“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”
How later courts described this case
- “We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”
- “At a minimum, however, an employee facing termination must be given ‘notice and an opportunity to respond’ before the termination takes effect.” (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546)
- “Garcetti added a threshold layer to our previous analysis. . . . Accordingly, our first task is to determine whether Davis’ speech was part of her official duties, that is whether she spoke as a citizen or as part of her public job.”
- reasoning that, when an auditor contacted the FBI and EEOC, those reports “were not made as an employee” since communicating “with outside police authorities or other agencies” was “not within an auditor’s job function”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-40644 Document: 125-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/24/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
February 24, 2026
No. 24-40644
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Johnathan Castille, Doctor,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Port Arthur ISD; Mark Porterie; Melissa Oliva;
Monique Bienvenue; Michael Oliver,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:23-CV-209
______________________________
Before Smith and Richman, Circuit Judges. *
Priscilla Richman, Circuit Judge:
A special education administrator sued the Port Arthur Independent
School District (Port Arthur ISD) and other school employees following the
termination of his employment. He alleged a conspiracy to violate his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, claiming that he was fired because he
_____________________
*
Judge Dennis was a member of the panel that heard this case but took inactive
status after the case was submitted. This matter is decided by a quorum under 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(d).
Case: 24-40644 Document: 125-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/24/2026
No. 24-40644
reported child abuse to his supervisor and participated in a CPS investigation.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. We affirm.
I
Because we are reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the following recounting of events “accept[s] all facts in the complaint
as true, but do[es] not accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual
inferences, or legal conclusions.” 1
Dr. Johnathan Castille was the administrator over Fine Arts and
Special Education at Memorial High School in Port Arthur ISD. He alleges
that while he held this position, the school’s principal, Dr. Melissa Oliva,
reassigned special education teachers in a manner that made it “impossible”
for Castille to serve many special education students adequately.
At the start of the 2021 academic year, Michael Oliver, a special
education teacher at the school, withheld lunch from a special education
student as a form of discipline. Shortly after, in mid-September, Monique
Bienvenue, another special education teacher, interrogated a special
education student “in an extreme manner” by flipping over the student’s
table so that it nearly hit him. Bienvenue also emptied the student’s
backpack, ripped up his papers, and threw the backpack’s contents onto the
floor as the student cried. Oliver watched this incident without intervening,
and the entire incident was caught on videotape. Castille provided Oliva with
“all the documentation listing all the violations” connected with these
incidents.
_____________________
1
McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Arnold v. Williams,
979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020)).
2
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No. 24-40644
In late September, not long after the previous incidents, Castille
intervened to break up a fight between students. The next week, Oliva
suspended Castille for three days with pay during an investigation into that
fight; the cause for his suspension stated that he “watched two boys fight in
front of the cafeteria and did not make any attempt to deescalate the
situation.” About two weeks after Oliva suspended Castille, he filed a
grievance against Oliva regarding the fight and suspension.
Oliva and Castille met to review the videotape of the abovementioned
incident involving Bienvenue. After viewing the footage, Oliva asked Castille
to “state what he had seen on the video,” and he responded that he had seen
Bienvenue “flip the table over and rip up the student’s papers.” She
repeated the question, and he supplied the same answer. She then stated that
the school district’s superintendent, Dr. Mark Porterie, “wants to get rid of
you and I can’t keep you if I can’t trust you.”
In December 2021, a Child Protective Services (CPS) agent
interviewed Castille regarding Oliver’s and Bienvenue’s alleged abuse
incidents from earlier in the fall. This interview took place in Oliva’s
presence, and at one point, Oliva falsely stated that she told Castille to
suspend Oliver. Castille corrected Oliva on that point. Throughout January
and February 2022, the mothers of the students Oliver and Bienvenue
allegedly abused reached out to Castille several times inquiring whether
Oliver and Bienvenue were disciplined. Castille brought these inquiries to
Oliva’s attention, and “[e]ach time Oliva would criticize [Castille] and
pushback as she had from the beginning.”
In early January 2022, Castille went to the Port Arthur ISD
warehouse to collect donations for a student. While there, he borrowed two
fogger/sprayer machines so that he could fog and sanitize the auditorium; the
supervisor on duty, Demetria Williams, gave him permission to borrow the
3
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No. 24-40644
foggers. He labeled the boxes to make clear they belonged to the warehouse,
used them to sanitize the auditorium, and left both foggers in their boxes in
the auditorium. The next day, Edgar Rideaux, the main warehouse
supervisor, came to the school to speak with Castille. Rideaux asked Castille
to email him instead of asking Williams whenever Castille needed something
for the school campus. After Castille apologized and explained that he was
unaware of that process, Rideaux responded that he understood and “just
wanted [Castille] to be informed of the future process.”
At the beginning of February 2022, Castille emailed school district
assistant superintendent Dr. Melvin Getwood “reporting what [Castille]
believed to be retaliatory harassment by Principal Oliva.” The complaint
does not specify what this harassment entailed. Getwood met with Castille
that afternoon. Two days later, Mr. Wyble, whose position the complaint
does not identify, told Castille to meet with him and Ms. Chappell-Carrier.
Chappell-Carrier asked Castille about his early-January visit to the
warehouse. Wyble told Castille at the meeting that he “may need” Castille
to write a statement about the foggers and, if so, he “would let [Castille]
know.” Wyble asked Castille for a statement the next day. After another
follow-up conversation in which Castille assured Wyble that he was working
on the statement with his attorney, Porterie informed Castille that he was
being suspended without pay because he “had not given Mr. Wyble the
statement which he had requested, and that there was going to be an
investigation.”
Later in February, Castille filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the school district,
claiming that Oliva, who is white, wanted to replace him with Oliver, who is
also “[w]hite and mid-thirties” but “not because of his qualifications.” The
complaint does not specify Castille’s race, but a later court filing states that
Castille is Black. In that discrimination charge, he claimed that Oliva “tried
4
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No. 24-40644
to make [Castille] fail in his job” because he opposed her discriminatory
practice. He also reported (1) Oliver’s August 2021 abuse incident, (2) that
he heard the same student had been assaulted by another Port Arthur ISD
teacher in 2019, (3) that he heard the same student had an earlier negative
history with Oliva at another Port Arthur ISD school, (4) that he watched
the video of Bienvenue’s September 2021 abuse incident with Oliva and
testified to CPS about the incident, and (5) that there was a resulting citation
against Port Arthur ISD by CPS.
In May 2022, twelve days after the school district filed its position
statement with the EEOC, its Board of Trustees (Board) held a regular board
meeting. Castille’s employment terms were not listed on the agenda
published before the meeting, Castille had no notice that the Board would
discuss him, and neither he nor his contract was mentioned in the minutes
published after the meeting. However, the next day, Porterie notified Castille
“that his 2021-2022 annual contract of employment was being terminated
after an opportunity to challenge the proposed action to terminate.”
Castille challenged “the proposed action,” and a hearing examiner
was assigned to decide whether Castille “had suffered adverse personnel
actions in violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act” and “whether there
existed good cause to terminate [Castille’s] employment” with Port Arthur
ISD. The complaint alleges that the hearing examiner “arbitrarily excluded
evidence produced by [Castille]” but does not specify what that evidence was
or any circumstances about the exclusion. The hearing examiner’s decision
“support[ed]” the proposal to terminate Castille, and in December 2022, a
majority of the Board voted to adopt the hearing examiner’s factual findings
and legal conclusions and terminate Castille’s employment. Castille
appealed to the Texas Commissioner of Education, Mike Morath, who
denied the appeal. Castille also filed another discrimination complaint with
the EEOC and received a federal right to sue letter.
5
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No. 24-40644
Castille then sued Port Arthur ISD, Porterie, Oliva, Bienvenue,
Oliver, and Morath in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas. He requested judicial review of his administrative appeal,
arguing that the school district had violated the Texas Whistleblower Act.
He also alleged that the school district retaliated against him for reporting to
CPS, serving as a witness in the CPS investigation of abuse at the school, and
for “report[ing] Oliva, Bienvenue, and . . . Oliver for conspiring to and
committing aggravated assault against” two students. Finally, he claimed
that “[d]efendants have joined together in a civil conspiracy to violate the
rights[,] privileges[,] and immunities secured to [Castille] by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” He
sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages.
Several defendants filed motions to dismiss, and Castille amended his
complaint. The defendants then filed updated motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on Castille’s lack of standing
and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on failure to state
a claim on which relief may be granted. Castille sought leave to amend his
complaint a second time, which the district court denied. The magistrate
judge then issued its report and recommendation, suggesting that the case be
dismissed based on Castille’s failure to state a claim. Castille timely objected
to the report and recommendation, but the district court adopted the report
and recommendations and granted the motions to dismiss. Castille filed a
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), which the district court denied. Castille timely appealed. Following
Castille’s appeal, he and Morath jointly moved to dismiss Castille’s claims
against Morath, and this court granted the motion. The remaining
defendants are Port Arthur ISD, Porterie, Oliva, Bienvenue, and Oliver
(Defendants).
6
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No. 24-40644
We “review orders on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under the de novo standard of review.” 2 “A complaint must
contain factual matter sufficient to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” 3 “A facially plausible claim ‘allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” 4
II
Castille argues that Defendants retaliated against him for the
following exercises of his First Amendment right to free speech: (1) reporting
child abuse to his supervisor, (2) cooperating with a CPS investigation into
school employees’ alleged child abuse, and (3) not describing the video of
Bienvenue’s September abuse incident in the manner that Oliva wished.
Defendants respond that he did not engage in this speech as a citizen speaking
on a matter of public concern, no unconstitutional factor motivated his
termination, and caselaw forbidding “compelled speech” does not apply to
these facts.
“Even if a teacher has no protectable property interest in his
continued employment sufficient to invoke the protections of the due process
clause, he ‘may neither be dismissed or not be rehired for constitutionally
impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or the assertion of rights
guaranteed by law or the Constitution.’” 5 Establishing “a First Amendment
_____________________
2
Id. (citing Petrobras Am., Inc. v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 9 F.4th 247, 253 (5th
Cir. 2021)).
3
Jones v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 51 F.4th 101, 109 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
4
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
5
Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Ferguson v. Thomas, 430
F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1970)).
7
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No. 24-40644
retaliatory-discharge claim” requires the plaintiff to show “that (i) he
suffered an adverse employment action; (ii) his speech involved a matter of
public concern; (iii) his interest in speaking on the issue outweighed
[Defendants’] interest in promoting workplace efficiency; and (iv) his speech
was a substantial or motivating factor for [Defendants’] actions.” 6
A
We must determine as a threshold issue whether Castille was speaking
as a citizen or an employee. 7 “[T]he question of whether a communication
is made as an employee or as a citizen is a question of law.” 8 “To be speaking
on a matter of public concern, the employee must speak in his capacity as
citizen, not employee.” 9 “The critical question under Garcetti is whether
the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s
duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” 10 “Activities
undertaken in the course of performing one’s job are activities pursuant to
official duties.” 11 “Even if the speech is of great social importance, it is not
_____________________
6
Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Harris v. Victoria Indep.
Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1999)).
7
Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Garcetti added a threshold
layer to our previous analysis. . . . Accordingly, our first task is to determine whether
Davis’ speech was part of her official duties, that is whether she spoke as a citizen or as part
of her public job.”); see also Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Before
proceeding to examine the substance of Charles’s speech, we must first focus on his role
when he uttered it.”).
8
Davis, 518 F.3d at 315.
9
Gibson v. Kirkpatrick, 838 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2016).
10
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
11
Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007).
8
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No. 24-40644
protected by the First Amendment so long as it was made pursuant to the
worker’s official duties.” 12
Castille argues that his speech involved a matter of public concern
because reporting child abuse is a mandatory duty for everyone in Texas, not
just school officials. The Texas Family Code provides that a “person having
reasonable cause to believe that a child’s physical or mental health or welfare
has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person shall
immediately make a report” of that abuse or neglect. 13 The law in effect at
the time of the incidents in question further required that “professional[s],”
“includ[ing] teachers,” “shall make a report not later than the 48th hour
after the hour the professional first has reasonable cause to believe that the
child has been or may be abused or neglected.” 14 In the time since the alleged
events occurred, the Texas Legislature amended the Code to require a
professional to report within twenty-four hours. 15 The report must be made
to a law enforcement agency or the Department of Family and Protective
Services. 16
We need not decide whether an educator reporting child abuse to the
authorities under a state-law-mandated reporting requirement constitutes
speech as a citizen. In this case, Castille did not allege that he directly
reported suspected child abuse to law enforcement or the Department of
_____________________
12
Id. at 692.
13
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a).
14
Duty to Report Child Abuse and Neglect, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 902, § 1, 2021 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2209, 2209 (amended 2025) (current version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 261.101(b)).
15
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.101(b).
16
Id. § 261.103(a), (d); see also id. § 261.001(2) (defining “[d]epartment” as the
“Department of Family and Protective Services”).
9
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No. 24-40644
Family and Protective Services, as required by state law. Castille reported
the child abuse only to his direct supervisor, and then he cooperated with a
CPS investigation during which he was interviewed in the presence of his
direct supervisor. It is unclear who reported the abuse to CPS to initiate this
investigation. We accordingly ask whether Castille spoke as a citizen or an
employee (1) when reporting instances of child abuse by teachers under his
supervision internally to his direct supervisor, (2) when participating in a
CPS investigation with his direct supervisor, and (3) when refusing to
describe an incident in a particular way to his supervisor.
1
Castille argues that reporting child abuse to his direct supervisor,
Principal Oliva, was protected speech. That Castille spoke within the office
rather than publicly is not dispositive. 17 We assess whether this activity was
“undertaken in the course of performing [his] job.” 18 As the administrator
over Special Education, Castille oversaw the Special Education students and
teachers. In this oversight role, he provided his supervisor, Principal Oliva,
with “all the documentation listing all the [abuse] violations.” Reporting
abuse violations involving the teachers and students under his care to his
direct supervisor was an activity “undertaken in the course of performing
[his] job.” 19
In Williams, we concluded that an Athletic Director’s memoranda to
his supervising principal were not protected speech because the memoranda
_____________________
17
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“That Ceballos expressed his
views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not dispositive. Employees in some cases
may receive First Amendment protection for expressions made at work.”).
18
Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007).
19
Id.
10
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No. 24-40644
included “special knowledge” gained in the course of his job, involved
“concerns about the program he ran,” and were written so he could
“properly execute” his job responsibilities. 20 Similarly, here, the
information Castille reported was special knowledge gained as part of his job;
his reports involved concerns about the Special Education students and
teachers he supervised; and he was concerned about properly executing his
job as administrator over the teachers and students involved by, for example,
advocating for “disciplinary actions.” His reports to Principal Oliva were
made as an employee, not a citizen.
2
Castille’s participation in a CPS investigation as the administrator
over the teachers whose conduct was at issue was speech as an employee in
the course of his job responsibilities. The Supreme Court’s decision in Lane
v. Franks, which held that “the First Amendment protects a public employee
who provides truthful sworn testimony . . . outside the scope of his ordinary
job responsibilities,” 21 does not control this case. Castille did not provide
sworn testimony, nor did he “testif[y] before an official government
adjudicatory or fact-finding body.” 22 He also did not allege that he made
independent reports to CPS outside the course of his usual job duties. 23
Rather, a CPS agent interviewed him about alleged abuse by teachers who
were under his supervision and under the supervision of Principal Oliva, who
_____________________
20
Id. at 694.
21
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2014).
22
Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989).
23
Cf. Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 314-16 (5th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that, when
an auditor contacted the FBI and EEOC, those reports “were not made as an employee”
since communicating “with outside police authorities or other agencies” was “not within
an auditor’s job function”).
11
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No. 24-40644
participated in the interview alongside Castille. Castille acted within his job
responsibilities as an administrator over Special Education to raise concerns
about child abuse of Special Education students to his direct supervisor and
to participate with his supervisor in a CPS investigation into those incidents.
Since Castille spoke as an employee and not a citizen, his speech is not
protected by the First Amendment.
3
Castille also alleges that he engaged in protected speech when he
refused to describe the video of Bienvenue’s abuse incident in the manner
that Oliva wished. This conversation was one between Oliva as principal and
Castille as the special education administrator regarding a special education
teacher’s treatment of a special education student. It fits squarely within the
scope of Castille’s job responsibilities and is not protected speech.
The cases Castille cites to support his contention that his refusal to
speak constitutes protected speech are inapposite. In the first, the Supreme
Court held that a private citizen may cover up the state’s motto on their
license plate, and in the second, the Supreme Court held that a person may
not be required to subsidize speech with which they disagreed. 24 Castille
also cites a case from our circuit expounding on the illegality of perjury. 25
_____________________
24
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 713 (1977) (holding that a New
Hampshire resident may cover up the state motto on their license plate because the state
may not “constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express
purpose that it be observed and read by the public”); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405, 411 (2001) (“First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can
compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for
speech on the side that it favors . . . the compelled funding for the advertising must pass
First Amendment scrutiny.”).
25
Springer v. Coleman, 998 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1993).
12
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No. 24-40644
Castille cites a Second Circuit decision that is also distinguishable,26 and in
any event, is in tension with our circuit’s precedent. 27 These cases do not
support the contention that Castille’s refusal to characterize the video of
Bienvenue’s abuse in a specific way, despite pressure from Oliva, was
protected speech.
Since we conclude that Castille spoke in his role as an administrator
and not as a citizen, we do not reach whether his speech was on a matter of
public concern.
III
Castille argues that his termination violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. Castille’s “due-process theory requires him
to identify a protected life, liberty, or property interest and prove that
‘governmental action resulted in a deprivation of that interest.’” 28 Even if
we assume that Castille could establish a protected property interest in his
continued employment, his claims fail because he cannot otherwise
demonstrate a violation of his procedural or substantive due process rights.
_____________________
26
See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a police
officer’s “refusal to comply with orders to retract his truthful Report and file one that was
false has a clear civilian analogue and that [the police officer] was not simply doing his job
in refusing to obey those orders from the department’s top administrative officers and the
chief of police”).
27
See Anderson v. Valdez, 913 F.3d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Gibson v.
Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 669-70 (5th Cir. 2014)) (“His argument is essentially that a job-
imposed duty with a ‘citizen analogue’ is never an official duty for the purposes of Garcetti.
But this relies on an implicit premise . . . that we have explicitly declined to adopt.”).
28
Wilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex. ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 878 F.3d 147, 155 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010)).
13
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No. 24-40644
A
For a procedural due process claim, “the deprivation by state action
of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an
interest without due process of law.” 29 “An essential principle of due process
is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” 30 An
“employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his
employment” is entitled to “‘some kind of a hearing’ prior to [his]
discharge.” 31 The “formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature
of the subsequent proceedings.” 32 But the “essential requirements of due
process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.” 33
Castille alleges that on May 18, 2022, he received notice by letter from
Porterie that the Board had proposed terminating his contract, and he had an
opportunity to challenge that proposed action. He did challenge the
proposed action and was assigned a hearing examiner, who received
evidence, conducted a hearing in October, and issued a decision. The hearing
examiner’s decision supported the proposed termination, and a majority of
the Board then voted to adopt the examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law and terminate Castille’s employment. Castille exercised his right to
_____________________
29
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
30
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
31
Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)).
32
Id. at 545 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)).
33
Id. at 546.
14
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No. 24-40644
appeal to the Texas Commissioner of Education, who issued a final
administrative decision denying the appeal.
Castille argues that (1) he should have received notice before the
Board voted to propose his termination, and (2) the hearing was insufficient
because the hearing examiner “arbitrarily excluded” evidence that he
produced. First, Castille cites no authority suggesting that notice before the
initial Board vote was necessary. During the initial vote, the Board appears
to have voted only to propose his termination, not actually to terminate him;
the termination decision was not made until after his notice and hearing
process was complete. Castille received pre-termination notice, as required
under Loudermill. 34 Second, while Castille claims that the hearing examiner
arbitrarily excluded evidence, he does not allege what evidence the hearing
examiner excluded, the purpose of the evidence, or why the decision to
exclude them was “arbitrary.” In our review, we “do not accept conclusory
allegations” as true, 35 and Castille has not pleaded facts that demonstrate he
did not receive meaningful due process.
B
As to his substantive due process claim, assuming Castille had a
property interest in his continued employment, he must show “that the
public employer’s termination of that interest was arbitrary or capricious.” 36
“Substantive due process ‘bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government
_____________________
34
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542; see also Greene v. Greenwood Pub. Sch. Dist., 890 F.3d
240, 242 (5th Cir. 2018) (“At a minimum, however, an employee facing termination must
be given ‘notice and an opportunity to respond’ before the termination takes effect.”
(quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546)).
35
McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024).
36
Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993)).
15
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No. 24-40644
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.’” 37 But “substantive due process requires only that public officials
exercise professional judgment, in a nonarbitrary and noncapricious manner,
when depriving an individual of a protected property interest.” 38 A plaintiff
“must ‘demonstrate that the abuse of power by the state official shocks the
conscience.’” 39 Conduct that shocks the conscience is conduct that:
“violates the decencies of civilized conduct”; . . . is “so brutal
and offensive that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas
of fair play and decency”; . . . “interferes with rights implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty”; and . . . “is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience.” 40
“Many cases that have applied the standard have involved the use of extreme
force by police officers or other state actors.” 41 The “burden to show state
conduct that shocks the conscience is extremely high, requiring stunning
evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond mere violations of
state law, even violations resulting from bad faith to something more
egregious and more extreme.” 42
_____________________
37
Id. (quoting Marco Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 489 F.3d 669, 672
n.3 (5th Cir. 2007)).
38
Id. at 631 (quoting Tex. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Walker, 142
F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1998)).
39
Id. (quoting Marco, 489 F.3d at 672 n.3).
40
Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 867 (5th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47, 847 n.8
(1998)).
41
Id. at 867-68 (collecting cases).
42
Id. at 868 (quoting J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010)).
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In this case, Castille’s allegations do not surmount this high bar. In
his complaint, Castille asserts that he was assigned a hearing examiner who
received evidence and made a “decision based on [the school district’s]
burden to support its claims that [he] should be terminated by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Castille states that the hearing examiner
“arbitrarily excluded evidence produced by [him],” and “intentionally
constructed an arbitrary decision supporting [the school district’s] proposed
termination of [him], transparently made up of arbitrary findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which were clearly pretextually contrived to effect [the
school district’s] desired goal.” Then, Castille notes that “a majority of the
[Port Arthur ISD] Board of Trustees arbitrarily voted to adopt the [hearing
examiner’s] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and terminate [his]
employment.” Castille also alleges that Port Arthur ISD “retaliated against
[him] because he, in good faith, reported and served as a witness against [the
school district] to an appropriate law enforcement authority, the Department
of Family and Protective Services – Child Protective Services.”
At oral argument, counsel for Castille noted that the hearing
examiner’s recommendation for termination was based on the incident with
the foggers/sprayers and the delayed giving of a statement about the incident.
Notwithstanding Castille’s claims that he was fired based on his participation
in a CPS investigation, his conclusory allegations fail to explain how the
hearing examiner’s recommendation to fire Castille was “arbitrary,” nor
does he describe why the Board’s adoption of the recommendation was
“arbitrary.”
Additionally, Castille cites no authority in his opening brief to support
his argument that his substantive due process rights were violated. Given the
bare pleadings in this case, we cannot conclude that Defendants’ actions
17
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No. 24-40644
“extend[ed] beyond mere violations of state law, even violations resulting
from bad faith to something more egregious and more extreme.” 43
IV
Castille argues the district court erred in granting qualified immunity
to the individual defendants. “To defeat a defendant’s assertion of qualified
immunity, the plaintiff must show ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time
of the challenged conduct.’” 44 As explained above, Castille has not
sufficiently pled that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. They are
entitled to qualified immunity.
V
Castille argues the district court erred in evaluating his conspiracy
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Regardless, Castille’s claim also fails under § 1983. A § 1983 civil conspiracy
claim requires a plaintiff to allege facts “establish[ing] (1) the existence of a
conspiracy involving state action” and “(2) a deprivation of civil rights in
furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.” 45 As discussed
above, Castille did not sufficiently plead a deprivation of his constitutional
rights. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of his conspiracy claim.
_____________________
43
Doe ex rel. Magee, 675 F.3d at 868 (quoting Gloria, 593 F.3d at 80).
44
Trevino v. Iden, 79 F.4th 524, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Shaw v. Villanueva,
918 F.3d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 2019)).
45
Shaw, 918 F.3d at 419 (quoting Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187
(5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by, Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449
(5th Cir. 1992)).
18
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No. 24-40644
VI
As to Castille’s argument that the district court erred in failing to take
judicial notice of the “complete Administrative Record” of proceedings
before the Texas Commissioner of Education, we conclude this was not an
abuse of discretion.
Castille asked the district court to take judicial notice of the “complete
Administrative Record” after the magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation and before the district court’s order adopting the report.
The district court did not explicitly rule on Castille’s request to take judicial
notice. However, it recognized that at the motion to dismiss stage, “the
Court is limited to reviewing the four corners of the Complaint.” When
issuing its final judgment, the district court denied as moot all pending
motions, which included Castille’s request to take judicial notice. Castille’s
corrected Rule 59(e) motion to alter the judgment did not argue that the
district court erred by denying his request to take judicial notice of the record.
But Castille now argues before this court that the “district court abused its
discretion by failing to take judicial notice of and consider the complete
Administrative Record,” which “substantially prejudiced [his] ability to
present his case.” He claims such failure “directly affected [the court’s]
analysis of [his] constitutional claims.”
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a “court may judicially notice a
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known
within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” 46 A court “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and
_____________________
46
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
19
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the court is supplied with the necessary information.” 47 This necessary
information may include “a careful delineation of the fact to be noticed,”
“the purpose and relevance of the noticed fact,” “authority for noticing the
fact,” and “the source of ‘indisputable accuracy’ for an ‘ascertainable fact’
under Rule 201(b)(2).” 48
“We review evidentiary rulings only for abuse of discretion and will
reverse a judgment on the basis of evidentiary rulings only if the challenged
ruling affects a substantial right of the party.” 49 “We apply the same
standard when reviewing a district court’s use of judicial notice.” 50 “To
show an abuse of discretion, the appellant must demonstrate that the district
court’s evidentiary decision was” 51 “based on an erroneous view of the law
or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” 52 When considering a
motion to dismiss, a district court “must consider the complaint in its
entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss,” including “documents incorporated into
_____________________
47
Id. (c)(2).
48
21B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 5107.1
(2d ed. 2025).
49
Weinhoffer v. Davie Shoring, Inc., 23 F.4th 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting S.
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Chabert, 973 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1992)).
50
Id. (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 422
(5th Cir. 2013)).
51
Gibson, Inc. v. Armadillo Distrib. Enters., Inc., 107 F.4th 441, 446-47 (5th Cir.
2024).
52
Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Resol.
Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Gibson, Inc., 107 F.4th at
447.
20
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the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.” 53
The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to judicially
notice the “complete Administrative Record.” First, Castille did not supply
the “necessary information.” Castille’s motion asked the court “to take
judicial notice of Doc. 22 and the 1032 documents filed therein (USB with
the District Clerk),” but did not identify the contents of Document 22, the
source of those contents, which facts within the 1032 documents were
relevant, or why the document was not subject to reasonable dispute.
Castille’s motion stated, “Attached as Exhibit {letter} is the necessary
information for the court to take judicial notice of the requested facts,” but
he did not attach an exhibit to the filing. The record contains some
information about the Administrative Record, with Morath identifying
Document 22 as his “Notice of Filing Administrative Record,” which came
from Castille’s proceedings before the Commissioner of Education.
However, in neither the district court nor this court does Castille explain with
relevant authorities why the court should take judicial notice of an entire
administrative record that does not appear to be publicly available. 54
Second, Castille does not demonstrate how failure to take notice of
the Administrative Record prejudiced his “ability to present his case.” His
_____________________
53
Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
54
See Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1996) (taking
judicial notice of public disclosure documents filed with the SEC “only for the purpose of
determining what statements the documents contain, not to prove the truth of the
documents’ contents”); Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir.
2015) (taking judicial notice of public records stored on state agencies’ websites when their
accuracy could not “reasonably be questioned”).
21
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No. 24-40644
conclusory statements to that effect do not establish an impact on his
substantial rights.
Third, Castille did not ask the court to take judicial notice of the
Administrative Record, which is 1032 pages, until eight months after Morath
first filed the record and several days after the magistrate judge issued her
report and recommendation. For these reasons, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying his request to take judicial notice.
VII
We do not reach the issue of Monell liability for Defendants since
Defendants committed no constitutional violations under the alleged facts.
We also decline to address Castille’s Texas Whistleblower Act claim and his
claim that the district court should have granted leave to amend his complaint
a second time. Castille mentioned the whistleblower claim in the
jurisdictional statement and the conclusion of his opening brief, requesting
we “[r]emand this case to the district court with instructions
to . . . [r]einstate [his] constitutional claims and Whistleblower claim.” He
otherwise presented no arguments about his whistleblower claim. “[A]
[party] waives an issue if he fails to adequately brief it.” 55 Because Castille
did not discuss this claim in his opening brief, he has waived this issue.
Similarly, the denial of leave to amend was not raised in the opening brief,
and the issue was argued only in the response and reply briefs. “[A]n
_____________________
55
Monteon-Camargo v. Barr, 918 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2019) (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2001)).
22
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appellant abandons all issues not raised in its initial brief.” 56 Therefore,
these issues have been waived.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
_____________________
56
United Paperworkers Int’l Union AFL-CIO, CLC v. Champion Int’l Corp., 908
F.2d 1252, 1255 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 905
F.2d 840, 854 (5th Cir. 1990)).
23