Zanazzi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Steven Andrew Zanazzi,

Plaintiff,

2:26-cv-514

-v- (NJC) (ARL)

Town of Babylon et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:

The Court has reviewed pro se Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s reported financial position qualifies him to commence this

action without prepayment of the filing fee. Accordingly, the IFP motion is GRANTED and the

Court respectfully directs service of the summonses and Complaint upon Defendants by the

United States Marshal Service (“USMS”). The USMS shall promptly file returns of service upon

completion of service.

However, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction (“TRO Motion”) (ECF No. 3). The Second

Circuit has long established that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show three things:

(1) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction pending resolution of the action, (2) either a

likelihood of success on the merits or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of

hardships decidedly favoring the moving party, and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the

public interest. See N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir.

2018). When a party seeks “mandatory” rather than “prohibitory” preliminary relief, “the

likelihood-of-success and irreparable-harm requirements become more demanding still, requiring

that the plaintiff show a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits and make a strong

showing of irreparable harm.” Daileader v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London Syndicate

1861, 96 F.4th 351, 356 (2d Cir. 2024).

Regardless of the standard, the TRO Motion does not currently satisfy any of the three

requirements for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). Even construing the Complaint

liberally and incorporating the facts contained within Plaintiff’s submissions in support of his

TRO Motion (see ECF No. 3 at 5–42), Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to present sufficient facts to

support those claims. Further, although Plaintiff alleges that he recently commenced a Chapter

13 bankruptcy proceeding, he has not indicated whether he has disclosed the filing of this case to

the bankruptcy court. See In re Steven Andrew Zanazzi, No. 26-70110 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.); see

also In re Laiscell, No. 20-20882, 2023 WL 5006356, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2023) (“As

a Chapter 13 debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1) and 1306(a)(1) the Debtor herself has an

initial and continuing obligation to disclose claims against third parties that arise both pre and

postpetition.”). Whether Plaintiff may proceed with his claims in the district court in light of the

bankruptcy action is far from clear on the present record. See Romeo v. FMA All., Ltd., No. 15-

cv-6524, 2016 WL 3647868, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2016) (finding a plaintiff lacked standing

to pursue a civil case in district court having filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition because the

claim then belonged to the estate, not the plaintiff).The Complaint alleges that between March

25, 2025 and March 29, 2025, Defendants “took enforcement actions” that violated (1) Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process, which the Court understands to refer to Plaintiff’s rights to

procedural due process; and (3) his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. (Compl. at

3–4.)

In support of the due process claim, the Complaint alleges that Defendants took the

challenged enforcement actions “without providing the Plaintiff advance notice, a hearing, or a

court-ordered eviction.” (Compl. at 4.) However, alongside the TRO Motion, Plaintiff submits a

Notice of Violation from the Town of Babylon that directed Plaintiff to appear for an

administrative adjudication on June 4, 2024 for unlawful occupancy. (ECF No. 3 at 9.) Plaintiff

also submits a ninety-day notice to vacate dated January 31, 2025. (Id. at 24) Plaintiff has not

alleged what additional notice and opportunity to be heard he was entitled to receive nor that it

was not provided. Likewise, Plaintiff has not clearly alleged, much less shown, the factual and

legal bases for his Fourth Amendment and equal protection claims. For example, it is not clear

from the Complaint or the TRO Motion on what basis Plaintiff challenges his eviction or the

Town Code violations that allegedly precipitated his eviction. (See Compl. at 4 (describing the

Town Code violations).) Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of an injunction given that he was evicted almost a year ago. (See id.)

Accordingly, the TRO Motion (ECF No. 3) is denied and Plaintiff must file an Amended

Complaint by February 19, 2026, pleading with greater particularity the factual bases for each

of his claims. Plaintiff should also clearly plead the specific enforcement actions taken by each

of the Defendants that he names in his Complaint. Plaintiff is advised that an Amended

Complaint completely replaces the original complaint. Therefore, all claims against each

Defendant must be included in the Amended Complaint as well as factual support for each claim.

The Amended Complaint shall clearly be entitled “Amended Complaint” and shall bear the same

Docket Number as this Order, 26-cv-514. Should Plaintiff fail to file an Amended Complaint

within the time allowed, absent a showing of good cause, the Complaint will be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The

Court encourages Plaintiff to avail himself of the free resources available to him at the Hofstra

Law Pro Se Clinic located in the Central Islip Courthouse. The Clinic can provide free

information, advice, and limited scope legal assistance to non-incarcerated pro se litigants. The

Court notes that the Pro Se Clinic is not part of, nor affiliated with, the United States District

Court. Consultations with the Pro Se Clinic can be conducted remotely via telephone. If you

wish to contact the Pro Se Clinic to make an appointment, email them at PSLAP@Hofstra.edu or

leave a message at (631) 297-2575.

The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at his address of record

and shall record such mailing on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

Dated: Central Islip, New York

January 30, 2026

/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY

United States District Judge