Selkin v. City of Los Angeles CA2/5

Filed 2/24/26 Selkin v. City of Los Angeles CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PINK SELKIN et al., B342433

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. Nos.

v. BC718464, 19STCV12627

19STCV15125, 20STCV12594,

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 20STCV27209, 22STCV21711)

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Frank M. Tavelman, Judge. Affirmed.

Aitken✦Aitken✦Cohn, Wylie A. Aitken and Megan G.

Demshki; Frantz Law Group, James P. Frantz, William P. Harris

and Jason R. Dawson; Niddrie│Addams│Fuller│Singh and

Victoria E. Fuller for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief

Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City

Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising Assistant City

Attorney and Brian Cheng, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant

and Respondent.

A fire in a commercial building killed two individuals and

severely burned a third. Plaintiffs sued defendant and

respondent the City of Los Angeles (City) under the Government

Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq., “the Act”),1 alleging that the

City was liable under section 815.6, based on its failure to carry

out a mandatory duty to abate obvious building and safety code

violations. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that the inspection immunity provided by

Government Code section 818.6 barred any potential liability.

Plaintiffs contend that the scope of section 818.6 inspection

immunity is not broad enough to cover liability based on

information obtained independent from any inspection.

According to plaintiffs, the City had a mandatory duty under

various municipal codes and state statutes to ensure building

safety based on City employees’ actual observation of safety

violations outside the context of any inspection.

The City contends that the inspection immunity statute,

which has been broadly applied to protect public entities from

liability in varied circumstances, bars liability here. The City

also contends that plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue of fact

about whether it was under a mandatory duty to act.

We affirm, because regardless of whether plaintiffs have

identified a specific mandatory statutory duty that the City failed

to carry out with reasonable care, section 818.6 inspection

immunity applies.

1 All further statutory references are to the Government

Code unless otherwise stated.

2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Overview

This case arises from an arson fire at a commercial building

in Los Angeles which killed two individuals. The survivors of the

deceased filed several suits against the City. Pink Selkin, who

was also trapped in the fire and survived, filed a separate suit,

seeking damages for her permanent injuries, including severe

burns over more than three-quarters of her body.2 Plaintiffs’

theory of liability is that because City employees had actual

knowledge of obvious fire safety hazards, the City had a

mandatory duty to ensure that the substandard conditions were

addressed, and because the City’s knowledge was not in any way

related to a building inspection, the inspection immunity statute

does not protect the City from liability for its failure to fulfill its

mandatory duties.

2 Although the survivors’ suits appear to have been

consolidated before the trial court, Selkin’s suit proceeded

separately but before the same trial court judge until summary

judgment, when the two proceedings were related and the subject

of a single minute order granting summary judgment. In April

2025, we ordered the two appeals consolidated for all purposes.

We give a common summary of the underlying facts and

procedural history, noting distinctions only when relevant to our

analysis.

3

B. Demurrer

As relevant here, the trial court denied the City’s

demurrers to plaintiffs’ complaints asserting inspection

immunity; the court reasoned there was a possibility of liability if

facts demonstrated that without any inspection, City officials

who witnessed unlawful conditions had the authority or duty to

act based on their personal observations. The City filed answers,

and the parties engaged in discovery.

C. Summary Judgment Motion

The City moved for summary judgment against plaintiffs,

making a number of arguments, including that the statutes and

municipal code sections relied upon by plaintiffs did not impose a

mandatory duty on the City, and that even if a mandatory duty

applied, the inspection immunity statute precluded liability.

Plaintiffs’ opposition argued the legal questions of whether a

mandatory duty or inspection immunity applied. On the question

of whether the City had a mandatory duty to take action,

plaintiffs presented evidence of the safety hazards observed by

City personnel.

The evidence presented to the trial court at summary

judgment established that between 2014 and 2021, police officers

responding to the property observed various fire safety issues and

were aware that individuals were living in the commercial

building. In addition, the fire department received two customer

service requests regarding an alleged marijuana grow operation

at the property, and the fire department made two online

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requests to the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety

(DBS). A DBS staff member testified that DBS is not trained in

matters concerning unlawful growing of marijuana, however, and

therefore DBS forwarded the requests to the police department.3

The trial court granted the City’s motion. In its minute

order, the court reviewed the various statutes and municipal code

sections plaintiffs relied upon to establish mandatory duty

liability under section 815.6, but ultimately found it unnecessary

to determine which, if any, of the provisions imposed a

mandatory duty. As the court explained, “Whether each of these

statutes/ordinances create a mandatory duty applicable to

Plaintiffs’ cause of action would require the statutory

interpretation of each. The Court finds such an analysis

unnecessary in light of the City’s argument that it is immune

from any mandatory duty under [Government Code section]

818.6.” The trial court found the City was immune from liability

based on cases that broadly construe inspection immunity under

section 818.6.

Plaintiffs filed a premature notice of appeal, but in the

interests of justice, we deem the appeal to be taken from the

judgment entered on November 20, 2024.

3 Based upon the appellate briefing and the trial court’s

minute order, we understand that no party presented evidence

that any DBS personnel inspected the property or personally

observed any substandard conditions of the property.

5

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The purpose of summary judgment “is to provide courts

with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order

to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact

necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield

Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) “A trial court properly

grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We generally apply a de novo

standard of review to a trial court’s decision to grant summary

judgment, “considering all of the evidence the parties offered in

connection with the motion (except that which the court properly

excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence

reasonably supports. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Keeping the standard of review in mind, we will

independently determine whether the City was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law under the immunity provided by

section 818.6.

B. Government Tort Liability

The Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing

liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees

for torts. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14

Cal.5th 1034, 1046–1047 (Santa Clara County).) Part of the

overarching purpose of the Act is to “shield[] public entities from

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tort claims seeking money damages.” (Santa Clara County, at

p. 1049.) Section 815 outlines the overall structure of the Act.

Section 815, subdivision (a), establishes that “there is no such

thing as common law tort liability for public entities; a public

entity is not liable for an injury ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by

statute.’ ” (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7

Cal.5th 798, 803.) “But even when there are statutory grounds

for imposing liability, subdivision (b) of section 815 provides that

a public entity’s liability is ‘subject to any immunity of the public

entity provided by statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 804.)

Relevant to this case, where plaintiffs allege that the City

was under a mandatory duty to abate obvious fire and safety

hazards about which City personnel had direct knowledge,

section 815.6 provides that “[w]here a public entity is under a

mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to

protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public

entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by

its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity

establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the

duty.” However, section 818.6 provides a specific statutory

immunity for inspections: “A public entity is not liable for injury

caused by its failure to make an inspection, or by reason of

making an inadequate or negligent inspection . . . for the purpose

of determining whether the property complies with or violates

any enactment or contains or constitutes a hazard to health or

safety.”

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C. Mandatory Duty

1. Applicable Law

“Government Code section 815.6 has three elements that

must be satisfied to impose public entity liability: (1) a

mandatory duty was imposed on the public entity by an

enactment; (2) the enactment was designed to protect against the

particular kind of injury allegedly suffered; and (3) the breach of

the mandatory statutory duty proximately caused the injury.”

(B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179

(B.H.); see also Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th

887, 898 (Guzman); Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22

Cal.4th 490, 498–499 (Haggis).)

“First and foremost, application of section 815.6 requires

that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely

discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity;

it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a

particular action be taken or not taken. [Citation.] It is not

enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been

under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself

involves the exercise of discretion.” (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at

p. 498; see also B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 180–181.)

“Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of

law. (Haggis, at p. 499.)” (Danielson v. County of Humboldt

(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) “ ‘Whether a particular statute is

intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere

obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of

statutory interpretation for the courts.’ [Citation.]” (Haggis,

supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499.) While statutory language is an

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important guide, the use of the term “shall” in a legislative

provision “does not necessarily create a mandatory duty; there

may be ‘other factors [that] indicate that apparent obligatory

language was not intended to foreclose a governmental entity’s or

officer’s exercise of discretion.’ (Morris v. County of Marin (1977)

18 Cal.3d 901, 910, fn. 6 (Morris); see Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th

at p. 499, quoting Morris.)” (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at

p. 899.)

“Second, but equally important, [Government Code] section

815.6 requires that the mandatory duty be ‘designed’ to protect

against the particular kind of injury the plaintiff suffered. The

plaintiff must show the injury is ‘ “one of the consequences which

the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the

alleged mandatory duty.” ’ [Citation.] Our inquiry in this regard

goes to the legislative purpose of imposing the duty. That the

enactment ‘confers some benefit’ on the class to which plaintiff

belongs is not enough; if the benefit is ‘incidental’ to the

enactment’s protective purpose, the enactment cannot serve as a

predicate for liability under [Government Code] section 815.6.

[Citation.]” (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499.)

“If these two prongs are met, the next question is whether

the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s

injury.” (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 898.)

A general assertion that a public entity has a mandatory

duty is insufficient to support a claim for liability under section

815.6. In Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 38

Cal.App.4th 890 (Washington), following the accidental release of

toxic gases from rail tank cars stored on private property,

plaintiffs sued the county, alleging that various sections of the

Health and Safety Code included mandatory language, and that

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based on those sections “it must be concluded that the County

therefore has a general mandatory duty to ensure that there will

be no uncontrolled release of hazardous material.” (Id. at p. 896.)

The appellate court rejected plaintiffs’ argument, holding instead

that “[i]t is not enough that some statute contains mandatory

language. In order to recover plaintiffs have to show that there is

some specific statutory mandate that was violated by the County,

which violation was a proximate cause of the accident.

[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 896–897.)

2. Analysis

The City contends that summary judgment in its favor was

warranted because the statutes and municipal codes upon which

plaintiffs rely do not require the City to take specific action based

upon the evidence that police officers observed safety hazards

and a fire chief received and forwarded to DBS a customer service

request to investigate an illegal marijuana grow operation. We

too are not entirely convinced that the statutes and municipal

code sections plaintiffs rely upon require the City to take specific

action, based solely on a police officer’s observation of an open

and obvious fire or safety violation. However, rather than

reviewing each of the enactments individually to determine

whether it requires ministerial or discretionary action, we—like

the trial court—find it unnecessary to determine whether City

has successfully shown as a matter of law that it was not under a

mandatory duty for purposes of liability under section 815.6.

Because inspection immunity under section 818.6 is

available to a public entity, regardless of whether the entity’s

duty to detect, address, or abate a health or safety hazard is

10

construed as mandatory or discretionary (Cochran v. Herzog

Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 411 (Cochran)), we

turn to the legal question of whether section 818.6 inspection

immunity applies.

D. Inspection Immunity

1. Applicable Law

Section 818.6, the inspection immunity statute, “was

intended to grant absolute immunity from liability for the

negligent inspection of private property to determine whether

such property constitutes a hazard to health or safety.” (Clayton

v. City of Sunnyvale (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 666, 671 [rejecting

liability arising from negligent review of or failure to inspect

patently dangerous stairwell].) The courts have interpreted

section 818.6 very broadly, immunizing public entities from

liability not just from negligent inspections (Cochran, supra, 155

Cal.App.3d at pp. 408–410 [negligent inspection or negligent

failure to advise property owner of additional fire safety

precautions]; Washington, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 897–898

[negligent inspection of manufacturing facility led to release of

hazardous materials]), but also from the failure to inspect

(Stevenson v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1994) 24

Cal.App.4th 269, 273 [negligent failure to inspect a building];

Powell v. State of California (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 910, 915

[negligent failure to inspect daycare premises]), and from the

failure to take certain actions after conducting an inspection

(Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 504 [failure to record the results

of an inspection with the county recorder]).

11

“As the legislative comment to section 818.6 explains:

‘Because of the extensive nature of the inspection activities of

public entities, a public entity would be exposed to the risk of

liability for virtually all property defects within its jurisdiction if

this immunity were not granted.’ In light of such purpose, we

believe that section 818.6 must reasonably be construed to

insulate a public entity from any liability which might arise as a

result of an entity’s failure to detect noncompliance with one of

the myriad safety regulations contained in local or statewide

building codes.” (Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 916.)

The California Supreme Court and the courts of appeal

have explained that the rationale for interpreting section 818.6

liberally and applying inspection immunity broadly arises not

just from the ubiquity and purpose of the inspection process, but

also from the breadth of what an inspection encompasses. (See

Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 504–505, quoting Cochran,

supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at pp. 411–412.)

In Cochran, the employee of an engraving company died in

a fire at a company plant, and the employee’s relatives sought to

hold the city liable for failing to advise the company of

recommended safeguards against fire, despite evidence that the

city learned in a prior inspection that the company used

magnesium, a very combustible material. (Cochran, supra, 155

Cal.App.3d at pp. 408–410.) The reviewing court rejected

plaintiffs’ argument that the inspection immunity should be

construed such that once a public entity had knowledge of

hazardous conditions, the entity would not be immune for

negligently breaching a duty to advise and recommend ways to

address the risks. (Id. at p. 411.) The court explained that such

a restrictive reading would be arbitrary and contrary to the

12

statute’s purpose of protecting public entities from liability in all

aspects of safety inspections and hazard reduction. (Id. at

pp. 411–412.) “Public safety inspection necessarily encompasses

making an informed determination that given conditions are in

fact hazardous or not in compliance with regulations, officially

reporting these hazardous conditions, and fully disclosing them to

all interested parties. Appellants’ narrow interpretation of the

immunity statute would . . . encourage municipalities not to

make any efforts to learn about possible . . . hazards.” (Cochran,

supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at pp. 411–412, italics added.)

In Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d

1335, 1345–1348 (Harshbarger), the reviewing court relied on

Cochran to conclude that inspection immunity also barred a

claim of negligent hiring. The plaintiffs in Harshbarger were

homeowners who incurred significant costs after two city

inspectors incorrectly certified that construction work was

proceeding in compliance with applicable building codes. (Id. at

p. 1338.) The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the city was

liable for failure to use due care in hiring employees and

discharging its duty under Health and Safety Code section 17960,

because the city had voluntarily assumed a duty to hire qualified

inspectors. After agreeing that Health and Safety Code section

17960 imposed a mandatory duty on the city to enforce provisions

relating to construction of dwellings, the court pointed out that

“inspection of property for compliance with codes and regulations

is the means by which the public entity carries out its mandatory

duty of enforcing compliance with codes and other building

standards,” and that the inspection immunity statute “grants

absolute immunity whether the duty to inspect is construed as

mandatory or discretionary, whether the act of inspection is

13

called ministerial, discretionary or even voluntary.” (Id. at

pp. 1346–1347.)

The California Supreme Court in Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th

at pp. 504–506, agreed with the Cochran court’s approach of

broadly construing the inspection immunity statute to encourage

public entities to learn of possible health and safety hazards. It

held that even when the city knew of a landslide hazard and had

a mandatory statutory duty to record that information with the

county recorder, the inspection immunity protected the city from

liability. The court explained that “allowing liability for failure to

fully report, by recordation, the results of an inspection, while

immunizing the failure to make an inspection at all, would have

the effect, contrary to the evident legislative intent, of

discouraging municipal safety and health inspections. Even if

plaintiff’s first cause of action stated a valid claim for breach of a

mandatory duty, therefore, section 818.6 would immunize the

City from liability for that breach. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 505.)

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs acknowledge that to the extent the inspection

immunity statute is applicable, it overcomes any liability under

the mandatory duty statute. They contend, however, that

because the City’s knowledge of the obvious health and safety

violations arose independent of any inspection, the inspection

immunity statute does not apply.

Plaintiffs draw the distinction that each of the cases finding

the inspection immunity applicable still involved some

relationship to an inspection activity, regardless of whether the

inspection took place or not. They argue that because their

14

claims do not implicate a duty to conduct an inspection or to take

action based on information obtained during an inspection, the

inspection immunity does not apply. Instead, they argue that the

City’s liability arises from its knowledge of the obvious safety and

fire hazards that police officers witnessed on at least eight

occasions over the course of over seven years.

We are not convinced by plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs do

not specify what statutory language requires the City (as a public

entity) to take specific ministerial action based on the officers’

observations. (Washington, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 897–898

[plaintiffs must identify a specific statutory mandate, the

violation of which proximately caused injury].) As the court

explained in Harshbarger, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at page 1346,

inspections are the “means by which the public entity carries out

its mandatory duty of enforcing compliance” with the relevant

fire, safety, and building codes. Plaintiffs have not relied upon or

cited to any statute requiring a police officer who observes an

open and obvious fire and safety hazard to report it to DBS or

any other public entity. (Compare B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at

pp. 180–181.) To the contrary, while plaintiffs point to language

in Harshbarger to argue that Health and Safety Code section

17960 imposes upon city building departments a mandatory duty

to enforce rules and regulations pertaining to building safety,

they ignore the language that follows immediately after,

explaining how the mandatory duty is satisfied: “inspection of

property for compliance with codes and regulations is the means

by which the public entity carries out its mandatory duty of

enforcing compliance with codes and other building standards;

and section 818.6 specifically provides immunity to public entities

15

for failure to make any, or adequate, inspection of property.”

(Harshbarger, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1346.)

To saddle the City, as a public entity, with the knowledge

attributable to individual city personnel, based upon an

unspecified mandatory duty untethered to the inspection process,

runs contrary to the law on mandatory duties and inspection

immunity. When a legislative body seeks to impose a mandatory

duty on a public entity or some department within a public

entity, it does so expressly, even identifying the particular

department that must carry out the duty. While some provisions

of the Los Angeles Municipal Code might be fairly read as

imposing a mandatory duty to abate when DBS knows about a

safety hazard (see, e.g., L.A. Mun. Code § 91.8901.1, et seq.; &

§ 91.8903.1.1), there is no evidence here that any DBS employee

knew of the hazards. Plaintiffs have also not identified any

statute imposing a mandatory duty for law enforcement or fire

officials to cross-refer building safety issues to DBS. (See, e.g.,

B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 180–183 [law enforcement agencies

have a statutory duty to cross-report to the child welfare agency

every known or suspected instance of child abuse or neglect

reported to it].)

We disagree with plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence

gave rise to a reasonable inference that building and safety

personnel had knowledge of a code violation. Instead, it is

reasonable to infer that the only way for DBS to be charged with

knowledge that a particular property is “substandard,” would be

for an inspection to occur, in which case, even if DBS or the City

was under a mandatory duty to abate the hazardous condition,

regardless of whether DBS failed to inspect, or the inspection

negligently failed to identify the open and obvious hazards, or

16

DBS failed to take action to abate, the inspection immunity

would bar liability. We see no reason to apply a different

standard simply because the City is charged with “knowledge”

obtained through an employee unaffiliated with DBS.

3. Plaintiffs’ Reliance on Non-Binding Cases

Plaintiffs point to two instances where a trial court or an

out-of-state court found inspection immunity inapplicable when

the public entity’s mandatory duty was based on knowledge

obtained independent of an inspection. Neither one is applicable

or persuasive. (Robertson v. Saadat (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 630,

649 [appellate court decisions “are not bound by rulings of trial

courts or courts of other jurisdictions”].)

a. Trial Court Decision in the Ghost Ship Case

Gregory et al. v. Ng et al., Alameda County Superior Court

case number RC16843631 is a 2018 trial court decision

overruling a demurrer to plaintiffs’ claim that the City of

Oakland was under a mandatory duty to act based upon

knowledge of dangerous conditions at a commercial property

known as the Ghost Ship, and rejected the city’s argument that

various immunities, including inspection immunity and

discretionary act immunity, barred plaintiffs’ claim. We decline

to give the decision any persuasive weight because it is neither

binding nor comparable to the current case. First, “[t]rial court

decisions are not precedents binding on other courts . . . .

[Citation.]” (Harrott v. County of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138,

1148.) In addition, the decision was made at the demurrer stage,

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and the trial court noted that “City personnel responsible for

enforcing the building codes at issue—other than police officers

and firefighters—were aware of the dangerous conditions at the

Ghost Ship.” Here, in contrast, the trial court was deciding a

motion for summary judgment, and the only evidence of the city’s

knowledge of the property’s safety issues came from police

officers and one fire chief who was aware of a marijuana grow

operation in the building. We also agree with the City that it

would be speculative to assume that those City personnel who

witnessed safety issues such as inadequate lighting or an

electronically locking door would recognize these as code

violations, much less violations requiring immediate abatement

efforts.

b. Out-of-State Opinion

In Drake by Drake v. Mitchell Community Sch. (1994) 628

N.E.2d 1231 (Drake) the family of an Indiana student who

contracted histoplasmosis from pigeon droppings in a grain

elevator repurposed for a Halloween fundraiser sued the school

district. Plaintiffs point to Drake as an example of a court

rejecting inspection immunity based on a teacher’s “specific

knowledge that the grain elevator posed a risk of [the illness]

independent of any investigation.” (Id. at p. 1234.) However, as

the Drake court expressly recognized, school personnel have a

duty to care for the safety of children in their care, and Indiana

law strictly construes immunity protection. (Ibid.) In contrast,

the California Supreme Court has affirmed a broad construction

of inspection immunity to include not just the process of

inspection, but also the additional process of reporting or

18

recording the results of that process. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th

at pp. 503–504.) Particularly because California decisional law

construes immunity protection under the Act more broadly, we do

not find plaintiffs’ reliance on an out-of-state decision to be

persuasive. (In re S.G. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1298, 1316, fn. 6

[out-of-state authority is not binding precedent, nor persuasive in

light of supreme court authority]; but see Kanter v. Reed (2023)

92 Cal.App.5th 191, 208 [out of state authority can provide useful

guidance in the absence of on point California case law].)

For the above reasons, we hold that when the information

about a building’s safety hazards is obtained independent of any

inspection under the circumstances involved here—where the

alleged safety hazards were observed by city employees who had

no duty to cross-report information about the hazards to DBS or

to take any specific steps to mitigate the observed hazards—the

inspection immunity applies.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to

defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

WE CONCUR:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

KUMAR, J.*

* Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of

the California Constitution.

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