Charles

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RUTH CHARLES, No. 4:21-CV-00883

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

COUNTY OF LYCOMING,

PENNSYLVANIA, RYAN

GARDNER, individually, and

LISA DIMASSIMO, individually,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 12, 2026

On the final day of 2025, this Court granted Defendants’, Ryan Gardner

(“Judge Gardner”), Lisa DiMassimo (“DiMassimo”), and the County of Lycoming,

Motion for Summary Judgment in a memorandum opinion and order.1 Two weeks

later, Plaintiff, filed a motion for reconsideration of that opinion and order.2 That

motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.3 For the following reasons

that motion is denied.

1 See Docs. 40, 41.

2 Doc. 43.

I. RECONSIDERATION STANDARD

While Plaintiff’s motion alleges that she is seeking reconsideration based on

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60,4 her brief in support of that motion only

argues that this relief is warranted based on Rule 59.5 Therefore, the Court will

analyze the motion solely under Rule 59.6

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59 “is to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”7 Such a

motion may only be granted if “the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one

of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the

availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion

for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to

prevent manifest injustice.”8 The Court should only utilize that final justification if

4 See Doc. 43.

5 See generally Doc. 44.

6 This is supported by the fact that a motion under Rule 60(b) would clearly be unavailing to

Plaintiff, as none of the six reasons justifying relief from judgment appear in this case. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (b).

7 Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985).

8 Howard Hess Dental Lab’ys Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010)

(quoting Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.

1999)). There is a line of case law that would seem to support the proposition that Plaintiff has

brought this motion under the wrong rule, and should have brought it under Rule 54(b). See,

e.g., Heckman v. N. Penn Comprehensive Health Servs., No. 4:20-CV-01680, 2024 WL

4608584, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2024). However, an analysis under this rule is appropriate

“for reconsideration of interlocutory orders—whether denials of summary judgment, grants of

partial summary judgment, or any other non-final order.” Qazizadeh v. Pinnacle Health Sys.,

214 F. Supp. 3d 292, 295 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Here, the underlying order is a grant of full summary

judgment and the entering of final judgment in Defendants favor. See Doc 41. As a result, the

less stringent requirements of Rule 54(b) analysis do not guide the Court’s analysis, and one

of the three justifications listed are required.

the “[C]ourt is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.”9

As a result of the limited circumstances that justify reconsideration and

“[b]ecause federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments,” it

should come as no surprise that courts in this circuit have found that “motions for

reconsideration should be granted sparingly.”10 Finally, it is important to note that

reconsideration motions are “not to be used as a means to reargue matters already

argued and disposed of or as an attempt to re-litigate a point of disagreement between

the Court and the litigant.”11

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s motion admits that there has been no change in the controlling law

since the summary judgment motion was decided.12 Nor does she argue that new

evidence is available.13 Rather she alleges that the motion is intended “to correct

clear errors of law or fact and prevent manifest injustice”14 —the third justification

allowing for the grant of a motion for reconsideration.15 She says that this argument

9 Drumgo v. Reese, No. 3:20-CV-02434, 2022 WL 21758567, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2022)

(quoting Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008)).

10 Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

11 Knopick v. Downey, 963 F.Supp.2d 378, 3878 (M.D. Pa. 2013).

12 See Doc. 44, at 4. In fact, in each section of its brief in support of her motion, Plaintiff asserts

that the Court utilized undertook the correct analysis, using the correct caselaw. See Doc. 44,

at 6, 8, 10.

13 See Doc. 44, at 4.

14 Id.

15 See Howard Hess Dental Lab’ys Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).

is availing because “the Court accepted Defendants’ allegations as fact and did not

consider, or failed to appreciate, the significance of probative, competent evidence

presented by Plaintiff in her opposition papers.”16

Plaintiff points to two pieces of evidence that she believes the Court did not

consider, and which ultimately led to it making a clear error of law. First, she implies

that the Court ignored their allegations that DiMassimo and Plaintiff’s co-worker

used the offensive racial epithet on multiple occasions, not just one.17 While Plaintiff

emphatically argues that the Court’s assertion that this case arose out of “one isolated

incident” is factually incorrect,18 the Court made that statement based on the

Plaintiff’s own agreement in her deposition with the statement “that the incident that

gives rise to this lawsuit is a singular incident.”19 As Defendants point out, Plaintiffs

provide no evidence that DiMassimo, or any other party or member of the office,

ever used the offensive word after the original time the co-worker used it.20 Further,

all citations surrounding the allegations that the epithet was used on other occasions

point to bare assertions in her statement of facts that are unrelated to the use of the

word or unclear citations to documents that the Court cannot find.21 After a thorough

16 Doc. 44, at 4.

17 See id. at 6-7.

18 See Doc. 40, at 9; Doc. 44, at 5-6. Additionally, the Court can find no evidence, and Plaintiff

has certainly pointed the Court to no such evidence, of the April 20th meeting where the usage

of the offensive statement was allegedly made again.

19 Doc. 37, Ex. A (Charles Dep.) 31:14-18.

20 See generally Doc. 37, 15 18-19; Doc. 44, at 5-6.

21 See Doc. 37, at 6-7; Doc. 44, at 5-6.

review of all the documents produced to the Court throughout the litigation, the

Court cannot find a single mention of any other use of the word, and the best

evidence it has at its disposal are the words of the Plaintiff that this was a single

incident.

The Court does not have to accept blanket, unsupported assertions set forth by

the Plaintiff at the summary judgment stage, rather it must believe the evidence

provided by the nonmovant Plaintiff.22 The Court considered the statements made

regarding further use of the epithet as it reviewed the summary judgment briefing

and re-considered them for the present motion. Nothing raised in this motion has

persuaded the Court that its original belief that these statements are flatly without

support in the record was incorrect. Because Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that

the Court failed to consider, it is not “left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed” on this front. 23

The second piece of evidence that is alleged to have been overlooked are

statements by Judge Gardner that the sole ground for termination was “Ms. Charles’

alleged use of the word ‘bitch.’”24 Again, this is the case of an assertion being made

that has no evidentiary support in any documents submitted to the Court.25 Rather,

22 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

23 Drumgo v. Reese, No. 3:20-CV-02434, 2022 WL 21758567, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2022)

(quoting Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008)).

24 Doc. 44, at 9.

25 Despite it being far from clear, it appears that the citation used after this assertion is pointing

to Judge Gardner’s deposition. See Doc. 44, at 9; Doc. 37, Ex. C (Judge Gardner Dep.).

However, nowhere in that deposition does the word “bitch” even appear. See generally, Doc.

Judge Gardner’s deposition provides support for the Court’s finding that the use of

the expletive was only a part of the reason for Plaintiff’s termination.26 This is

another example of Plaintiff’s unsupported assertions made throughout this litigation

that do not need to be relied on at the summary judgment stage.

What remains of Plaintiff’s motion are points that have been explicitly

discussed and disposed of in the summary judgment memorandum opinion. Plaintiff

now explicitly states that her co-worker should be used as a comparator for the

disparate treatment analysis.27 But the Court already gathered that Plaintiff was

implying this comparison and detailed why she does not qualify for such status.28

She also re-raises the fact that “the single use of a racial epithet … [can be] severe

enough to establish a hostile work environment.”29 But in its opinion, the Court

acknowledged that this can be true and explained why the circumstances of this case

were still not severe enough to allow for the hostile work environment to survive

summary judgment.30

37, Ex. C. Rather, it seems that Plaintiff meant to say that the word “bullshit” was used. That

expletive does appear in the deposition, and I will proceed in this analysis assuming that

Plaintiff’s intention was to say that the single use of the word “bullshit” was the sole ground

for termination. This is supported by Plaintiff’s statements in her brief in opposition to the

motion to dismiss, where she said that she was “subject to termination because of an

unsupported allegation that she used of a single curse word (‘bullshit’).” Doc. 37, at 11.

26 See Doc. 37, Ex. C 125:13-22 (“It was the culmination of not only the e-mails that I received,

but then in addition to her indicating that it was unfair to her to have to come into work on

what she described as her day off when, in fact, it was not a day off.”).

27 Doc. 44, at 8-9.

28 See Doc. 40, at 13-14.

29 Doc. 44, at 7.

30 See Doc. 44, at 9-10.

Reconsideration motions are “not to be used as a means to reargue matters

already argued and disposed.” 31 That is just what Plaintiff attempts to accomplish

with the present motion.

Plaintiff is correct in noting that at the summary judgment stage, “the Court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”32 The Court did not undertake

such a forbidden practice. Rather, the Court believed the evidence provided by the

nonmovant Plaintiff—as it must.33 It simply deemed such evidence to be insufficient

to raise any material facts relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to prove her case.

Nothing raised in Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration leaves “with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”34 Further, the Court

can find no clear error of law or fact and does not believe there has been any manifest

injustice that has occurred. Therefore, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration.

31 Knopick v. Downey, 963 F.Supp.2d 378, 3878 (M.D. Pa. 2013).

32 Wesley v. Hollis, No. CIV.A. 03-3130, 2007 WL 1655483, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2007)

(quoting Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

33 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). This is not the motion to

dismiss stage where I must accept allegations made by the parties. See Connelly v. Lane

Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). The summary judgment standard

demands more; it demands evidence. That is what ultimately dooms Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration—it simply lacks evidentiary support.

34 Drumgo v. Reese, No. 3:20-CV-02434, 2022 WL 21758567, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2022)

(quoting Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008)).

III. CONCLUSION

Motions for reconsideration are not intended “to provide litigants with a

second bite at the apple,”35 by asking the Court “to rethink a decision it, rightly or

wrongly, already made.”36 Simply put, “mere disagreement with the outcome of the

District Court’s opinion is not the proper basis for a motion for reconsideration.”37

That appears to be the exact reason Plaintiff filed this motion. For this and the

foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

35 Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. UPMC & Highmark Inc., No. CV 10-1609, 2017 WL 432947,

at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2017) (quoting Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220,

1231 (3d Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

36 Id. (citing Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998)).

37 Knight v. Kaminski, 331 F. App’x 901, 905 (3d Cir. 2009).