Opinion

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge

Deputy Clerk: Court Reporter:

Rita Sanchez Not Reported

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant:

None Present None Present

Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO REMAND [11]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Victoria Jacobsen’s Motion to Remand (the

“Motion”), filed November 26, 2025. (Docket No. 11). Defendants Henkel

Corporation, et al. filed an Opposition on December 22, 2025. (Docket No. 12).

Plaintiff filed a Reply on December 29, 2025. (Docket No. 15).

The Court read and considered the papers and held a hearing on January 12,

2026.

The Motion is DENIED. Defendants’ removal was timely, and the

jurisdictional facts are adequately pled.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff Victoria Jacobsen filed this action in the Superior

Court of California for the County of Los Angeles. (See Docket No. 1 at 1 (Notice of

Removal (“NOR”))). The Complaint alleges claims for common law misappropriation

of likeness and statutory misappropriation of likeness under California Civil Code

section 3344 against Defendants. (See generally Exhibit A to NOR (the

“Complaint”)). On October 30, 2025, Defendant Henkel Corporation removed the

action to this Court. (See NOR). Defendant asserted in the NOR that this Court had

diversity jurisdiction over the action, given that the parties are diverse and the amount

in controversy requirement is met. (Id. at 3). While Defendant asserted that the

______________________________________________________________________________

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

amount in controversy was not facially apparent from the Complaint, Defendant

submitted evidence that Plaintiff rejected a settlement offer of $75,001, thus conceding

that the amount in controversy met the jurisdictional threshold. (Id. at 5-7).

Plaintiff subsequently filed this Motion. In the Motion, Plaintiff does not

challenge that the parties are diverse. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the removal was

untimely and that the amount in controversy requirement is not met. (See generally

Motion).

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

In support of its Opposition, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial

notice of the state court complaints filed in three unrelated actions, which were

removed to federal court and subsequently remanded. (See Docket No. 13 (“RJN”) at

1). Plaintiff opposes the RJN. (See Docket No. 16).

Court filings and orders are typically judicially noticeable because they are

readily verifiable. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746

n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of

public record.”). Although the submitted complaints are all appropriate for judicial

notice, the Court does not rely on these complaints for any part of this Order.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the requests as moot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts

of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the

defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original

jurisdiction where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s

citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. § 1441(a). A

removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See

Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)

(noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

removing defendant”). If there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to

state court. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

instance.”). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s removal both on procedural and substantive

grounds. First, Plaintiff argues that removal was untimely because the Complaint

established that the amount in controversy was over the threshold to remove to federal

court. (Motion at 3-9). Then, in the next section, Plaintiff argues that Defendants

cannot establish that the amount in controversy meets the threshold requirement. (Id.

at 9-12).

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that these arguments are inconsistent —

and not merely alternative legal arguments, as Plaintiff suggests, but incompatible

representations of the record and jurisdictional facts. In the same breath, Plaintiff

asserts that the amount in controversy was plainly apparent from the Complaint to be

over $75,000, but also that the amount in controversy is fatally speculative.

Therefore, while Plaintiff asserts them as “alternative arguments,” the factual

basis for both arguments cannot simultaneously be true, as courts have recognized in

the context of similar arguments. See Letter v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. CV 25-07757-

HDV (MAAx), 2025 WL 3187652, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). Plaintiff’s

contradictory arguments also seem indicative of precisely the type of “gamesmanship

in pleadings” that the Ninth Circuit has attempted to curb in its removal jurisprudence.

See Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 2005); see also

Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1141 (2013) (explaining that

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is interpreted to “avoid a ‘Catch-22’ for defendants desirous of a

federal forum,” and that, accordingly, plaintiffs “assume the costs associated with their

own indeterminate pleadings”).

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

Nevertheless, the Court will address these arguments in turn.

A. Timeliness of Removal

Under § 1446(b)(1), a defendant must file a notice of removal “within 30 days

after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial

pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is

based[.]” Notice “of removability under § 1446(b) is determined through examination

of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a

duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. In adopting this standard, the

Ninth Circuit sought to, among other things, “bring[] certainty and predictability to the

process” of removals, “avoid[] gamesmanship in pleading,” “guard[] against premature

and protective removals,” and ensure “that removal occurs once the jurisdictional facts

supporting removal are evident[.]” Id. at 697, 698.

Plaintiff first argues that Defendants’ removal was untimely because

removability was ascertainable from the face of the Complaint. (Motion at 3-8). But

as Defendants argue, the Complaint contains no dollar figures whatsoever, and instead

asserts relief in the form of general categories of damages. (See Exhibit A to NOR).

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Complaint contains no particular amounts of

damages, but instead makes much out of the statement from Kuxhausen that defendants

must “apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining removability.” 707

F.3d at 1140-1141. According to Plaintiff, this standard means that Defendants should

have assumed it was “facially apparent” that the amount in controversy will exceed

$75,000 “where the complaint alleges general damages, emotional distress damages,

and punitive damages and seeks attorneys’ fees.” (Motion at 6).

But the type of “reasonable amount of intelligence” contemplated by the court in

Kuxhausen consisted of “[m]ultiplying figures clearly stated in a complaint[,]” not

extrapolating from general categories of damages or looking to recoveries from similar

cases in order to divine an amount in controversy, as Plaintiff asserts Defendants were

obligated to do. See 707 F.3d at 1140. Indeed, Kuxhausen specifically held it was not

duty of defendants to “make extrapolations or engage in guesswork.” Id. In the

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

context of a complaint that contains no dollar amounts whatsoever, extrapolation or

extreme guesswork is the precise type of exercise Defendants here would have needed

to perform in order to arrive at an amount in controversy based on the allegations in the

Complaint. Therefore, the amount in controversy was not ascertainable from the face

of the Complaint such that its filing triggered a 30-day deadline to remove the action.

Nor is Plaintiff’s argument persuasive that the Court should use “judicial

experience and common sense” to hold otherwise. (Motion at 5-6). While the amount

in controversy may have been “facially apparent” from the complaints in the cases

cited by Plaintiff, the same is not true here. (Id. at 6-7). As discussed in the

Opposition, the Complaint in this action merely alleges damages stemming from a

putatively broken agreement to only use images of Plaintiff for one year. (Opp. at 2;

Complaint ¶¶ 2, 5). But as highlighted in the Opposition, the Complaint contains no

allegations about the original terms of the putative agreement, and thus critically leaves

ambiguous the value of the use of Plaintiff’s name or likeness. For example, if the

agreement provided $200 of compensation for the use of Plaintiff’s name and likeness

for a year, it would hardly be certain that the value of these claims would exceed

$75,000, even considering the other categories of damages asserted in the Complaint.

While $200 may be an extreme assumption, it is a variable left open by Plaintiff’s

choice of vague pleading.

Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the Complaint triggered the 30-day

deadline to remove the action under § 1446(b)(1).

B. Proof of Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff next takes issue with Defendants’ proffered basis for removal: the

rejection of Defendants’ offer of compromise. (Motion at 9-12). It is undisputed that

Defendants removed within thirty days of Plaintiffs’ rejection, so the only question is

whether this is such an “other paper from which it may be ascertained that the case is

one which is or has become removable.” See 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3).

As an initial matter, the Court could well construe Plaintiff’s timeliness

arguments as a concession that the amount in controversy is over $75,000, as discussed

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

above. Nonetheless, even considered on the merits, Plaintiff’s arguments on this point

are unpersuasive.

Plaintiff first argues that this objection to the offer of compromise cannot be a

qualifying “other paper” because it was not a “voluntary act” of Plaintiff—rather,

Defendant sent the offer and Plaintiff responded, so Defendants should be precluded

from relying on that response when it was contrived by Defendants themselves.

(Motion at 8-9). But this argument strains credulity. As Defendants point out, if this

distinction were upheld, then that would mean, for example, that Defendants could

never remove on the basis of sworn answers to interrogatories. (Opp. at 15). But even

Plaintiff concedes that such a result would untenable, and that removal would be

proper if she had answered an interrogatory about the amount in controversy. (Reply

at 7-8). While Plaintiff asserts that the distinction between answering a settlement

offer and answering an interrogatory is “mixing apples and oranges[,]” Plaintiff never

points to a meaningful distinction between the two scenarios. (Id.).

Moreover, it is well settled that settlement communications may be considered

“other paper” under the removal statute. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840

(9th Cir. 2002); (Opp. at 13-14 (collecting cases)). Plaintiff creatively tries to

distinguish between settlement offers “initiated” by plaintiffs versus settlement offers

initiated by defendants, but that distinction is without merit. As one court has observed

in a similar action, given that Plaintiff did not accept the settlement offer of $75,001,

“[she] must believe that not only do[es] [her] case[] put more than that in controversy,

but that [she’s] likely to do better by litigating.” In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6

Powershift Transmission Prods. Liab. Litig., CV 18-ML-02814 AB (FFMx), 2018 WL

5905942, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018). Plaintiff simply cannot escape the clear

implications of rejecting the settlement offer, despite her best efforts to argue that it

was somehow not a valid settlement offer. It would be counterintuitive for the Court to

hold now that a rejection of a settlement offer for $75,001 leaves any ambiguity that

Plaintiff believes her claims to be worth more than that amount; if she did not believe

her claims put more in controversy, there would be no reason to reject the offer.

______________________________________________________________________________

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case No. CV 25-10443-MWF (SSCx) Date: January 14, 2026

Title: Victoria Jacobsen v. Henkel Corporation, et al.

Finally, Plaintiff at no point puts forward an affidavit or other evidence to prove

that the amount in controversy is less than $75,000. Again, this failure to do so is

consistent with Plaintiff’s timeliness argument, where she argues forcefully that the

amount in controversy is in fact over $75,000. This lack of contrary evidence is further

support for the result here.

Accordingly, the Motion to Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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