Singh

PEARSON, J. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SAMANPREET SINGH, )

) CASE NO. 3:26-CV-133

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

)

FREDRICK W. STEVENS, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

) ORDER

Respondents. ) [Resolving ECF No. 1 and ECF No. 10]

Pending before the Court is Samanpreet Singh’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. The matter is fully briefed. Resp. Response Br., ECF

No. 8; Pet. Traverse Br., ECF No. 9. Being duly advised, having reviewed the parties’ briefs and

the applicable law, the petition for habeas relief under § 2241 (ECF No. 1) is granted.

Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 10) is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”),

“unaccompanied alien child[ren]” arriving in the United States are so designated and placed in

the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), Office of Refugee

Resettlement (“ORR”). 6 U.S.C. § 279(a)–(b)(1)(A), (g)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3). “The

detention of unaccompanied alien children is governed by the TVPRA, which does not mandate

detention.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO (HC), No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-

SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2686866, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §

1232(d)(2)(A)–(B)). Instead, unaccompanied minors “shall be promptly placed in the least

restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). After

considering any danger the minor poses to themselves or the community, ORR may place them

in an Unaccompanied Refugee Minor program or with suitable family members. Id. If detained,

a monthly detention review is required. Id.

When such individuals “age out” of ORR custody (i.e., reach the age of 18), they are

transferred to Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). Under § 1232(c)(2)(B):

If a minor . . . reaches 18 years of age and is transferred to the

custody of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary shall

consider placement in the least restrictive setting available after

taking into account the alien’s danger to self, danger to the

community, and risk of flight. Such aliens shall be eligible to

participate in alternative to detention programs, utilizing a

continuum of alternatives based on the alien’s need for supervision,

which may include placement of the alien with an individual or an

organizational sponsor, or in a supervised group home.

8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, persons who have aged out are afforded certain

protections upon their transfer to ICE custody. Garcia Ramierz v. U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 18-508 (RC) 2025 WL 3563183, at * 2 (D.D.C.

Dec. 12, 2025). Those protections require all persons who have aged out to be considered for

placement in the least restrictive setting. Lopez v. Sessions, No. 18 Civ. 4189 (RWS), 2018 WL

2932726, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (holding that individuals who age out while on

physical release but in legal custody of HHS are entitled to TVPRA protections); F.S.S.M. v.

Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01518-TLN-AC, Slip Op., 2025, WL 3526671, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9,

2025) (holding that the petitioner who aged out was subject to the TVPRA, not § 1225(b)(2)).

B. Factual Background

Petitioner Samanpreet Singh is a 24-year-old Indian national who fled India due to

alleged persecution, physical violence, and death threats made against him and his family

relating to their political affiliations. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 2, 23. When Petitioner entered the United

States, on or about November 3, 2018, he was 17 years old. DHS apprehended him shortly

thereafter and placed him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, but did not identify

him as an “arriving alien.” ECF No. 1, ⁋ 24; ECF No. 1-3. He was released by ORR on

February 8, 2019, “pursuant to section 462 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and section

235 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,”

into the care of an unrelated sponsor, Paramjit Singh, in Queens Village, New York. ECF No. 1-

1.

Four years later, on February 17, 2023, the immigration court gave notice that

Petitioner’s case was being taken off the calendar because he was: “eligible to seek asylum

before USCIS in the first instance (e.g., pursuant to the [TVPRA]).” ECF No. 1-2. ICE arrested

Petitioner on December 15, 2025, and he is currently detained in the Seneca County Jail. ECF

No. 1, ⁋ 26. Petitioner has no criminal history and has an asylum application pending with U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). ECF No. 1, ⁋ 27. A master calendar hearing

has been scheduled for February 25, 2026. See ECF No. 11 at PageID ##: 99–100.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

The Government begins, as it has in numerous prior habeas challenges from noncitizens

in ICE custody, by insisting the Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and

(g). ECF No. 8 at PageID ##: 57–59. As the Court (and many other courts around the country)

has articulated, the Government is mistaken.

First, the Government misapprehends § 1252(g) to bar judicial review of “any cause or

claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action . . . to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” ECF No. 8 at

PageID #: 57 (original emphasis). The Supreme Court “rejected as implausible” any claim that §

1252(g) bars judicial review over “all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” Dep’t of

Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020). Section 1252(g) applies only

to the three categories enumerated therein: the commencement, adjudication, and execution of

removal orders. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).

Claims that do not seek “review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the

process by which removability will be determined” are not barred by § 1252(g). Regents of

Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. at 19; see Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018) (A

“district court’s jurisdiction over the detention-based claims is independent of its jurisdiction

over the removal-based claims.”). Accordingly, detention-based challenges—as in the case at

bar—which do not require the Court to address the merits of a removal order are not barred by §

1252(g). Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597, 605 (6th Cir. 2010).

Respondents’ § 1252(b)(9) argument is equally unavailing. Under that provision,

“[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of

constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to

remove an alien . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order.” 8 U.S.C. §

1252(b)(9). The question of whether statutory provisions require detention without a hearing

does not “arise from” actions taken to remove noncitizens. Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25-CV-

10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.

281, 292–93 (2018)). Neither does § 1252(b)(9) strip courts of jurisdiction to determine whether

agencies comply with federal law and their own regulations. Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721,

728–29 (2d Cir. 2015); Musunuru v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 880, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2016); Kurapati v.

U.S. Bur. of Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 775 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014); Abdelwahab

v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2009).

Respondents attempt to frame Petitioner’s claims as merely “repackaging” his removal

challenge under the guise of a detention-specific claim. In support of this argument,

Respondents point to a recent Third Circuit decision, Khalil v. President, United States, 164

F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026), insisting that Petitioner’s detention-claims arise from his removal

proceedings. Respondents’ reliance on Khalil is misplaced.

The petitioner in Khalil was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, and an

outspoken advocate for Palestinian human rights. Id. at 266. The United States Secretary of

State determined that Khalil was removable for foreign policy reasons under the INA, prompting

DHS to detain him and initiate removal proceedings. Id. Khalil challenged the lawfulness of his

removal, claiming First Amendment retaliation, violations of the INA, the Administrative

Procedure Act, and the Accardi doctrine. Id. at 276. In assessing his detention-based challenges,

the Third Circuit concluded that § 1252(b)(9) stripped the district court of subject matter

jurisdiction because Khalil’s detention challenge was “inextricably linked to” his removal

challenges. Id. at 274. In other words, in ruling on Khalil’s detention claims, the court was

asked to determine the lawfulness of removal, an “issue decided through the [petition-for-

review] process.” Id. at 276.

That is not this case. Petitioner’s challenge is “wholly collateral to the removal process,”

see id. at 274, relating specifically to the lawfulness of his detention under § 1225 without an

individualized assessment as required under TVPRA. ECF No 1, ⁋ 42. In ruling on whether

Petitioner’s detention is lawfully detained, the Court does not disturb DHS’s discretion to

initiate, commence, or execute remove proceedings against Petitioner pursuant to § 1229a. Other

courts have similarly distinguished Khalil, holding that the petitioners’ detention-specific claims

are not “inextricably linked” to removal proceedings because they address the lawfulness of

detention, not removal proceedings. See, e.g., Coronel-Hernandez v. Woosley, No. 4:26-cv-20-

DJH, 2026 WL 227011, at * 2–3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 28, 2026) (distinguishing Khalil because

petitioner only challenged ICE’s authority to detain her without a bond hearing, not ICE’s

decision to initiate removal proceedings); Cervantes-Garcia v. Bondi, No. 1:26-cv-98-RP, 2026

WL 196519, at *3 n. 5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026) (“[L]ike the cases the Third Circuit specifically

distinguished, the question here is detention-specific: only whether, as a matter of law, Petitioner

falls under the mandatory detention authority of § 1225 while his removal proceedings are

ongoing.”).

Because Petitioner’s claims relate to the lawfulness of his detention under § 1225 and his

rights to a bond hearing or an individualized assessment under TVPRA, the Court’s jurisdiction

is not barred by § 1252(b)(9) or (g).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondents next argue that the Court should exercise its discretion to require Petitioner

to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF No. 8 at PageID ##: 60–61. The Government

acknowledges that there is no statutory exhaustion requirement, rendering exhaustion prudential

and within the Court’s sound discretion. See, e.g., Echavaria Morales v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-

2691, 2026 WL 100583, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026) (Pearson, J.) (citing McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). Although “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a

standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies,” see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,

797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2025), appeal pending No. 25-1965 (6th Cir.), the Court

and other district courts within the Sixth Circuit have utilized the Ninth Circuit’s three-factor test

(see United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983)) to require

exhaustion when:

(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

generate a proper record and reach a proper decision;

(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate

bypass of the administrative scheme; and

(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its

own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.

Echavaria Morales, 2026 WL 100583, at *2 (collecting cases).

All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. First, the issues raised in the habeas petition

are pure legal questions and do not require an administrative record be developed. Second,

because Petitioner’s habeas petition includes, inter alia, a due process claim, the administrative

scheme (i.e. appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)) is likely futile. Finally,

administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies

in this case. As such, requiring Petitioner to go through the administrative process would be

fruitless and a waste of time.

Even if these factors weighed in favor of requiring administrative exhaustion, the Court

may still waive administrative exhaustion “when the interests of the individual weigh heavily

against requiring administrative exhaustion, or exhaustion would be futile and unable to afford

the petitioner the relief he seeks,” or when “delay means hardship.” Lopez-Campos, 797 F.

Supp. 3d. at 778–79.

In this case, exhausting administrative remedies would be futile. “Waiver based on

futility is appropriate when an administrative agency ‘has predetermined the disputed issue’ by

having a ‘clearly stated position’ that the petitioner is not eligible for the relief sought.”

Contreras-Lomeli v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12826, 2025 WL 2976739, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21,

2025) (quoting Cooper v. Zych, No. 09-CV-11620, 2009 WL 2711957, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug.

25, 2009)); see Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083, 1093 (6th Cir. 1981) (recognizing

that administrative exhaustion may be excused if it would be futile). The Government’s position

regarding mandatory detention and bond hearings under § 1225 and § 1226 is clearly articulated

in two recent BIA decisions: Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) (holding

that an immigration judge “lack[s] authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who

are present in the United States without admission”) and Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66, 69

(BIA 2025) (holding that “an applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a

warrant while arriving in the United States . . . is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond

under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”). Both BIA opinions are binding on the agency and immigration

courts, and which conclusively reject Petitioner’s arguments in this case.

The Government concedes that Petitioner’s likelihood of success on any administrative

remedies is slight but nevertheless demands he be required to exhaust remedies because his case

“might well prove to be one in which the agency changes or refines its policy.” ECF No. 8 at

PageID #: 61 (quoting Amaya-Velis v. Raycraft, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 4:26-cv-73, 2026 WL

100596, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026) (Calabrese, J.). This argument is as unpersuasive as

it is disingenuous. First, Respondents have not provided any evidence demonstrating even a

remote possibility that the agency is or will change course concerning mandatory detention in

this case. ECF No. 8. Second, and in any event, Petitioner’s detention-specific claims raise

constitutional due process violations, over which the BIA lacks authority. Contreras-Cervantes

v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-13073, 2025 WL 2952796, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (citing

Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006); accord Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d

487, 494 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required in cases of

non-frivolous constitutional challenges to an agency’s procedures.”) (citation omitted)).

Therefore, exhaustion in this case would be futile.

Furthermore, Respondents’ argument ignores the relief sought: release from unlawful

detention; an individualized assessment required under TVPRA; or, alternatively, a bond hearing

under § 1226. Indeed, requiring Petitioner to remain in detention during both the immigration

court proceeding, which has yet to occur (ECF No. 11 at PageID ##: 99–100), and the BIA

appeal process, which can take six months or more to complete, see Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp.

3d at 779, “‘would result in the very harm the bond hearing was designed to prevent,’ that is,

prolonged detention without due process.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025

WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (quoting Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp.

3d 227, 237 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)). Finally, requiring Petitioner to remain in custody while

exhausting administrative remedies would subject him to undue hardship. See Lopez-Campos,

797 F. Supp. 3d at 779 (“When the liberty of a person is at stake, every day that passes is a

critical one.”); Contreras-Lomeli, 2025 WL 2976739, at * 3 (“Forcing Petitioner to endure six

months or more of potentially unlawful detention would thus cause him great hardship.”).

Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is waived.

C. Mandatory Detention Requirements

At issue in this case is whether Petitioner is correctly subject to mandatory detention

under § 1225(b). For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner’s detention is not governed by §

1225(b) but, rather, § 1232(c)(2)(B).

The analysis begins with the statutory framework. Section 1225 applies to “applicants

for admission,” defined as any “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or

who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). This provision mandates detention of

two categories of noncitizens: (1) noncitizens arriving in the United States who indicate (a) an

intention to apply for asylum, or (b) a fear of prosecution (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) and

(B)(ii)); and (2) noncitizens seeking admission who are not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled

to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Respondents assert that all noncitizens not admitted

or paroled into the country are “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1) and, therefore, fall

under § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision.

The Court previously joined the growing nationwide consensus rejecting Respondents’

interpretation, holding that it ignores—and renders superfluous—other detention schemes within

the INA, such as § 1226(c), which provides exceptions to discretionary detention under §

1226(a) that affords noncitizens (who are already in the country and subject to removal

proceedings) bond hearings. See, e.g., Echavaria Morales, 2026 WL 100583, at *3–5; Morales

Chavez v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., No. 4:25CV2061, 2025 WL 3187080, at *7, n. 6 (N.D. Ohio

Nov. 14, 2025) (Lioi, C.J.) (collecting cases); see also Guzman Cardenas v. Almodovar, No. 25-

CV-9169 (JMF), 2025 WL 3215573, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025) (citing Morales Chavez,

supra). Unless and until the Sixth Circuit holds otherwise, the Court has no reason to depart

from its previous statutory analysis regarding § 1225(b)’s application to all noncitizens without

legal status.

Next, the Court must determine whether Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 or

some other detention scheme. Petitioner’s primary argument is that he is not subject to the

mandatory detention under § 1225(b) because, as a person who has aged out under the TVPRA,

he is subject to the detention scheme set forth in § 1232(c)(2)(B). ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 25, 72–73.

Respondents failed to address Petitioner’s arguments concerning the TVPRA (see ECF No. 8)

and, accordingly, any challenge is waived. See Amezola-Garcia v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 135, 140 n.1

(6th Cir. 2016) (holding that arguments not raised in an opening brief are waived); Huerta v.

Garland, No. 23-3361, 2024 WL 2142068, at *3 n. 4 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024) (same).

Nevertheless, the Court must assess whether Petitioner’s argument holds water; and finds that it

does, for two primary reasons.

First, Petitioner cannot be subject to both § 1225(b) detention and the protections

afforded under § 1232(c)(2)(B) because the two provisions are mutually exclusive. F.S.S.M. v.

Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01518-TLN-AC, 2025 WL 3526671, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025);

Sandoval v. Rokosky, No. 25-17229 (SDW), 2025 WL 3204746, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2025);

see Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[A] noncitizen cannot

be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under §

1226.”).

The plain text of the two statutes makes their conflict clear. Under § 1232(c)(2)(B), DHS

is required to: (1) make an individualized assessment for all persons who have aged out,

including Petitioner, to determine whether they pose a flight risk or a danger to themselves or

others; (2) consider alternatives to detention; and (3) place those persons, including Petitioner, in

the least restrictive setting. Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183, at *9. In contrast, § 1225(b)

provides a limited exception to mandatory detention as prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A),

that is, parole for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. F.S.S.M., 2025 WL

3526671, at *4 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 300 (“That express exception to detention implies

that there are no other circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be

released.”) (original emphasis)); see Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th

Cir. 2007) (releasing a noncitizen on their own recognizance necessarily means that individual

was detained under § 1226 because such release is not available under § 1225.).

If, as Respondents insist, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under § 1225, then his

release could only be pursuant to those exceptions prescribed in § 1182(d)(5)A). Indeed,

Respondents admit as much in their opposition. ECF No. 8 at PageID #: 67–68. But Petitioner

was not paroled for humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. Instead, he was released

by ORR to an unrelated sponsor consistent with the TVPRA’s least restrictive placement

requirements. ECF No. 1-1. Four years later (and after Petitioner had aged out), an immigration

judge issued a “Notice of Intent to Take Case Off of the Court’s Calendar,” indicating that

Petitioner was eligible to seek asylum in the first instance under the TVPRA. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 25;

ECF No. 1-2. These facts indicate that Petitioner was initially detained and released under the

TVPRA provisions, not § 1225. It is illogical to now treat Petitioner as an “applicant for

admission” under § 1225 seven years after he entered the country under a different statutory

scheme. See Salvador v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-07946-MRA-MAA, 2025 WL 2995055, at *7 (C.D.

Cal. Sept. 2, 2025) (“[W]hen Petitioner crossed the border and was apprehended, the government

did not classify him as an applicant for admission subject to expedited removal. That Petitioner

should now—approximately four years after entering the country and being released by ORR—

be treated as an ‘applicant for admission’ defies logic.”).

Second, the Government’s decision to release Petitioner pursuant to the TVPRA seven

years ago “created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his liberty under

the TVPRA’s protection.” F.S.S.M., 2025 WL 3526671, at * 5. Similar reasoning has been

applied to individuals released under § 1226; once removal proceedings are initiated under §

1226(a), the government cannot change course and subject individuals to § 1225’s mandatory

detention. See Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 486 (holding that the government cannot rely

on § 1225 to deny a bond hearing to a petitioner initially released under § 1226); Martinez v.

Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 215 (D. Mass. 2025) (same). Nearly every court that has reviewed

DHS’s attempt to apply § 1225(b) post-hoc has rebuked the agency, see, e.g., Sandoval v.

Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12987, 2025 WL 2977517, at *8 n.8 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025)

(collecting cases), holding instead that “[a]n agency must defend its actions based on the reasons

it gave when it acted.” Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. at 24); Quinteros Cornejo

v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-02062 JLT HBK, 2026 WL 237748, at * 7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026)

(holding that the petitioner was released into the interior under the TVPRA, “suggesting §

1225(b)(2) is unlawful as applied to him.”).

Petitioner was initially detained and released by ORR consistent with the TVPRA.

Accordingly, he remains protected under § 1232(c)(2)(B) of the TVPRA and is not an “applicant

for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

D. Due Process

Petitioner’s procedural due process claims are assessed in two steps: first, whether he has

a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause; and second, what procedures are

necessary to ensure deprivation of his interests are constitutional. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections

v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Each

step is considered in turn.

1. Petitioner’s Liberty Interest

Under the Due Process Clause, the Government is prohibited from depriving any person

of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. Freedom “from government

custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint [ ] lies at the heart of the liberty that

Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504

U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). These protections extend to noncitizens subject to removal proceedings.

Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025).

Citing Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020),

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s mandatory detention does not violate due process because he

was provided all the process due to him under § 1225. ECF No. 8 at PageID ##: 70–71.

Respondents’ argument is not well taken. As the Court explained in E.V. v. Raycraft,

Respondents’ reliance on Thuraissigiam is misplaced because the petitioner in that case was

detained shortly after crossing the border and never released from custody and, therefore, never

established a protected liberty interest. No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 3122837, at *10 (N.D. Ohio

Nov. 7, 2025) (Pearson, J.) (citing Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 114–15, 140). Petitioner in this

case was released from ORR custody in 2019 and has since lived in the United States in reliance

on the Government’s initial determination that he was not a flight risk or a danger to himself or

the community.

Furthermore, Respondents’ argument completely ignores the requirements of the

TVPRA, which governs Petitioner’s detention. Petitioner has an interest in, and is therefore

entitled to, a compliant decision from DHS regarding his individualized assessment and “least

restrictive placement” determination under § 1232(c). See Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183,

at *14–15. In addition, for seven years, Petitioner has been living in the United States in reliance

on the Government’s initial determination to release him under the TVPRA. See F.S.S.M., 2025

WL 3526671, at * 5. Therefore, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest to remain out of

detention pursuant to the TVPRA.

2. The Mathews Analysis

Having established Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Court applies the

balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) to determine what process is

necessary to ensure any deprivation of that liberty interest accords with the Constitution.

F.S.S.M., 2025 WL 3526671, at * 6; see Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL

3039255 at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025) (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d

848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)) (holding the Mathews balancing test applies in the context of

immigration detention). Under that test, the Court must weigh three factors: (1) the private

interests that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such

interests; and (3) the government’s interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens

additional procedures may entail. Id.; Ballestros v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-594, 2025 WL 2880831,

at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 9, 2025). All three factors demonstrate Petitioner has a right to a pre-

detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker in compliance with the TVPRA.

The first factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Freedom from detention is one of the “most

elemental of liberty interests.” Ballestros, 2025 WL 2880831, at *4 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). As discussed at length above, Petitioner has lived in the United

States and built community connections for seven years in reliance on the Government’s initial

decision to release him under the TVPRA provisions. He has, therefore, created a strong interest

in his continued liberty under the protections of the TVPRA.

The second factor—the risk of erroneous deprivation—also weighs in Petitioner’s favor

because he was re-arrested without any procedure or evidentiary findings. Lopez, 2018 WL

2932726, at *11; Garcia Domingo v. Castro, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:25-cv-00979-DHU-GJF,

2025 WL 2941217, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025). In addition to conducting the individualized

assessment required under § 1232(c)(2)(B), other district courts have required DHS to

demonstrate a change in circumstances warranting before re-detaining a person who has aged

out. See e.g., R.D.T.M., 2025 2686866, at *4–5 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (analogizing

pre-deprivation hearing requirements for individuals who age out under the TVPRA with pre-

deprivation hearing requirements for parole revocation); Quinteros Cornejo, 2026 WL 237748 at

*9 (holding that post-deprivation hearings inadequately protect the liberty interests of individuals

who age out and, instead, a hearing before the deprivation occurs is necessary); see also Lopez v.

Noem, No. 2:25-cv-1288 JB/DLM, 2026 WL 252513, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 30, 2026) (collecting

cases) (holding that due process requires a pre-deprivation bond hearing before re-detaining

noncitizens who have previously been released into the interior on bond under § 1226). The

purpose for pre-deprivation hearings is to guard against arbitrary and capricious agency action.

See Quinteros Cornejo, 2026 WL 237748, at *10 (“DHS’s failure to abide by [the TVPRA]’s

clear mandate . . . suggests that Respondents are engaging in an arbitrary and capricious

application of the regulation.”).

The Government has not offered any evidence that a TVPRA-compliant assessment was

completed, that alternatives to detention were considered, or that a pre-deprivation hearing was

afforded to Petitioner. Neither has the Government demonstrated a material change in

circumstances warrants Petitioner’s re-detention. Indeed, the record indicates the opposite.

Petitioner has a pending asylum application and is currently scheduled to appear before an

immigration judge on February 25, 2026, for a master calendar hearing. ECF No. 11 at PageID

##: 99–100. There is no indication that he is uncooperative with USCIS or has failed to appear

at any schedule hearings. In addition, Petitioner has no criminal record, demonstrating his is not

a danger to himself or others. Therefore, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high without

adequate safeguards, i.e., a TVPRA-compliant decision and a pre-deprivation hearing.

Finally, the third factor contemplates the Government’s interest, including administrative

and fiscal burdens, of providing the pre-detention hearing. The Government offers no argument

that providing Petitioner with a pre-detention hearing would be burdensome. ECF No. 8.

Nevertheless, the Court recognizes the Government’s interest in enforcing immigration policies,

including ensuring that noncitizens appear at removal proceedings. Escobar-Ruiz, 2025 WL

3039255, at *7. That does not, however, translate into an interest in detaining Petitioner without

any hearing or process. See Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 WL

2337099, at *14 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (concluding the Government failed to identify specific

justifications outweighing the individual’s constitutionally protected liberty interests.). Neither

does DHS have discretion to ignore congressional directives explicitly set forth in the statute to

provide individuals who age out with TVPRA protections. Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183,

at *8. Indeed, Respondents are squandering, rather than preserving resources, by detaining

Petitioner who was cleared to live outside of detention seven years ago and has done so without

incident.

Because the Mathews factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor, he is entitled to a bond hearing

that should have occurred before he was detained. Accordingly, Respondents violated

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights when they re-detained him without a pre-

deprivation bond hearing and his detention is, therefore, unlawful. The writ for habeas corpus is

granted and shall issue.

III. CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is granted.

It is hereby ordered that:

1. Respondents are hereby ordered to release Petitioner immediately.

2. Respondents are enjoined from subjecting Petitioner to any post-release

monitoring or supervision, including, but not limited to, GPS monitoring or travel

restrictions.

3. Respondents are enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner under § 1225(b) without

first complying with constitutional and TVPRA protections, including affording

Petitioner with a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, during which

the Government must show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight

risk or a danger to himself or the community, consistent with § 1232(c)(2)(B), such that

his physical custody is justified.

4. Respondents shall submit certification that Petitioner has been released from

custody within seven days of this Order.

Because Petitioner’s writ for habeas corpus is granted, his Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order (ECF No. 10) is denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

February 18, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge