Rudaj

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX RUDAJ, :

Petitioner : No. 1:25-cv-02248

:

v. : (Judge Kane)

:

WARDEN LSCI ALLENWOOD, :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court is pro se Petitioner Alex Rudaj (“Rudaj”)’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which he challenges disciplinary sanctions imposed

for destroying property valued at more than $100 while he was incarcerated in a Federal Bureau

of Prisons (“BOP”) correctional facility. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the

petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Rudaj’s Convictions, Sentence, Place of Confinement, and Projected Release

Date

Rudaj is currently serving an aggregate sentence of three hundred and twenty-four

months’ incarceration to be followed by five years of supervised release after a jury sitting in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found him guilty of

racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)), conspiracy to commit racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)),

assault in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(2)), illegal gambling conspiracy (18

U.S.C. § 371), operation of an illegal gambling business (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1955), extortion

conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951), and attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951). See United

States v. Rudaj, No. 04-cr-01110-01 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 6, 2004), ECF No. 431.1 He is

currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Allenwood Low (“FCI Allenwood

Low”) and has, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) inmate locator

(https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/), an anticipated release date of December 20, 2027.

B. Procedural History

Rudaj commenced the instant action by filing his Section 2241 habeas petition, which the

Clerk of Court docketed on November 25, 2025.2 (Doc. No. 1.) In his petition, Rudaj

challenges disciplinary sanctions imposed on him, which included, inter alia, the loss of good

conduct time (“GCT”), following a finding by a disciplinary hearing officer (“DHO”) that he

destroyed property valued at more than $100. (Id. at 2.) He appears to assert that the imposition

of sanctions violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. (Id. at 3.) For relief, Rudaj seeks an order directing the BOP to dismiss and

remove the infraction from his prison record, restore his lost GCT, and restore other privileges

taken from him. (Id. at 7.)

On December 12, 2025, the Court issued an order which, inter alia, directed Respondent

to file a response to Rudaj’s Section 2241 petition. (Doc. No. 4.) Respondent timely filed a

response in opposition to the petition on December 31, 2025. (Doc. No. 6.) Rudaj then timely

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in Rudaj’s underlying criminal case. See Orabi v.

Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2014) (stating that the court “may take

judicial notice of the contents of another [c]ourt’s docket”); Wilson v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d

685, 688 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notice of court docket).

2 Rudaj neither remitted the filing fee nor sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis when he

filed his petition; as such, an Administrative Order issued providing him with a period of thirty

days to pay the filing fee or apply for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 3.) In

response, Rudaj timely paid the fee. See (Unnumbered Docket Entry Between Doc. Nos. 3 and

4).

filed a reply brief in further support of his petition on January 14, 2026. (Doc. No. 7.) Rudaj’s

petition is now ripe for disposition.

C. The BOP’s Administrative Process in Inmate Disciplinary Cases3

The BOP has enacted specific procedures for disciplinary proceedings. See 28 C.F.R. §§

541.1–.8. Under these procedures, a staff member charges a prisoner with committing a

prohibited act by issuing an incident report. See id. § 541.5(a) (“The discipline process starts

when staff witness or reasonably believe that you committed a prohibited act. A staff member

will issue you an incident report describing the incident and the prohibited act(s) you are charged

with committing.”). The incident report ordinarily must be issued within twenty-four hours of

the time the staff member became aware of the prisoner’s involvement in the incident. See id.

(stating that inmates “will ordinarily receive the incident report within 24 hours of staff

becoming aware of [the inmate’s] involvement in the incident”). The incident is then

investigated by a staff member. See id. § 541.5(b) (indicating that “[a]fter [the inmate] receives

an incident report, a [BOP] staff member will investigate it”).

After the BOP staff member investigates the incident, the correctional facility’s Unit

Discipline Committee (“UDC”) reviews the incident report and takes one of the following

actions: (1) finds that the prisoner “committed the prohibited act(s) charged[] and/or a similar

prohibited act[] as described in the incident report”; (2) finds that the prisoner “did not commit

the prohibited act(s) charged”; or (3) refers the incident report to a DHO for further review. See

id. § 541.7(a)(1)–(3). Prohibited acts are separated into four categories based on severity:

Greatest, High, Moderate, and Low. See id. § 541.3(a). If a prisoner is charged with a prohibited

3 To provide context to the Court’s recitation of Rudaj’s relevant disciplinary proceedings at FCI

Allenwood Low, the Court will first set forth the BOP’s procedures for such proceedings.

act in the Greatest or High severity category, the UDC automatically refers the incident report to

the DHO for further review. See id. § 541.7(a)(4).

When an incident report is referred to the DHO, a disciplinary hearing is conducted in

accordance with the procedures set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 541.8. Pursuant to these procedures, the

prisoner is entitled to notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours before the hearing. See id.

at § 541.8(c) (stating that the prisoner “will receive written notice of the charge(s) against [them]

at least 24 hours before the DHO’s hearing” and explaining that they “may waive this

requirement, in which case the DHO’s hearing can be conducted sooner”). The prisoner is

entitled to appear at the hearing and have staff representation at the hearing. See id. at §

541.8(d), (e). The prisoner is also “entitled to make a statement and to present documentary

evidence to the DHO on [their] own behalf.” See id. § 541.8(f). A prisoner may request to have

witnesses appear “before the DHO either in person or electronically” at the hearing on their

behalf. See id. § 541.8(f)(1). However, the DHO may refuse to call requested witnesses if “they

are not reasonably available, their presence at the hearing would jeopardize institutional security,

or they would present repetitive evidence.” See id. § 541.8(f)(3).

When rendering a decision on an incident report, the DHO considers “all evidence

presented during the hearing.” See id. § 541.8(f). The decision of the DHO must be “based on at

least some facts and, if there is conflicting evidence, on the greater weight of the evidence.” See

id. (emphasis added). Following the hearing, the DHO must provide a written report

documenting (1) whether the prisoner was advised of their rights, (2) the evidence relied upon by

the DHO, (3) the DHO’s decision, (4) the sanctions imposed by the DHO, and (5) the reasons of

the DHO for imposing those sanctions. See id. § 541.8(h)(1)–(5).

A prisoner dissatisfied with the DHO’s decision “may appeal the [decision] through the

Administrative Remedy Program, 28 CFR part 542, subpart B.” See id. § 541.8(i). Pursuant to

the Administrative Remedy Program, a prisoner may file an appeal from the DHO’s decision to

the Regional Director for the region where the prisoner is currently confined within twenty

calendar days of the DHO’s decision. See id. § 542.15(a). The Regional Director then has thirty

calendar days to respond to the appeal. See id. § 542.18. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the

Regional Director’s response, that decision may be appealed to the BOP’s General Counsel at the

BOP’s Central Office within thirty calendar days from the date of the Regional Director’s

response. See id. § 542.15(a). General Counsel then has forty calendar days to respond to the

appeal. See id. § 542.18.4

D. Rudaj’s Disciplinary Proceedings

While he was incarcerated at FCI Allenwood Low, Rudaj was the subject of an incident

report (No. 4123200) relating to an incident on May 25, 2025, in which he was charged with

Code 218 – Destroying Property with a Value over $100. See (Doc. Nos. 1-1 at 1; 6-5 at 2). The

incident report describes the events at issue as follows:

On May 25, 2025, at approximately [7:25 p.m.,] while conducting a search of

Lycoming A Cube 43, I noticed a section of fresh white paint on the cement

blocking underneath the Lycoming A Cube 432L bunk which seemed inconsistent

with the rest of the wall. I inspected the area and found a false cover concealing a

hole in the wall for an inmate made wall safe. The hole was covered with a plaster-

like material and painted over to conceal the hole. The inmates assigned to cell

Lycoming A Cube 43 are Tavarez, Eulises Reg. No. 61498-509, and Rudaj, Alex

4 “No administrative grievance is considered to have been fully and finally exhausted until

denied by the [BOP’s] Central Office.” Sharpe v. Costello, 289 F. App’x 475, 478 (3d Cir. 2008)

(unpublished) (citing 28 C.F.R. §542.15(a)). However, a prisoner may consider the lack of a

timely response to their administrative remedy or appeal as a denial. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.18

(providing that if “the inmate does not receive a response within the time allotted for reply,

including extension, the inmate may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that

level”).

Reg No. 02381-748. The facilities department stated the wall repair would require,

Speed Plug: $55.30, Concrete Block: $26.25, Fast Set Mortar: $19.99, Paint for

Block: $59.98, Roller and Brush Kit: $29.98, for an approximate repair total of

$191.80. The destroyed government property [is] valued in excess of $100.00.

See (Doc. Nos. 1-1 at 1; 6-5 at 2).

The incident report also indicates that on May 26, 2025, Rudaj was advised of his rights,

received a copy of the incident report, and stated, “I’ve been in the cell for a few months, I had

no idea it was there its [sic] not on my side, I keep to myself, I do not get in trouble, I’ve been

down 21 years, I don’t play inmate games, I’m just doing my time to get out.” See (Doc. No. 6-5

at 4). Rudaj was noted as “display[ing] a cooperative attitude during [his] interview.” See (id.).

On May 27, 2025, Rudaj told the UDC that he had “been down 21 years and [he had]

never seen anything like that. [He] didn’t know anything about it.” See (id. at 3). On the same

date, the UDC referred Rudaj’s incident report to a DHO for a hearing. See (id.).

On June 12, 2025, a DHO held a hearing, after which they issued a report finding Rudaj

guilty of the charge. See (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at 1–2; 6-7 at 2). The DHO noted that Rudaj declined

assistance by a staff representative and did not call any witnesses on his behalf. See (Doc. Nos.

1-2 at 1–2; 6-7 at 2). The DHO also indicated that Rudaj stated during the hearing that “I just got

put in there. I didn’t put that hole in there. I didn’t even know it was there.” See (Doc. Nos. 1-2

at 1–2; 6-7 at 2).

Despite Rudaj’s statement, the DHO concluded that he had destroyed government

property valued at over $100. See (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at 1–2; 6-7 at 2). The “specific evidence relied

on to support [the DHO’s] findings” is noted in the DHO’s written report as follows:

Your due process rights were read and reviewed by you by the DHO at the time of

this hearing. You stated that you understood your rights. You stated that you had

no documentary evidence to present to the DHO. You did not request to have a

staff representative. You did not request any witnesses.

The DHO finds that you committed the prohibited act of destroying Government

Property valued at $100.00 or more. The specific evidence relied upon in this case

were photographs of the hole in the wall and a memorandum provided by facilities

documenting the cost to repair the said damages. The written account of the

reporting staff which states: “On May 25, 2025, at approximately [7:25 p.m.,] while

conducting a search of Lycoming A Cube 43, I noticed a section of fresh white paint

on the cement blocking underneath the Lycoming A Cube 432L bunk which seemed

inconsistent with the rest of the wall. I inspected the area and found a false cover

concealing a hole in the wall for an inmate made wall safe. The hole was covered

with a plaster-like material and painted over to conceal the hole. The inmates

assigned to cell Lycoming A Cube 43 are Tavarez, Eulises Reg No. 61498-509, and

Rudaj, Alex Reg No 02381-748[.] The facilities department stated the wall repair

would require, Speed Plug: $55.30, Concrete Block: $26.25, Fast Set Mortar:

$19.99, Paint for Block: $59.98, Roller and Brush Kit: $29.98, for an approximate

repair total of $191.80. The destroyed government property [is] valued in excess

of $100.00.”

The DHO read the incident report aloud to you. You stated: “I just got put in there.

I didn’t put that hole in there. I didn’t even know it was there.”

The DHO considered your statements and defense, some facts and the evidence

presented. The DHO concludes: There was a hole bored into the wall structure of

your assigned living area which caused damage to the structure. The hole was

concealed with a false cover and fresh paint. Hollowed spaces in walls such as this

are commonly used to conceal contraband from staff. There are photographs of the

hole in the wall. You stated that you did not damage the wall and your cubicle had

been in that condition since you moved into that area. There is a memorandum

provided by facilities documenting the cost to repair the said damages. Other than

denying the charges, you provided the DHO with no substantive evidence to

support that you did not damage Government property valued [more] than $100.00.

Being that neither you or your cell mate [sic] accepted responsibility for committing

this act, and you both had reasonable access to this area, the DHO finds you both

culpable for committing this act and you will split the cost to repair the damages

with your bunk mate.

Based on the above, the DHO finds that the greater weight of evidence presented

shows that you have committed the prohibited act of destruction of Govt. [sic]

property valued [at] over $100.00, Code 218.

See (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at 3–4; 6-7 at 3–4).

Following these findings, the DHO imposed five sanctions: (1) loss of twenty-seven days

of GCT; (2) fifteen days of disciplinary segregation; (3) loss of commissary privileges for six

months; (4) loss of the use of a tablet for six months; and (5) $95.90 in restitution. See (Doc.

Nos. 1-2 at 4; 6-7 at 4). The reasons for these sanctions are explained in the DHO’s written

report as follows:

The action/behavior on the part of any inmate to destroy, alter, or damage

government property, regardless of financial value, detracts staff from other

responsibilities and lead to possible endangerment of staff or other inmates. The

items/equipment that are damaged must be replaced and cannot be used for their

intended purpose by others until the items are repaired/replaced. This puts

unnecessary burdens on staff and resources.

Placing you in Disciplinary Segregation was imposed as a penalty for wrongdoing.

The disallowance of [GCT] was imposed because you were sentenced under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) which mandates the disallowance of [GCT]

per policy. The loss of commissary, tablet and monetary restitution sanctions were

imposed to deter misconduct.

See (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at 4; 6-7 at 4).

Rudaj timely appealed from the DHO’s decision to the Regional Director. See (Doc. No.

1-4 at 1–5). In his appeal, Rudaj complained that:

On June 12, 2025 I was found guilty during a DHO hearing of destroying property

arising from a 218 shot issued on May 25, 2025 for damage exceeding $100 related

to a hole in a block under my cellmates [sic] bed. I had no knowledge of the hole.

The hole in the wall block in cell # 43 could not be construed as being in a common

area of our cell by any reasonable measure. . . . The hole identified by the Unit CO

on duty was camouflaged by a plug covered in white paint under the head in the

corner of my cell mates [sic] bunk. Only 3 or 4 days earlier than this discovery a

previous cell mate [sic] went to the SHU for a disciplinary infraction. At that time

cell # 43 was searched on two separate occasions by Unit CO’s during pack out of

my previous cell mate [sic]. At no time was contraband or a “hide” hole found on

either occasion. Only on the 3rd search was it located by an officer lying flat under

my cellmates [sic] bed and hitting the wall with a small hammer. Something under

no circumstances would I have done in deference to my cell mates [sic] privacy.

This location is clearly not [a] “common area”. The BOP’s repair cost estimate is

also seriously flawed. The repair procedure is to simply fill the block with

newspaper, cardboard or rags, then apply a mortar[-]based patch. The patch is then

spot painted with a brush in matching paint. No concrete block is repaired and no

speed plug is used. The actual repair, based upon information from a lead Orderly

at BOP Allenwood Facilities, who is prepared to swear in evidence, requires 1/8 of

a bag of mortar, ¼ pint of paint and perhaps a new paint brush. Inmate labor is

used, the cost of which is nominal, brining the total estimated cost of repair to

approximately $23.95 . . . .

I respectfully request that the shot be cancelled as I clearly had no knowledge, nor

any responsibility or could have taken any action in [sic] respect to this damage. I

have been incarcerated for 21 years and during this time have an exemplary

disciplinary record.

See (id. at 2).5

On August 12, 2025, the Regional Director issued a decision affirming the DHO’s

findings and sanctions. See (id.). The Regional Director’s Response stated:

You appeal the June 12, 2025[] decision of the [DHO at FCI Allenwood Low]

finding you committed the prohibited act of Destroying/Damaging/Altering

Government Property having Value in Excess of $100.00, Code 218, Incident

Report No. 4123200. You deny committing the prohibited act, and list multiple

issues which you contend support your request for the Incident Report to be

expunged.

The DHO reasonably determined you committed the prohibited act based on section

11 of the Incident Report and supporting evidence. A review of the disciplinary

proceedings revealed no due process concerns or deviations from policy. Section

11 of the Incident Report contains sufficient notice of the charge and allowed you

to prepare a defense. The record reflects the DHO afforded you the opportunity to

present evidence and provide a statement in your defense. The DHO considered

your statement prior to rendering a decision.

The record in this case reflects substantial compliance with Program Statement

5270.09, Inmate Discipline Program. The decision of the DHO was based upon the

greater weight of the evidence, and the sanctions imposed were consistent with the

severity level of the prohibited act. The sanctions imposed were not

disproportionate to your misconduct. Accordingly, your appeal is denied.

See (id.).

5 Rudaj also attached to his appeal a drawing of his cell that included the location of the hole and

a typewritten estimate in support of his valuation of the repair costs. See (id. at 3, 5).

Rudaj filed an appeal from the Regional Director’s decision to the BOP General Counsel.

(Doc. No. 1-5).6 Rudaj asserts that he never received a response from the General Counsel. See

(Doc. No. 1 at 3).7

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Section 2241 Habeas Petitions

Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition that has been filed by a

federal inmate challenging “not the validity but the execution of [their] sentence.” See Cardona

v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and footnote omitted); Woodall v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal

prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”). While “the precise meaning of

‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy[,]” the phrase has been interpreted as to “put into effect” or

“carry out.” See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242, 243 (citation omitted). As a result, a federal inmate

may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects the duration of the inmate’s custody.

See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a federal

inmate’s Section 2241 petition is actionable where the inmate attacks the term of their custody by

challenging the way the BOP is computing their federal sentence).

6 Unfortunately, most of the copy of Rudaj’s BP-11 form he attaches to his petition is

unreadable. See (Doc. No. 1-5 at 1). As such, the Court cannot recite his grounds in support of

his appeal to the General Counsel.

7 Respondent attaches a copy of Rudaj’s “Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval” to his

response. See (Doc. Nos. 6-2 ¶ 4; 6-4). The Retrieval states that the General Counsel’s response

was due by November 2, 2025, but it does not indicate the date of a decision. See (Doc. No. 6-4

at 27). Based on this information, Rudaj can consider the lack of timely response as a denial of

his appeal. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.18 (providing that if “the inmate does not receive a response

within the time allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate may consider the absence of a

response to be a denial at that level”).

B. Due Process Claims Relating to Prison Disciplinary Proceedings

“[P]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”8 Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). As such, a prisoner is entitled to the following minimum procedural

due process rights when accused of misconduct in prison which may result in the loss of GCT:

(1) the right to appear before an impartial decision-making body; (2) twenty-four hour advance

written notice of the disciplinary charges; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in their defense when it is consistent with institutional safety and

correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate representative if the charged prisoner is

illiterate or complex issues are involved; and (5) a written decision by the fact finder of the

evidence relied upon and the rationale behind the disciplinary action. See id. at 563–67.

The standard of review concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is

“any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”

See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985). This standard “does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence.” See id. at 455. Instead, if there is “some evidence” to support the

decision of the hearing examiner, the district court must reject any evidentiary challenges by the

petitioner. See id. at 457. Overall, judicial review of a prison disciplinary decision is limited to

ensuring that the prisoner was afforded certain procedures, the action against them was not

arbitrary, and that the ultimate decision has some evidentiary support. See id.

8 Liberty interests protected by the Fifth Amendment may arise either from the Due Process

Clause itself or from statutory law. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002).

Nevertheless, there can be a liberty interest at stake in disciplinary proceedings in which an

inmate loses GCT. See id. Since Rudaj’s sanctions included the loss of GCT, he has identified a

valid liberty interest in this matter for due process purposes.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Rudaj’s habeas petition contains only a limited recitation of his grounds for relief. See

(Doc. No. 1 at 6). Despite this issue, the Court construes Rudaj as asserting that his due process

rights were violated because the DHO failed to base their decision on sufficient evidence. See

(id.). He states that the area with the hole was under the control of his cellmate; therefore, he

lacked “constructive possession as [he] had no dominion or control over [the] relevant area.”

See (id.). He also argues that there was no evidence introduced that he knew about the hole, and

he had only “recently moved into the cell.” See (id.).

Respondent contends that the Court should deny Rudaj’s petition because he received all

the process he was due. See (Doc. No. 6 at 5–9). Respondent asserts that Rudaj received

sufficient notice of the charges against him, had an opportunity to call witnesses and present

evidence in his own defense, and received a written statement from the DHO identifying the

evidence in support of their decision. See (id. at 6–7). Respondent also argues that the DHO

properly documented “some evidence” to support their findings, namely “the photographs,

incident report, and memorandums [sic] of staff documenting the damage to the wall.” See (id.

at 7–9).

In his reply brief, Rudaj appears to argue that the “some evidence” standard requires the

DHO to rely upon only “reliable” evidence in reaching their disciplinary determination. See

(Doc. No. 7 at 1). He also challenges Respondent’s Exhibit B to his response, which Rudaj

believes shows his housing assignments from March 16, 2011, until September 3, 2025. See (id.

at 2). He believes that it references his housing at FCI Allenwood Low as starting on July 11,

2025, even though he had already been incarcerated there for months by that date. (Id.) Due to

this lack of information, he claims that Respondent has failed to attach a complete copy of his

housing assignments to his response, and he requests that the Court direct Respondent to submit

the remainder of his housing records for consideration. See (id.).

B. Analysis

After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that Rudaj fails to show

that his due process rights were violated during the disciplinary proceedings at issue.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that this analysis will be limited to whether the DHO relied upon

sufficient evidence in finding Rudaj responsible for the disciplinary infraction because he does

not argue that his disciplinary proceedings otherwise violated his due process rights. In other

words, he does not contend that, inter alia, he failed to receive written notice of the charge

against him, he lacked an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his own defense,

or the DHO failed to provide him with a written statement of the evidence they relied upon in

reaching their decision.9 Secondly, Rudaj’s argument in his reply brief about Respondent’s

Exhibit B to its response is meritless because Exhibit B is not a list of his housing assignments as

he claims. Rather, as attested to by Respondent’s attached declaration of Austin J. Langon, a

BOP CLC Attorney, shows that Exhibit B is a copy of Rudah’s Administrative Remedy

Generalized Retrieval. See (Doc. No. 6-2 ¶¶ 1, 4). Thus, while Exhibit B notes Rudaj’s housing

assignments, they appear to be included in this exhibit only because they show his place of

incarceration at the time he filed administrative remedies and any appeals. See (Doc. No. 6-4).

9 Even if Rudaj had challenged these aspects of his disciplinary proceedings, his arguments

would lack merit as the record shows that he received adequate and timely notice of the charge

against him, he had an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his own defense, and

the DHO supplied him with a written statement identifying the evidence the DHO relied upon in

concluding that he destroyed property valued at $100 or more. See (Doc. Nos. 1-1; 1-2; 6-5–6-

7).

Accordingly, the Court will not direct Respondent to submit any additional documentation Rudaj

mistakenly believes was omitted from Exhibit B.

Turning now to the merits of Rudaj’s Section 2241 petition, although the Court

understands Rudaj’s concern that the DHO relied on insufficient evidence in finding him

responsible for destroying property, he is mistaken that the DHO did not identify “some

evidence” in support of their decision. The disciplinary hearing record contains “some evidence”

to support the DHO’s finding that Rudaj, at a minimum, was constructively responsible for the

hole in his cell, despite his representation that the hole was located near his cellmate’s bed, and

he was unaware of it. Even if other prisoners occupied Rudaj’s cell prior to prison officials

locating the hole in the wall, he indicates in his appeal to the Regional Director that his cell was

thoroughly searched approximately three or four days prior to the search that discovered the

hole, and prison officials did not locate the hole during this search. If Rudaj’s representation is

accurate, he acknowledges that he and his cellmate were the only two individuals occupying the

cell for a few days prior to the discovery of the hole in the cell wall. Therefore, there was a 50%

chance that Rudaj was responsible for the hole in the wall at the time officials discovered it, and

as the DHO indicated in their written decision, the whole was covered by fresh paint. See (Doc.

Nos. 1-2 at 3–4; 6-7 at 3–4).

When addressing habeas challenges to disciplinary sanctions based on an inmate’s

possession of contraband, “[c]ourts have held that where the realistic probability of a prisoner’s

actual possession of contraband is 1 in 6 or greater, the ‘some evidence’ standard is met.” See

Sabir v. Warden, FCI-Loretto, No. 20-cv-00152, 2024 WL 1329772, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28,

2024) (citing cases), aff’d sub nom., Sabir v. Warden Loretto FCI, No. 24-2102, 2025 WL

2400433 (3d Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) (unpublished). Thus, even in disciplinary cases such as the

instant one, where “there [is the] absence of direct evidence pointing to an inmate’s guilt, the

‘some evidence’ standard of Hill may be satisfied by application of the constructive possession

doctrine.” See Cardenas v. Wigen, 921 F. Supp. 286, 289 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Hamilton v.

O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1992)). This constructive-possession rationale applies equally to

this case, even though the infraction involves destruction of property to create a location where

contraband can be concealed rather than the possession of contraband. See, e.g., Brown v.

Recktenwald, 550 F. App’x 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (concluding that some evidence

of construction possession was enough to support the DHO’s decision, “and that is all that is

required under Hill to satisfy due process”); Solomon v. Warden, FCI Fairton, 506 F. App’x 147,

149 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“In the absence of direct evidence indicating an inmate’s guilt

of possession, the ‘some evidence’ standard may be satisfied by application of the constructive

possession doctrine in limited circumstances where a small number of inmates are potentially

guilty of the offense charged.” (citations omitted); Reynolds v. Williamson, 197 F. App’x 196,

199 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (finding that, “[i]n the absence of direct evidence indicating an

inmate’s guilt, the ‘some evidence’ standard may be satisfied by application of the constructive

possession doctrine” (citation omitted)); United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir.

1992) (“In general, a person has constructive possession if [they] knowingly [have] ownership,

dominion, or control over the contraband itself or over the premises in which the contraband is

located.”).

Overall, the Court finds that the “some evidence” standard is satisfied by application of

the constructive possession doctrine to Rudaj’s disciplinary proceedings in this case. The record

shows that there was a 50% chance that Rudaj either created or controlled the hole in the wall in

his cell, and at best, even accounting for the presence of a prior cellmate, he was still one of only

a few inmates who had access to the area in which the hole was located. There is also no

evidence in the record showing that so many inmates had unrestricted access to his cell which

would show that the DHO should not have held him to have been constructively responsible for

the hole in his cell. Accordingly, Rudaj has not established that he was denied due process

because there was insufficient evidence to support the DHO’s findings, and the Court will deny

his Section 2241 petition.

IV. CONCLUSION

For reasons set forth above, the Court will deny Rudaj’s habeas petition. An appropriate

Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania