determining the Board acted beyond its authority and in contravention of a separate enabling ordinance by imposing a two-year limitation on a tenant's right to receive a refund on rent overcharges
How later courts described this case
- determining the Board acted beyond its authority and in contravention of a separate enabling ordinance by imposing a two-year limitation on a tenant's right to receive a refund on rent overcharges
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2954-23
MARC CELLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
1017 PARK AVENUE, LLC,
ESTATE OF VINCENZA
PETRUZZELLA,
GAETANO PETRUZZELLA,
VITO PETRUZZELLA, and
LAZZARO PETRUZZELLA,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________
Argued November 5, 2025 – Decided March 2, 2026
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Torregrossa-
O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-4735-19.
John V. Salierno argued the cause for appellant (Law
Offices of Peter W. Till, attorneys; John V. Salierno, on
the brief).
Alberico De Pierro argued the cause for respondents
(De Pierro Radding, LLC, attorneys; Alberico De
Pierro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, Marc Celler, appeals a series of Law Division orders denying
two motions for summary judgment, two motions for reconsideration, and
entering a no cause verdict after a bench trial on all plaintiff's claims against
defendants, 1017 Park Avenue, LLC, Estate of Vincenza Petruzzella, Gaetano
Petruzzella, Vito Petruzzella, and Lazzaro Petruzzella. 1 Plaintiff sought $7,526
in rent refunds from defendants, as well as treble damages, alleging breach of
contract and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2
(CFA). Plaintiff alleged defendants 2 overcharged him for monthly rent from
2015 to 2020 in violation of Hoboken's rent-control ordinance, Hoboken, N.J.,
Code § 155-4 (the ordinance) that limits the amount of rent landlords may collect
1
Three separate judges entered the various orders, with the first denying
summary judgment and reconsideration, the second denying plaintiff's
subsequent motions for summary judgment and reconsideration, and the third
presiding over the trial and entering the no cause.
2
We reference defendants collectively as they appear jointly on appeal and
advance a uniform response, and because the claims plaintiff raises render
immaterial which defendants performed each discrete action.
A-2954-23
2
from tenants living in certain rent-controlled apartments throughout the city,
including plaintiff's.
Although we affirm the orders denying summary judgment and
reconsideration, we vacate the entry of no cause and remand for a new trial in
accordance with this decision.
I.
Plaintiff leased defendants' rent-controlled apartment from 2015 to 2020.
On December 8, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendants violated
the CFA, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, by "charging," "collecting," and "demanding
increases in the rents from plaintiff in excess of the amount permitted by the
City."
Defendants filed a counterclaim asserting "plaintiff failed to pay the
correct legal rent owed from the apartment he rented." Defendants' counterclaim
was based on a tax surcharge of $392 per month the City of Hoboken, New
Jersey Rent Leveling and Stabilization Board (Board) granted to landlords who
own rent-controlled apartments, which defendants transferred to plaintiff for the
period of May 2019 to May 2020.
A-2954-23
3
A. First Motions for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration
At the close of discovery, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing
defendants' violation of the ordinance constituted "unlawful" conduct under the
CFA that caused an "ascertainable loss" to plaintiff for which he is entitled to a
rent refund. Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
ordinance's two-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim, defendants
are not "sellers" under the CFA, and defendants are entitled to unpaid rent based
on the tax surcharge increase imposed by the Board.3 Plaintiff contended that
the two-year statute of limitations relied on by defendants was invalidated by
our decision in Knight v. City of Hoboken Rent Leveling & Stabilization Board,
332 N.J. Super. 547 (App. Div. 2000) (determining the Board acted beyond its
authority and in contravention of a separate enabling ordinance by imposing a
two-year limitation on a tenant's right to receive a refund on rent overcharges) ,
and alternatively claimed defendants improperly increased his rent because he
was not served with proper notice.
The rent leveling provision of the ordinance provides, in part:
All rents for rental of housing space and services in
dwellings to which this act is applicable are hereby
3
Plaintiff provides no transcripts of any of the motion arguments; thus, we
derive our understanding of the parties' arguments before the respective motion
judges from the corresponding orders and written decisions.
A-2954-23
4
controlled at the base rent level received by the landlord
as of October 1, 1985, and no rental increases shall be
hereinafter demanded, paid or accepted, except as
provided in this chapter. Any rent increases imposed
after October 1, 1985, to the extent that such increases
are in excess of the rent increases allowed under this
ordinance, are hereby declared to be null and void, and
subject to the limitations and repose period set forth
herein, such excess rents shall be refunded or credited
to the tenant by the landlord forthwith. . . . Any
landlord seeking an increase shall notify the tenant, in
writing, at least [thirty] days prior to the effective date
of the increase and explain, in detail, the reason for the
increase.
[Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155-4.]
The ordinance imposes a "[t]wo-year statute of limitations" on refund
requests:
A refund and/or credit of excess rents shall be barred if
the tenant's request for a legal rent calculation is not
made within two years from service of the disclosure
statement upon the tenant. The statute of limitations
commences only upon proper service of the disclosure
statement in compliance with § 155-4. Nothing in this
provision shall bar a tenant from requesting a legal rent
calculation, nor prohibit the Rent Regulation Officer or
Board from rendering a determination as to whether the
rent of the dwelling is in excess of those permitted
under this chapter.
[Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155-4(b).]
A-2954-23
5
The ordinance also contains a "[t]wo-year period of repose," which directs:
In no instance shall a tenant be allowed to collect rental
overcharges for a period in excess of two years as
determined by the Rent Leveling Officer or the Board.
Nothing in this provision shall bar a tenant from
requesting a legal rent calculation, nor prohibit the Rent
Regulation Officer or Board from rendering a
determination as to whether the rent of the dwelling is
in excess of those permitted under this chapter.
[Hoboken, N.J., Code § 155-4(c).]
By order and written decision, the first motion judge denied both
plaintiff's and defendants' motions for summary judgment. The judge found
certain undisputed facts as follows. "Plaintiff leased the Hoboken apartment in
July 2015 from owner and landlord, Vincenza Petruzzella." "The lease
agreement between plaintiff and Ms. Petruzzella provided for a one-year term at
$2,150 per month." "Ms. Petruzzella thereafter died, and Vito Petruzzella, her
son, signed a lease agreement with plaintiff for $2,200 per month" and "on
October 31, 2018, title of the property was transferred by Vito to 1017 Park
Avenue, LLC." 4 "Plaintiff's rent payments were $2,150 from August 2015
through December 2017; $2,200 from January 2018 through January 2019; and
$2,244 from February 2019 to January 2020."
4
The court noted "Vito, along with Gaetano Petruzzella and Lazzaro
Petruzzella, are the sole members of the LLC."
A-2954-23
6
The judge found, in April and December 2019, the Board sent a letter to
defendants that included calculations of the legal base rent for plaintiff's
apartment as follows: "$1,1991 effective August 1, 2015; 5 $2,009 effective
August 1, 2016; $2,045 effective August 1, 2017; $2,090 effective August 1,
2018; and $2,122 effective August 1, 2019."
The motion judge further stated, "On May 7, 2019, the [Board] granted a
tax surcharge of $329 per unit per month." The judge also found "on October
1, 2019, a notice was sent to plaintiff advising of an increase in rent." According
to the motion judge, "Plaintiff was required to respond. Plaintiff did not respond
[and] a notice to quit was served upon plaintiff on November 26, 2019." 6
The motion judge identified the elements of a CFA claim7 and found the
CFA applied and defendants were "sellers" under the CFA. The judge found
5
We presume the total of "$1,1991" reflected in the written opinion is a
typographical error because the correct amount of rent charged for this period is
$1,991.
6
The November 26 letter defendants sent to plaintiff contained a heading
stating, "NOTICE TO CEASE," and explained that plaintiff was "in breach of
the lease covenants because [he] did not notify [defendants] within [fifteen] days
after [he] received the renewal notice. This is cause for termination of your
tenancy."
7
"The CFA requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: '1) unlawful conduct
by defendant; 2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and 3) a causal relationship
A-2954-23
7
"no factual dispute" that "plaintiff paid rent in excess of the Rent Leveling
Board's maximum allowable rent."
The court specifically addressed and rejected plaintiff's argument
contending a panel of this court invalidated the ordinance's two-year statute of
limitations in Knight. The judge found our decision in Knight inapplicable as it
dealt with "a different issue of administrative law" and the Board there acted
"where authority was not codified," noting that the ordinance was "amended in
2011 to be consistent with the holding in Knight."
The judge rejected what it characterized as plaintiff's argument defendants
did not increase his rent lawfully pursuant to a tax surcharge because defendants
failed to serve plaintiff with a notice to quit. The court stated, "Defendant[s]
provide[d] a notice to quit dated November 26, 2019." 8
between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.'" D'Agostino v.
Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 184 (2013) (quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.,
197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009)).
8
The judge reasoned:
absent a notice to quit or subsequent agreement
between the parties, any attempt to increase rent is
ineffective, and the tenancy continues at the old term.
Skyline Gardens Inc. v. McGarry, 22 N.J. Super. 193,
196 (App. Div. 1952). Plaintiff claims that no Notice
to Quit was served upon him, and therefore defendants
A-2954-23
8
Thus, the judge concluded the ordinance's two-year limitation applied, but
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment finding "a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether defendant[s are] entitled to rent based upon the tax
surcharge." The court explained, "The surcharge was granted to defendant[s]
on May 7, 2019, and there is a question as to whether plaintiff was required to
pay the surcharge in light of the notices sent to plaintiff."
Plaintiff subsequently moved for reconsideration, which the court denied,
finding "no basis to reconsider."
fail to establish that plaintiff's rent was ever increased
subsequent to the Board's approval of the tax surcharge.
However, in reply, Defendant provides a notice
to quit dated November 26, 2019. The
notice . . . indicates that on or about October 1, 2019 a
notice was sent to plaintiff advising plaintiff of an
increase in rent. The notice references the lease
agreement between the parties which states under line
27 that plaintiff was required to respond to the letter
increasing rent within 15 days. The lease further states
that failure to respond would indicate rejection.
However, the notice to quit indicates that on November
6, 2019 plaintiff informed defendant that he would
remain in the unit.
A-2954-23
9
B. Plaintiff's Second Motions for Summary Judgment and
Reconsideration
Months later, plaintiff again moved for summary judgment, arguing in
relevant part "defendants' alleged violation of the rent control ordinance is
unlawful conduct under the CFA that caused him an ascertainable loss . . . ."9
Defendants opposed plaintiff's motion on the grounds that plaintiff failed to
show he sustained an ascertainable loss under the CFA.
Pertinent to this appeal, the second motion judge enumerated her findings
of undisputed fact, mirroring the lease history and rental amounts found by the
first motion judge. The second motion judge also found: in April 2019, the
Board "calculated the legal base rent for the apartment at $2,090, effective
August 2018, $2,045 effective August 1, 2017, $2,009, effective August 1, 2016,
and $1,991 effective August 1, 2015"; "in October 2019, [the LLC] again
attempted to increase the rent"; two months later the Board again calculated the
legal base rent for the apartment, listing the same rents for the identical time
periods as it did in the April 2019 calculation, with the exception of the legal
base rent effective August, 2019, which was $2,122; and plaintiff paid rent in
the monthly amount of "$2,150 from August 2015, through December 2017;
9
Defendants did not again cross-move for summary judgment.
A-2954-23
10
$2,200 from January 2018, through January 2019; and $2,244 from February
2019, through January 20[20]."
The judge then determined plaintiff paid a total of "$7,526 above the legal
rent." However, in addressing whether plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss
under the CFA, the judge highlighted the ordinance "limits a tenant's recovery
to two years of overpaid rent." Addressing, and like the first motion court
rejecting, plaintiff's identical Knight argument, the judge stated she found "no
basis to invalidate the application of the two-year limitation in this matter."
The judge found, in light of "the two-year statute of limitations under [the]
Hoboken ordinance, . . . [plaintiff] ha[d] not suffered an ascertainable loss under
the CFA." The judge, however, also recognized "[t]he City granted [defendants]
a tax surcharge totaling $329 for twelve months, which was legally permitted to
be transferred to plaintiff." Thus, the judge calculated the offset and concluded,
"the two-year limitation period coupled with the $329 legally permissible
surcharge evidences that in actuality [plaintiff] is indebted to [defendant s] for
the sum of $702," and therefore, "[plaintiff] has failed to show that he suffered
an ascertainable loss under the CFA." The judge accordingly denied summary
judgment in plaintiff's favor.
A-2954-23
11
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The same judge denied the motion
but "agree[d] with plaintiff's contention that [defendants] failed to serve a notice
to quit on . . . plaintiff in order to effectuate the rent increase permitted by the
City for the time period before October 1, 2019." The judge noted, however,
"the notice to quit indicate[d] that on November 6, 2019 plaintiff informed
defendant[s] that he would remain in the unit. Plaintiff then renewed the lease,
which stated the increased rent based on the October 1, 2019 letter, effective
January 31, 2020."
The judge noted "[the first summary judgment motion judge's] opinion
also found [the] ordinance limits a tenant's recovery to two years of overpaid
rent." Accordingly, the court found "any recovery sought by . . . plaintiff is
time-barred before January 2018 as . . . plaintiff filed his complaint on
December 8, 2019," and "all claims of alleged overpayments of rent are then
time-barred for the periods of May 2017 until December 2017 based on the
December 8, 2019 filing date of the complaint." The court also denied "recovery
after October 1, 2019 as [defendant] properly served a notice of the rent increase
on . . . plaintiff."
A-2954-23
12
The judge then calculated plaintiff's rent overpayments, concluding
"plaintiff overpaid $3,401 from the period of January 2018 to July 2019 ."10
However, the judge then subtracted $3,948—the amount owed on defendant's
counterclaim—finding plaintiff owed defendants $547. Accordingly, the court
denied reconsideration of the second summary judgment determination again
finding plaintiff "did not suffer an ascertainable loss under the CFA."
C. The Trial
A bench trial followed before a third judge on October 2, 2023 during
which no testimony or evidence was presented. Instead, the hearing commenced
with plaintiff's counsel representing the parties "stipulate[d] to the facts
that . . . [the second motion court] found as fact in plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment."
To that proposal the trial court questioned "as a result of stipulating to
those facts, . . . where does that lead us to?" Plaintiff's counsel responded,
"plaintiff is asking for the court to find the base amount of damages in an amount
10
We note our inability to replicate the court's calculation using the rent
payments for January 2018 to July 2019. However, even if the court were to
calculate the amount of overpayment from January 2018 to July 2019, the
overpayment would be $2,669. Thus, when the tax surcharge of $3,948 is
subtracted, plaintiff would still owe defendant $1,279.
A-2954-23
13
of $7,526. We're also seeking treble damages under the [CFA]." Defense
counsel countered asking the court to
effectively affirm both the May 22, 2020 decision of
[the first motion judge] and the February 8, 2021
decision of [the second motion judge], which ultimately
found as a matter of law that . . . plaintiff has suffered
no ascertainable loss under the [CFA] or suffered
damages and, therefore, effectively—although not in
the decision—that the plaintiff's claim for damages, as
just articulated, should be dismissed and ask that
judgment be entered as such.
Without argument or further clarification of the scope of the stipulation,
the trial court then read into the record a combination of the findings and
decisions of the two prior motion judges. The court noted the first motion judge
denied summary judgment finding issues of fact remained regarding "whether
defendant[s] [were] entitled to the rent based upon the tax surcharges
granted . . . to the defendant[s] May 7, 2019" and "whether . . . plaintiff was
required to pay the surcharge in light of the notices sent to . . . plaintiff." The
trial court similarly recounted the first judge's conclusion "the two-year
limitation period set forth in ordinance Section 155-4 applies."
The court then quoted the second motion judge's findings and decision
denying plaintiff's second motion for summary judgment. The trial court then
repeated verbatim the prior motion court's analysis, first identifying the elements
A-2954-23
14
of a CFA claim, including "a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct
and the ascertainable loss." It further quoted the second motion court's summary
of the parties' summary judgment arguments, and then read into the record the
second motion court's response to the various arguments.
In particular, the court quoted the second summary judgment court:
Considering the two-year statute of limitations
under Hoboken ordinance § 155-4(c), the court
finds . . . that [plaintiff] has not suffered an
ascertainable loss under the CFA. . . .
The City granted [defendants] a tax surcharge
totaling $329 for twelve months, which was legally
permitted to be transferred to plaintiff, a[nd] the two-
year limitation period coupled with the $329 legally
permissible surcharge evidences that in actuality
[plaintiff] is indebted to [defendants] for the sum of
$702. Considering this, [plaintiff] has failed to show
that he suffered an ascertainable loss.
[(Internal quotation marks omitted).]
After reciting the findings of both motion courts, the trial court issued its
oral decision, stating only the following:
Now before me is . . . plaintiff's request for an
award of $7,526 to be tripled by the
[CFA] . . . and . . . defendant[s] asked for the decision
to be affirmed.
The court finds it has no basis really—the
application is like an application . . . to set aside their
decisions based upon the law of the case and—which
I'm not married to but, because of these well-written
A-2954-23
15
and well-argued opinions by both [motion judges], I am
going to affirm the decisions of [both] and deny that
request. So the defendant[s'] relief is granted and,
therefore, the case is decided and resolved.
After the bench trial, the court issued its finding of "No Cause."
II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues: (1) both summary judgment motions were
improperly denied, as were their corresponding motions for reconsideration
because "no genuine issues of material fact existed"; (2) the trial court erred
when it overlooked defendants' failure to serve a disclosure statement upon
plaintiff, which was "absolutely fatal to [the trial court's] analysis of the
ordinance, as the two-year clock begins to run only after the disclosure statement
is served"; (3) the trial court erred by failing to address whether the ordinance's
two-year statute of limitations is preempted by the six-year statute of limitations
applicable to plaintiff's CFA claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; and (4) the
trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law, and
neglected to "either dismiss or enter judgment on the counterclaim."
Defendants respond, asserting questions of fact precluded summary
judgment regarding plaintiff's obligation to "pay the surcharge in light of the
notices," and arguing plaintiff's preemption claim should not be considered as it
was never raised before the motion or trial courts. Defendants contend the trial
A-2954-23
16
court made sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in adopting the
findings of the summary judgment judges.
III.
A.
We first address plaintiff's arguments that the judge erred in denying his
motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment decisions are reviewed de
novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Townsend v. Pierre, 221
N.J. 36, 59 (2015). A court should deny summary judgment when "the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder
to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
By contrast, we review with deference a trial court's denial of a motion
for reconsideration under Rule 4:42-2, and disturb those findings only upon an
abuse of discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).
A dissatisfied litigant's desire to reargue an unsuccessful motion does not
warrant reconsideration. Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App.
Div. 2010).
A-2954-23
17
A review of the first motion record reflects the judge properly found
disputed issues of material fact concerning the issue of notice to plaintiff of the
rent increase. As the judge correctly noted, the parties asserted conflicting
accounts concerning the nature and timing of notice, impacting whether
defendants proceeded adequately in pursuing the tax surcharge by way of rent
increase to plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff contended defendants failed to adhere to
the ordinance and consequently could not pass the tax surcharge to plaintiff.
Conversely, in their counter-statement of material facts, defendants included
facts allegedly demonstrating proper notice. Therefore, the first motion judge
properly denied plaintiff summary judgment.
The first motion court also correctly rejected plaintiff's claim that our
decision in Knight invalidated the ordinance. In Knight, we determined
Hoboken's Board exceeded its authority by enacting a time-limiting regulation
when the empowering ordinance contained no such limitation. Knight, 332 N.J.
Super. at 551-52, 554. Further, after the Knight decision, Hoboken amended the
ordinance in 2011 to expressly include the two-year limitation, thereby curing
the problem presented by Knight. Therefore, the trial court properly found that
Knight provided no basis for granting summary judgment in plaintiff's favor,
denied plaintiff's motion, and correctly denied reconsideration.
A-2954-23
18
Similarly, the second motion judge did not err in denying summary
judgment. The judge found plaintiff had not established his CFA claim as a
matter of law because he had not demonstrated an ascertainable loss. Clearly,
the parties disputed whether and, if so, for what period defendants were
authorized to pass the rent surcharge to plaintiff. The judge found the record
showed defendants were at least partially entitled to increase plaintiff's rent for
a limited period in accordance with the surcharge. Offsetting that amount
plaintiff owed defendants, the judge found plaintiff owed defendants
outstanding rent. We thus perceive no error by the second motion judge in
denying summary judgment, and therefore no error in the judge's denying
reconsideration.
B.
Turning to the argument the trial court erred in entering a no cause in
defendant's favor, we are persuaded the trial court's merely "affirming" the
summary judgment findings failed in these circumstances to meet the
requirement the trial court make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of
law. As the stipulations were ambiguous, and the trial court's findings were
sparse, we are unable to conclude the trial court's decision was sound.
A-2954-23
19
We recognize "[o]ur review of a judgment following a bench trial is
limited." Accounteks.Net, Inc. v. CKR Law, LLP, 475 N.J. Super. 493, 503
(App. Div. 2023) (citing Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150,
169 (2011)). Indeed, "findings [of fact] by the trial court are binding on appeal
when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co.,
65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We further acknowledge "[t]he basic thought is that generally litigants
should be held to their stipulations and the consequences thereof." Negrotti v.
Negrotti, 98 N.J. 428, 432 (1985). However, "the terms of a stipulation, if it is
to be given effect, must be 'definite and certain and it is essential they be
assented to by the parties.'" Kurak v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 298 N.J.
Super. 304, 325 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Schere v. Twp. of Freehold, 150 N.J.
Super. 404, 407 (App. Div. 1977)). Further, stipulations are not binding on the
trier of fact, see AGS Computers, Inc. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 244 N.J. Super.
1, 5 (App. Div. 1990); and courts need not accept stipulations as to matters of
law, see State v. Bodtmann, 239 N.J. Super. 33, 47 (App. Div. 1990).
A-2954-23
20
Here, the parties represented to the trial court their proposed stipulation
to the "facts" found by the second motion court. The record contains no further
specificity concerning the scope of the stipulated facts and no suggestion the
parties intended the court to adopt the second judge's legal conclusions or any
portion of the first motion judge's factual findings or legal determination.
The first and second motion judges at a minimum found genuine issues of
material fact warranting denial of summary judgment; they also appeared to
diverge on their findings concerning the issue of notice. Yet the trial court made
no attempt to harmonize the two or provide its reasons for determining if or
when the relevant notices were or were not lawfully provided.
That the stipulation was hopelessly vague can be appreciated by the
parties' conflicting positions at trial. After announcing their general
"stipulation" to the second motion judge's factual findings, the parties each
presented diametrically different claims concerning whether plaintiff
established an ascertainable loss; tied inextricably to divergent factual claims as
to notice and legal claims concerning the ordinance's applicability and
defendants' entitlement to collect the surcharge from plaintiff. It strains logic to
conclude plaintiff somehow assented to accepting as binding the legal
A-2954-23
21
conclusion of the second motion court, namely, that he failed to show
entitlement to relief under the CFA.
Ultimately, Rule 1:7-4 requires the court to find facts and state
conclusions of law in all actions tried without a jury. Specifically, the Rule
mandates:
The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum
decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state
its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried
without a jury, on every motion decided by a written
order that is appealable as of right.
[R. 1:7-4(a).]
Disregard for this obligation exacts "a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys
and the appellate court." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980).
"[C]ourt[s] must state clearly [their] factual findings and correlate them with the
relevant legal conclusions." Id. at 570.
Here, the trial court was required to determine whether plaintiff suffered
an ascertainable loss, by calculating rental amounts paid and owed by plaintiff.
This required the court to resolve the issues of whether defendants provided
required notice and lawfully imposed the rental surcharge on plaintiff, and for
what period of time. The court's "affirming" by broad brush all prior findings
A-2954-23
22
of both motion courts failed to adequately address these pivotal questions or
satisfy Rule 1:7-4(a).
Generally, a court's "failure to provide reasons necessitates a remand."
Allstate Ins. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super. 289, 303 (App. Div. 2009). When a court
fails to provide reasons in support of its decision, "we are left with the option of
remanding for a statement of reasons or reversing and remanding for
consideration . . . anew." Ibid. Here, we are satisfied the latter is necessary.
Regarding plaintiff's preemption claim as framed before us, our review of
the record persuades us his arguments on appeal are substantively different than
the Knight arguments or any other arguments plaintiff raised before the trial
court, or the motion judges. See Pfannenstein v. Surrey, 475 N.J. Super. 83, 99
(App. Div. 2023) ("We will not consider an issue that is raised for the first time
on appeal unless the issue pertains to the trial court's jurisdiction or concerns a
matter of great public interest."). Here, plaintiff asserts the CFA preempts the
ordinance. Specifically, plaintiff argues "[t]he trial court's application of the
ordinance undercuts N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, overrules CFA case law, and produces
varying results in CFA claims by tenants depending on municipality." As the
crux of plaintiff's challenge appears to be a claim the CFA's six-year statute of
limitations preempts the ordinance's requiring plaintiffs to bring rent challenges
A-2954-23
23
within two years of being served with a disclosure statement, we are satisfied
plaintiff debuts this argument on appeal.
We affirm both orders denying summary judgment and reconsideration.
We vacate the court's order finding no cause and remand for a new trial to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new trial. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
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24