WHITE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAWN-RYAN WHITE, :

Plaintiff, :

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6665

UPPER DARBY TOWNSHIP, ef al., ‘

Defendants. □

MEMORANDUM

+

WEILHEIMER, J. JANUARY28 , 2026

Shawn Ryan- White filed this pro se action alleging his constitutional rights were violated

in connection with a family dispute over a property that led to his alleged unlawful arrest. White

seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, leave to proceed in forma

pauperis will be granted, and the Complaint will be dismissed.

I FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS!

White names the following Defendants in his Complaint: Upper Darby Township

(“Upper Darby”), Upper Darby Police Department Officers Sergeant Francis Devine, Sergeant

Michael DeHoratius, and John Doe Police Officers (the “Police Officer Defendants”), Upper

Darby Department of Licenses and Inspections (“L&I”) Director Daniel Knowles, Attorney

Elizabeth T. Stefanide, Edward Fasbinder, identified as his maternal uncle, and Bonnie Jennings

and Elaine Kay, identified as his maternal aunts. (See Compl. at 2-3, 5, 11)

' The factual allegations are taken from White’s Complaint (“Compl.”), which consists of

nineteen typewritten pages. (ECF No. 2.) The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned

by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where the Court quotes from the Complaint, punctuation,

spelling, and capitalization errors will be cleaned up. The Court may also consider matters of

public record when conducting a screening under § 1915. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452

F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Orabi v. Alt’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014)

(“We may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court’s docket.”).

White’s allegations are detailed and stem from a family dispute over his residence,

located at 7000 Greenwood Avenue, Upper Darby Township, Pennsylvania (the “Property”), in

Delaware County. (/d. at 4.) He alleges, in relevant part, that the Property belonged to his

mother, Teresa White, and was “solely titled” in her name. (/d.) He has “virtually always

maintained his residence” as the Property with the “express permission and authority of his

Mother,” including when he went to law school in Harrisburg.” (/d.) He asserts he was

appointed as durable power of attorney over his mother’s estate in early August 2023. (Id. at 6.)

However, on August 22, 2023, White was temporarily evicted from the Property by

Upper Darby Township police officers after his maternal aunts, Defendant Jennings and Barbara

Troop,? petitioned and successfully obtained a temporary state court order against him pursuant

to the Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act (the “PFA Order’). (/d. at 5-6.) White alleges

that Jennings and Troop procured the PFA Order “through the vehicle” of his mother, “by their

undue influence and for purposes of removing him” from the Property, because wanted to

“readily dispose of it and its contents as they pleased.” (/d. at 5.) He avers on November 16,

2023, a final hearing was held on the PFA Order, which resulted in a favorable disposition in his

favor and the Order was vacated. (/d. at 7.) Because the PFA Order was vacated, he returned to

the Property on November 19, 2023. (/d.) However, while the PFA was pending, Jennings

through her attorney Defendant Stefanide filed for guardianship over his mother and her estate,

including the Property, which they obtained on October 3, 2023. (/d. at 8-9.) He asserts that

Jennings retained Stefanide to countermand his power of attorney and control his mother’s

* In his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, White states that he is currently temporarily

suspended from practicing law. (See ECF No. 1 at 5.)

3 Although White does not name Troop as a defendant, the Court will treat her as a

defendant out of an abundance of caution.

estate, obtaining the guardianship by making fraudulent representations in the Delaware County

Orphans’ Court, such as alleging that White physically and financially abused his mother. (/d. at

7-8.) Prior to returning to the Property on November 19, 2023, White believes Jennings and/or

the other family member defendants put his and his mother’s belongings in trash bags outside

and changed the lock on the front door of the Property to prevent him from returning. (/d. at 8-

On November 21, 2023, White left the Property to file an appeal of the guardianship

granted to Jennings‘ and asked his friend to stay at the Property while he was gone in

anticipation that his family “would continue to seek his removal by any means at their disposal.”

(Ud. at 9.) That same day, when he returned to the Property after filing his appeal, White alleges

his friend was gone and the front door was removed. (/d. at 10.) He later learned Upper Darby

police officers were at the Property while he was gone and arrested his friend for trespassing.°

Ud. at 11.) While he was attempting to reinstall the front door, Defendants Kay and Fasbinder

arrived at the Property and Kay demanded that he leave. (/d.) White did not leave and alleges

that shortly after, Upper Darby police officers surrounded the Property and demanded he come

out of the Property “with his hands up in the air.” (/d. at 12.) At this time, he was not aware that

4 A review of the public records corroborates that White appealed the guardianship order

to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and reflects that his appeal was dismissed for his failure to

file a brief. See In Re: Est. of T.W., Appeal of: S.-R.W., 2967 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct.). It

appears White filed other appeals and requests related to the guardianship order that were

dismissed for the same reason. See Jn Re: Est. of T.W., Appeal of: S.-R.W., 3159 EDA 2023 (Pa.

Super. Ct.); In Re: Est. of T.W., Appeal of: S.-R.W., 3160 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct. O.C.).

° White alludes to this event as the first time officers entered the Property and arrested his

friend as without just cause. (Compl. at 9-10). However, to the extent he is attempting to do so,

White may not pursue claims or seek damages based on harm allegedly suffered by his friend.

See generally Twp. of Lyndhurst, N.J. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011)

(“[A] plaintiff must assert his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third party” to have

standing to bring a claim) (quotations omitted).

the police officers had been there earlier in the day when his friend was arrested and claims he

“responded by screaming back something to the effect of ‘Why? I live here?’” (/d. at 11-12.)

He was not sure if the police heard him, but “almost simultaneously, [he] heard a very large

smashing or crashing sound” that he believed was the rear basement door “being bashed in” by

the police officers. (/d. at 12.) He alleges he “very cautiously made his way down the basement

steps with his hands raised in the air informing the home invaders that he was coming down the

steps with his hands up” in order to de-escalate the situation. (/d.) He claims when he entered

the basement, he asked the officers to “calm down and begged them not to shoot him and

expressed his desire to comply with their demands.” (/d.) A police officer, identified as

Sergeant Doe, entered the basement, maintaining a distance of about ten feet from White, and

ordered him “‘to lay face down on the ground” while pointing a firearm at him. (Jd. at 12-13.)

White asserts he complied with the order to lay down and was “at all times peaceful and

compliant” with the police officers. (Ud. at 13.) White, who was still wearing a book bag from

earlier, alleges his “hands were tightly handcuffed behind his back” by Sergeant Doe while he

lied face down on the basement floor and “gave no resistance whatsoever.” (/d.) He was

removed from the Property, patted down, then placed in the police vehicle and transported to the

police station. (/d. at 14.) When he arrived at the police station, “he was unhandcuffed and

place in a small approximately 5’x7’ room and stripped searched,” removing all his clothes

except his underwear. (/d. at 15.) He alleges he was “held in this room for the next

approximately 3-5 hours.” (/d.) He was informed by the officer who drove him to the station

that the police intended to charge him with criminal trespassing, “and that his aunt and uncle,

[Kay] and [Fasbinder] had relayed to officers that he was in violation of a PFA order.” (Jd. at

14.) White told the officers that he was not trespassing and lawfully present at the Property by

showing them a copy of the November 16, 2023, Order dismissing the PFA Order. (/d.) He

claims he “repeatedly implored” the officers to check the PFA database and they “failed to

consider or check for the cessation” of the PFA Order. (/d. at 18.) However, he also alleges that

he was “informed that he was not going to be criminal charged with trespassing after all, in light

of the documentation he provided to the officers.” (/d. at 15.)

Although he was released, White was told that he was “prohibited from re-entering his

home because it had been declared condemned as ‘uninhabitable’ by the Upper Darby

Department of Licenses and Inspections.” (/d.) Police officers allowed him to briefly return to

the Property to retrieve his belongings, where he saw a “cease and desist” form citing

“deplorable conditions.” (/d. at 16.) He alleges the condemnation of the Property was “imposed

solely as an alternative means of precluding [him] from lawfully returning to his domicile and

residence, and this ‘solution’ was agreed upon by the aforementioned Police Officer state actors

under color of law and in coordination with the private named defendants.” (/d. at 15.) He

claims agents of the L&I, through the direction of Defendant Knowles, made the decision to

condemn the Property and Knowles “wrongfully, pretextually, and without any actual inspection

or due process of law order[ed] the condemnation of the property in coordination with the

aforementioned actors, and for their agreed upon purpose jointly, that being [his] removal and

the preclusion of his lawful right to return” to the Property. (/d. at 16.)

White asserts that the next day, November 22, 2023, he went to the L&I Office and spoke

with Knowles, who relayed “his mistaken belief that the [Property] was without utilities.” (/d. at

17.) White informed Knowles that the Property did have properly working utilities, explained

the alleged ongoing arene of the other Defendants to remove him from the Property, and

requested that he undo the condemnation order. (/d.) White alleges that Knowles and Stefanide

engaged in a phone call, presumably to discuss his request to undo the condemnation order. (/d.)

After the call, he claims Knowles informed him that there would be an inspection scheduled the

following week and he could attend. (U/d.) White believes no inspection ever took place, and

since these events, the Property has been “boarded up and abandoned.” (/d.) He also indicates

that on September 16, 2024, Stefanide petitioned the state court for permission to sell the

Property after Jennings “as court-appointed guardian” entered an agreement to sell it on July 13,

2024. (Ud. at 8n.2.) He alleges the state court granted the request, which he opposed, and he has

appealed the state court’s order authorizing the sale of the Property. (/d.) A review of public

records indicates the appeal is still pending, and that White’s emergency requests for relief were

denied. See In Re: Est. of T.W., Appeal of: S.-R.W., 3220 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 10,

2024).

As a result of these events, White alleges Defendants “all conspired and coordinated — on

multiple occasions to effectuate [his] wrongful removal by any means, and the private actors are

liable also in like manner due to these agreements and concerted actions taken together

knowingly.” (Compl. at 18.) In addition to the conspiracy allegations, White brings claims for

denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability under Mone//, Fourth

Amendment violations for malicious prosecution,® excessive force, wrongful arrest, false

° To state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege that a government official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable

seizure of his person. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 & n.2 (2022)). White’s malicious prosecution claim is not

cognizable because he alleges that he was “informed that he was not going to be criminal

charged with trespassing after all, in light of the documentation he provided to the officers.”

(Compl. at 15.) Because he was not criminally charged, his malicious prosecution claim will be

dismissed.

imprisonment, and other claims under state law. (/d). He seeks money damages and injunctive

relief allowing him to re-enter the Property.” (/d.)

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants White leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is

incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether

a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher

v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.

Werzel, 15 F 4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will

accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff's favor,.and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible

7 To the extent White is requesting relief from the state court’s order granting Jennings

guardianship over the Property, including her right to sell the Property, which is pending appeal,

the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant such relief. In Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v.

Thompson, the Supreme Court held courts are prevented from exercising jurisdiction when a

court in a previously filed action is exercising control over the property at issue and the second

court must exercise control over the same property in order to grant the relief sought, even where

the property has not actually been seized. 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939). Applying this principal, the

Third Circuit recently held a district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a party’s suit brought under

section 1983 where the party asked the district court “to order the distribution of specific

property subject to the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court” because “[t]o grant the relief sought

by the plaintiffs, the District Court would have had to exercise control over the shares of stock at

issue.” Dyno v. Dyno, No. 20-3302, 2021 WL 3508252, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (per

curiam); see also Lefkowitz v. Bank of New York, 528 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding

that providing requested specific performance and declaratory relief would require the federal

court “to assert control over property that remains under the control of the state courts”). Like in

Dyno, the Court does not have jurisdiction to exercise control over the Property.

claim. See Shorter vy. United States, 12 F 4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other

grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F Ath 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, pro se pleadings are different from “formal

pleadings drafted by /awyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “The requirement

that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally does not ordinarily apply to pro se lawyers.”

Spence v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2024), cert. denied

sub nom. Spence vy, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 145 8. Ct. 594 (2024); see also, e.g., Erb y,

Thompson, No. 23-329, 2025 WL 3124152, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2025) (citing id. and

Godlove v. Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald, & Hahn, 903 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1990)

(“Ordinarily, we treat the efforts of pro se applicants gently, but a pro se lawyer is entitled to no

special consideration.”)); McElwee v. Aldersgate Life Plan Servs., Inc., No. 24-00288, 2024 WL

4438673, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2024). However, although a legally trained pro se litigant is

not afforded liberal construction, the Court will nevertheless construe his complaint “so as to do

justice.” Spence, 109 F.4th at 538 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)).

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss any claims over which it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)@) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v.

Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua

sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing

federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015)

(“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”).

The Court’s continuing obligation to assure its jurisdiction includes an assessment of whether a

case has become moot. See Seneca Res. Corp. v. Twp. of Highland, Elk Cty., Pa., 863 F.3d 245,

252 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Our ‘continuing obligation’ to assure that we have jurisdiction requires that

we raise issues of standing and mootness sua sponte.”).

Il. DISCUSSION

White asserts his constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which such

claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color

of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Ina § 1983 action, the personal

involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element, and,

therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences

giving rise to the claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998); see

also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires

particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)).

A. Section 1983 Conspiracy Claims and Individual Claims Against Defendants

Stefanide, Jennings, Kay, Troop, and Fasbinder

White seeks to bring constitutional claims against Stefanide, the private attorney

representing Defendant Jennings in the guardianship case over White’s mother and her estate,

which includes the Property. Private attorneys are not state actors. See, e.g., Gannaway v.

Stroumbakis, 842 F, App’x 725, 730 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (noting that “[a] privately

retained attorney clearly does not act under color of state law, and . . . that ‘no color of state law

attache[s] to the functions of court-appointed counsel.’”); Coulter v. Allegheny Cnty. Bar Ass’n,

496 F. App’x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (none of the defendants named, including an

attorney, his law firm, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, the Allegheny County Bar Association

or its three individual members, were state actors for purposes of Section 1983); Runge v. Kelly,

No. 05-10849, 2006 WL 167497, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 23, 2006) (dismissing § 1983 claims

against private attorney who procured order appointing him as plaintiff's guardian because “[a]

private party’s abuse of a valid state procedure does not... implicate state action”). Thus, the

claims against Stefanide will be dismissed.

White’s constitutional claims against his family members, Jennings, Kay, Troop, and

Fasbinder, are not plausible because they also are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. See

Groman y. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that state action is a

“threshold issue” for § 1983 claims). “Whether a defendant is acting under color of state law —

i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor — depends on whether there is “such a close nexus

between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly

treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal

quotations omitted). In assessing whether a private party’s action constitutes state action the

Court will consider: “(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the

exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in

concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the

challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and

alteration omitted). To support a finding of state action, “the government must be ‘responsible

for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870

F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum y. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).

10

None of those criteria is met here. Jennings, who is the guardian in the lawsuit over

White’s mother and her estate, is a private individual and accusations that she has made

fraudulent allegations or taken action to deprive White of the Property during the course of the

state court proceedings, does not make her a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See e.g., Gueson

v. Feldman, No. 00-1117, 2001 WL 34355662, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2001) (“Filing a

lawsuit in state court, is not for 1983 purposes ‘state action;’ nor does it turn a private citizen into

a state actor.”); Smith y. Wood, 649 F. Supp. 901, 906 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (family members who

invoked Pennsylvania’s guardianship laws resulting in a ruling that plaintiff was incompetent to

manage his estate were not state actors “[m]erely because a judicial determination was

required”). The same is true for Troop, who petitioned for the PFA Order with Jennings, and

Kay and Fasbinder, who have also allegedly taken actions to keep White off the Property by

calling the police with false information when he was at the Property on November 21, 2023,

that ultimately led to his arrest. “Merely giving information to police officers is insufficient to

convert a private party into a state actor.” Simmer v. Kehler, No. 15-2285, 2015 WL 6737017, at

*3 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2015) (collecting cases); see also, e.g. Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F.

Supp. 3d 403, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Providing false information to the police -- even

deliberately -- does not transform a private party into a state actor.”), aff’d, No. 22-1960, 2023

WL 4418213 (3d Cir. July 10, 2023); Cvetko v. Derry Twp. Police Dep’t, No. 09-1260, 2010

WL 1791140, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2010) (“[A] private actor does not proceed under color of

state law merely by furnishing the police with information pertaining to a possible public

disturbance.”).

Nor can Jennings, Kay, Troop, Fasbinder, and Stefanide be considered state actors based on

White’s allegations of conspiratorial conduct because he has failed to state a conspiracy claim

11

under § 1983. Seeming to recognize the fact that these Defendants are private citizens and do

not qualify as state actors for purposes of § 1983, White attempts to assert this claim based on his

allegation that these non-state actor Defendants “conspired and coordinated” with the state actor

Defendants, to deprive him of the Property in an attempt to nudge his claims from the possible to

the plausible. As an initial matter, a “bare assertion of conspiracy” does not suffice to state a

claim, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Furthermore, “‘[a] conspiracy

cannot be found from allegations of judicial error, ex parte communications (the manner of

occurrence and substance of which are not alleged) or adverse rulings absent specific facts

demonstrating an agreement to commit the alleged improper actions.’” Capogrosso v. The

Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Crabtree

v, Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1990)). Rather, “to properly plead an

unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement

can be inferred.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d

Cir. 2010). White’s allegations of conspiracy are essentially predicated on these Defendants’

actions related to keeping him from residing at the Property, such as Jennings and Troop

obtaining the PFA Order temporarily evicting him from the Property then Jennings subsequently

obtaining guardianship in state court through Stefanide, the L&I inspection deeming the Property

inhabitable, and the other Defendants assisting in assuring that he was not allowed on the

Property since he is not the guardian over the Property. White has not pleaded any facts that

plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds between Jennings, Kay, Troop, Fasbinder, Stefanide,

the police officers, Knowles, and the other defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S at 556 (holding

that a plaintiff claiming conspiracy must plead “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement”). The Complaint sets forth merely a

“conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point[, which] does not supply facts

adequate to show illegality.” Jd. at 557. Specifically, White has failed to allege any facts to

support a conspiracy, such as the approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific

parties to the agreement, the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy. See

Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989) (“To plead conspiracy

adequately, a plaintiff must set forth allegations that address the period of the conspiracy, the

object of the conspiracy, and the certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that

purpose.”), abrogated on other grounds by Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000). The mere fact

that the state court proceedings resulted in the PFA Order against White evicting him from the

property then subsequently granting Jennings guardianship over White’s mother and her estate,

which includes the Property, and that the other defendants abided by such rulings, are not

sufficient to allege plausibly the existence of a conspiracy. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.

24, 28 (“[M]erely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not

make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.”); Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at

179 (holding that conspiracy claim was not plausible where plaintiff “failed to allege except in

general terms the approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific parties to the

agreement ..., the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy”); Stephens v.

Kenney, 802 F. App’x 715, 720 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (conclusory allegations that guardian

and attorney conspired with state actor to deprive plaintiff of due process did not state a basis for

state action); Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff cannot rely

exclusively “upon his own suspicion and speculation” to establish a conspiracy claim). White’s

allegations merely assume the existence of a conspiracy rather than alleging one and therefore do

not state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983. In sum, White’s allegations of conspiracy are

13

insufficient either as a basis for a conspiracy claim or as a basis for finding that the private

defendants may be considered state actors for purposes of § 1983. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it

stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relicf.’’) (internal

quotations omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not

nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be

dismissed.”).

c. Fourteenth Amendment Claims against Knowles

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It appears White

attempts to state a claim against Knowles for a violation his procedural due process rights based

on the condemnation of the Property. (See Compl. at 16.) To state a claim under § 1983 for a

violation of one’s procedural due process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived

of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of

law.’” Hilly. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v.

Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). The Fourteenth Amendment’s protections encompass

real property. See Nicholas v. Penn. State Uniy., 227 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 2000),

“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

Thus, a deprivation of property should “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. Educ. y. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542

(1985) (citation omitted). “Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual

notice before the government may take his property.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226

14

(2006) (citation omitted). Rather, due process requires the government to “provide notice

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency

of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Jd. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “In emergency situations, where quick action is necessary and pre-

deprivation process impractical, the state satisfies due process by providing some meaningful

means by which to assess the propriety of the state’s action at some time after the initial taking.”

Dyortsova vy. City of Philadelphia, 585 F. Supp. 3d 723, 730-31 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (internal

quotations and alterations omitted).

White alleges that on the date of his arrest, police officers informed him that he was

“prohibited from re-entering his home because it had been declared condemned as

‘uninhabitable’ by the Upper Darby Department of Licenses and Inspections.” (Compl. at 15.)

He was allowed to return to the Property to retrieve his belongings, where he saw a “cease and

desist” form citing “deplorable conditions.” (/d. at 16.) White asserts that the next day, on

November 22, 2023, he went to the L&I Office and spoke with Knowles, who relayed “his

mistaken belief that the [Property] was without utilities.” (Ud. at 17.) White informed Knowles

that the Property did have properly working utilities, explained the alleged ongoing conspiracy of

the other Defendants to remove him from the Property, and requested that he undo the

condemnation order. (/d.) White admits that Knowles, after speaking with Stefanide, informed

him that there would be an inspection scheduled the following week and he could attend. (/d.)

White “believes" no inspection ever took place, without factual allegations to support such

belief, and alleges that the Property has been “boarded up and abandoned ever since.” (/d.) Asa

result, White claims Knowles directed his agents to condemn the Property and he “wrongfully,

pretextually, and without any actual inspection or due process of law order the condemnation of

15

the property in coordination with the aforementioned actors, and for their agreed upon purpose

jointly, that being [his] removal and the preclusion of his lawful right to return” to the Property.

(Id. at 16.)

Assuming, without deciding, that White has a property interest in the Property that

Jennings currently has guardianship over, White’s allegations show that he had an adequate

opportunity to be heard when discussing the condemnation with Knowles and was given notice

by him that he believed the Property was condemned. Knowles also gave White notice that the

inspection was scheduled, and he was allowed to be present. Whether he “believes” the

inspection actually took place or not is not sufficient to allege a due process violation. See

Twombly, e.g., 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to

relief above the speculative level”); Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir.

2016) (“Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does

require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, he was also given notice

regarding the condemnation order not only by the police officers on November 21, 2023, but also

when he went to the Property that same date and saw the “cease and desist” sign declaring the

Property as “deplorable conditions.” White’s own allegations show that he was provided

sufficient notice of the condemnation order and an adequate opportunity to be heard by Knowles.

Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Knowles will be dismissed.®

8 The substantive component of the Due Process Clause can only be violated by

governmental employees when their conduct amounts to an abuse of official power that “shocks

the conscience.” Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994). Although it also

does not appear White intended to bring a substantive due process claim, even if he did, White’s

allegations regarding Knowles’s action fails to rise to the level of conscious-shocking behavior.

Knowles took the time to meet with White, explained his belief that the Property did not have

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D. Fourth Amendment Claims

The Police Officer Defendants, in their respective individual capacities, are state actors

who may be liable under § 1983. White specifically names Sergeant Devine, Sergeant

DeHoratius, and John Doe Police Officers in the heading of his Complaint. He makes factual

allegations against the police officer who arrested him at the Property and the police officer who

drove him to the station, referring to those officers as Sergeant John Does. It appears those

officers may be Sergeant Devine and Sergeant DeHoratius. In any event, regardless of the actual

names of the officers involved in the Fourth Amendment claims, they fail for the reasons set

forth below. If those are not the names of the Sergeant John Does, he failed to allege any factual

allegations against Sergeant Devine and Sergeant DeHoratius to show personal involvement of

those defendants, which is a required element and also fatal to his claims. See Rode, 845 F.2d at

1207.

1. False Arrest and Imprisonment Claims

“False arrest and false imprisonment are ‘nearly identical claims’ that are ‘generally

analyzed together.’” Karkut v. Target Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting

Brockington v. Phila., 354 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 n. 8 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citation omitted)). To state

a claim for false arrest and related false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege facts establishing that he was arrested without probable cause. See Orsatti v. N.J.

State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995), “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts

and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to

warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the

working uilities; andischeduled an inspection after White requested reconsideration of the

condemnation order. Thif was not arbitrary conduct.

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person to be arrested.” Jd. at 483. “Therefore, White must allege facts sufficient to support a

reasonable inference that the Police Officer Defendants acted without probable cause. Courts

“consider the existence of probable cause via a ‘common sense approach’ based on the totality of

the circumstances, and viewed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer.”

Young v. City of Pittsburgh, 562 F. App’x 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).

The standard is “not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the

arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”

Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).

“Under Pennsylvania law, a person commits criminal trespass if he enters or breaks into

‘any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof’ while

‘knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so.’” Eaton v. Figaski, No. 21-3094, 2022

WL 17831444, at *4 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2022) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(a)(1)). It

“merely requires proof of scienter, in other words, that the defendant had knowledge of a lack of

license or privilege to enter.” Jd. (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir.

2005), abrogated on other grounds by Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F 4th 295

(3d. Cir. 2024)).

According to the Complaint, White admits on August 22, 2023, he was temporarily

evicted from the Property by Upper Darby police officers after his aunts petitioned and

successfully obtained a temporary PFA Order. (See Compl. at 5-6.) On November 16, 2023, a

final hearing was held on the PFA Order, which he claims resulted in a favorable disposition in

his favor and the Order was vacated. (/d. at 7.) Because the PFA Order was vacated, he returned

to the Property on November 19, 2023. Ud.) He acknowledges however, that while the PFA

was pending, his aunt obtained a court order on October 2, 2023, granting her a guardianship

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over his mother and her estate, which included the Property. (/d. at 8-9.) When he returned to

the Property on November 21, 2023, after filing an appeal of the guardianship order, he admits

that one of his aunts, Kay, demanded that he leave the Property. (/d. at 11.) White did not leave

and alleges that shortly after, Upper Darby police officers surrounded the Property and

demanded he come out of the Property. (Ud. at 12.) He was ultimately arrested and taken to the

police station, and told that the police intended to charge him with criminal trespassing, “and that

his aunt and uncle, [Kay] and [Fasbinder] had relayed to officers that he was in violation of a

PFA order.” (d. at 14.) White told the officers that he was not trespassing because the PFA

Order was dismissed, and he was ultimately not charged criminally. (/d. at 15.) It is also

apparent from the Complaint that the police were aware that the property had been condemned.

Under the facts White alleges, although the PFA Order had been dismissed a few days

prior to his arrest, he admitted that he knew guardianship of the Property had been granted to

Jennings and was still pending, hence why he left the day of his arrest to appeal it. He had also

been asked to leave by Kay the day of his arrest, who he alleges did not want him at the Property

like Jennings. He further alleges that affer the arrest, the police explained that Kay and

Fasbinder called the police informing them he was in violation of the PFA Order, and they

intended to criminally charge him. These allegations make it clear that the police officers who

arrested White believed at the time of the arrest he was trespassing under the PFA Order. See

Wright, 409 F.3d at 602 (explaining that the probable cause standard is met when officers “if at

the moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge

and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent

man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”) (cleaned up).

Even though the PFA Order was allegedly no longer in effect, White informed the officers of this

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after the arrest. It is also important to note that Upper Darby Police Officers had previously

been involved in his eviction from the Property in August based on the PFA Order, meaning they

were aware to some extent of the underlying family dispute, and it is clear they believed that the

Order was still intact at the time of the arrest, adding to their reasonable belief that White was

not allowed there and was trespassing. See Turkos v. Dupont Borough, 721 F. App’x 208, 213

(3d Cir, 2018) (“The focus of the probable cause inquiry is the information available to officers

“at the time the charges were filed, not whether, in retrospect, the PFA was actually valid in May

2013.”) Furthermore, given that White had been asked to leave by Kay and knowing that

Jennings successfully obtained guardianship of the Property, which he sought to appeal, White

was Clearly aware that he was not legally permitted to be there. The facts alleged in the

Complaint reflect that the Police Officer Defendants had probable cause to arrest White for

trespassing based on what they knew at the time of the arrest, even assuming they made a factual

or legal mistake. In other words, under these circumstances, the arrest was justified.

Accordingly, White has not plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment false arrest or false

imprisonment claim, and this claim will be dismissed.

De Excessive Force Claims

A constitutional claim of excessive force that occurs during an arrest is governed by the

Fourth Amendment. Graham y. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“[C]laims that law

enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop,

or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

‘reasonableness’ standard[.]”); see also Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (Gd Cir. 2015) (“In

an excessive force case, we determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred using the

Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test.”). “Courts determine whether the force used

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is ‘objectively reasonable’ based on the totality of the circumstances, ... and certain factors,

including: ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular case, . . . the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Klein v. Madison,

374 F. Supp. 3d 389, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 386)).

White alleges that after Upper Darby police officers surrounded the Property and

demanded he come out of the Property “with his hands up in the air,” he complied as he made his

way to the basement. (Compl. at 12.) Once in the basement, he alleges Sergeant Doe, entered

the basement, maintaining a distance of about ten feet from White and ordered him “to lay face

down on the ground” while pointing a firearm at him. (/d. at 12-13.) White asserts he complied

with the order to lay down and alleges his “hands were tightly handcuffed behind his back” by

Sergeant Doe while he lied face down on the basement floor and “gave no resistance

whatsoever.” (/d. at 13.) He was removed from the Property, patted down, then placed in the

police vehicle and transported to the police station, where he the handcuffs were subsequently

removed. (/d. at 14-15.) Although he was not aware at the time of his arrest, Upper Darby

police officers had also been at the Property earlier in the day when his friend was arrested for

trespassing. (/d. at 11.)

In evaluating the use of handcuffs, the Court must “look at the intrusiveness of all aspects

of the incident in the aggregate.” Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1995), In

Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 2004), the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit held where the handcuffs were so tight that the defendant began to faint from the

pain and lost feeling in his hand, resulting in permanent nerve damage in his right wrist,

warranted a finding of excessive force. Jd. However, the Court cautioned that the opinion

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should not be “overread” as it was not meant to open the “floodgates to a torrent of handcuff

claims.” Jd. Merely alleging that the handcuffs were tight, as White has done in this case, does

not warrant a finding of excessive force under Kopec and its progeny. See id. Based on White’s

detailed allegations, including the circumstances surrounding his encounter with the police

officers, why he was approached by them, and how Sergeant Doe arrested him after he

voluntarily lied down, these facts indicate that force of tightly placed handcuffs were objectively

reasonable to conduct the arrest based on the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Rivera v.

Como, 733 F. App’x 587, 591 (3d Cir. 2018) (“The amount of force was limited to that

reasonably necessary to bring Rivera under control and to place handcuffs on him’); Pagliaccetti

vy. City of Phila., No. 09-1106, 2010 WL 3222153, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Merely

alleging that the handcuffs were too tight, as plaintiff has done in this case, does not warrant a

finding of excessive force” ). The factual allegations describe the normal course of an arrest

without any indication that White suffered pain and/or an injury from the use of handcuffs, or

more importantly, that the officers had any reason to believe that the use of handcuffs in the

normal course of his arrest was causing him any pain.

White also alleges Sergeant Doe entered the basement after officers requested him to exit

the Property and ordered him “to lay face down on the ground” while maintaining a distance of

about ten feet from him and pointed a firearm at him. (Compl. at 12-13.) White asserts he

complied with the order to lay down and was then handcuffed, escorted to the police car and

transported to the station. Although the crime of trespassing alone does not likely warrant a

safety concern, given the information available to the police officers, the decision to draw a

firearm to safely arrest White inside the Property was justified by the circumstances. See

Armstrong v. Sherman, No. 09-716, 2010 WL 2483911, at *4 (D.N.J. June 4, 2010) (“[P]ointing

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a firearm at a person can constitute excessive force if such action is not justified by the

circumstances.”) (emphasis added); see also Graham vy. Connor, 490 U.S. at 386, 396 (1989)

(“[Making an arrest] necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion

or threat thereof to affect it.”). For instance, White alleges that officers told him that when his

family members called the police, they relayed to them that White was in violation of a PFA

Order, which is an order to protect someone from abuse.’ Upper Darby Officers also had been

present during his previous eviction from the Property based on that Order and knew another

individual, his friend, was present at the Property earlier that day and was arrested for

trespassing. He also admits the police asked him to exit the residence with his hands in the air

prior to entering the basement. Importantly, White does not allege that the firearm was pointed

at him after he was handcuffed or when he was transported to and detained at the police station.

Sergeant Doe pointing the firearm at White while entering the basement to effectuate his arrest

was objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances, especially given Sergeant

Doe was entering an unsecured space after White had been asked to exit the Property, and

officers knew that a protection from abuse order was previously granted against him. See, e.g.,

Pearson y. Krasley, 715 F. App’x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2017) (no plausible excessive force claim

when officer pointed gun at the plaintiff and requiring him to lie on the ground during arrest for

promoting prostitution); Stiegel v. Peters Twp., 600 F. App’x 60, 67 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that

an officer drawing his handgun on suspects was reasonable in part because the officer’s “use of

See United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 263 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.

Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6107, 6108) (“The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § § 6101—22, allows a plaintiff to obtain a PFA order upon, infer alia, proof of abuse

by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing.”’)

23

his service and weapon was limited—he displayed it for a short amount of time and holstered it

once the situation was under control.”); Mellott v. Heemer, 161 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1998)

(concluding that “it was objectively reasonable for the marshals to load and point their weapons

in an effort to discourage resistance and ensure their own safety”); Cf Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50

F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding excessive force where police held suspect’s family

members, two of whom were minors, on the ground at gunpoint while they searched the alleged

suspect’s house).

White’s allegations, taken as true, describe the officers’ use of handcuffs and display of a

firearm were justified by the circumstances to safely effectuate his arrest and nothing indicates

that the force used was more than necessary given the totality of the circumstances. Therefore,

these claims will be dismissed.!°

E. Municipal Liability

White names Upper Darby Township as a defendant.!! As an initial matter, a

municipality is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees. See Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (holding that local governments can be liable as “persons”

'0 White references that “other officers who failed to intervene” are liable. (Compl. at

18.) To the extent he intended to bring a failure to intervene claim based on the alleged

excessive force claim, such claim would also be dismissed based on the dismissal of the

excessive force claim. See Bush v. Renegar, No. 18-327, 2020 WL 5408065, at *10 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 9, 2020) (quoting Lora-Pena vy. Denney, 760 F. Supp. 2d 458, 468 (D. Del. 2011) (cleaned

up)) “Although legally distinct, the fate of plaintiff's failure to intervene claim is closely linked

to that of the excessive force claim since, by definition, if there was no excessive force then there

can be no failure to intervene.”).

'l White also names the Police Officer Defendants and Knowles in their official

capacities. Claims against these defendants in their official capacities are indistinguishable from

the claims against Upper Darby, the governmental entity who employs them. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”). Thus, a suit against these defendants in their

official capacities is duplicative of White’s claims against Upper Darby and will be dismissed

with prejudice.

24

under § 1983, but this liability extends only to “their own illegal acts” (emphasis in original)

(quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). Rather, to plead a § 1983 claim

against a municipality or municipal entity, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality or

municipal entity’s policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the

plaintiff] must... specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan y. City of York,

PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232

(3d Cir, 2008)). A plaintiff may also state a basis for municipal liability by “alleging failure-to-

supervise, train, or discipline . . . [and alleging facts showing] that said failure amounts to

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d

93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019). “This consists of a showing as to whether (1) municipal policymakers

know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult

choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will

frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Jd. But “[i]t is well-settled that, if there is

no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.” Mulholland v. Gov't

Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Los Angeles v. Heller, 475

U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (stating that ifa municipal employee “inflicted no constitutional injury □□ □ ,

it is inconceivable that [the municipality] could be liable”)). Because White has failed to plead

any plausible underlying constitutional violation, it is inconceivable that the claim against Upper

Darby is plausible and will be dismissed.!*

'2 Even if White’s allegations had amounted to plausible constitutional violations, he has

failed to plead facts to support any Monel/ claim against Upper Darby. White does not

sufficiently allege that the conduct of which he complains was caused by a municipal policy or

custom, or municipal failures amounting to deliberate indifference. General allegations that

simply paraphrase the standard for municipal liability do not support a plausible claim. See

25

F. State Law Claims

Any state law claims will also be dismissed. In the absence of any federal claims, the

only independent basis for jurisdiction over state law claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants

a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”

Section 1332(a) requires “complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,” which

“means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of

the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 104 (first quoting Lincoln

Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); then quoting Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,

592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010)). An individual is a citizen of the state where they are

domiciled, meaning the state where they are physically present and intend to remain. See

Washington v. Hovensa, LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011).

White asserts he is a citizen of Pennsylvania. (See Compl. at 3.) Although he does not

allege the state citizenship for any of the Defendants, Upper Darby is located in Delaware

County and several of the Defendants are employed by Upper Darby. (/d. at 2-3.) Therefore, it

appears at least some of the Defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania and diversity jurisdiction is

lacking over White’s state law claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant White leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and dismiss the Complaint. Leave to amend will not be given as any attempt to amend would be

futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002).

Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021)

(“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is

insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”) (citing cases).

26

An appropriate Order dismissing this case will be entered separately. See Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 58(a).

BY THE COURT:

Gaolt

GAIL A. WEILHEIMER, J.

oF