The opinion
J-A29040-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
THOMAS M. HOOVER, JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALICIA J. LEWIS, DECEASED :
:
: No. 795 WDA 2025
v. :
:
:
LISA K. COHEN AND SHAWN COHEN :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES R. LEWIS AND KIM LEWIS :
:
:
APPEAL OF: LISA COHEN AND :
SHAWN COHEN :
Appeal from the Order Entered May 29, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Orphans’ Court at No. 2011-00254
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: February 26, 2026
In this ongoing custody dispute, currently between grandparents, Lisa
K. Cohen and Shawn Cohen (Paternal Grandparents) appeal from the order
which granted sole legal and physical custody of A.J.L. (Child) to James R.
J-A29040-25
Lewis and Kim Lewis (Maternal Grandparents).1 After careful consideration,
we affirm.
CASE HISTORY
Child is 16 years old. He was born in January 2010 to Alicia J. Lewis
(Mother) and Thomas M. Hoover, Jr. (Father), who were teenagers at the time.
For the majority of Child’s life, he has endured the parties’ “yearslong,
acrimonious litigation.” Hoover I at *11. This Court relayed the case history,
from 2011 to 2024, as follows:
Father did not initially acknowledge paternity, and the relationship
between the families was antagonistic. Father filed an action in
2011 resulting in an award of partial custody, which he did not
exercise consistently.
Between 2010 and 2015, Child and Mother resided in Maternal
Grandparents’ home. In 2015, Mother married [Stepfather].
Mother and Child then moved out of Maternal Grandparents’ home
to live with Stepfather, but they [all] returned to live in a
doublewide trailer-home located on Maternal Grandparents’
property. … Although Child no longer lived in Maternal
Grandparents’ house, he had a bedroom there, and he often slept
over. Maternal Grandparents were involved in Child’s life on a
near-daily basis until 2020. They often cooked for him, bathed
him, and saw him off to school.
Mother and Father engaged in more custody litigation between
2016 and 2017. Mother was again awarded primary physical
custody subject to Father’s partial custody. Father’s exercise of
____________________________________________
1 This Court previously described Shawn Cohen (Paternal Grandfather) as a
“quasi-participant in these proceedings.” Hoover v. Lewis, 318 A.3d 1287,
812 WDA 2023, 2024 WL 1829250, at *2 n.5 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 26, 2024)
(unpublished memorandum) (Hoover I), aff’d sub nom. T.M.H. v. J.L., 334
A.3d 860, No. 29 WAP 2024, 2025 WL 1231559 (Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2025) (per
curiam order). We also observed that Paternal Grandfather is actually Child’s
step-grandfather as well as a practicing attorney. Id.
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custody continued to be sporadic. Although Paternal
Grand[parents] had a good relationship with Child, Father’s
involvement was minimal.
In May 2020, Mother separated from Stepfather. She and Child
left the trailer-home and moved to live near Paternal
Grandparents, approximately 30 minutes away. According to
Maternal Grandparents, Mother left because they sought to get
her help for her suicidal ideations.
At this juncture, the procedural history of this custody case
became incredibly convoluted. In July 2020, Maternal
Grandparents filed a petition to intervene in the custody case
between Mother and Father. Initially, Maternal Grandparents
requested “emergency shared legal and physical custody” to
“ensure [C]hild’s attendance at counseling, medication,
appointments, and school.” Given the urgent nature of the
pleading and the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court conducted a
brief video conference, prior to its evidentiary hearing, with all
parties…. At the video conference, Maternal Grandparents
clarified that they sought only partial physical custody.
Less than two weeks later, on August 24, 2020, Mother and Father
signed a consent agreement granting Paternal Grandmother
shared physical and legal custody. Maternal Grandparents were
not made aware of this agreement for some time. The August
2020 consent order provided no periods of physical custody to
Father, except during holidays.
In October 2020, upon Mother’s request, the trial court continued
the hearing on Maternal Grandparents’ petition to intervene.
Meanwhile, Maternal Grandparents learned of the August 2020
consent order. Maternal Grandparents then filed a “motion for
guardian ad litem/standing/conflict.” Therein, Maternal
Grandparents alleged that Mother had limited their contact with
Child, and they raised three challenges. First, Maternal
Grandparents sought to have Child appointed a guardian ad litem.
Second, they claimed that Paternal Grandparents lacked standing
to be involved in Maternal Grandparents’ bid to intervene in
Mother and Father’s custody case; Maternal Grandparents did not
allege facts to support their own standing to seek custody. Third,
they raised the potential conflict between the court and … Paternal
Grandfather, a local attorney. The court scheduled the motion for
a hearing.
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Between October 2020 and April 2021, the litigation was delayed
for various reasons. ... In December 2020, the trial judge recused
himself due to Paternal Grandfather’s involvement in the local bar
association. The recusal meant that the matter had to be set
before an out-of-county judge.
After several months in limbo, on April 5, 2021, Mother filed for
custody modification against Paternal Grandmother. Mother
requested th[at] Child be returned to her sole custody. Mother
alleged that Child had not done well in Paternal Grandparents’
school district; that Paternal Grandparents had pressured Child
about his studies; that Paternal Grandmother had denied Mother
access to Child and was overly critical of Mother; and that Child
was depressed. When Mother filed her April 2021 modification
petition, Maternal Grandparents’ July 2020 action for partial
custody was still pending[,] as was their October 2020 request for
the appointment of [a] guardian ad litem. And then the character
of this case drastically changed.
On April 30, 2021, Mother committed suicide. On May 11, 2021,
Maternal Grandparents filed a “complaint for modification of
custody.” Critically, Maternal Grandparents sought custody under
new grounds. For the first time, they alleged that they had
standing to seek primary physical custody and legal custody under
23 Pa.C.S. § 5324; alternatively, they alleged standing to seek
partial physical custody under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(1) (pertaining to
the death of a parent).
On May 14, 2021, Maternal Grandparents, Paternal Grandmother,
and Father appeared before the court. Paternal Grandmother
appeared pro se, but the court permitted Paternal Grandfather to
assist in her self-representation. Ostensibly, the hearing was on
Maternal Grandparents’ “petition for standing/petition for
guardian ad litem/petition to intervene,” according to the title on
the transcript of those proceedings. Unfortunately, the trial court
did not resolve the discrepancies in the procedural posture of the
case before testimony began. In the view of Father’s attorney,
the [matter] before the court on May 14, 2021 was twofold: 1)
Maternal Grandparents’ July 2020 petition to intervene for partial
custody; and 2) the October 2020 petition for the appointment a
guardian ad litem. Counsel for Maternal Grandparents said that
the matter concerned standing, the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, “as well as a custody schedule for all parties involved.” It
became apparent, however, that Maternal Grandparents wanted
to treat their earlier July 2020 petition to intervene as the vehicle
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to preserve, as timely, their May 2021 action for primary custody.
There was no mention of Maternal Grandparents’ May 2021
complaint, wherein they alleged standing for primary custody and
a new basis for partial custody. The court simply said it hoped to
have “an interim custody order so that we can see where we are
relative to maybe a further full-time custody situation.” Counsel
for Maternal Grandparents then called the first witness.
Starting with the May 2021 hearing, the trial court conducted four
days of proceedings over the course of two years. On the first
day, the trial court conducted an in camera interview of Child and
Maternal Grandmother testified. The trial court then issued an
interim order granting shared physical custody and shared legal
custody to Maternal Grandparents for the rest of the summer. The
order was silent on standing.
On August 3, 2021, the hearing resumed where it left off three
months prior. The transcript labeled this proceeding as a “custody
evidentiary hearing,” but there was no mention of whether the
hearing was meant to address either the July 2020 action for
partial custody or the May 2021 action for primary custody. In
any event, the trial court heard additional testimony from Paternal
Aunt, Maternal Grandfather, Father, and Stepfather. At the end
of the testimony, with the case still incomplete, the court issued
a second interim order.
The second interim order was designed to last through the 2021-
2022 school year, if need be. The court increased Maternal
Grandparents’ physical custody from shared to primary, so that
Child could return to the school district where he had been
enrolled until 2020. The order provided that only Maternal
Grandparents and Father would share legal custody. Paternal
Grandparents received partial physical custody every Tuesday and
Thursday evening and one weekend per month. The second
interim order provided that the next hearing date would be
scheduled by separate order.
In September 2021, Father (through counsel) and Paternal
Grandmother (pro se) petitioned the trial court to vacate the
second interim order. Until then, the court had yet to deprive
Paternal Grandmother of primary physical custody or legal
custody. Evidently, it became apparent to Father and Paternal
Grandmother that the trial court meant to resolve not just
Maternal Grandparents’ July 2020 petition, but also their May
2021 complaint for primary physical and legal custody. Father
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and Paternal Grandmother reiterated that Maternal Grandparents
lacked standing under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324. The trial court did not
rule on these petitions until the hearing resumed 10 months later,
in July 2022.
On July 21, 2022, the hearing began with a discussion about the
petitions to vacate the second interim order, which as far as we
can tell, had been pending since the previous September. Father
and Paternal Grandmother maintained that Maternal
Grandparents lacked standing to seek primary custody under 23
Pa.C.S. § 5324. Maternal Grandparents countered that they stood
in loco parentis under Section 5324(2); alternatively, that they
had standing under Section 5324(3)(iii)(C), alleging that Child
lived with them for 12 consecutive months and that … their action
was timely. The court ruled that Maternal Grandparents had
standing under “5324(2) or (3),” and … proceeded with testimony.
The trial court heard additional testimony from Paternal
Grandparents, Father, and Maternal Grandmother. At the
conclusion of this testimony, the court prepared to issue its final
order and asked the litigants to file respective proposed findings
and a proposed custody order by August 15, 2022. In the
meantime, the court issued another interim order, dated July 22,
2022, setting forth the rest of the summer schedule. Maternal
Grandparents’ proposal was docketed on August 22, 2022.
Paternal Grandmother did not submit a proposal but instead
appealed the denial of her request to vacate the interim orders.
While Paternal Grandmother’s appeal was pending, the trial court
decided not to issue a final custody order, even though the court
apparently recognized that it retained jurisdiction to do so.
Instead, the court issued yet another interim custody order, dated
August 26, 2022, meant to last the entire 2022-2023 school year.
This Court quashed Paternal Grandmother’s appeal as
interlocutory in October 2022. The trial court took no further
action for another six months, until it conducted a “status
conference” on May 23, 2023.
At the status conference, the trial court learned that Child had
been buckling under the weight of the litigation and in the
aftermath of Mother’s death. There was a pending truancy
matter, Child had since enrolled in cyber school, and he might be
held back a grade. Father did not appear at the status conference.
Both sets of Grandparents, each represented by substitute
counsel, traded blame and accusations. There had been just one
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visit between Child and Paternal Grandparents …. There was
doubt as to whether the recommendation of the guardian ad litem
was valid, given his failure to interview Paternal Grandparents.
Even the trial court recognized that the record had gone stale,
[and] that a final custody order had to be issued so that the
litigants could either appeal or initiate modification proceedings.
The court ultimately issued its final custody order and
memorandum opinion on June 7, 2023 – two years after the first
date of the evidentiary hearing. In its memorandum opinion, the
trial court determined that Maternal Grandparents had standing
for any form of custody, even as the court acknowledged that they
did not meet the technical requirements under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324.
The trial court awarded Maternal Grandparents primary physical
custody and shared legal custody. The court awarded Paternal
Grandparents partial physical custody, which they could exercise
on the fourth full weekend of each month. The court awarded
Father shared legal custody and partial physical custody every
Tuesday and Thursday evening, and the second full weekend of
each month[,] but the order provided Paternal Grandparents the
ability to assume Father’s custody time if he chose not to exercise
it. During the summer, Maternal and Paternal Grandparents
would share physical custody.
Paternal Grandmother timely filed a notice of appeal.
Hoover I at *1-6 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In Hoover I, Paternal Grandmother challenged Maternal Grandparents’
standing, as well as the order granting them primary physical custody of Child.
This Court first addressed the standing issue. We concluded that the trial
court erred “when it determined that Maternal Grandparents had standing to
obtain primary physical custody and legal custody under Section 5324(3).”
Id. at *11. Accordingly, we did not address Paternal Grandmother’s other
issues, “including whether the [custody] award was in the best interests of
the Child.” Id. We vacated the custody order, stating:
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We recognize that Maternal Grandparents still have standing for
partial physical custody under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(1), due to
Mother’s death. Upon remand, we direct the trial court to consider
whether it would be in Child’s best interests to award Maternal
Grandparents partial physical custody. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)
(relating to best interest factors); (c)(relating to grandparent
considerations). We are loathe to order further proceedings but
recognize the same might be necessary. Grandparents know what
is best for Child. We remind them of the caustic effects that
prolonged custody litigation and family infighting have on
everyone, and we urge them to work together moving forward.
Id.
After receiving our decision in Hoover I, Maternal Grandparents
petitioned for allowance of appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
the request to consider whether Maternal Grandparents had standing to seek
primary physical custody and legal custody of Child. See T.M.H. v. J.L., 327
A.3d 615, 221 WAL 2024, 2024 WL 4448712 (Pa. filed Oct. 9, 2024) (per
curiam order). However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided, in the
following order:
Pursuant to this Court’s powers under PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a)
(vesting this Court with “general supervisory and administrative
authority over all the courts”) and § 10(c) (granting this Court
“the power to prescribe general rules governing practice,
procedure, and the conduct of all courts”), the trial court is
DIRECTED to hold a custody hearing within thirty (30) days from
the date of this order to make a fresh assessment of standing,
resolve any outstanding custody petitions, and determine
a final custody arrangement that will serve the best
interests of [C]hild. The court shall maintain the status quo
of the current custody arrangement pending the issuance
of a final custody order.
T.M.H. v. J.L., 334 A.3d 860–61, 29 WAP 2024, 2025 WL 1231559 (Pa. filed
Apr. 29, 2025) (per curiam order) (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court remanded the case directly to the trial court.2 The
trial court held a hearing on May 8, 2025.3 At the beginning of the hearing,
Paternal Grandparents’ counsel announced that he had “filed [motions]
yesterday for the [c]ourt to consider.” N.T., 5/8/25, at 1. The trial court
stated that it had “not seen” any motions, and did “not know of any motions
that have been filed.” Id. Paternal Grandparents’ counsel replied, “I
understand,” but continued to state:
The first I want to talk about, Your Honor, with all due respect is
one of recusal. We filed [a recusal motion] in reconsideration
before we filed the [December 13, 2024] appeal [that was
quashed on March 27, 2025, as being] from a non-final [o]rder.
... My clients have asked me to present this motion because of
their concerns that they are not feeling as though the [c]ourt is
viewing this in an unbiased fashion, and one of the reasons behind
that, Your Honor, was when we were before this [c]ourt on July
2nd, 2024, if you recall, … the [c]ourt at that time made some
statements that my clients felt were somewhat biased and felt
they would really have trouble with the way this was handled, Your
Honor.
Id. at 1-2. Paternal Grandparents’ counsel also made a motion for counseling,
stating that Child “has been alienated from my clients and there should be ...
some form of what we call reunification counseling between him and my two
clients.” Id. at 4.
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2 The Honorable Kevin A. Hess, a senior judge and former President Judge of
Cumberland County, was “assigned to this case following a decision of the
Superior Court in April o[f] 2024.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/29/25, at 1.
3 Father did not appear at the hearing and no counsel appeared on his behalf.
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In response, counsel for Maternal Grandparents expressed opposition to
the motions, arguing that the recusal issue “has already been decided,” and
“[t]his is the first time [Paternal Grandparents] ever brought a motion asking
for reunification counseling.” Id. at 10.
The trial court denied the recusal motion, see id., and proceeded to
hear testimony from the two witnesses: Kim Lewis (Maternal Grandmother),
and Lisa K. Cohen (Paternal Grandmother).4
Maternal Grandmother
Maternal Grandmother testified to being employed for decades as
nurse’s aide, working three days a week. Id. at 13. She stated that she
“always” had “a very good relationship” with Child. Id. Maternal
Grandmother explained that Child had lived with her and Maternal
Grandfather, or on their property, “his whole entire life, 15 years … except for
the ten months he was with [Paternal Grandparents, from August 2020 to May
2021].” Id. Maternal Grandmother testified that she and Maternal
Grandfather had been “exclusively raising” Child “for at least [the past] three
years.” Id. at 23. She stated that Child “has his own bedroom. I cook for
him. I do his wash. We hang out. We go watch the trains all the time.” Id.
____________________________________________
4 Although Child did not testify, his preference to remain with Maternal
Grandparents was undisputed. See, e.g., id. at 193 (counsel for Paternal
Grandparents describing Child as “slamming the door” on Paternal
Grandparents). The trial court stated that it would not require Child to testify
because it had “learned what [it] needed to learn,” and “unless counsel wants
to say anything about that, I think the sooner we let [Child] know that he
doesn’t have to come [to court], the better his day will be.” Id. at 95-96.
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at 14. She added, “We provide a home for him. We provide food for him.
We provide health insurance. We go grocery shopping and get him his favorite
things. Everything. We provide everything for him.” Id. at 23-24.
Maternal Grandmother emphasized that the ongoing custody litigation
“is devasting for” Child, who sees a counselor and takes medication. Id. at
24, 30. However, she also testified that Child was doing well in cyber school
and “is very resilient.” Id. at 24. Maternal Grandmother described Child’s
close relationship with Maternal Grandfather, who has helped raise Child. Id.
at 32.
With respect to Paternal Grandparents, Maternal Grandmother testified
that she has encouraged Child to have a relationship with Paternal
Grandmother in particular, but Child refuses and “just gets so upset.” Id. at
31. She relayed that in June 2024,
[Paternal Grandparents] came to the house [in an attempt to
exercise partial custody]. [Paternal Grandfather] went over to the
trailer. I was in the yard working in my garden. [Child] had
himself locked in the trailer. [Paternal Grandfather] came back …
and called the state police. The state police came to our home.
Before that[, Child] ran into the woods, out the back door and into
the woods, ran away … [b]ecause he didn’t want to go. … [After
Child returned, t]he state police came and talked to him[, and]
the state police went back and talked to [Paternal Grandparents,]
and they didn’t make [Child] go.
Id. at 36.
Maternal Grandmother stated that she “feel[s] sad for [Paternal
Grandmother] because [she and Child] need a relationship.” Id. at 44.
Maternal Grandmother testified that she would encourage Child to participate
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in counseling with Paternal Grandparents, but did not believe that Child would
do so. Id. at 45-46. She explained that even if Child attended counseling,
[Child] is the type of person with a counselor or with anybody[,]
he has to really get to know them and know that he can trust
them. Like with his guardian [ad litem], he is afraid he can’t trust
him because he’s an attorney[,] and he thinks that he is friends
with [Paternal Grandfather].[5] [H]e is afraid of letting his guard
down.
Id. at 46-47.
Finally, Maternal Grandmother described having to return to court as
“mental abuse.” Id. at 47. She explained:
It has been ongoing [between grandparents] for four years. [Child
previously] told the [trial court] three or four times where he
wants to live. … He wants it done. He is 15. What normal 15-
year-old wants to go through this constantly? It is time for
healing. It is time for [Maternal Grandfather] and [Child] and I to
heal from [Mother’s] death[,] because we never have been able
to because we’ve had court. I mean, I lost my daughter four years
ago…. [Child] has been in his room [for] three days. He comes
out to eat. He stays in his room and does his school work and
won’t come out. … Like I said, what normal 15-year-old wants to
have this hanging over [his] head for four years? It needs to stop.
It needs to end.
Id. at 48.
____________________________________________
5 The record does not indicate that the guardian ad litem communicated with
Child. The guardian ad litem appeared at the hearing and questioned the
witnesses, but did not express a position. On appeal, the guardian ad litem
argues that “clear and convincing evidence established that the best interests
at this time will best be served by awarding [M]aternal [G]randparents
custody of [Child].” Guardian Ad Litem’s Brief at 8.
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Paternal Grandmother6
Paternal Grandmother testified that she has eight children and twelve
grandchildren. Id. at 144. She relayed that from the time Child was “18
months to 2 years old,” until he was five-years-old, Father had custody “50
percent,” and “would bring [Child] … to our place whenever, because we had
to get to know him too.” Id. at 105. Paternal Grandmother said that Father
“would bring [Child] over [during his custodial] week, and we would see him,
especially when [Father] was working, and then the other week [Child] would
go … back and forth in the custody.” Id. She confirmed that Paternal
Grandparents saw Child when Father had custody, and Paternal Grandparents
“didn’t have our own custody order.” Id. at 159.
Paternal Grandmother disputed Maternal Grandmother’s account of
caring for Child. She stated that Mother “was still in high school … when she
had [Child, s]o of course she lived with [Maternal Grandparents] until she
finished school.” Id. at 107. She noted that Mother had married, separated,
and filed for divorce, but “always had” Child. Id. Paternal Grandmother
added:
[Maternal Grandparents] lived right there. So when [Child]
wanted to see the[m], he could. [B]ut they didn’t parent him.
____________________________________________
6 As discussed more fully below, Paternal Grandmother was initially absent
when called to testify. Before taking a midday recess, the trial court told the
parties to return at “a quarter of 2 and be back by then, [w]hen we will hear
from [P]aternal [G]randm[other].” Id. at 101. When Paternal Grandmother
appeared at 2:05 p.m., the court advised Paternal Grandparents’ counsel, “in
terms of any consideration of time constraints in this case this afternoon, you
… are already 20 minutes into her examination.” Id.
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They didn’t take him to school. They didn’t take him to his doctor
appointments. … They didn’t have custody of him. They just had
the ability to be able to see him all the time because he lived right
there in their place.
Id.
Paternal Grandmother stated that there “was always that contention
between” Mother, Father, and Maternal Grandparents. Id. at 108. She
testified that in 2020, Mother asked her, “can you take [Child?]” Id. at 111.
According to Paternal Grandmother, Mother wanted her to have custody of
Child because Mother was going through a divorce and Maternal Grandparents
were trying to get Mother “back here or whatever because they had filed
something.” Id. Paternal Grandmother testified that “we all decided
together[,] with [Father] and [Mother] and me[,] that [Child] would live with
[me and Paternal Grandfather,] and [Child] would go to school [while living]
with us, especially with it being virtual [due to the COVID-19 pandemic,]
because everybody else had to be at work but I didn’t.” Id. She stated that
she and Paternal Grandfather performed “all of the parental duties” for Child
at that time. Id. at 137.
Paternal Grandmother acknowledged that in April 2021, shortly before
Mother’s death, Mother filed a petition to revoke her custody. Id. at 160.
Paternal Grandmother claimed “nobody got served” and stressed that the
petition “was never prosecuted.” Id. She testified that after Mother’s death
on April 30, 2021, Maternal Grandmother
called to say [Mother] passed away and wanted to know if they
could get [Child], to tell him[,] and if they could be the ones to
tell him, and I said, sure…. It’s not like I wanted to tell [Child]
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that his mother had died. I mean that was a heartbreaking thing
to do, but … I respected that [Maternal Grandmother] had lost her
daughter too. So I said okay. So they came and picked him up
to take him to the funeral and stuff.
Id. at 112-13.
Paternal Grandmother explained that shortly after Mother’s death,
[Maternal Grandparents] filed some kind of emergency [petition]
… and they filed for modification of custody which we never got
served with, didn’t know about until after the hearing was over,
and we saw that it was filed but not given to us, but … we had
[Child]. We went to a court hearing, an emergency one. Well,
[Child] wasn’t in an emergency. [Mother] had killed herself, but
we had custody and [Child] was doing fine. So I don’t know. They
ended up having an emergency hearing…. [The interim court
order provided that Child] was going to finish out the school year
with us, and then we were going to do 50-50 during the summer,
which we did, until we came back for the next hearing which was
in August [2021,] right before school started…. Even at that
hearing[, Child] said he loved being with [us] and it’s in the
transcripts, you know. There [are] two transcripts where [Child]
… said he loved going one week on, one week off with both
grandparents. He was happy.
Id. at 113. Paternal Grandmother reiterated that Child “loved all of us.” Id.
at 134.
Paternal Grandmother recounted the parties sharing custody of Child
“every other week in the summer and he was perfectly fine.” Id. at 118. She
explained:
Even going into the fall we went on a vacation … and, you know,
we had a good time. We started to see [Child] on the weekends
and the days during the week. We would go down and see him
and that happened for several months, but then all of a sudden
he had some reason why he wouldn’t go with us anymore, and
even though they would make him come with us, within two
minutes of being in the car, with us, he would be jabbering on
about his day and about things. He was perfectly fine. … We
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would take him back and he was perfectly fine, and he would text
us, and we would have contact with him. Then all of a sudden
around October it just ended for some reason. We have no idea.
He just wouldn’t come with us anymore. [Y]ou could tell from his
grades from that year that he was flunking everything from that
period on, but when he stopped seeing us in October his grades
started flunking.
Id. at 118-19. Paternal Grandmother testified that Paternal Grandparents’
most recent custody of Child occurred in October 2021, when “for some
reason, he wouldn’t … come [to] us.” Id. at 121. She said, “we couldn’t get
him, and they weren’t going to make him come anymore.” Id. Paternal
Grandmother also testified that her “last positive communication” from Child
occurred by text in April 2023, although “not for us not trying.” Id. at 145.
Paternal Grandmother confirmed that she and Paternal Grandfather
attempted to exercise partial custody of Child in June 2024, after this Court’s
decision in Hoover I, and “figured we would call the … state police[,] and see
if they would help, [and] there wasn’t a fight or anything that happened
because [Maternal Grandmother] had never said [Child] hates you, he doesn’t
want to come.” Id. at 128. Paternal Grandmother testified that she had never
known Child to feel unsafe or threaten self-harm. Id. She stated that Child
“hates me for some reason, [but] I had nothing to do with [Mother committing
suicide, and] I would never try to get him to hate [Maternal Grandparents,]
but, you know, someday he will probably see it.” Id. at 134-35. Paternal
Grandmother added that she “wouldn’t say anything negative about” Maternal
Grandparents, but asserted that Maternal Grandmother “doesn’t like us for
some reason.” Id. at 138, 145.
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Paternal Grandmother expressed her desire for contact with Child and
her belief that Child would benefit from counseling. Id. at 142. In response
to her counsel asking her to “explain where you think we should go,” she
answered:
[W]e should all get together, go out to eat together, you know, be
with [Child] as a united force, you know, get him into counseling,
get us into counseling with him…. I can’t believe all this time has
gone by, another year has gone by. Obviously, you know, the
Superior Court had everything and they know that he shouldn’t
have been taken from us. The Supreme Court knew he shouldn’t
have been taken from us. I mean his life could be totally different
right now if all of this would not have occurred….[7]
***
[A] counselor would know … that somebody doesn’t commit
suicide because what? What did we do, you know? … [Child]
can’t go his whole life hating us[,] thinking that we made [Mother]
commit suicide. I don’t want to throw [Maternal Grandparents]
under the bus[, but Child] has to accept the fact that [Mother]
couldn’t handle life.
Id. at 142-43.
On cross-examination by Maternal Grandparents’ counsel, Paternal
Grandmother confirmed that her last overnight custody of Child was October
2021. Id. at 145. She then admitted that she had claimed and received
Child’s Social Security benefits from Mother’s death, even though Child was
not living with her. Id. at 150. Paternal Grandmother repeatedly justified her
____________________________________________
7 The trial court subsequently commented that prior judicial decisions “speak
for themselves, and I don’t mean to say that I agree with [Paternal
Grandmother’s] description of what the Superior and Supreme Court have
done. I do not. I have tried to make that point with her counsel as well,
apparently to no avail.” Id. at 149-50.
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actions, stating: “We have legal custody”; “We had legal custody”; “We had
legal custody”; “We have legal custody.” Id. at 150-53. She said three times
that she did not know when she filed for the benefits, but “it was probably
back when the Superior Court reaffirmed our thing.” Id. at 151-52. When
the trial court asked her how much money she received, Paternal
Grandmother replied, “I don’t know. I don’t remember. I don’t get it
anymore. I don’t know.” Id. at 152.
Maternal Grandparents’ counsel questioned Paternal Grandmother:
Q. When did [your receipt of Child’s Social Security benefits] stop?
A. I don’t know.
Q. You don’t know?
A. Ask [Maternal Grandparents]. They are the ones that asked for
it to be stopped even though they didn’t have custody. The
Supreme Court said we still had custody.
Q. You have demonstrated a very good memory about a lot of
things, but you can’t remember how much money you were
getting from Social Security?
A. No. That’s not even something I worry about.
Q. You can’t remember from when to when you were receiving
Social Security?
A. I imagine from the Superior Court[’s decision] until whenever
[Maternal Grandparents] wrote to them saying that they had
custody even though we still had legal custody from the Superior
Court[,] and then the Supreme Court said we do too. They just
wouldn’t hand him over. Maybe [Maternal Grandmother] knows.
Q. Does seven hundred forty-nine dollars a month sound familiar?
A. It might. I don’t know. I don’t even touch it or look at it.
Q. Well, where is it?
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A. It’s in an account.
Q. Do you think it should go to [Child]?
A. It will go to [Child].
Q. The child was never —
A. We technically have custody.
Q. The child was never in your home —
A. So what? Because they wouldn’t give him to us. Just because
somebody keeps somebody doesn’t mean they have custody. We
have legal custody.
Q. So you acknowledge that [while C]hild was [not] in your care
in your home, you were receiving Social Security from the
government for [C]hild and you were receiving it that entire time?
A. Because the Superior Court said we have custody. So I don’t
know what is criminal about the Superior Court and the Supreme
Court saying we have custody.
Q. You were receiving it even after th[e trial court ordered] that
[M]aternal [G]randparents have primary custody?
A. Th[e trial court] didn’t have the right to do that because it was
pending before the Supreme Court. That’s what they said. …
Q. You have collected over $5,000 for [Child] when he wasn’t in
your care from the government, didn’t you?
A. I don’t know. How would I know? I don’t look at it. I don’t
know, and we have had him—we have had legal custody.
Id. at 152-54.
According to Paternal Grandmother, if Maternal Grandparents “would
have given us custody last year like they were supposed to, it wouldn’t still be
going on.” Id. at 155. She stated, “I believe [Child] is being abused by not
allowing him to have contact with his paternal side when everything was
perfectly fine through the whole court proceeding before, and now since
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[Maternal Grandparents] have been the only ones to see him, all of a sudden
he hates everybody.” Id.
When Maternal Grandparents’ counsel asked Paternal Grandmother
about the adverse effects of litigation on Child, she testified:
A. [Maternal Grandparents] are the ones that have been
prosecut[ing] the whole way through. They started it before
[Mother’s] death. They took it to the Supreme Court. It is still
going on because of them. It is not us.
Q. How many appeals did you file?
A. Are you blaming me for this whole court process all these
years?
Q. I am asking you. You are leaving yourself out of this?
A. I never started any of them.
Q. You are leaving yourself out of this?
A. I never started any of them.
Q. You never filed an appeal to the Superior Court?
A. Well, of course.
Id. at 165-66.
After the testimony concluded, the trial court remarked:
The question is where do we go from here[,] and the instruction,
regardless of how we interpret who won and who lost, the
Supreme Court’s direction to me is rather specific. I am supposed
to enter a [f]inal [c]ustody [o]rder in this case based on the
current state of affairs. It is clear now[,] much after the fact[,]
that [Maternal Grandparents] have standing. There doesn’t seem
to be much of an issue on that today. So the question then is
what is in [Child’s] best interest…. So that’s where we are.
Id. at 172.
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Counsel next presented closing arguments. Maternal Grandparents’
counsel requested that the trial court “maintain the status quo” of Maternal
Grandparents’ sole legal custody and physical custody. Id. at 185. Paternal
Grandparents’ counsel requested reunification counseling to “rekindle[e] that
relationship so we can get a strong and consistent [c]ustody [o]rder where
[Child] is able to spend considerable time with [Paternal Grandparents].” Id.
at 196-97.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court advised, “so [Child] has
some sense of what happened, I do not intend to change the underlying
custody arrangement,” and “will keep sole physical and legal custody in
[M]aternal [G]randparents[,] where [Child has] been for the [past] years[,]
under their loving and capable care.” Id. at 198. On May 29, 2025, the trial
court entered an order and opinion. The order stated:
[A]fter hearing and careful review of the testimony adduced, the
court being satisfied that [M]aternal [G]randparents have met the
conditions for standing and that the best interest of [C]hild will be
served by granting them custody, it is ORDERED and DIRECTED
that Sole Legal and Physical Custody of [Child] is awarded to
[M]aternal [G]randparents.
Order, 5/29/25.
Paternal Grandparents timely filed a notice of appeal and concise
statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). They present three questions
for review:
I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion by
entering an [o]rder … that was contrary to the best interests of
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[C]hild by awarding exclusive sole legal and physical custody of
[C]hild without any periods of custody in [Paternal Grandparents]?
II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion
by failing to follow the mandates of the [o]rder of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, dated April 29, 2025, which directed the
[c]ourt to hold a custody hearing[,] and among other things,
resolve any outstanding custody petitions. At the time of the
entry of the [c]ourt’s [o]rder of May 2[9], 2025, the [c]ourt had
never ruled on two separate sets of Preliminary Objections filed
July 26, 2024; a Petition to Reconsider and Vacate Order of
November 13, 2024, filed December 12, 2024; and Omnibus
Custody Petitions filed May 7, 2025, which included a Petition for
Counseling, a Petition to Follow the Mandates of the Appellate
Court Orders regarding the Purpose of the Remand Hearing, a
Petition to Direct the Maternal Grandparents to provide all relevant
information to the [c]ourt, and a Petition for Recusal[?]
III. [Paternal Grandparents] are also requesting the [Superior]
Court to [r]econsider its initial denial of the[ir] Petition for Recusal
… filed December 12, 2024, given the fact that in addition to the
reasons set forth in that [p]etition, the [c]ourt showed further
bias, prejudice or unfairness raising a substantial doubt as to the
[court’s] ability to preside over the proceedings impartially by
berating [Paternal Grandmother] for being approximately 20
minutes late for the afternoon session of the hearing … when she
was late because of a medical problem. The [c]ourt did not make
any inquiries as [Paternal Grandmother] appeared in the
courtroom and went directly to the witness stand, and the [c]ourt
displayed an utter lack of appropriate judicial temperament by
berating [Paternal Grandmother] and her counsel[,] and
threatening them with the forfeiture of time in presenting their
case. The [c]ourt acted in this fashion despite the fact that
counsel for [Maternal Grandparents] was approximately 40
minutes late for the start of the proceedings. The [c]ourt’s bias
and prejudice is further reflected in its final order which
completely denied any contact by any member of [F]ather’s family
and did not grant, at the very least, the request for counseling
services between [C]hild and [P]aternal [G]randparents[?]
IV. Whether the [trial] court erred and/or abused its discretion in
denying Paternal Grandparents’ [p]etition for [r]ecusal where, in
addition to the reasons set forth in that [p]etition, the [t]rial
[c]ourt’s conduct during the … proceedings[,] as well as at the
earlier hearing on July 2, 2024, demonstrated bias, prejudice,
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and/or unfairness that created a substantial doubt as to its ability
to preside over the instant matter impartially?
V. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion
by entering an [o]rder that completely excludes any contact
between [C]hild and Paternal Grandparents[,] contrary to
[C]hild’s best interests[?]
Paternal Grandparents’ Brief at 5-8.8
DISCUSSION
Paternal Grandparents’ questions involve three issues which we address
in turn: (1) the trial court’s denial of Paternal Grandparents’ recusal request;
(2) the scope of the May 8, 2025 remand hearing; and (3) the substance of
the May 29, 2025 custody order.
1. Recusal
Paternal Grandparents argue that the trial court should have recused
from the proceedings, based on “actions prior to the May 8, 2025, hearing and
during the hearing,” and that “taken together, these errors deprived [Paternal
Grandparents] of a fair proceeding.” Paternal Grandparents’ Brief at 39. This
argument lacks merit.
We review the trial court’s denial of Paternal Grandparents’ recusal
request for an abuse of discretion. Irish Holdings LLC v. EQT Prod. Co.,
____________________________________________
8 Paternal Grandparents present five questions, but include only four (I, II, III
and IV) in their summary of the argument, and four (I, II, III and V) in their
argument. See Paternal Grandparents’ Brief at 20-47); see also Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (stating that the argument in a party’s brief “shall be divided into as
many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head
of each part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the
particular point treated therein”).
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330 A.3d 455, 464 (Pa. Super. 2025). A party seeking recusal of a judge must
provide evidence of the necessity for a disqualification. Id. A trial judge
should recuse whenever he has any doubt as to his ability to preside
impartially, or whenever he believes his impartiality can be reasonably
questioned. Id.
Here, counsel for Paternal Grandparents acknowledged at the May 8,
2025 hearing that the recusal issue had been raised and rejected by the trial
court five months prior. See Order, 12/20/24 (trial court denying Paternal
Grandparents’ recusal motion). When Paternal Grandparents’ counsel raised
the issue at the May 8, 2025 hearing, the trial court responded:
What basis for recusal do you have? I have no financial interest
that entangles me with your clients whatsoever. I don’t know
anybody involved in this case. I have no reason to be biased or
prejudiced for either side. I have been on the bench for 38 years.
I cannot tell you how many hundreds of custody cases I have had.
All you are telling me is they simply don’t like my decisions so far.
That is not a basis for recusal.
N.T. at 2-3. The trial court added, “I am not in the position to waste my time
this morning anymore on this … [w]e need to find out what the best interest
is for this child.” Id. at 3.
Later that afternoon, when Paternal Grandmother was late returning to
the courtroom, the following discussion occurred:
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: Judge, I’ve tried calling
and also texting. I haven’t gotten any response. I went down the
hall to make sure [Paternal Grandparents] weren’t perhaps
thinking I was going to meet them in a conference room. I don’t
see them. I’m not sure what is going on, Judge. I apologize.
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2:05 p.m.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: I will call [Paternal
Grandmother], Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: All right. Now, as she approaches the stand in
terms of any consideration of time constraints in this case this
afternoon, you may assume that you are already 20 minutes into
her examination. Am I understood?
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor —
BY THE COURT : Am I understood?
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: You are understood,
Your Honor, but with all due respect [Maternal Grandparents’
counsel] was late [this morning]. I was here on time, and there
was nothing said about that.
BY THE COURT: You cannot call yourself as a witness.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: I understand that.
BY THE COURT: Your witness is 20 minutes late.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: I understand that, Your
Honor, but what I am saying—
BY THE COURT: You are 20 minutes into your time. Go.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor —
BY THE COURT: Go.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: I get it. I don’t
understand the anger here. With due respect, Your Honor, I
think—
BY THE COURT: With due respect is just fine when every
courtroom that I know that I can think of, many, many judges,
she would be in handcuffs right now.
[PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER]: I had a kidney transplant, and I had
to go to the bathroom and take my medicine and go do all that
stuff.
BY THE COURT: [Counsel] didn’t say that when you first walked
in the room.
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[PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER]: He didn’t know that.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: I didn’t know what the
problem was, Judge, but I can say that I waited here for [Maternal
Grandparents’ counsel] and that was okay because he must have
run into traffic, but I am getting the impression that there may be
a little bit of bias here against me and I will put that on the record
because I am being treated differently by this [c]ourt.
BY THE COURT: There is no bias.
[PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS’ COUNSEL]: I feel it.
BY THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that. We all sat
here for 20 minutes and she walked—
[COUNSEL]: Why am I being chastised and my client being
chastised when we waited this morning for 20 minutes for
[Maternal Grandparents’ counsel], Your Honor? I don’t get it.
BY THE COURT: Very well. Go ahead.
Id. at 101-03.
After Paternal Grandmother testified, the trial court apologized. The
trial court stated that it had “perceived a nonchalance on the part of [Paternal
Grandmother] arriving while we are all sitting here for 20 minutes, and it was
a misperception on my part. I lost my temper and I should not have.” Id. at
175-76. The trial court said, “Please be assured that I have no bias,” and “I
have no bias, no bias against either side.” Id. at 176.
As indicated above, the trial court expressed no “doubt as to [its] ability
to preside impartially.” Irish Holdings LLC, 330 A.3d at 464. There is
nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Thus, the trial court did not abuse
of its discretion in denying Paternal Grandparents’ request to recuse.
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2. Scope of the May 8, 2025 Remand Hearing
Paternal Grandparents argue that the trial court erred in disregarding
the Supreme Court’s remand order and failing to rule on preliminary
objections they filed in July 2024 (challenging Maternal Grandparents’
standing); the petition to reconsider and vacate the November 13, 2024
custody order they filed in December 12, 2024; and the custody motions
(seeking recusal and counseling) they filed on May 7, 2025, the day before
the remand hearing. See Paternal Grandparents’ Brief at 5, 27-28. This
argument also lacks merit.
The trial court recognized the Supreme Court’s instructions to “‘make a
fresh assessment of standing, resolve any outstanding custody petitions, and
determine a final custody arrangement that will serve the best interest of the
child.’” TCO at 1 (quoting T.M.H. v. J.L., 334 A.3d 860–61, 29 WAP 2024
(Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2025) (per curiam order)). The trial court followed the
Supreme Court’s instructions in determining that Maternal Grandparents
“have met the conditions for standing and that the best interest of the child
will be served by granting them custody.”9 Order, 5/29/25. Thus, the trial
court resolved Paternal Grandparents’ preliminary objections pertaining to
standing and their petition to reconsider and vacate the prior custody order.
____________________________________________
9 Although standing was not disputed at the hearing, we note that the Child
Custody Act provides standing to persons who are in loco parentis. 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 5324(2). At the time of the hearing, Maternal Grandparents were in loco
parentis because they had “assumed obligations incident to the parental
relationship” with Child. A.C. v. E.K., 331 A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. Super. 2025).
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In addition, the trial court denied Paternal Grandparents’ recusal request
from the bench, and denied their request for reunification counseling in the
opinion accompanying the May 29, 2025 custody order. See TCO at 7 (trial
court stating it was “not satisfied that a court order requiring counseling is in
[Child’s] best interest, and [was] instead satisfied that it would only ensure
the further litigation of this matter throughout what remains of his teenage
years”).
As the trial court observed, it was “directed … to set aside the tortured
procedural history of this case and make a decision based on today’s reality.”
TCO at 1-2. The record shows that the trial court did so. Paternal
Grandparents’ argument to the contrary is without merit.
3. The May 29, 2025 Custody Order
Paternal Grandparents argue that the trial court’s award of sole legal
and physical custody to Maternal Grandparents, and its decision to not order
reunification counseling, “is clearly against [C]hild’s best interests.” Paternal
Grandparents’ Brief at 24.
We review the trial court’s custody order for an abuse of discretion.
Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60 (Pa. Super. 2023). This Court has
explained:
We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported
by competent evidence of record, as our role does not
include making independent factual determinations. In
addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of
the evidence, we must defer to the [trial court] who viewed
and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
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Id. (citation omitted). The trial court’s discretion “should be accorded the
utmost respect, given the special nature of the proceeding and the lasting
impact the result will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” B.S.G. v.
D.M.C., 255 A.3d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). The
“knowledge gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody
proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed
record.” Id.
In challenging the trial court’s order, Paternal Grandparents state that
they “have a longstanding nurturing relationship” with Child, and cite Paternal
Grandmother’s testimony to support their claim that Child “would benefit from
restoration of his relationship with Paternal Grandparents.” Paternal
Grandparents’ Brief at 24, 53; see also id. at 24-27, 47-50. However,
“parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on evidence.
Rather, the paramount concern of the trial court is the best interest of the
child.” See Smith v. Smith, 281 A.3d 304, 312 (Pa. Super. 2022).
The record shows the trial court’s consistent focus on Child’s best
interest, which involves factors that “affect a child’s physical, intellectual,
moral, and spiritual well-being.” S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 554 (Pa.
Super. 2013). Notably, the trial court considered the best-interest factors set
forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). See TCO at 5-6. In addition, the trial court
stated the reasons for its decision from the bench and in its written opinion.
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See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(d) (requiring the trial court to “delineate the reasons
for its decision on the record in open court or in a written opinion or order”).10
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced that it would
“keep sole physical and legal custody” with Maternal Grandparents, and noted
the years that Child had been “under [Maternal Grandparents’] loving and
capable care.” N.T. at 198. With regard to counseling, the trial court stated:
[B]oth parties seem to agree, I am happy to hear, that the best
interest of [C]hild demands that this custody case be concluded.
So that leaves the issue about which … you both seem to agree[,]
and that is whether we can rekindle a relationship between [Child]
and [P]aternal [G]randparents. If ever he will recover such a
relationship will depend on [Paternal G]randparents’ appreciation
of the situation, the manner in which they reach out to him, and I
think at the end of the day it is probably for them to decide how
to do that, not for me, the Judge. I am not qualified to do that,
but will take under advisement the issue and timing of
reunification counseling. I am inclined to agree, however, and this
I do need to think about, but inclined at least to initially agree that
the threshold question of the reunification counseling should be
whether it is in the best interest of [C]hild to begin with[,] and go
from there.
Id. at 198-99.
The trial court subsequently issued its order and opinion, in which it
specifically “resolve[d] issues of credibility in favor of [M]aternal
[G]randmother.” TCO at 4. The trial court explained:
____________________________________________
10 There “is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all
that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that the
custody decision is based on those considerations.” A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818,
823 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
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[P]aternal [G]randmother’s testimony seems to … be marked by
a superficial understanding of the events … and an attempt to
completely discount any responsibility she bears for the discord in
the family. There was testimony to the effect that, in the months
leading up to her suicide, [M]other came to question her decision
to leave [Child] with [P]aternal [G]randparents[,] and [M]other
sought to obtain custody from them. As this process was
unfolding, she committed suicide. Notably, [P]aternal
[G]randmother did not even attend the funeral…. [I]t is clear that
these events have left [Child] with an extreme dislike of [P]aternal
[G]randparents.
… By the time the undersigned became involved, [P]aternal
[G]randparents were attempting to enforce their rights and had
even enlisted the assistance of the State Police. It was during one
such episode that [C]hild hid from law enforcement and, at one
point, threatened self-harm rather than go with [P]aternal
[G]randparents.
… [C]hild, initially, refused to come to the courthouse for our
hearing. He expressed to [M]aternal [G]randmother that he was
deeply distressed by the squabbling which was occurring between
his grandparents and had no desire to talk to ‘yet another judge.’
… In the meantime, it became apparent that he was otherwise
being very well cared for. It was clear to us that he had a very
close and loving relationship with [Maternal Grandparents] and
that they reciprocated with warmth and affection.
We have carefully examined the testimony in this case in light of
the statutory factors which we are required to consider in deciding
custody cases. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328. [M]aternal
[G]randparents will best ensure the safety of [C]hild. They have
been his capable caregivers, calming these otherwise rough seas
for most of [C]hild’s life and, exclusively, for more than three
years. … In terms of the assumption of parental duties,
[M]aternal [G]randparents have exclusively performed them.
Considerations of stability and continuity clearly militate in favor
of [M]aternal [G]randparents. [Child] now is an A and B student
and has had great support from [M]aternal [G]randmother in his
academics. In terms of extended family, there is availability on
both sides, but [Child] has not had a relationship with his paternal
side for years. …
The custody factors also include an examination of the preference
of the child. [Child] wants to live with [M]aternal [G]randparents.
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Our inquiry also involves the question of the extent to which a
party will encourage contact between the other party and the
child. In that regard, we find [M]aternal [G]randmother credible
in describing her efforts to encourage a relationship with
[P]aternal [G]randparents. Unfortunately, she has not been very
successful.
In short, examining the statutory factors as we must, it is clear
that [Child] is not only well-off, but is thriving in his current living
situation in the care of [Maternal Grandparents]. Moreover, it is
now beyond peradventure that [Maternal Grandparents] have
standing in this case to pursue primary custody.
In entering today’s order, it is our hope to bring an end to this
custody case. This litigation has loomed over [Child] to the degree
that it is harmful. While it is arguably the public policy of this
Commonwealth to maintain relationships between children and
their grandparents, the maintenance of that relationship has
always been secondary to the child’s best interest. See Rigler v.
Treen, 660 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. 1995). At the end of our recent
hearing, counsel for [P]aternal [G]randparents requested that we
order some sort of reunification counseling. It may be that in
future years [Child] will reconcile with [P]aternal [G]randparents
and that existing wounds will be healed. We do not see that
happening at this point by court order, let alone court-ordered
reunification counseling. We simply are not satisfied that a court
order requiring counseling is in [Child’s] best interest, and are
instead satisfied that it would only ensure the further litigation of
this matter throughout what remains of his teenage years.
TCO at 4-7.
The record supports the trial court’s assessment of Child’s best interest.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting sole legal
and physical custody to Maternal Grandparents.
Order affirmed.
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DATE: 2/26/2026
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