Emerick, C. v. Erie Insurance Exchange

J-A26017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CHRISTOPHER EMERICK ON BEHALF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

OF HIMSELF AND AS EXECUTOR OF : PENNSYLVANIA

THE ESTATE OF JANET EMERICK :

:

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

: No. 88 WDA 2025

:

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 17, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at

No(s): GD-19-15291

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: February 27, 2026

Appellant, Christopher Emerick on behalf of himself and as executor of

the Estate of Janet Emerick, appeals from the December 17, 2024 judgment

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County upon a jury verdict

in favor of Appellant and against Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie Insurance”).

Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

Janet Emerick was the owner and resident of a home located [] in

Economy Borough, Beaver County, [Pennsylvania,] when the

home and a separate storage structure nearby were struck by a

windstorm during the night of November 17, 2018. The home was

constructed in the year 1849 and[, at the time of the windstorm,]

had its original, decorative slate roof. The morning after the

windstorm, Linda Emerick (Janet Emerick’s daughter-in-law)

noticed that numerous tree branches had apparently been blown

down. One branch penetrated the roof of the separate storage

structure, which was referred to as the “spring house.” Another

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large branch was hanging from the roof of the home where Linda

Emerick resided with Janet Emerick. [Appellant] (Janet Emerick’s

grandson and Linda Emerick’s nephew) had been responsible for

maintaining the property, and Janet [Emerick] telephoned him

and asked for help removing the tree limb from the roof of her

home. [Appellant] was in Michigan on a work assignment when

Janet [Emerick] spoke to him over the telephone about the tree

limb on the roof. On November 19, 2018[,] Linda [Emerick] found

there was water leaking into the home from the ceiling of its third

floor/attic[. ]Janet [Emerick] telephoned her homeowners

insurance company, Erie Insurance[,] and notified it that her

home had been damaged by the November 17, 2018 windstorm.

Two or three days after his grandmother telephoned him asking

for assistance, [Appellant] went to her home. He observed a tree

branch hanging off the roof that was 16 to 18 inches in diameter

at its base and 25 to 30 feet long. He placed a ladder near the

tree branch and was able to get it to drop from the roof to the

ground without injuring himself. [Appellant] believes the tree

branch weighed at least 150 pounds. Janet [Emerick made]

[Appellant] a joint owner of the property [in] 2019.

Erie Insurance [] adjuster Jason Watkins [(“Mr. Watkins”)] went

to the Economy Borough property on November 25, 2018. He

viewed and photographed the damage to the home and the spring

house, using a drone to photograph the home’s roof from above.

Mr. Watkins issued an estimate of $5,020.50 in damages[,] and

[based upon the estimate, Erie Insurance sent] a $4,520.50 check

[made payable] to Janet [Emerick], reduced by the insurance

policy’s $500[.00] deductible. Mr. Watkins’ estimate allocated

$1,726.56 towards the repair of the damage to the home’s

decorative slate roof. Believing repair of the damage to her home

would cost more than $5,020.50, Janet [Emerick] hired public

adjuster Brian Pfister [(“Mr. Pfister”)] to represent her for a fee of

20 percent of any additional payments made by [Erie Insurance].

See 63 P.S. [§]§ 1601-1607 and Pennsylvania’s Insurance

Department regulation at 31 PA. CODE § 115.2 that allows public

adjuster compensation to be “expressed as a percentage of any

payments to be received on the negotiated claim."

On January 11, 2019[,] Mr. Pfister [sent Erie Insurance] an

estimate[, via electronic mail, that] he prepared in the total

amount of $121,598.77 to repair the home and the spring house.

On January 24, 2019[,] Mr. Pfister, Erie [Insurance] adjuster

Michele Buck [(“Ms. Buck”)] and Joshua Hunt [(“Mr. Hunt”)], a

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professional, structural engineer hired by Erie [Insurance], met at

[the] property. They inspected the interior of the home and the

interior and exterior of the spring house, but the inspection of the

roof [on] the home by Mr. Hunt was postponed due to an

accumulation of snow on [the roof. Eighteen] days later[,] Erie

[Insurance] sent Janet [Emerick], care of Mr. Pfister, a revised

estimate [along] with a check for an additional [payment of]

$7,751.75. With the $4,520.50 check sent in November [] 2018,

this brought the total amount Erie [Insurance] paid on the claim

to $12,272.25. On April 2, 2019[,] Mr. Hunt returned to [the]

property to inspect the roof. Thereafter, Mr. Pfister, on behalf of

Janet [Emerick], and Erie [Insurance] were unable to reach an

agreement on the amount of the damages to the home and the

spring house. There were two primary areas of disagreement.

First, Erie [Insurance] believed the slate roof of the home could

be repaired by replacing [four] missing pieces of slate, while Mr.

Pfister and Janet [Emerick] believed Erie [Insurance] was

obligated to pay the replacement cost for the home’s entire slate

roof. Second, Erie [Insurance] believed the only repair required

for the spring house was replacement of the non[-]slate roof,

while Mr. Pfister and Janet [Emerick] believed Erie [Insurance]

was obligated to pay for demolition of the entire spring house

together with construction of its replacement.

[Appellant commenced an action against Erie Insurance by filing

a praecipe for writ of summons on October 31, 2019. Ultimately,

Appellant filed an amended complaint, on April 30, 2020, raising

claims for breach of contract and bad faith, pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 8371.] In January [2020,] Janet Emerick and

[Appellant] had the entire slate roof of the home replaced by

asphalt shingles for the price of $19,380[.00]. A suggestion of

the death of Janet Emerick was filed in November [] 2021. Before

the trial [on] the breach of contract claim began, [Appellant]

argued a motion in limine to preclude [Erie Insurance] from

presenting evidence of [the insurance policy’s] functional

replacement cost loss settlement endorsement. [Appellant]

believed [Erie Insurance] could not assert a provision in its

homeowners insurance policy relative to the slate roof of the home

that allowed [Erie Insurance] to limit payment to “the amount

which it would cost to repair or replace the damaged building with

less costly common construction materials and methods which are

functionally equal to obsolete, antique or custom construction

materials and methods used in the original construction of the

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building.” [The trial court] denied [the] motion [on January 25,

2024].

[A trial on Appellant’s breach of contract claim commenced on

January 17, 2024.] The jury had a difficult time reaching a

verdict. The jury submitted approximately [twelve] written

questions to [the trial court] while deliberating for approximately

[nine] hours over the course of [two] days. [The trial court] then

submitted to the jury, without objection from counsel, the written

question of whether the jurors believed they were hopelessly

deadlocked. After receiving a response that [ten] jurors were

willing to keep talking but several said they will not change their

minds, [the trial] charged the jury on the consequences of them

being hopelessly deadlocked. Shortly afterward the jury rendered

a verdict[, on January 24, 2024, in favor of [Appellant and

awarded damages] in the amount of $19,380[.00].

[Appellant] promptly filed a motion for post-trial relief [that

sought] a new trial as to damages only[. The trial court] denied

[the motion on May 20, 2024.]

Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 1-5 (ellipsis omitted; formatting modified).

Judgment was entered in favor of Appellant and against Erie Insurance on

December 17, 2024. The judgment was in the amount of $19,380.00 plus an

award of interest to be calculated starting on January 14, 2020, and the costs

of litigation in the amount of $2,544.75. This appeal followed.1

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err by failing to grant a new trial for damages

after it permitted [Erie Insurance] to submit evidence of a

functional replacement cost loss settlement endorsement and

argue to the jury that [it] should only award [Appellant] the cost

of an asphalt roof as opposed to a slate roof?

____________________________________________

1 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925.

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Appellant’s Brief at 6 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the denial of his request for a new

trial based upon an allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling. Id. at 13-25.

Specifically, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion

in limine to preclude Erie Insurance from presenting evidence of the insurance

policy’s functional replacement cost loss settlement endorsement. Id.

Our standard of review when faced with an appeal from the trial

court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is whether the trial court

clearly and palpably committed an error of law that controlled the

outcome of the case or constituted an abuse of discretion. In

examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

winner, to reverse the trial court, we must conclude that the

verdict would change if another trial were granted. Further, if the

basis of the request for a new trial is the trial court’s rulings on

evidence, then such rulings must be shown to have been not only

erroneous but also harmful to the complaining parties.

Evidentiary rulings which did not affect the verdict will not provide

a basis for disturbing the jury’s judgment.

Moreover, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the

sound discretion of the trial court. In reviewing a challenge to the

admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial

court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed

an error of law.

Heffelfinger v. Shen, 342 A.3d 711, 720 (Pa. Super. 2025) (brackets and

ellipsis omitted), quoting Blumer v. Ford Motor Co., 20 A.3d 1222, 1226

(Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012).

A motion in limine is used before trial to obtain a ruling on the

admissibility of evidence. It gives the trial [court] the opportunity

to weigh potentially prejudicial and harmful evidence before the

trial occurs, thus preventing the evidence from ever reaching the

jury. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is

subject to an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.

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Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d 682, 690 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and

quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 123 A.3d 331 (Pa. 2015), cert.

denied, 577 U.S. 1008 (2015); see also Ruff v. York Hosp., 257 A.3d 43,

58 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating, “[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a

motion in limine, this Court applies an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard

of review), appeal denied, 266 A.3d 1064 (Pa. 2021). “An abuse of discretion

may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a

different conclusion, but requires a manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly

erroneous.” Parr, 109 A.3d at 690 (citation omitted).

In his motion in limine, Appellant asserted that Erie Insurance should be

precluded from introducing evidence of the functional replacement cost loss

settlement endorsement because (1) Erie Insurance never invoked the

endorsement in their denial of Appellant’s claim, as is required by Section

146.7 of Title 31 of the Pennsylvania Code, and (2) the endorsement “only

applies where the damage involves ‘obsolete, antique or custom construction

materials’ and the intended replacement is the functional equivalent.”

Appellant’s Motion In Limine, 1/10/24, at ¶¶8-9. Appellant argued that Erie

Insurance’s initial payment of $1,726.56 to repair the four slate tiles on the

roof evidences its concession that the roof was not obsolete, antique or

custom. Id. at ¶10; see also N.T., 1/18/24, at 54 (arguing that Erie

Insurance’s payment of insurance funds to repair the slate roof and its

assertion, now, that the roof is obsolete, antique or custom are contradictory);

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Appellant’s Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 2/2/24, at ¶16 (arguing that because

Erie Insurance’s “complete claims adjusting system had information relating

to [a] slate [] roof’s repair/replacement preloaded in the [software program,]

a slate roof cannot be considered [obsolete, antique or custom] as a matter

of law”). Appellant further argued that a slate roof is not obsolete, antique

or custom because “there are hundreds if not thousands of slate roofs in use

today[.]” Appellant’s Motion In Limine, 1/10/24, at ¶11; see also N.T.,

1/18/24, at 50 (stating, slate roofs are not obsolete, antique or custom

“because they are still being put on”). Erie Insurance countered that to

replace or restore Appellant’s slate roof to the equivalent of the 1849 slate

roof “would cost a lot of money and a lot of premium.” N.T., 1/18/24, at 52.

Erie Insurance also argued that when the insurance policy originated, the

functional replacement cost loss settlement endorsement was incorporated

because Janet Emerick elected not to pay the premium required to cover the

replacement of a slate roof. Id.

In denying Appellant’s motion in limine, the trial court found that the

insurance policy uses “common words,” i.e., obsolete, antique or custom, and,

therefore, was unambiguous. Id. at 55. The trial court held that whether the

slate roof was obsolete, antique or custom was a factual question to be

determined by a jury. Id. at 55 (stating, “it’s a contract, what it says and the

facts, does it fit within that factually is up to the jury, does it fit within that

provision”). As such, the trial court, in denying Appellant’s motion in limine,

held that Erie Insurance was entitled to present evidence concerning the

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endorsement to show that the insurance policy did not cover the costs to

replace the original slate roof with a new slate roof. Id. at 54-55.

“Insurance policies, like all contracts, are enforceable in accordance with

the language used[,] and the scope of their coverage may be determined by

the [trial] court as a matter of law.” Betz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 957 A.2d 1244,

1252-1253 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 995 A.2d 350 (Pa. 2010). “In

construing a contract, the intention of the parties is paramount and the [trial]

court will adopt an interpretation which under all circumstances ascribes the

most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of the parties, bearing in mind

the objects manifestly to be accomplished.” Betz, 957 A.2d at 1253 (citation

omitted).

“Policy language is not rendered ambiguous if the [trial] court can

determine its meaning without any guide other than a knowledge of the simple

facts on which, from the nature of the language in general, its meaning

depends. Mere disagreement between the parties on the meaning of language

or the proper construction of contract terms does not constitute ambiguity.”

Id. at 1254 (citations, original quotation marks, and original brackets

omitted).

It has long-been recognized that “it is a necessary prerequisite to

recovery upon a policy for the insured to show a claim within the coverage

provided by the policy.” Id. at 1256, quoting Miller v. Boston Ins. Co., 218

A.2d 275, 278 (Pa. 1966). “[A] defense based on an exception or exclusion

in a policy [(such as the endorsement in the case sub judice)] is an affirmative

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one, and the burden is cast upon the [insurance company] to establish it.”

Betz, 957 A.2d at 1256.

Pursuant to the functional replacement cost loss settlement

endorsement, the “loss settlement” language of Appellant’s insurance policy

read, in pertinent part, as follows:

Dwelling and Other Structures

We will pay no more than the functional actual cash value of

the damage until the actual repair or replacement is completed.

When the repair or replacement is completed, we will pay the

additional amount you actually and necessarily spend to repair or

replace the damaged part of the property.

If the property is actually repaired or replaced, payment will not

exceed the smallest of the following amounts:

a. the amount which it would cost to repair or replace the

damaged building on the same residence premises on

a functional replacement cost basis; or

b. the actual amount spent to repair or replace the

damaged building on a functional replacement cost

basis.

Appellant’s Motion In Limine, 1/10/24, at Exhibit B (emphasis in original). The

following terms, as defined by the endorsement, were applicable to Appellant’s

insurance policy:

• “Functional actual cash value” means we will deduct for

depreciation on the amount which it would cost to repair or

replace the damaged building with less costly common

construction materials and methods which are functionally

equal to obsolete, antique or custom construction materials

and methods used in the original construction of the

building.

• “Functional replacement cost” means the amount which

it would cost to repair or replace the damaged building with

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less costly common construction materials and methods

which are functionally equal to obsolete, antique or custom

construction materials and methods used in the original

construction of the building.

Id.

Upon review, we concur with, and the record supports, the trial court’s

finding that the terms of the functional replacement cost loss settlement

endorsement are unambiguous. Because the terms of the endorsement were

unambiguous, Erie Insurance could submit evidence pertaining to the

functional replacement cost loss settlement endorsement, and the jury could

determine whether, or not, Appellant’s award should be limited to the cost of

an asphalt roof, as opposed to a slate roof, because the slate roof tiles used

in the original construction of Janet Emerick’s home and their installation

qualified as obsolete, antique or custom construction materials or methods.

Appellant, at the time he presented his motion in limine, offered no

evidence, other than his assertion that slate roofs (in general) are not

obsolete, antique or custom because they are still in use and installed today,

to show that the terms obsolete, antique or custom were subject to more than

one reasonable interpretation.2 Appellant mistakenly equates the current

practice of using slate as a roofing material with the question of whether

____________________________________________

2 A term may be found to be ambiguous “if, and only if, it is reasonably or

fairly susceptible of different constructions and is capable of being understood

in more senses than one and is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of

expression or has a double meaning.” Betz, 957 A.2d at 153 (citation and

brackets omitted).

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Appellant’s 1849 slate roof was obsolete, antique or custom. The trial court,

in denying Appellant’s motion in limine, determined that the jury could

reasonably understand the terms “obsolete,” “antique” and “custom,” and

apply those terms to the credible evidence, as determined by the jury as

ultimate fact-finder, when deciding whether, or not, the endorsement limited

Appellant’s coverage under the insurance policy. Erie Insurance was,

therefore, entitled to present evidence, at trial, that Appellant’s state roof was,

in fact, obsolete, antique or custom to show that the endorsement served as

a valid affirmative defense against coverage. As such, we discern no error of

law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion in

limine to preclude evidence of the functional replacement cost loss settlement

endorsement.3

To the extent Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his

post-trial motion on the grounds that the evidence did not support a finding

____________________________________________

3 Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s assertion that the trial court

erred in precluding evidence of the endorsement on the ground that Erie

Insurance failed to reference the endorsement when it denied Appellant’s

claim. Section 146.7 of Title 31 of the Pennsylvania Code requires the insurer

to specifically reference the insurance policy provision, condition, or exclusion

the insurer is relying on to deny the claim. 31 PA. CODE § 146.7(a)(1). Here,

the trial court concluded, and the record supports, that Erie Insurance did not

deny Appellant’s claim. Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 9 (stating, “Erie

[Insurance] did not deny the roof claim. It paid Janet Emerick $1,726.56 for

the roof claim, and then there was a disagreement on the scope of the repairs

[] but not a denial.”) Rather, Erie Insurance determined that Appellant was

able to recover under the insurance policy but was not entitled to recover the

full sum he believed he was entitled to receive.

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that the slate roof was “custom” and that the asphalt roof installed by

Appellant was the functional equivalent of the original slate roof, we find this

claim raises a challenge to the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief

at 17 (arguing that the trial court’s determination that the decorative slate

tiles used in Appellant’s roof were custom was legal error).

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the trial court’s

exercise of discretion, not the underlying question whether[, or

not,] the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The

fact[-]finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses[. ]In determining

whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to

whether the trial [court’s] discretion was properly exercised, and

relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record

disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. Thus, the trial court's

denial of a motion for a new trial based on a [weight of the

evidence] claim is the least assailable of its rulings.

Getting v. Mark Sales & Leasing, Inc., 274 A.3d 1251, 1260 (Pa. Super.

2022) (citation omitted).

Appellant asserts that because Mr. Pfister was able to prepare an

estimate for the replacement of the slate roof via a claims program used by

an insurance company other than Erie Insurance, this demonstrated that a

slate roof is not obsolete, antique or custom. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20.

Appellant also contends that Mr. Pfister, through his testimony, established

that slate roofs and asphalt roofs are not functional equivalents. Id. at 19.

In denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial limited to damages, the

trial court explained,

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[Appellant] also argues the function[al] replacement cost [loss

settlement] endorsement should not have been introduced

because the home’s slate roof is not within the endorsement’s

“obsolete, antique or custom construction materials and methods

used in the original construction of the building” description.

However, Erie [Insurance] adjuster Michele Buck credibly testified

that the home’s slate roof is a custom feature. It is not solely the

slate material that makes the [] home’s roof fit within the

endorsement as custom. It also is the decorative nature of the

roof, with the upper and lower portions displaying rectangular tiles

while the middle portion displays elegant, curved tiles. Since the

[] roof is custom, [the trial court] did not make an error in allowing

the functional replacement cost [loss settlement] endorsement to

be introduced.

...

[Appellant also argues] that [the trial court] erroneously allowed

introduction of the functional replacement cost [loss settlement]

endorsement because an asphalt roof is not the functional

equivalent of a slate roof. [Appellant] testified during the trial [an

asphalt roof and a slate roof] are not functional equivalents

because an asphalt roof lasts for approximately 25 years while a

slate roof lasts from 50 to 250 years. [The trial court] would agree

if it were a new slate roof being replaced. Because construction

of the [home’s] slate roof dates to 1849[,] and all witnesses at

the trial agreed it was close to the end of its useful life, a new

asphalt roof that will last 25 more years[,] in fact[,] is the

functional equivalent of [Appellant’s] slate roof. Therefore, the

new asphalt roof is the functional equivalent of [Appellant’s] slate

roof, and [the trial court] made no error.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/25, at 10-12 (record citations omitted).

It is well-established that it is the function of a jury to pass on the

credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be accorded the

evidence presented. At trial, Ms. Buck, an Erie Insurance property specialist,

testified that “slate is definitely not an ordinary material used today. It would

be something you’d have to absolutely custom request from a builder, and it

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would be considered an antique method of doing a roof.” N.T., 1/22/24, at

418. Ms. Buck considered slate roofs to be antique or custom but not obsolete

because a slate roof is still available as a roofing method. Id. at 422-423. In

addition, as the trial court observed, the home’s slate roof had a custom

feature because of the design details of certain tiles. Appellant substantially

confirmed this characterization, testifying that the slate roof was comprised

of slate tiles of different designs. N.T., 1/18/24, at 208 (stating, “That’s the

slate right there [(referring to photographs of the slate roof)], and you can

see the designs on it and everything else”); see also Erie Insurance Exhibit

D-1.

Ms. Buck explained that if a slate roof needed to be repaired, i.e., four

slate tiles needed to be replaced, Erie Insurance would cover the cost to

replace the four tiles because “[y]ou wouldn’t put three asphalt shingles on a

roof when its already slate.” N.T., 1/22/24, at 420. She further explained

that if a slate roof needed to be replaced, however, then Erie Insurance, under

the functional replacement cost loss settlement endorsement, would cover the

cost to replace the slate roof with an asphalt roof due to the antique and

custom nature of a slate roof. Id. at 423. In evaluating Appellant’s insurance

claim, Ms. Buck stated that the loss suffered was four slate tiles and that the

tiles could be repaired by replacing them with new slate tiles. Id. Mr. Hunt,

the structural engineer, further testified that, in his opinion, there were only

four slate tiles that were damaged due to the tree limb impact and that those

four tiles could be repaired. N.T., 1/23/24, at 538-539. Mr. Pfister testified

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that “[f]rom the pictures that I was able to take from the ground, it seemed

like there was an awful lot of damage. And from what I was able to see, I felt

as though the roof needed to be replaced.” N.T., 1/22/24, at 250-251.

Mr. Pfister, when asked about the condition of the slate roof, stated that

there was no question that the slate roof was 170 years old and that it was

showing signs of wear and tear. Id. at 256. When asked if the slate roof was

at the end of its useful life, Mr. Pfister agreed that “this was probably the event

that broke the camel’s back. The roof probably couldn’t take – well, it just

couldn’t take anymore.” Appellant testified that in his opinion, a slate roof

would last between 50 and 250 years, while an asphalt roof could last about

25 years. N.T., 1/18/24, at 208.

In denying Appellant’s post-trial motion requesting a new trial solely on

damages, the trial court considered the jury’s credibility determines in light of

the evidence presented at trial. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred

because Mr. Pfister was able to generate an estimate for the replacement of

the roof using slate tiles and because Mr. Pfister believed that an asphalt roof

was not the functional equivalent of a slate roof. Appellant’s argument invites

this Court to do nothing more than reassess witness credibility and reweigh

the evidence in an attempt to convince us to alter the result reached by the

jury. The trial court considered the jury’s verdict to be in alignment with the

evidence presented at trial, namely that the slate roof was custom due to its

special design of slate tiles and that an asphalt roof was the functional

equivalent of the slate roof, which was at or near the end of its useful life. We

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decline Appellant’s invitation to alter these assessments since the jury, while

passing on the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence, was free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229

A.3d 662, 634 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d, 263 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied,

142 S.Ct. 1679 (2022). Moreover, we discern no abuse of discretion or error

of law in the trial court’s determination that the jury’s verdict was supported

by the evidence and that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial as to

damages.

Judgment affirmed.

DATE: 02/27/2026

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