Hernandez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SARA LUCIOLA VILLA : Civil No. 1:25-CV-01847

HERNANDEZ, :

:

Petitioner, :

:

v. :

:

MICHAEL KUNES, Warden of Clinton :

County Correctional Facility, et al., :

:

Respondents. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 filed by Petitioner Sara Luciola Villa Hernandez (“Hernandez”). (Doc. 1.)

Hernandez argues that she is being wrongfully detained without a bond hearing

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and, instead, should be immediately released or provided

an opportunity for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. For the reasons that

follow, the court will grant Hernandez’s petition and order her released from

custody.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hernandez is a 33-year-old native and citizen of Colombia. (Doc. 1, ¶ 2;

Doc. 12-2, p. 5.)1 She entered the United States on or about January 19, 2024, was

encountered by United States Border Patrol agents that day, and arrested. (Doc. 1,

1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

¶ 3; Doc. 12-2, p. 5.) The same day, United States Border Patrol issued and served

Hernandez with a Notice to Appear in immigration court for removal proceedings

under the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), because she was in

the United States without being admitted or paroled. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 4–5; Doc. 12-3.)

United States Border Patrol then released Hernandez on her own recognizance

pending immigration proceedings. (Doc. 1, ¶ 5; Doc. 12-2, p. 5.)

On August 9, 2025, Hernandez was a passenger in a vehicle that was the

subject of a traffic stop in Dallas Township, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, ¶ 6; Doc. 12-2,

p. 5.) Hernandez presented her Columbian passport, advised officers that she was

in immigration proceedings, and was detained by Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) pending the completion of her immigration proceedings.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 6; Doc. 12-2, pp. 4–5.) On August 19, 2025, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed additional charges of inadmissibility/

deportability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (Doc. 12-4.)

Hernandez, who is being held at the Clinton County Correctional Facility,

subsequently requested bond, which was denied on September 16, 2025. (Doc. 1;

¶ 12; Doc. 12-5.) An immigration judge found that pursuant to Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2016 (Sept. 5, 2025), “Immigration Judges lack authority

to hear bond requests or grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States

without admission” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Id. at 2.) Hernandez reserved

her right to appeal this decision. (Id. at 3.) On December 16, 2025, an

immigration judge ruled that Hernandez was inadmissible under Sections

212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”). (Doc. 12-6, p. 2.) The immigration judge ordered Hernandez removed to

Honduras in accordance with the Asylum Cooperative Agreement. (Id. at 4.)

Hernandez appealed this decision, which is currently pending before the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. 17, pp. 2, 10–12.)

Meanwhile, on October 3, 2025, Hernandez filed the instant petition

requesting release from detention or a bond hearing against Michael Kunes and

Jason Kormanic, Wardens of Clinton County Correctional Facility; Todd M.

Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of DHS; DHS; and Pamela

Bondi, Attorney General of the United States (collectively, “Respondents”).2

(Doc. 1.) A memorandum of law in support of the petition was filed on November

26, 2025, and Respondents responded on December 18, 2025. (Docs. 9, 12, 13.)3

2 Respondents, in a footnote, submit that the only proper respondent is Michael Kunes because

he is the Warden of Clinton County Correctional Facility. (Doc. 12, p. 1 n.1.) In this case,

consistent with Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004), Petitioner has named the Warden

as a respondent. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447 (“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to

challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he should name his warden as

respondent.”) The court will not address an argument requesting dismissal of other Respondents

when only raised in a footnote.

3 Upon review of Hernandez’s memorandum of law, the court noted that certain pages were

missing from the filing. (See Doc. 9.) The court requested that counsel refile the memorandum,

which was done on January 8, 2026. (See Doc. 13.)

No reply was filed by the December 24, 2025 deadline, thus, this petition is ripe

for review.4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a district court may consider a writ of

habeas corpus when an immigration detainee is “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Claims related to an

immigration detainee’s request for release from confinement must be brought as a

habeas petition as these “claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.”

Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 167

(2022)). Jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions . . . lies in only one district: the

district of confinement.” Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443

(2004)) (internal quotations omitted). Hernandez is detained at the Clinton County

Correctional Facility, which is within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See 28

U.S.C. § 118(b).

DISCUSSION

Before the court turns to the merits of Hernandez’s petition, the court must

address Respondents’ arguments that this court lacks jurisdiction to resolve the

4 The court requested supplemental letter briefs to address whether Hernandez’s immigration

status had changed during this litigation. (Doc. 16.) Based on a review of the parties’ responses,

Docs. 17 & 18, the court is satisfied that resolving the instant petition is appropriate.

petition for writ of habeas corpus before it and that Hernandez failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies.

A. The court has jurisdiction to resolve Hernandez’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus.5

Respondents assert that several sections of the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), deprive this court of jurisdiction to

resolve the present petition. (Doc. 12, pp. 21–29.) As the court will explain, these

arguments are without merit.

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

Section 1252(g) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “no court shall

have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising

from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,

adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”

Respondents argue that Section 1252(g) divests this court of jurisdiction because

Hernandez challenges the method by which the Attorney General chose to

commence removal proceedings, which includes the decision to detain Hernandez.

(Doc. 12, pp. 22–24.) But Section 1252(g) only applies to “those three specific

actions themselves,” i.e. commencement, adjudication, and execution of removal

orders. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab

5 The court notes that on February 5, 2026, Respondents conceded that the court has subject-

matter jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Hernandez’s petition. (Doc. 18, p. 2–3.) Nonetheless,

the court will address the arguments previously raised by Respondents.

Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999)); Patel v. O’Neil, No.

3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025). Hernandez does

not challenge the commencement, adjudication, or execution of a removal order.

Rather, she asserts that her detention under Section 1225(b) is unconstitutional.

(See Doc. 1.) Thus, Section 1252(g) does not divest this court of jurisdiction.

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)

Section 1252(b)(9) provides:

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation

and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from

any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the

United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial

review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided

in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under

section 2241 of Title 28 . . . to review such an order or such questions

of law or fact.

Respondents submit that the court lacks jurisdiction in this matter because

judicial review of a final removal order is only appropriate before a federal court of

appeals. (Doc. 12, pp. 24–29.) Again, this argument misses the mark. Section

1252(b)(9) is “designed to channel claims together for judicial review.” E.O.H.C.

v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing

Reno, 525 U.S. at 483). However, “[i]t does not reach claims that are independent

of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process, like claims that cannot effectively

be handled through the available administrative process.” Id. (quoting Aguilar v.

U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st

Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, district courts are not

divested of jurisdiction when “aliens seek relief that courts cannot meaningfully

provide alongside review of a final order of review.” Id.

3. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to

review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be

in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.”

Respondents submit that this clarifies that courts cannot entertain a challenge to a

discretionary decision by the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security.

(Doc. 12, p. 29.) Hernandez is not challenging the discretionary decision to detain

her, rather, she is challenging whether Section 1225(b) properly applies to her.

(See Doc. 1.) Seeking review of the extent of Respondents’ authority to detain an

immigration detainee “is not a [challenge to a] matter of discretion.” Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *3 (holding

same). Thus, Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip this court of jurisdiction to

consider Hernandez’s petition.

B. Hernandez need not exhaust her administrative remedies.

Respondents assert that Hernandez’s petition must be dismissed or stayed

because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before an immigration

judge and the BIA. (Doc. 12, pp. 29–32.) Typically, a petitioner is required to

exhaust her administrative remedies before filing a petition under Section 2241.

Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

But, there is no statutory requirement for exhaustion as “exhaustion exists only as a

judicially created doctrine applied at the Court’s discretion.” Kashranov v.

Jamison, 2:25-cv-5555, 2025 WL 3188399, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). And exhaustion “is likewise not

required when it would be futile.” Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-cv-

5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (citation omitted). Here,

requiring Hernandez to exhaust her administrative remedies would be futile as the

BIA has held in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2016 (Sept. 5, 2025),

that immigration judges lack the authority to hear bond requests for detainees held

pursuant to Section 1225. Thus, the court will not require Hernandez to do so and

will resolve her petition. See, e.g., Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *4 (excusing

exhaustion requirement based on Hurtado); Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-cv-2276,

2025 WL 3537279, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (same); Demirel, 2025 WL

3218243 at *4 (same).

C. The court will grant Hernandez’s petition.

The court now turns to the merits of Hernandez’s habeas petition.

Hernandez argues that she was improperly detained under Section 1225(b) of the

INA, which relates to applicants for admission. (Docs. 1, 13.) Hernandez submits

that she should have been detained, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and

provided a bond hearing because she has been in the United States since January

2024, and is thus, no longer an applicant for admission. (Docs. 1, 13.) Hernandez

requests the following forms of relief: the court order Respondents to release her

immediately on conditions of release as necessary; alternatively, the court conduct

a bond hearing or order an immigration judge to conduct a bond hearing;

alternatively, hold that her detention is governed by Section 1226, entitling

Hernandez to a bond hearing before an immigration judge; and award costs and

attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412. (Doc. 1, p. 21; Doc. 13, pp. 23–24.)

Respondents agree that Hernandez is detained pursuant to Section

1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 12, p. 19.) They assert that Hernandez falls within the

statutory definition of “applicant for admission,” she is properly detained under

Section 1225(b)(2), and Section 1226(a) is inapplicable to her. (Doc. 12, pp. 32–

54.) Respondents submit that the plain language of Section 1225(b)(2) requires

detention of applicants for admission and that the section’s reference to noncitizens

“seeking admission” does not narrow the scope of Section 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 32–

44.) They further argue that their interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not

make Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention authority superfluous and Jennings

does not undermine Respondents’ interpretation. (Id. at 44–54.) Respondents also

assert that Hernandez’s temporary detention does not violate due process. (Id. at

54–59.) Alternatively, if the court wishes to grant Hernandez’s petition,

Respondents request that the court order a bond hearing rather than releasing

Hernandez. (Id. at 59.)

Section 1225 of the INA is titled “Inspection by immigration officers;

expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225. It defines “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United

States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” Id.

§ 1225(a)(1). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer

determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

Noncitizens subject to this mandatory detention may only be released while their

removal proceedings are pending “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant

public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. The BIA recently decided Matter of

Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2016 (Sept. 5, 2025), wherein the BIA held that

noncitizens who enter the United States without admission are subject to

mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus, immigration judges

lack the authority to provide a bond hearing.

Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested

and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and

pending such decision, the Attorney General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(a) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and

containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney

General; or

(b) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including

an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate

work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent

residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal

proceedings) be provided such authorization.

The parties agree that Hernandez is detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and

neither party alleges that Hernandez is subject to Section 1226(c).6 (See Docs. 1,

12.)

Federal district courts across the country and within this district have,

overwhelmingly, rejected Respondents’ position regarding the applicability of

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to detainees like Hernandez, a noncitizen who previously

entered and had been living in the United States prior to her detention.7 See, e.g.,

6 Section 1226(c) requires detention of noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable because

they have committed a criminal offense identified in this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

7 The court acknowledges that there are some district courts, as well as the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals, who have agreed with Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225. (See Doc. 18, p. 3

n.1.) Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb.

6, 2026). However, none of these decisions are binding on this court.

Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:25-cv-1896, 2025

WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson, J.) (adopting report and

recommendation finding that Section 1225 was inapplicable to petitioner); Patel v.

O’Neil, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)

(collecting cases within the Third Circuit as of December 8, 2025); Quispe v. Rose,

3:25-cv-2276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (holding that petitioner

was improperly detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)); Patel v. O’Neill, 3:25-cv-

2289, 2026 WL 323121 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2026) (same). “The vast majority of

courts confronting this precise issue have rejected the Government’s interpretation,

and the BIA’s interpretation of Hurtado, as contradictory to the plain text of §

1225.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243 (citing Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, No. 25-16429,

2025 WL 3033880, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2025) (collecting cases)).

The court is persuaded by and agrees with the majority of federal district

courts that have ruled on this issue to date in rejecting Respondents’ interpretation

of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Hernandez’s detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is

unlawful because Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “applies only to noncitizens who are

actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United States.” Bethancourt

Soto v. Soto, No. 25-cv-16200, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7

(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025). Thus, this section simply does not apply to someone like

Hernandez, who has been residing in the United States for over two years. Id.

(collecting cases adopting the same conclusion).

In reaching this conclusion, the court holds that Respondents’ interpretation

of “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage and contradicts the

plain meaning of the statutory text. Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *5

(finding that respondents’ interpretation “violates the rule against surplusage and

negates the plain meaning of the text.”); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5

(citing Centeno Ibarra v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-cv-6312, 2025

WL 3294726, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025)) (same). If Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

applied to every “applicant for admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would

become unnecessary and surplusage.8 Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *6

(citations omitted); see also United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res.,

Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023) (explaining that “every clause and word of a statute

should have meaning” and “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,

void, or insignificant”). Further, “seeking admission” connotes “some affirmative,

8 Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at*6, provides a helpful example of why Respondents’

interpretation violates the rule against surplusage:

[R]emoving the words “seeking admission” from § 1225(b)(2)(A) would not alter its

meaning under Respondents’ theory: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission

is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained[.]”

That result is inconsistent with the principle that courts must interpret a statute to give

meaning to “every clause and word” that Congress chose to include. See Polansky, 599

U.S. at 432, 143 S.Ct. 1720 (quotation marks omitted).

present-tense action” such that it “requires an act currently underway not a static

condition.” Id. at *5 (citations omitted). Thus, Respondents’ argument that

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not require any “affirmative act” is contrary to the

plain meaning of the words “seeking admission.”9

Respondents’ interpretation also makes Section 1226(c)’s mandatory

detention provision superfluous and redundant. Centeno Ibarra, 2025 WL

3294726 at *6 (“Under the government’s interpretation, § 1225 would require such

mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or convictions. If this was the

case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for

mandatory detention.”).

In sum, Hernadez is not currently “seeking admission” to the United States.

That was her status in January 2024. At that time, an immigration official made

the decision to release her in the United States on her own recognizance.

9 Again, the examples provided by the court in Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *6, are

illustrative of why Respondents’ argument fails:

For example, one could deem every person in the country a “potential homebuyer,” but

they are not “seeking to buy a home,” without taking some affirmative action towards that

goal. Nor is every “employable adult” in the country “applying for a job,” simply because

jobs exist. Or, as Judge Ho explained in Benitez, “someone who enters a movie theater

without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film

would not ordinarily then be described as ‘seeking admission’ to the theater. Rather, that

person would be described as already present there.” Benitez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2025

WL 2371588, at *7. Further, “[e]ven if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for

a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as ‘seeking admission’ ... at that point—

one would say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining

there.” Id.

Therefore, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to her as she is not currently

“seeking admission” to the United States.

Addressing Hernandez’s constitutional claims, it is undisputed that “once an

alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process

Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether

their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 693 (citations omitted). Thus, the court must determine what process is due

to Hernandez, who is currently subject to mandatory detention without a bond

hearing, by applying the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976). Mathews requires the court to weigh three factors: (1) “the private interest

that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if

any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.

The first factor weighs heavily in Hernandez’s favor because the “official

action” has deprived her of her physical liberty. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being

free from physical detention by one’s own government.”). The second factor

similarly swings in Hernandez’s favor because she “is presently and erroneously

detained under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, without an

opportunity for a bond hearing.” Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *8

(emphasis in original). As to the third factor, the court recognizes Respondents’

interest in detaining noncitizens to ensure “the appearance of aliens at future

immigration proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 690. Still, this factor weighs in favor of Hernandez because

Respondents do not contend that she has a criminal record, that she poses a danger

to the community, or that she is a flight risk. Accordingly, the Mathews factors

weigh in Hernandez’s favor and the court finds that her mandatory detention

without a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) violates her procedural due

process rights. See Bethencourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *8 (“Taken together,

the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh decisively in Petitioner’s favor, and

as such his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due

process rights.”) (citations omitted); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *6 (holding

same). Thus, the court will grant Hernandez’s petition and release her on her own

recognizance as the United States Border Patrol did in January 2024.

D. The court will award EAJA fees and costs.

Hernandez requests costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by the

EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 1, p. 21.) Respondents refer the court to a then-

pending Third Circuit case addressing whether EAJA fees can be obtained in

immigration habeas petitions and argue that any EAJA fees should not be

permitted until the underlying immigration proceedings have also concluded.

(Doc. 12, pp. 60–61.) Since Respondents filed their brief, the Third Circuit

decided Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, --- F.4th ----,

2026 WL 263483 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). The court held that a petition for writ of

habeas corpus from immigration detention under Section 2241 is a “civil action”

under the EAJA. Id. at *1. Because the present action is a Section 2241 petition

regarding immigration detention, it is a civil action. Thus, Hernandez will be

permitted to file a motion for costs and fees pursuant to the EAJA within thirty

days of the entry of judgment.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court will grant Hernandez’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus and order her immediate release. An appropriate order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: February 13, 2026