Rexroad

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL REXROAD,

Petitioner,

Case No. 1:24-cv-44

v.

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

WARDEN, SOUTHEASTERN Magistrate Judge Jolson

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

On July 1, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

(R&R, Doc. 19) advising the Court to dismiss with prejudice pro se Petitioner Michael

Rexroad’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). (Doc. 19, #414). Since the

Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, Rexroad has filed what he styles a “Motion to

Amend Evidence” (Doc. 24), but which the Court construes as objections to the R&R.1

1 Rexroad cites 28 U.S.C. § 2242, which provides that federal habeas petitions may be

“amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.”

In other words, federal habeas petitioners may amend their petition in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416, 418 (6th Cir.

2006). The time has long passed for Rexroad to amend as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a)(1). And to the extent that Rexroad is seeking leave to amend his petition to include

an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, (see Doc. 24, #443), the amendment is

DENIED as futile because the claim is procedurally defaulted. See infra Law & Analysis;

Hopson v. Miller, No. 5:16-cv-1867, 2019 WL 2928746, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2019) (denying

amendment to habeas petition on futility grounds).

Alternatively, giving Rexroad, a pro se petitioner, the benefit of the doubt, he could be seeking

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which permits an evidentiary hearing on claims that the

applicant failed to develop in state proceedings only if the claim relies on (1) “a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that

was previously unavailable,” or (2) “a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Additionally, “the

facts underlying the claim” must be “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

For the reasons stated below, the Court OVERRULES Rexroad’s objections (Doc.

24), and ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 19) in its entirety, thereby DISMISSING Rexroad’s

habeas petition (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Rexroad is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Southeastern

Correctional Institution. In January 2024, he filed a pro se habeas petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). The concatenation of events that gave rise to the petition

began in June 2020, when the State of Ohio charged Rexroad with “seventeen counts

of rape under Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02; one count of sexual battery under Ohio

Revised Code § 2907.03; and one count of gross sexual imposition under Ohio Revised

Code § 2907.05.” (Doc. 19, #414). After roughly a year of negotiations, Rexroad

entered a plea deal with the state. (Id. at #414–15). And on July 21, 2021, he pleaded

guilty pursuant to that agreement. (State Ct. R., Doc. 12, #51). But the next day,

Rexroad (without informing his court-appointed counsel) filed a pro se motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. (See id. at #56).

Because the procedural history of the guilty plea and its attempted withdrawal

is central to Rexroad’s claims in habeas, the R&R describes it in some detail. It seems

that during in-person pretrial proceedings that occurred in January and March 2021,

the state trial court stressed the gravity of Rexroad’s charges. (Doc. 19, #415).

that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant

guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Rexroad does not meet this standard.

He identifies no new rule of constitutional law that would provide for his release. And, as

explained below, the “factual predicate” of Rexroad’s request is not new either. See infra note

3.

Rexroad confirmed he understood. (Id.). Then, on July 21, 2021, the day of his plea

hearing, Rexroad signed a guilty plea form. (Id. at #416; see Doc. 12, #51). There, he

waived the reading of the indictment and indicated that he fully understood the rights

the Constitution granted him. (Doc. 19, #415). He further waived those rights and

declared his intent to enter a guilty plea for two sexual-battery counts and a sexual-

imposition count. (Id. at #415–16). Separately, Rexroad affixed his signature to a

document that explained to him the maximum penalties for those offenses. (Id. at

#416).

The R&R further describes that, at the plea hearing, “Rexroad also indicated

that he understood that by pleading guilty to three counts, the state would dismiss

the remaining charges. Rexroad further stated that he understood that since this is

a jointly recommended sentence[,] he waives the right to appeal his sentence.” (Id.).

The state trial court specifically queried whether Rexroad had the opportunity to

review the waiver and maximum-penalty documents with his counsel, and Rexroad

responded that “he had reviewed them, understood them, and signed them.” (Id. at

#416–17). The trial court also separately reminded Rexroad of the constitutional

rights he was waiving by pleading guilty (the same rights listed on the plea form he

had signed), and Rexroad again replied that he understood. (Id.). Finally, the court

again stressed the maximum penalty associated with each offense, as well as the

mandatory post-release control that would form part of Rexroad’s punishment if he

pleaded guilty. (Id. at #417). Rexroad once again confirmed that he understood both

aspects of the punishment that awaited him based on his guilty plea. (Id.). After

relaying this information to Rexroad, the trial court asked whether he wished to

proceed with his plea, and Rexroad again said yes. (Id.). With that, the court accepted

Rexroad’s plea. (Id.).

One day later, though, “Rexroad filed a one-paragraph, unsigned handwritten

document asking to withdraw his plea.” (Id.). And so the sentencing hearing the state

court had set based on the plea instead became a combined motion-and-sentencing

hearing. (See id.). Apparently, neither the state nor Rexroad’s counsel had received a

copy of Rexroad’s handwritten motion in advance of the hearing. (Id.). But Rexroad’s

counsel was aware, due to the online docket, that Rexroad had filed the motion. (Id.).

And Rexroad’s counsel had spoken with Rexroad about it. (Id.).

Among the “several reasons” that Rexroad raised in his motion as a basis for

withdrawing his plea was “a claim of tampering with evidence by the state in

discovery.” (Id.). But while Rexroad’s counsel was aware that Rexroad had included

that argument, he balked at the prospect of actually pressing it on Rexroad’s behalf

at the hearing. According to the attorney, he saw “no good faith basis for that

argument and w[ould] not make it before the Court.” (Id.). So it fell to Rexroad himself

to read his reasons for withdrawal into the record:

I, Michael Rexroad, on July 25th, 2021, request to withdraw my plea of

guilty and instead go to trial for some of the following reasons; one, I

survived a year and a half in jail without signing a time waiver and

believe I have earned the right to have … that right returned to me. I

feel that scare tactics were used to influence my decision. As a 50 percent

disabled veteran that fought the state and the last year and a half after

my injury, I requested I still be allowed to continue to fight for my

innocence. I apologize for pulling the VA card, but I’m at my wits

end … It has been brought to my attention that I do not have to convince

12 people of my innocence, only one … or one that she is faking, or one

that she is lying, which would be easier if I had my motion of discovery.

(Id. at #417–18).

Following Rexroad’s remarks, the trial court asked Rexroad’s counsel if he

wished to present any evidence in support of the motion. (Id. at #418). Counsel

reiterated that he lacked a good-faith basis for pressing the argument:

Scare tactics, Your Honor, everything has been explained to him in the

court … there w[ere] no scare tactics used. He[] … knowingly made the

choice he made … we have went over and discussed the motion of

discovery … So, I cannot put forward any good faith argument for a

motion to withdraw [the] guilty plea.

(Id.).

So the trial court asked Rexroad whether he wished to testify in support of his

motion. (Id.). Rexroad said he did, and he also confirmed that he understood that the

state would have the opportunity to question him regarding any issues raised in his

testimony. (Id.). With that, the trial court administered the oath to Rexroad. (Id.).

Then, after Rexroad completed his testimony and cross examination, the trial court

declared, “I am going to find that this was a request filed by the Defendant

individually and not through counsel. This Court did choose to proceed with a hearing

on this matter despite that fact.” (Id.).

Following that, the trial court denied the motion. (Id.). The judge found there

was “no reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw the plea.” (Id.). In support of

that conclusion, the trial court pointed out that Rexroad was afforded “a

full … hearing, understood the nature of the charges he was pleading guilty to, and

understood the possible penalties including the jointly recommended sentence.” (Id.

at #418–19). What’s more, the court “held that Rexroad failed to present evidence

supporting his innocence, and, that to [the] contrary, the state presented his

admission of committing the offenses.” (Id. at #419). At bottom, Rexroad’s request

was based on “a change of heart,” and the court “did not find credible his assertion

that the interrogation recording was tampered with.” (Id.). So the trial court

proceeded to sentencing, and the state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s

judgment. (Id.). The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over Rexroad’s case.

(Id.).

Undeterred, Rexroad filed for post-conviction relief in the state trial court.

(Id.). He proffered two grounds for such relief: (1) “Ineffective assistance of counsel,

both trial and appellate counsel,” and (2) the “Trial court committed reversible error

when it overruled Defense Rule 29 Motion to Dismiss due to insufficient evidence.”

(Id. (cleaned up)). But the state trial court held (1) that res judicata barred the

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,2 (2) that Rexroad had failed to identify

any “substantive grounds for relief,” as Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21(D) requires, and

(3) that in any event, the petition was untimely under the 365-day limit specified in

Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2)(a). (Id.). Some two months later, Rexroad moved for

2 Under Ohio law, when a defendant is (1) represented by a new attorney on appeal (as

Rexroad was here), and (2) capable of raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based

on record evidence (as Rexroad was here), he typically must raise that claim on direct appeal.

See infra note 3. Relatedly, while the state trial court did not expressly deny the ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim on res judicata grounds, this Court notes that Ohio law

requires defendants to raise such claims in the first instance by way of a petition under Ohio

Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B). See, e.g., State v. Sellars, No. 28860, 2021 WL 1593196,

at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2021) (noting that an application to reopen under Rule 26(B),

not “a petition for post-conviction relief,” is the appropriate vehicle to raise claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).

post-conviction DNA testing and for production of certain documents, but the state

trial court denied both. (Id.). It appears that Rexroad declined to appeal any of these

post-conviction decisions. (Id.).

That brings the Court to the instant matter. In his federal habeas petition,

Rexroad asserts two grounds for relief: (1) “The trial court erred to the prejudice of

Mr. Rexroad by accepting a plea of guilty that was not made knowingly, voluntarily

[and] intelligently,” and (2) “The trial court erred to the prejudice of Mr. Rexroad by

denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” (Id. at #420).

The petition also lays out “[s]upporting [f]acts” for each ground. (Id.). As for

the first, Rexroad contends that the trial court did not ensure that Rexroad

understood the nature of his charges; that the statement of facts was not read into

the record; that the trial court did not review the elements of the offense with

Rexroad; that the record shows Rexroad was “unsure” if he really wanted to enter a

guilty plea; and that Rexroad was “confused regarding the proceedings,” apparently

because he “believed he was already sentenced.” (Id.). And as for the second, Rexroad

asserts that he filed a pro se motion to withdraw the plea; that he was unsatisfied

with counsel’s performance; that he received no other court-appointed attorney; and

that he “put forth specific reasons why he wanted to withdraw his plea”—namely,

that he was “innocent,” “confused about how a jury trial worked,” and “was prepared

to go to trial but felt backed into a corner.” (Id.). To the extent that Rexroad had

disclosed self-inculpatory information to authorities, he asserts that he made those

disclosures “because he was homeless and the investigation promised him a place to

stay.” (Id.).

After Respondent filed a Return of Writ (Doc. 13), the state court record (Doc.

12), and transcripts (Docs. 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-4, 12-5), and Rexroad filed a Traverse

(Doc. 18), the Magistrate Judge issued her R&R (Doc. 19). There, the Magistrate

Judge started her analysis by noting that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a court may not

issue a writ of habeas corpus on any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court

unless the adjudication either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the United States Supreme Court,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding.” (Doc. 19, #420–21 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d))).

Because this case implicates the first prong, the Magistrate Judge elaborated

on its content. “A decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established law when ‘the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on

a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” (Id. at #421 (quoting Otte v. Houk, 654

F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up))). A state court’s application of clearly

established federal law is unreasonable “when the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (cleaned up). The burden

of satisfying these standards lays with Rexroad, and the Court’s review is “limited to

the record before the state court.” (Id. (cleaned up)).

The Magistrate Judge found that Rexroad could not make the necessary

showing as to either claim for relief. Recall that his first claim challenges whether his

plea was knowing and voluntary. (Id. at #415). As the Magistrate Judge noted,

Rexroad had already pressed this exact ground for relief on direct appeal in state

court. (Id. at #423). And the state appellate court held that “[t]he totality of the

circumstances here demonstrate that Rexroad was notified of the nature of the

charges and he understood them.” (Id.). Rexroad had access to all the information

regarding the charges pending against him. (Id.). He “was advised” of his crimes

“through several hearings.” (Id.). He reviewed “the guilty plea and maximum penalty

documents” “with counsel,” was “questioned about them at the plea hearing by the

trial court,” and “more than once, indicated he signed them and wished to keep his

signature on them.” (Id.). And although Rexroad attempted to portray one of his

responses to the trial court (“I’m going to have to say, yes”) as “demonstrating

hesitation,” this argument did not persuade the state appellate court. (Id. at #424).

In the Magistrate Judge’s view, this conclusion “was not unreasonable,” largely

for the same reasons that had persuaded the state appellate court. (Id. at #424–25).

So the R&R recommends denying Rexroad’s claim that the state court had committed

an AEDPA-cognizable error in finding that his plea was knowing and voluntary. (Id.

at #425–26).

Turn now to the second ground. The Magistrate Judge likewise concluded that

the state court did not commit an AEDPA-cognizable error in denying Rexroad’s

motion to withdraw his plea. (Id. at #426–32). Like Rexroad’s first ground, a state

appellate court has already rejected this argument. (Id. at #426–27). That court found

that the state trial court should not even have considered Rexroad’s motion because

Rexroad “was represented by counsel who did not join the motion.” (Id. at #426). And

under long-established Ohio law, “[h]ybrid representation is prohibited.” (Id.).

Ultimately, though, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Ohio’s hybrid-

representation rule does not give rise to a procedural default in this matter that

would preclude consideration of the issue in habeas. (Id. at #429). That’s because one

could read the state appellate court’s decision in Rexroad’s direct appeal “as finding

that the state trial court—not [Rexroad]—failed to follow a procedural rule.” (Id.).

That is, the appellate court seemed to fault the trial court for entertaining Rexroad’s

motion to withdraw his plea in the first instance, rather than faulting Rexroad for

failing to comply with the procedural rule. (Id.). Thus, the appellate court’s decision

was “not an express, unequivocal statement that [Rexroad’s] claim was barred on

procedural grounds.” (Id.).

But the Magistrate Judge concluded that Rexroad’s second ground for relief

fails for a different but related reason—namely, that “[s]tate court decisions based on

state law issues are not subject to federal habeas review.” (Id. at #430 (citations

omitted)). As the Magistrate Judge put it, “[t]ime and again, courts have held that

the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is a question of state law insufficient to

warrant habeas relief.” (Id (citations omitted)). And to the extent that Rexroad is

instead endeavoring to raise some kind of freestanding actual innocence claim, “the

Sixth Circuit has repeatedly indicated that such claims are not cognizable on habeas.”

(Id. at #431 (quotation omitted)). So, like the first, Rexroad’s second ground for relief

falls short.

Deeming both of Rexroad’s grounds for relief infirm, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the Court dismiss Rexroad’s petition with prejudice. (Id. at #432).

The Court granted Rexroad’s request to extend the default 14-day response deadline.

(See 7/15/25 Not. Order (granting Rexroad’s first request for an extension and denying

as moot two subsequent requests for the same relief)). As a result, Rexroad had until

September 2, 2025, to object. (Id.). On July 31, 2025, Rexroad filed what he styled a

“Motion to Amend Evidence” (Doc. 24). There, he seeks to “present additional

evidence” on his second ground for relief (i.e., that the state trial court erred in

denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea). (Id. at #441). He says that the “trial

judge had an affirmative duty to inquir[e] about a conflict that unfolded right inside

its court room,” though he does not expand on what he means by “conflict.” (Id. at

#443). Perhaps the term is best read as a reference to the next paragraph, where

Rexroad explains that he told his trial counsel at a hearing that counsel had “failed

to investigate” numerous “issues” that Rexroad had “pointed out.” (Id.). Based on

that, Rexroad appears to argue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and also

suggests that the trial court had an independent duty to inquire into the adequacy of

counsel’s representation. (Id. at #443–44). The remainder of Rexroad’s filing is a

series of exhibits—various documents created in connection with the proceedings

described above. (Id. at #447–72). Giving Rexroad, a pro se litigant, the benefit of the

doubt, the Court construes Rexroad’s motion as objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

analysis of Rexroad’s second ground for relief.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[]

[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v.

Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio

July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to

which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation omitted). In response to such an

objection, “the district court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge

with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up).

By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, that “has the same

effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932

F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the report and

recommendation to which he objects with sufficient clarity for the Court to identify

it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo review of the issue. Miller v. Currie,

50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections must be clear enough to enable the

district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”).

That said, Rexroad is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings should be

construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin v. Rose,

765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with the

procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993). And “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient

treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading

stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.”

Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010)

(citations omitted).

For any unobjected portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself

that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the

recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D.

Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Finding that dispositive issues bedevil each of Rexroad’s arguments, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court dismiss Rexroad’s habeas petition with

prejudice. (Doc. 19, #414). As noted, the Court construes Rexroad’s so-called “Motion

to Amend Evidence” (Doc. 24) as objecting solely to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis

of Rexroad’s second argument. Accordingly, the Court reviews the R&R’s analysis of

Rexroad’s first argument for clear error, and the R&R’s analysis of the second

argument de novo. Redmon, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1; Bates, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1.

Ultimately, the Court affirms the R&R as to both.

1. The Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in rejecting Rexroad’s first

ground for relief (i.e., his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary). (Doc.

19, #426). Explaining why that is so, though, involves a closer look at the details

surrounding his plea.

As the R&R correctly observes, in his petition, Rexroad basically argues “that

the trial court did not (1) ‘ensure’ that he understood the nature of the charges against

him or (2) review the elements of the charged offense.” (Id. at #422). To be sure, such

complaints rest on solid legal footing. Because a criminal defendant waives numerous

constitutional rights when he enters a guilty plea, any such plea must be entered into

knowingly and voluntarily. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). “The

longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea

represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action

open to the defendant.’” Railey v. Webb, 540 F.3d 393, 417 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)). The Court considers the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the plea in applying the standard. Garcia v. Johnson, 991

F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

A plea is voluntary if the defendant “understands the nature of the charges

against him and the constitutional protections that he is waiving.” Evans v. Jackson,

No. 20-11379, 2022 WL 989321, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2022) (citing Henderson v.

Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 n.13 (1976)). A plea is knowing and intelligent if the

defendant has “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. But the mere fact that a defendant “did not

correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision” does not mean the

decision was not intelligent. Id. at 757.

A defendant’s in-court remarks are also germane to the analysis—a “[s]olemn

declaration[]” of guilt in open court carries a “strong presumption of verity.”

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Consistent with that, the Sixth Circuit

has long held that a petitioner is bound by his in-court statements as to his

understanding of the plea. Ramos v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 560, 563 (6th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, the Court

must afford a presumption of correctness to a state court’s determination that a plea

was valid. Railey, 540 F.3d at 417 (quoting Garcia, 991 F.2d at 326).

Here, the record provides no backup whatsoever for the notion that Rexroad’s

guilty plea was anything less than the product of a knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent choice. (See Doc. 19, #423–24 (describing Rexroad’s plea and its

surrounding circumstances)). And were there any doubt, the state appellate court’s

independent determination on that factual issue would obviate it. After all, a state

court’s determination of fact is entitled to substantial deference in habeas review. See

Railey, 540 F.3d at 417 (quoting Garcia, 991 F.2d at 326). Accordingly, the R&R did

not clearly err in rejecting Rexroad’s first ground.

2. Nor did the Magistrate Judge go awry in analyzing Rexroad’s second

ground. Even reviewing that determination de novo in light of Rexroad’s objections,

Rexroad says nothing that warrants a different conclusion.

Recall that Rexroad asserts that the state trial court erred by denying his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Doc. 1, #7). Respondent, meanwhile, challenges

this contention on two grounds. First, as the R&R notes, Respondent says that the

argument is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 19, #427). And second, the Warden says

that the argument is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. (Id.). The

Magistrate Judge rejected Respondent’s first contention, but accepted the second. (Id.

at #426–32). Because the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of

Respondent’s second argument—which is dispositive here—the Court does not reach

Respondent’s first argument.

As a general matter, state court decisions based on rules of state law are not

subject to federal habeas review. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)

(“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). Unsurprisingly,

then, federal courts routinely reject challenges to the denial of a motion to withdraw

a plea, finding that such denials are questions of state law that do not give rise to

habeas relief. See, e.g., Bingham v. Haviland, No. 3:20-cv-1846, 2023 WL 6383684, at

*6 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2023) (citation omitted); Goodwin v. Buchanan, No. 5:19-cv-

888, 2022 WL 1152782, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2022). True, if the denial were to

amount to a due process violation, things may be different. But that generally “hinges

on whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.” Bingham, 2023 WL 6383684, at *6

(citations omitted). And the Court has already determined above that Rexroad failed

to show that his plea was constitutionally infirm on those grounds here. That finding

largely precludes this avenue of relief. See Dunlap v. Warden, No. 2:21-cv-5849, 2022

WL 16950956, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2022) (rejecting an argument based on the

denial of a motion to withdraw a plea where the court had already determined that

the petitioner’s plea was constitutionally permissible). Indeed, even in the unlikely

event that the state trial court somehow abused its discretion in denying Rexroad’s

motion, an abuse of discretion alone does not ineluctably give rise to a due process

violation. See Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1995).

Rexroad’s objections—(1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate Rexroad’s theory that the state suppressed evidence, and (2) that the trial

court had an independent duty to inquire into the supposed “conflict” between

Rexroad and his trial counsel, (see Doc. 24, #443–45)—wither in light of these

conclusions. As for the former, while it is true that “a guilty plea can be involuntary

as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel,” United States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d

541, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59), a state court has already

determined that res judicata bars Rexroad’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claim,3 (see Doc. 12, #183). So the claim is procedurally defaulted, as the Sixth Circuit

3 In Ohio, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief

in the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.” Brown v. City of Dayton, 730 N.E.2d

958, 962 (Ohio 2000). The doctrine requires ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be

brought on direct appeal so long as the defendant “[1] had new counsel on direct appeal and

[2] the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been raised on direct appeal

without resorting to evidence outside of the record.” State v. Dempsey, No. 76386, 2000 WL

777003, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 2000). Admittedly, the state court post-conviction

decision holding that Rexroad’s claim is barred on res judicata grounds is rather conclusory

and does not apply this two-part test. (See Doc. 12, #183). But the record nonetheless reflects

that it is satisfied. Rexroad had new counsel on direct appeal. (See id. at #75; Doc. 12-5, #310).

And Rexroad’s theory—that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an

allegedly tampered-with and suppressed video interrogation, (see Doc. 24, #444)—could have

been advanced on direct appeal. At his sentencing hearing, Rexroad testified in support of

his motion to withdraw the guilty plea that he “strongly fe[lt] that the interrogation video

has “repeatedly” held that “res judicata is an adequate and independent state ground

to foreclose” review of a federal habeas claim.4 Gerth v. Warden, Allen Oakwood Corr.

Inst., 938 F.3d 821, 830 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

As for Rexroad’s argument that the trial court had an independent duty that

it failed to meet, the three cases that Rexroad cites—Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335

(1980), United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.

162 (2002)—are inapposite. Cuyler held that a criminal defendant who does not object

to a potential conflict of interest stemming from multiple representation at trial must

demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s

that was shown to me … had been modified and key segments were removed.” (Doc. 12-5,

#319). Jodi Conkel, a detective from the Scioto County Sheriff’s Office who investigated

Rexroad’s case, then took the stand to testify as to the Sheriff’s Office’s procedure for

recording interviews. (Id. at #331–35). Conkel testified that evidence tampering of the sort

Rexroad had alleged is “physically impossible” given the Sheriff’s Office internal procedure

for storing digital video and audio files. (Id. at #333, 336). “Once [the Sheriff’s Office] record[s]

something,” it is “store[d] on [a] hard drive.” (Id. at #333). And once it’s there, Sheriff’s Office

personnel have no ability to alter the files. (Id. at #333, 336). Thus, in light of this record

evidence, Rexroad’s trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the matter was “known at

the time of trial and could have been raised on direct appeal based solely on the trial record.”

Dempsey, 2000 WL 777003, at *7.

4 The four-part test for determining whether a state procedural rule precludes a habeas claim

articulated in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986), is met here. That test

requires the Court to ask whether (1) Rexroad failed to comply with Ohio’s res judicata

doctrine, (2) Ohio courts enforce that doctrine, (3) res judicata is an adequate and

independent state ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim, and

(4) Rexroad can show cause and prejudice excusing the default. Id.; Gerth, 938 F.3d at 829.

Rexroad failed to comply with Ohio’s res judicata doctrine by declining to raise his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in his initial state appeal. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, No. 05-ca-

9, 2006 WL 648352, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2006) (citations omitted) (“If a petitioner

fails to bring a first appeal as of right, he cannot raise in a postconviction relief petition issues

that should have been raised in that appeal.”); (Doc. 12, #183 (noting that Rexroad failed to

raise the issue in his initial appeal)). The Sixth Circuit has categorically held that Ohio courts

enforce Ohio’s res judicata doctrine. Gerth, 938 F.3d at 830 (citations omitted). As already

noted, res judicata is an adequate and independent state ground to bar habeas relief. Id. And

Rexroad identifies no reason why he could not have raised the ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claim in his appeal of right.

performance. 446 U.S. at 350. Cronic held that, outside a few narrow circumstances—

namely, (1) a complete denial of counsel, (2) a complete failure “to subject the

prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” or (3) other circumstances so

likely to prejudice the defendant that even competent counsel could not provide

effective assistance—the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. 466

U.S. at 658–59. And Mickens held that a trial court’s failure to inquire into a potential

conflict of interest, even when it knew or should have known about the conflict, does

not necessitate reversal; rather, the defendant must still demonstrate that an actual

conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance. 535 U.S. at 170–73. None

of these authorities help Rexroad’s argument here. Multiple representation is not at

issue. And Rexroad has not shown a conflict of interest, meaning he cannot

demonstrate an adverse effect from such a conflict. Thus, on de novo review,

Rexroad’s second objection fails, too.

In sum, evaluating Rexroad’s first argument under a clear error standard, and

his second argument de novo, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

Rexroad’s habeas petition fails.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 19) in its entirety.

The Court OVERRULES Rexroad’s Motion to Amend Evidence (Doc. 24) and

DISMISSES this matter WITH PREJUDICE. Consistent with that, the Court

DIRECTS the Clerk to TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s docket.

SO ORDERED.

February 3, 2026 ;

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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