolvency or indebtedness of the

transferor, lack of consideration for the conveyance, relationship between the

transferor and the transferee, the pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or

concealment, departure from the usual method of business, the transfer of

the debtor’s entire estate, the reservation of benefit to the transferor, and the

retention by the debtor of possession of the property. Anderson,

v. Architectural Glass Constr., Inc. (In re Pfister), Ch. 7 Case No. 09–05670–

HB, Adv. No. 10-80162-HB, 2012 WL 1144540, at *5 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 4,

2012) (citing In re Jones, 397 B.R. at 770). Actual fraud may be inferred from

the presence of “badges of fraud”; however, that is not the end of the inquiry.

Hovis v. Ducate (In re Ducate), 369 B.R. 251, 264 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).

There are several “badges of fraud” present in this matter from which

the Court may infer actual fraud. Wallace is Debtor’s romantic partner and

did not tender any consideration beyond love and affection for the transfer.

Debtor made the transfer to Wallace after Movant obtained his judgment for

damages against Debtor. “Regardless of the ability of the courts to infer

actual fraudulent intent from the presence of ‘badges of fraud,’ actual

fraudulent intent requires a subjective evaluation of the debtor’s motive.”

Pfister, 2012 WL 1144540, at *5, (quoting In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group,

Inc., 956 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir.1992)). Debtor’s sworn testimony indicates

that the transfer was made for Wallace’s financial comfort after Debtor’s

death, and that he continues to pay taxes and finance maintenance of the

mobile homes. This testimony provides some evidence indicating that the

transfers could have been made for reasons other than to hinder, delay, or

defraud Movant.

A trustee may also avoid a transfer that is constructively fraudulent

where the debtor, voluntarily or involuntarily, received less than a

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and

was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was

incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation. 11

U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B). To recover under § 548(a)(1)(B), the Trustee must

establish that: (1) the transfer was made by Debtor; (2) the transfer occurred

within 2 years of the date the petition was filed; (3) Debtor received less than

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for transfer; and (4) Debtor was

insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the

transfer. There is no question that the transfer of the mobile homes was

made by Debtor and occurred within 2 years before this case was filed.

Therefore, the Court must examine the evidence before it to determine

whether Debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value for transfer of

the mobile homes to Wallace and whether Debtor was insolvent, or became

insolvent, at the time of the transfer.

“When evaluating an avoidable transfer claim under § 548(a)(1)(B), the

Fourth Circuit has explained that the determination of ‘reasonably

equivalent value’ requires the court to ‘focus... on the consideration received

by the debtor, not on the value given by the transferee.’” Vieira v. Think Tank

Logistics, LLC, et al. (In re Levesque), 661 B.R. 731, 775 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2024)

(quoting Bigelow Design Grp., 956 F.2d at 484) (internal citations omitted).

The burden of demonstrating that the Debtor did not receive reasonably

equivalent value for the transfer lies with the Trustee. Architectural Glass

Constr., Inc. v. Anderson (In re Pfister), No. 7:12-cv-01825-HMH, slip op. at 10

(D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2014) (citing In re Ducate, 369 B.R. at 265)). This Court has

applied a two-step inquiry to determine reasonably equivalent value: (1) did

the debtor receive value and (2) was the payment reasonably equivalent to

the value extended? In re Levesque, 661 B.R. 731, 775 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2024)

(internal citations omitted).

Debtor received only love and affection as consideration for the

transfer. However, Debtor’s accounting of the value of these mobile homes

has been inconsistent, and the Court cannot determine whether the

consideration received was reasonably equivalent to the value extended.

Moreover, there is insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether

Debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made.

The Trustee has not yet sought to avoid the conveyance of the mobile

homes; however, such an action may be necessary if the mobile homes are not

brought into the estate voluntarily. This order does not resolve whether those

transfers are avoidable and whether Debtor’s conduct constitutes cause to

deny confirmation and dismiss this case.

CONCLUSION

Given the discrepancies in valuation between the Original Schedules

and Amended Schedules, the Court orders Debtor to submit a second set of

amended schedules and a second modified plan. In the second set of amended

schedules, Debtor must separately list the location and value of real property;

separately list the location and value of any personal property, including any

mobile home that Debtor claims an interest in; disclose the year, make,

model, and dimensions of each mobile home that Debtor claims an interest in;

identify the basis for his assertion that he holds only a 38% ownership

interest in all life estate property; and provide a statement for each rented

mobile home showing gross receipts, ordinary and necessary business

expenses, and total monthly net rental income.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered that confirmation of the Modified Plan

filed on November 25, 2025, is denied;

It is ordered that Debtor file amended schedules and a second modified

plan addressing the deficiencies outlined above within ten days of the entry

of this Order;

It is ordered that Debtor shall provide all documents requested by the

Chapter 13 trustee within ten days of the entry of this Order;

It further is ordered that the Trustee and Movant submit further

briefing on the question of whether Debtor’s transfer of mobile homes to

Chassity Wallace should be considered fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548 on

or before March 16, 2026, at 5:00 P.M.; and

If Debtor fails to comply with this Order, this case may be dismissed

without further notice or hearing.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

FILED BY THE COURT

02/03/2026

Oo Narr ain WY

lw “| US Bankruptcy Judge

an □ ¥ > District of South Carolina

Entered: 02/03/2026

29