The opinion
[Cite as In re P.A., 2026-Ohio-660.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In the matter of: [P.A.] :
[I.D.] :
No. 24AP-693
Plaintiff-Appellant, : (CP.C. No. 23JU-10526)
v.
: (REGULAR CALENDAR)
[R.A.] et al.,
Defendant-Appellees. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on February 26, 2026
On brief: Kimberly P. Jordan, for appellant. Argued:
Kimberly P. Jordan.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, I.D., appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, which dismissed
his complaint seeking custody of his half-brother, P.A.
{¶ 2} I.D. filed his complaint on October 16, 2023, and requested an order pursuant
to R.C. 3109.04 granting him legal custody of P.A., who was 17 years old at the time the
complaint was filed and had travelled to the United States from Ghana. I.D. requested that
the court make special findings that P.A. had been abandoned by and could not be reunited
with his parents and that it was not in P.A.’s best interest to return to Ghana. These findings
would permit P.A. to obtain an immigration status that is available to noncitizen children
who are found in the United States, placed in the legal custody of a legal resident or citizen
other than the child’s own parents by the state juvenile court having jurisdiction over the
case, and that juvenile court makes factual findings regarding that child’s placement and
No. 24AP-693 2
need for both custody and legal status. See generally In re A.M.A., 2023-Ohio-723 (10th
Dist.).
{¶ 3} I.D.’s complaint asserted that P.A. was born in Ghana in 2006, that his father
had died in a car accident in January 2008, that his mother was mentally ill, that she was
not caring for her son, and that P.A. was living with I.D. It also alleged that P.A. suffered
intimidation and physical violence while living in Ghana because he was bisexual, that he
feared for his life, and that he fled from Ghana to Ecuador and then traveled to the United
States in January 2023.
{¶ 4} In addition to requesting that I.D. be given custody of P.A., the complaint
requested that the court find that P.A. could not be reunified with his father or mother due
to abandonment and that it was not in P.A.’s best interest to be returned to Ghana. Along
with the complaint, I.D. filed exhibits purporting to be P.A.’s birth certificate and the death
certificate for P.A.’s father.
{¶ 5} P.A.’s mother was served by publication. But it appears from the record that
the juvenile court was concerned with P.A.’s paternity, and on December 12, 2023, the
juvenile court magistrate granted a continuance at I.D.’s request to perfect service on a
“John Doe” defendant. That defendant was served by publication later in December 2023,
and the magistrate scheduled a hearing on the case for February 12, 2024.
{¶ 6} Still, the complaint was unanswered and uncontested, and I.D. was the only
witness who appeared and testified at the February 2024 hearing. I.D. testified that P.A.
was his half-brother, explaining that they shared the same mother but had different fathers.
I.D. testified that P.A.’s father had died in 2008, and identified a copy of his death
certificate. I.D. also stated that their mother had disowned P.A. about one year earlier
because of religious objections to his sexual orientation, and that she had not attempted to
contact either I.D. or P.A. during the prior 90 days.
{¶ 7} I.D. further stated that while living in Ghana, P.A. and his male romantic
partner were attacked and beaten by members of the community where they lived, who also
had religious objections to their sexual orientation. He testified that P.A.’s romantic
partner was killed in the attack, that the attackers believed P.A. to be dead because he
fainted, and that other individuals transported P.A. to a hospital where he was treated. I.D.
testified that P.A. fled from Ghana after leaving the hospital, first traveling to Ecuador, then
No. 24AP-693 3
through Mexico and entering the United States. All this testimony was admitted without
objection and these facts are not contested.
{¶ 8} I.D. stated that P.A. had lived in his home for approximately a year, together
with I.D.’s wife and daughter, and a minor cousin over whom I.D. had been granted
custody. P.A. attended high school and aspired to join the military after graduation. I.D.
testified he and his wife planned to care for P.A., and that he sought to be awarded custody
of P.A. so that he could ensure P.A.’s care.
{¶ 9} I.D. further testified that he believed it would not be in P.A.’s best interest to
be returned to Ghana and that P.A.’s life would be in danger if he returned. I.D. stated that
their mother would not protect P.A. from members of the community who wished to harm
him because she shared the same religious objections to P.A.’s sexual orientation.
Accordingly, I.D. requested the court to issue findings that would allow P.A. to apply for
“Special Immigrant Juvenile” (“SIJ”) status, allowing him to apply to legally remain in the
United States.
{¶ 10} Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), SIJ status can be only granted to “an
immigrant who is present in the United States”
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located
in the United States or whom such a court has legally
committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or
department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a
State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose
reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis
found under State law;
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or
judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best
interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). This court has decided several cases regarding the factfinding
required to seek SIJ status, and we do not believe that it requires a particularly searching
factual or legal inquiry on the part of trial courts. See, e.g., In re A.M.A., 2023-Ohio-723,
¶ 4-5 (10th Dist.) (quoting federal statute and attorney’s transcript argument to trial court),
and Vargas Pelaez v. Martinez Moreno, 2025-Ohio-5532, ¶ 9-22 (10th Dist.) (describing
in detail application of SIJ statutory scheme, finding trial court erred by not making special
No. 24AP-693 4
findings, and modifying trial court’s judgment to include requested special findings). This
is especially true where, as is true here, the facts underlying those findings are uncontested.
See In re A.M.A. at ¶ 8 (reviewing uncontested evidence and concluding that on that basis
trial court’s entry vacating special findings to be a “clear abuse of the trial court’s
discretion”).
{¶ 11} At the close of the hearing, the magistrate indicated she would issue a
decision that would be submitted to the juvenile court judge for review. The magistrate
stated she would try to issue the decision as quickly as she could. The magistrate was aware
of the need for P.A. to have a legally secure placement as soon as possible, and also that his
age required the court to act with dispatch.
{¶ 12} But notwithstanding, a decision from the magistrate was not forthcoming.
Although the record is not entirely clear, at some point shortly after the hearing, the
magistrate submitted a proposed decision to the trial court for approval, but that decision
was never filed on the case docket or served on I.D.’s counsel. It appears from the record
that the trial court refused to approve the magistrate’s decision, but then took no further
direct action. Moreover, despite I.D.’s counsel repeatedly contacting court staff and seeking
information about the status of the case, counsel was not informed that the court was
reserving decision, and was never told that the trial court apparently desired more
information prior to approving the magistrate’s decision.
{¶ 13} In June 2024—249 days after the complaint was filed and 131 days after the
hearing before the magistrate—P.A. turned 18 years old. On August 26, 2024, the case was
continued at the trial court’s request, ostensibly for the purpose of scheduling a hearing
before the trial judge. On September 24, 2024, I.D.’s counsel filed a memorandum
asserting that the court had continuing jurisdiction over P.A., notwithstanding the fact that
he had turned 18 years old, because a custody order and the other requested special findings
would enable P.A. to apply for SIJ status.
{¶ 14} The hearing before the trial judge occurred on September 26, 2024, and
again, it was uncontested and only I.D. testified at the hearing. At the beginning of the
hearing, the trial judge asserted that “the Magistrate had published [a decision] on this one
and the Court did not approve the Magistrate’s Decision and it was here now for a hearing
to - - for a complaint or for movant here to supplement. (Sept. 26, 2024 Tr. at 4.). I.D.’s
No. 24AP-693 5
counsel advised the trial court that she was unaware of the magistrate’s proposed decision
and had not been served with a copy of it:
[Defendant’s Counsel]: Thank you. I was not aware that the
Magistrate published a decision. Today is the first time I’m
hearing of that.
[The Court]: Yes. Yeah. There was a decision published. You
should have got it but - -
Staff Attorney: No.
[Defendant’s Counsel]: I never received it.
[The Court]: Oh.
[Defendant’s Counsel]: I asked the bailiff numerous times
about it. She told me she couldn’t tell me anything. I emailed
your staff attorney about a month ago. She told me she had not
seen anything. This is the first time hearing that there actually
was a decision.
Id. at 4-5. The trial court later noted that the magistrate’s decision was “unpublished.”
(Oct. 22, 2024 Jgmt. Entry on Pl.’s Compl. for Custody at 2.) Again, that purported decision
does not appear on the trial court’s docket, and it is not part of the record on appeal.
{¶ 15} I.D. testified at the September 26, 2024 hearing that he had been notified
earlier in the month that his and P.A.’s mother had died, and there had been no contact or
reconciliation between P.A. and their mother between the February 12, 2024 hearing and
her death. I.D. also testified that the high school P.A. attended had requested
documentation to establish residency and guardianship so that P.A. could continue to
attend the school.
{¶ 16} The trial court and I.D.’s counsel then engaged in a lengthy dialogue about
whether the case was moot because P.A. had turned 18 years old. (Sept. 26, 2024 Tr. at 13-
21.) The court apparently took the opinion that it had lost jurisdiction when P.A. turned 18,
some six months after the hearing before the magistrate. The trial court did not explain the
delay in decision or provide any basis for holding the case, and did not examine why I.D.’s
counsel was not informed of its concerns about the decision during that period. In response
to the trial court’s suggestion that the case was now moot, I.D.’s counsel argued that failure
to grant custody and enter the requested findings would impose collateral consequences
No. 24AP-693 6
that precluded a finding of mootness by preventing P.A. from applying to the federal
government for SIJ status.
{¶ 17} On October 22, 2024, the trial court issued a judgment entry dismissing I.D.’s
complaint. The court held that it lost jurisdiction over the complaint upon the occurrence
of P.A.’s 18th birthday, and despite its position at the commencement of the hearing that
the magistrate had already issued a decision, no factual findings or temporary or emergency
orders had been made before P.A. turned 18 years old. The court concluded it could not
issue an order giving I.D. custody over P.A. because P.A. had reached the age of majority
and therefore that the case was moot:
The hearing was set before this Court as the Magistrate had
proposed an unpublished Magistrate’s Decision to this Court
for signature. The Court found the Decision was incomplete
and missing information that this Court deemed crucial to the
resolution of the case. The matter was set for further hearing
before this Court so that said information could be obtained.
The subject hearing was recorded.
...
In this case, this Court notes that in the prayer for relief of the
Complaint filed on October 16, 2023, the Plaintiff requested the
Court award him legal custody of the subject youth, [P.A.]
(DOB: 6/21/2006), and find that reunification of the youth
with his mother, [J.B.], was not possible due to abandonment,
and that it was not in the youth’s best interests to return to
Ghana. The initial hearing before the Magistrate was scheduled
for December 12, 2023. That hearing was continued to
February 12, 2024, as Plaintiff had not completed service on all
parties. The hearing on February 12, 2024, took place before
Magistrate Matthews. A copy of the transcript of that
proceeding was later filed on September 24, 2024.
This Court reviewed the unpublished Magistrate’s Decision as
well as the recording and transcript of the proceeding before
the Magistrate. The transcript documents that at the hearing
on February 12, 2024, the Magistrate heard testimony from
Plaintiff. . . . The Magistrate later proposed a Magistrate’s
Decision to this Court that this Court felt lacked sufficient
information. Therefore, this Court set this matter for hearing
before the Judge on September 26, 2024.
The Court notes that at the time of the hearing before this Court
on September 26, 2024, the subject youth, [P.A.] was eighteen
No. 24AP-693 7
(18) years old. By statute and caselaw, this Court loses
jurisdiction of juveniles at the age of eighteen years old who are
not previously found to be abused, neglected, dependent or
delinquent. In this case there was no dispositional order put in
place prior to the subject youth’s eighteenth birthday.
Moreover, there were no temporary orders put into place
before the youth turned eighteen years old. Further, there were
never any allegations by any party in the Complaint,
subsequent filings, or at any hearing before either the Judge or
Magistrate that this child was under any legal disability. Thus,
any jurisdiction this Court may have had was lost in when the
youth turned eighteen. Therefore, this Court is left with no
option but to dismiss the case.
(Emphasis added.) (Oct. 22, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 1-3.) I.D. has now appealed to this court,
asserting a single assignment of error:
The lower court erred and abused its discretion in dismissing
appellant’s complaint as moot when the court failed to issue a
timely custody decision before the child turned 18 years old and
there are ongoing collateral consequences.
{¶ 18} We recently set forth the general standards of review governing this
assignment of error:
In previous appeals arising from a party seeking findings from
the juvenile court in order to petition for SIJ status, we did not
specify the standard of review applied. See Gonzalez v.
Rodriguez, 2018-Ohio-2410, 115 N.E.3d 718 (10th Dist.)
(affirming juvenile court’s denial of request to make SIJ
findings based on interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) that
parties did qualify as a matter of law) and In re A.M.A., 2023-
Ohio-723, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.) (reversing juvenile court’s sua sponte
decision to “vacate[] its prior orders” with SIJ findings
“without a hearing and notice” because it “clearly violate[d] the
procedural due process rights of the parties”). However, both
Gonzalez and In re A.M.A. addressed issues of law, which are
reviewed “de novo on appeal.” Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.
3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, ¶ 8, 938 N.E.2d 342. Here, we apply
that standard to the juvenile court’s resolution of legal issues,
such as its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J). See id.
(applying de novo review to “question of statutory
construction”).
However, a juvenile court makes the findings that are a
prerequisite to SIJ status “under State law.” 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(27)(J). And here, where the court acted as a factfinder
No. 24AP-693 8
in a custody proceeding under R.C. 3109.04, an abuse-of-
discretion standard applies to our review of its factual
determinations. E.g., Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 523
N.E.2d 846 (1988). Under that standard, a trial court abuses its
discretion if its ruling is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219, 5 Ohio B. 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “An unreasonable
decision is one that is unsupported by a sound reasoning
process.” Lias v. Beekman, 2007-Ohio-5737, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.),
citing AAAA Ents. v. River Place Community Urban
Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990). An arbitrary ruling lacks an “ ‘adequate determining
principle’ ” and is “ ‘not governed by any fixed rules or
standard.’ ” Downey v. 610 Morrison Rd., L.L.C., 2008-Ohio-
3524, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), quoting Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v.
McGee, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 359, 423 N.E.2d 1095 (1981). An
unconscionable ruling “ ‘affront[s] the sense of justice,
decency, or reasonableness.’ ” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Collier,
2008-Ohio-6817, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).
Vargas Pelaez, 2025-Ohio-5532, at ¶ 7-8 (10th Dist.). Normally, because there are no
disputed findings of fact in this case, we would be limited to reviewing the trial court’s
judgment on the legal issue of jurisdiction. But on review of the record, we have identified
an issue that must take precedence to addressing that question.
{¶ 19} The relevant local rule provides that “Magistrates shall be appointed in
accordance with Civil Rule 53, and shall have all powers conferred by said Rule,” as well as
referring to magistrates “[a]ll complaints for custody filed in the Juvenile Branch of this
court . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Franklin C.P., Dom. Rel. Div., Loc. R. 8. See also Franklin
C.P., Juv. Div. Loc. R. 20 (“Magistrates . . . shall conduct hearings in complaints initiated
in the Juvenile Branch . . . for abuse, neglect and dependency.”). And while it is true that
Civ.R. 53(D)(1)(b) provides that courts “may limit a reference [of a case to a magistrate] by
specifying or limiting the magistrate’s powers, including . . . directing the magistrate to
receive and report evidence only,” the record provides no suggestion that the trial court
limited its reference of jurisdiction to the magistrate in this way. And under Sup.R.
40(A)(2), “cases submitted for determination after a court trial shall be decided within
ninety days from the date the case was submitted.”
{¶ 20} In short, given the general order of reference embodied in the local rule, the
90-day timeline for the decision, and the lack of any specific notice or order from the court
No. 24AP-693 9
to the contrary, I.D. and his counsel were entitled to expect that the magistrate would issue
a decision in the case within 90 days, and that the order would be subject to objections to
the trial court as in the ordinary course of such cases. See Civ.R. 53(D)(3) (“Magistrate’s
Decision; Objections to Magistrate’s Decision”), and Franklin C.P., Juv. Div., Loc. R. 8 (“A
decision of a Magistrate may be reviewed by the assigned Judge of this Court by filing an
Objection in accordance with Rule 40 of the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure / Rule 53 of
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Moreover, the magistrate had assured both I.D. and
his counsel that a decision would be released soon:
What will happen from here is, I will issue a decision based on
your testimony. That decision then goes up to the Judge to
include his signature. Then it goes to the clerk’s office. And then
the clerks will send a copy to your attorney. So, you’ll receive a
copy from her. I’ll try to get this out as quickly as I can.
(Feb. 12, 2024 Tr. at 22.)
{¶ 21} But a magistrate’s decision was never issued, despite the magistrate’s
assurances, P.A.’s age, and the uncontested nature of the case. Based on the record before
us, the decision was held from release because the trial court concluded that “it was
incomplete and missing information that this Court deemed crucial to the resolution of the
case.” (Oct. 22, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 1.) The nature of that “incomplete and missing
information” is never specified in the record, not even in the final entry of the court
dismissing the case.
{¶ 22} Upon determining that there was “incomplete and missing information,” the
appropriate action for the court would have been to reject the decision and direct the
magistrate to issue an order denying the motion, or at least to issue an order directing the
parties to supplement the record so that an order could be issued. Given this anomaly, we
believe that the trial court’s actions must be reviewed for plain error and prejudice to the
I.D. Here, neither the court nor the magistrate took any action to notify the parties that the
court needed additional information prior to the issuing a decision, even though I.D.’s
counsel stated on the record that she had regularly checked with court personnel regarding
the status of the case. Moreover, it seems that I.D.’s counsel was not informed that the case
had been taken out of the hands of the magistrate by the trial judge, and there is certainly
no indication in the docket that this had occurred.
No. 24AP-693 10
{¶ 23} This was an uncontested case—P.A.’s father was dead and his mother was
both in Ghana and uninvolved in his life. And there is certainly no doubt that children
under the age of majority are required to have custodians to protect them under Ohio law.
The court’s action in delaying a decision in an uncontested custody case is frankly
inexplicable, and we have little difficulty concluding that the trial court’s actions in refusing
to sign the magistrate’s decision and holding that decision for some six months without
notifying the parties was erroneous, particularly in light of the representations made to the
parties and the necessity to resolve such matters in the normal and ordinary course of law.
{¶ 24} In response to I.D.’s contention that the court had violated Sup.R. 40(A)(2)
and “took too long in making a decision after the hearing of February 12, 2024,” the court
justified its delay as follows:
The Court reviewed the Magistrate’s proposed Magistrate’s
Decision and reviewed the record. This Court found that there
was information lacking which would have been critical in
making a decision on the proposed relief that the Plaintiff
requested. Therefore, the matter was set for further hearing.
Due to this Court’s congested docket, the Court was able to hear
the matter on September 26, 2024. It issues this decision
within a timely manner after that hearing. The Court is allowed
to take time and weigh the evidence before making any findings
or decision. To expect a quick decision on every case is to place
unrealistically high expectations on an overburdened court
system. Thus, this Court does not find this decision to be
untimely.
(Oct. 22, 2024 Jgmt. Entry at 5.)
{¶ 25} This analysis does not stand up to scrutiny. Specifically, the record is undisputed
that the September 26, 2024 date upon which the trial court relies was not scheduled until
August 21, 2024, and that hearing was scheduled at the court’s request. (Aug. 26, 2024
Mot. & Mag.’s Order.) Accordingly, the court was already three months beyond the Sup.R.
40(A)(2) 90-day deadline at the time it scheduled the hearing. Moreover, the trial court
did not identify what precise “information [was] lacking which would have been critical in
making a decision on the proposed relief,” even during the September 26 hearing—the
hearing that presumably was intended to resolve that question. And finally, we simply do
not think that the “overburdened” trial court’s “congested docket” is a sufficient explanation
for the delay in question—this case was uncontested, the facts were undisputed, the legal
No. 24AP-693 11
relief sought was uncomplicated, and without a more cogent explanation, we view the trial
court’s actions and explanations of those actions with skepticism. Compare In re A.M.A.,
2023-Ohio-723, at ¶ 8 (10th Dist.) and Vargas Pelaez, 2025-Ohio-5532, at ¶ 19-21 (10th
Dist.) (both describing unreasonable errors in SIJ proceedings by the same judge who
presided over this case). It is true that the trial court did not determine this case until after
P.A. had turned 18. But that was not due to any action by I.D. or P.A.—rather, it was the
result of errors by the trial court.
{¶ 26} In sum, we believe that the departure from normal proceedings in the
handling of this case prejudiced both I.D. and P.A. well before the definitional deadline set
forth in R.C. 2151.011(B)(6). Moreover, undisputed evidence in the record shows both that
P.A. was an abandoned child as defined under R.C. 2151.011(C), and also that it was not his
best interest to be returned to Ghana, both because it would place him directly in danger
and because he would lack care by a guardian.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we sustain I.D.’s sole assignment of error, conclude that the trial
court plainly erred by departing from established procedures in determining this case, and
reverse the judgment of the court. This case is remanded to the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch with instructions to issue
an order finding P.A. abandoned, to grant custody of P.A. to I.D., and to issue findings in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) based on the evidence present in the record.
Judgment reversed; cause
remanded with instructions.
BOGGS, P.J., concurs.
and DORRIAN, J., dissents.
DORRIAN, J., dissenting.
{¶ 28} I respectfully dissent because I conclude the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
complaint in this case terminated upon the occurrence of P.A.’s 18th birthday and,
therefore, I would affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint as moot. However, I share
the majority’s concern over the trial court’s handling of this case. Particularly troubling is
the fact that, although the trial judge appeared to have a copy of the magistrate’s proposed
decision, the decision was not filed and made a part of the trial court record or served on
the parties, thereby depriving I.D. the opportunity to file objections, if any, and depriving
No. 24AP-693 12
this court the opportunity to review any findings upon appeal. Also troubling is the fact
that the trial court later suggested that additional information was necessary but then failed
to even schedule a second hearing until after P.A.’s 18th birthday notwithstanding the
complaint having been filed more than 8 months before P.A.’s birthday, the uncontested
nature of the proceeding, the potential significance of the outcome to P.A., and trial
counsel’s diligent efforts to inquire regarding the status. Nevertheless, because the trial
court’s jurisdiction expired, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the
complaint as moot for lack of jurisdiction.