Myers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MARK ALLEN MYERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:26-CV-00139 HEA

)

ST. CHARLES COUNTY JAIL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon self-represented Plaintiff Mark Allen Myers’ Motion

to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. [ECF No. 4]. Having reviewed the Motion and the financial

information submitted in support, the Court will grant the application and waive the filing fee.1

As Plaintiff is now proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915. Based on such review, the Court will dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

1 Plaintiff has submitted a prison account statement showing a zero account balance. Accordingly, the Court

will waive the filing fee at this time. [ECF No. 3].

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the

veracity of well-pleaded facts but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However,

even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a

matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry,

364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts

that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does

not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse

mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993).

State Criminal Action

On December 3, 2025, a criminal complaint was filed in St. Charles County Circuit Court

against Plaintiff charging him with felony trafficking drugs in the second degree and three counts

of felony endangering the welfare of a child – creating a substantial risk in the first degree. See

State v. Myers, No. 2511-CR03834 (11th Jud. Cir., St. Charles County Court).

According to the probable cause statement filed in Plaintiff’s criminal action, Plaintiff,

who has prior convictions for statutory rape in the second degree, failure to register as a sex

offender, possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,

was living with his co-defendant Amber Britton with their three children in St. Charles County.

The Children’s Division initiated an investigation into the couple when one of the children

arrived at school with a laceration that required medical care. Myers and Britton failed to

respond to the school or seek timely or appropriate treatment. Children’s Division requested law

enforcement assistance due to concerns about the child’s welfare. See id.

Law enforcement and the Children’s Division appeared to have visited Myers’ and

Britton’s home on a couple of occasions. The residence was unsanitary, with extreme clutter in

the home, strong odors of urine, no bedding on mattresses and large amounts of debris and dirty

dishes covering surfaces. The kitchen cabinets and refrigerator were secured with locks that

prevented the children from accessing food. Myers and Britton stated that the locks were

necessary to control food access. Id.

During the visits Myers and Britton were evasive, impaired or unresponsive and

repeatedly claimed to be unable to complete drug testing after investigators received information

that methamphetamine was being used inside the residence. Despite being given opportunities to

clean and correct safety hazards, no meaningful improvements were made at the residence. Id.

Two of the three children participated in forensic interviews and disclosed that they were

regularly locked inside their bedrooms, denied food access and were forced to break the locks on

cabinets to eat. One child reported that she had experienced hunger so badly that she vomited

and was then punished after vomiting. The children also reported that they were forced to care

for one another and themselves, including waking each other, preparing food and getting ready

for school. Myers and Britton were known to often sleep in and fail to provide supervision. Id.

The children also described being subjected to physical discipline, including being struck

with belts, paddles and other objects, as well as being grabbed or dragged by the neck. The

children stated that their bruises and injuries were concealed, and they were instructed not to

disclose what occurred inside the home. They reported that they feared additional punishment if

they spoke about the conditions, attempted to leave their bedrooms, or tried to obtain food. They

also stated that the windows to their rooms were screwed shut to prevent them from leaving

while they were confined. Id.

During the execution of a search warrant on December 2, 2025, investigators found locks

on all cabinets and the refrigerator. Locks were found on each bedroom door which required

fingerprints for access. Boards and screw holes were located near the windows. Belts consistent

with those described by the children were located. Large quantities of what appeared to be

methamphetamine and smoking paraphernalia were found unsecured in the bedroom and shed on

the property. The house was unsanitary, lacked heat and was deemed uninhabitable by St.

Charles County Code Enforcement. No children’s toys or clothing were found. Id.

Upon the search of the adjoining shed on the property, law enforcement found multiple

baggies of suspected methamphetamine, some in a locked safe which appeared to be packaged

for sale. The methamphetamine weighed approximately 130 grams in total. There was also a

digital scale, an undetermined amount of money, two glass plates containing rock-like substances

suspected to be methamphetamines, and glass smoking devices which contained burnt residue.

Inside the shed was paperwork containing the names of both Mark Myers and Amber Britton. Id.

The Complaint

On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant action against St. Charles County Jail and

the State of Missouri. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff complains that his home was searched, and he was

taken into custody on December 2, 2025, in St. Charles County. Although he denotes that he was

told at the time he was arrested that it was subject to a lawful arrest warrant, and that officers

also had a warrant to search his home, he states that he was not shown the warrants at the time of

his arrest. However, it is clear from the probable cause statement and from review of his criminal

action on Missouri Case.net, that officers had both an arrest warrant and search warrant for his

home. See State v. Myers, No. 2511-CR03834 (11th Jud. Cir., St. Charles County Court).

Plaintiff claims that there is no evidence that he had access to any controlled substances

at the premises, as he was not the owner of the premises – his co-defendant Amber Britton was

leasing the home from her uncle. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that there is no evidence that he

had keys to the shed on the property where much of the controlled substances were found.

Plaintiff has not filled out the portion of the complaint indicating the relief he is seeking

in this action. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from jail, he would need to file a petition

for writ of habeas corpus.2 To the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, the Court will

address Plaintiff’s contentions as brought against the St. Charles County Jail and the State of

Missouri, who are the only named Defendants in this action.

2 “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (explaining that Supreme Court “has held that

a prisoner in state custody cannot use a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his

confinement”); Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a habeas action is

the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the legality of his sentence or seek immediate or speedier

release); Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that when “a prisoner directly attacks

the validity of his sentence, the proper vehicle is a habeas corpus action”).

Discussion

Based on a careful review and liberal construction of the filings before the Court, the

Court will dismiss this action.

Plaintiff’s claims against the St. Charles County Jail are subject to dismissal. “Section

1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law, of another’s

civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). A jail, however, is not a

distinctly suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974

F.2d 81, 82 (1992); Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“county jails

are not legal entities amenable to suit”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 Fed. Appx. 436,

437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department

because they are not suable entities). Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim

against the St. Charles County Jail.

To the extent the Plaintiff intends to bring this case against St. Charles County, his

complaint still falls short. A local governing body can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To prevail on this

type of claim, a plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability for the alleged

conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016). Such liability may

attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an

unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,

883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.

2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a

theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, there are three ways in

which a plaintiff can potentially assert a municipal liability claim.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any facts that would establish liability under Monell.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the proposition that an unconstitutional policy or

custom exists. He merely details his home was searched on December 2, 2025, and he was

arrested on that date and charged with felony trafficking drugs in the second degree and three

counts of felony endangering the welfare of a child – creating a substantial risk in the first

degree. As noted above, Plaintiff’s state court criminal case indicates that the search and arrest

occurred according to a valid search warrant and arrest warrant. See State v. Myers, No. 2511-

CR03834 (11th Jud. Cir., St. Charles County Court).3 This does not indicate any unconstitutional

policy or custom. Further, Plaintiff has provided no allegations or facts indicating a deliberately

indifferent failure to train or supervise. Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against

St. Charles County.

Last, Plaintiff fails to establish liability on behalf of the State of Missouri in this action.

“Section 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law, of

another’s civil rights.”4 McLean, 548 F.3d at 618; Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d

1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only”).

However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under §

1983.” See also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Calzone v. Hawley,

866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and

3 To the extent Plaintiff wishes to argue in a new action that he was subjected to unlawful imprisonment or

unlawful arrest, he can attempt to sue the officer or officers who subjected him to arrest. The new action

would have to be filed within the five-year statute of limitations from the date of the alleged occurrence,

see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007), and he would need to explain his arrest and imprisonment

by the officers were unlawful given the existence of the search warrant and arrest warrant. See State v.

Myers, No. 2511-CR03834 (11th Jud. Cir., St. Charles County Court).

4 Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of relief, not

merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007).

Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8" Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for

purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Furthermore, an agency exercising state

power is also not a person subject to suit under § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis

Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8 Cir. 1991).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to proceed without prepayment of

the required filing fees and costs [ECF No. 4] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 18" day of February, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE