Hafner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ERIC HAFNER,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

– against – 23-cv-09517 (NCM) (PK)

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF

ELECTIONS, HENRY BERGER,

individually and in his official capacity

as Co-Chair of the New York State

Board of Elections, PETER KOSINSKI,

individually and in his official capacity

as Co-Chair of the New York State

Board of Elections, EMMA BAGNUOLA,

individually and in her official capacity

as Commissioner of the New York State

Board of Elections, ANTHONY CASALE,

individually and in his official capacity

as Commissioner of the New York State

Board of Elections,

Defendants.

NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Eric Hafner seeks to run for election to the U.S. House of Representatives

in New York as an independent candidate in special elections. Am. Compl. (“AC”) 3, ECF

No. 16.1 He is currently incarcerated in a federal prison, with a projected release date of

2036. AC 3. Proceeding pro se, he sues the New York State Board of Elections (the

“NYSBOE”) and its members in their individual and official capacities. AC 6; Suppl. to

AC 1, ECF No. 18; Order dated January 29, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that a requirement New

York state election law imposes on would-be independent candidates—to submit a

1 Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers

assigned in ECF filing headers.

nominating petition with signatures from a specified number of registered voters—is

unconstitutional as applied to him because his incarceration prevents him from gathering

the necessary signatures. AC 4–5.

On May 12, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss

(“Mot.”), ECF No. 30. Plaintiff filed a response. See Ltr. Resp. in Opp’n to Defs. (“Opp’n”),

ECF No. 32. Defendants filed a reply. See Reply, ECF No. 33. For the reasons stated below,

defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Prospective candidates for office in New York can earn a place on the general

election ballot via two routes: as the nominee of a political party or as the nominee of an

independent body. See Walden v. Kosinski, 153 F.4th 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2025); see generally

N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 6-100 to -212 (McKinney 2025). State law defines a “political party” as

an organization whose candidates for Governor of New York and President of the United

States, in their respective preceding elections, each received at least two percent of the total

votes cast or 130,000 votes, whichever is greater. Walden, 153 F.4th at 124 (citing N.Y.

Elec. Law § 1-104(3)). Political parties may automatically place a candidate on the general

election ballot, with no need to solicit and submit signatures from registered voters. Id.

(citing N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 6-104, 6-110, 6-120). Meanwhile, the law defines an “independent

body” as “any organization or group of voters which nominates a candidate or candidates

for office to be voted for at an election, and which is not a [political] party.” N.Y. Elec. Law

§ 1-104(12). “Unlike a political party, an independent body is not given automatic access

to the ballot at elections. Rather, to run as the nominee of an independent body, a

prospective candidate must obtain a prescribed number of signatures from registered

voters on an independent nominating petition.” Walden, 153 F.4th at 124–25 (citing N.Y.

Elec. Law §§ 6-138, 6-142, 6-144, 6-158).2 Prospective independent candidates for a U.S.

House of Representatives seat typically must obtain 3,500 signatures from registered

voters within the relevant congressional district, but if fewer than 70,000 votes were cast

in the district during the last gubernatorial election, the number of signatures need only

equal five percent of the number of votes cast. N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 6-138, 6-142.

Typically, elected offices in New York are filled via general elections held at

regularly scheduled intervals. New York law also establishes procedures for proclaiming

and holding a special election under certain circumstances should a vacancy arise.

See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 42. If a prospective candidate seeks to run as the nominee of an

independent body in a special election, the candidate generally must file an independent

nominating petition with the requisite signatures “not later than twelve days following the

issuance of a proclamation of such election.” N.Y. Elec. Law § 6-158(9).

Plaintiff is an indigent, incarcerated individual who intends to run in special

elections for the U.S. House of Representatives in New York as an independent candidate.

AC 3–5. Plaintiff’s current projected release date from incarceration is in 2036. AC 3.

Plaintiff’s initial complaint, filed on December 21, 2023, stated that he intended to run in

a 2024 special election to fill a vacant seat for New York’s third congressional district.

Compl. 6–7, ECF No. 1. On January 8, 2025, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint noting

that the 2024 special election for the third congressional district had since passed but that

plaintiff also intends to run in future special elections in New York, including a special

election for the U.S. House of Representatives seat held by Representative Elise Stefanik,

2 Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and

citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.

which he expected to become vacant. AC 3–4. As of the date of this order, no document in

the record indicates that the seat held by Representative Stefanik has, in fact, become

vacant.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that New York’s signature-gathering requirement is

unconstitutional as applied to him. AC 5. He asserts that because of his incarceration, he

cannot collect signatures himself, and because of his indigence, he cannot afford to pay a

signature-gathering company to collect signatures for him. AC 5. Plaintiff argues that these

restrictions, as applied to him, amount to a violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. AC 6.3 Additionally, plaintiff challenges

the constitutionality of New York requiring signatures for independent candidates in

special elections while automatically granting political parties ballot placement. AC 4.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mot.

LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss, a district court must “accept[] all factual claims

in the complaint as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Lotes

Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2014). “The issue” on a

motion to dismiss “is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail” but instead whether a

plaintiff is “entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Sikhs for Just. v. Nath, 893 F.

Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Accordingly, dismissal is only appropriate if “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to

3 Plaintiff also challenges “any in-person requirements” for running in U.S. House of

Representatives races but does not identify what—if any—such requirements New York

maintains.

relief.” Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000). At the same time, plaintiff must

allege sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conclusory allegations

and legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions do not suffice to prevent a

motion to dismiss. Nwaokocha v. Sadowski, 369 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)

(quoting Smith v. Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2002)).

DISCUSSION

I. Mootness

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that may only hear “cases” or

“controversies” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.

330, 337 (2016). One requirement for a dispute to qualify as a “case” or “controversy”

under Article III is that the matter must not be moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.

85, 91 (2013). A “case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for

purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a

legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. However, the Supreme Court has

recognized an exception to the requirement for a live issue if a dispute is “capable of

repetition, yet evading review.” Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) (quoting Moore

v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)). For a case to be capable of repetition, yet evading

review, two conditions must exist: “the challenged action must be in its duration too short

to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration [i.e. evading review], and there must

be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the

same action again [i.e. capable of repetition].” Freedom Party of N.Y. v. NYSBOE, 77 F.3d

660, 663 (2d Cir. 1996) (brackets in original) (quoting N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food

Co., 969 F.2d 1430, 1433 (2d Cir. 1992)). With respect to litigation regarding elections, the

“passage of an election does not necessarily render an election-related case moot” because,

depending on the exact circumstances, “such cases may fit within the category of

capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. at 662.

The present case is justiciable because it fits cleanly within the category of

capable of repetition, yet evading review. First, with respect to the “evading review” prong,

New York law requires that a prospective independent candidate for a special election

submit a nominating petition with the requisite signatures “not later than twelve days

following the issuance of a proclamation of such election.” N.Y. Elec. Law § 6-158(9). New

York’s acceptance of independent nominating petitions only during a twelve-day window

qualifies as an action “too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.”

Freedom Party, 77 F.3d at 663; see, e.g., Orazio v. Town of North Hempstead,

426 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a 19-day window was too brief to

litigate a challenged action); Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 123 F.4th 513, 523 (D.C. Cir.

2024) (holding that a 60-day window was too brief to litigate a challenged action). Second,

with respect to the “capable of repetition” prong, plaintiff alleges that future special

elections for U.S. House of Representatives seats in New York are “reasonably expected to

occur” and that he intends to run for them as an independent candidate. AC 3. Moreover,

plaintiff states that he has previously been a candidate for the U.S. House of

Representatives on at least three occasions in Hawaii, Oregon, and Alaska. AC 5. Given

that plaintiff’s term of incarceration will run for an additional ten years, that special

elections for U.S. House of Representatives seats in New York occur periodically, that

plaintiff has stated he intends to run in such elections when they occur, and that plaintiff

has a demonstrated history of running in past congressional elections, the Court finds it

“plausible” that plaintiff will seek a place on the ballot in future special congressional

elections in New York. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Both elements of the “capable of

repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine are thus met here. See

Freedom Party, 77 F.3d at 663. Accordingly, even though the 2024 special election for

New York’s third congressional district has passed, and even though plaintiff has not

alleged that any specific special election is currently scheduled, the Court finds that this

case is not moot.

II. Claims against Defendant NYSBOE

Plaintiff’s claims against one of the defendants—the NYSBOE—must be dismissed

because they are barred by sovereign immunity. Under the Eleventh Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution, state governments and their agencies generally cannot be sued in federal

court. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, 779 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state in federal court unless that state has

consented to the litigation.”). “A state may only be sued in federal court if it has waived its

own immunity[] or if Congress has limited the state’s immunity.” Janczuk v. United States,

Nos. 24-cv-03128, 24-cv-03141, 2024 WL 4350689 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2024) (citing

Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009)). The NYSBOE is entitled to

sovereign immunity because it is an arm of New York State and plaintiff has not identified

any basis to conclude that New York waived its sovereign immunity or that Congress

abrogated its sovereign immunity. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss must be

granted to the extent it seeks to dismiss claims against the NYSBOE.

III. Fifth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff’s claim under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed because he

challenges the constitutionality of a state law while the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause regulates only the conduct of the federal government. See Mitchell v. Home,

377 F. Supp. 2d 361, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,

167 (2002)) (“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects citizens against only

federal government actors, not State officials.”). Accordingly, defendants’ motion to

dismiss must be granted to the extent it seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due

process claim against state officials.

IV. First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are that the signature-gathering requirement violates

his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. “It is well settled that the First

Amendment protects the rights of candidates and their supporters to organize, access the

ballot, and vote for the candidate of their choice.” Tiraco v. NYSBOE, 963 F. Supp. 2d 184,

197 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting McMillan v. NYSBOE, No. 10-cv-02502, 2010 WL 4065434,

at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2010), aff’d, 449 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2011)). Meanwhile, the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from engaging in

discrimination “by adopting out of discriminatory animus policies which are facially

neutral but have a discriminatory effect, or by applying a facially neutral policy in a

discriminatory manner.” Id. at 199 (quoting Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 470

F.3d 458, 470 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Although normally these constitutional rights are evaluated under the framework

of strict scrutiny, federal courts use a distinct framework in the context of state election

rules that create “barriers tending to limit the field of candidates.” SAM Party of N.Y. v.

Kosinski, 987 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433

(1992)). The U.S. Constitution grants state legislatures broad power to set the “Times,

Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” U.S. Const.

art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also SAM Party, 987 F.3d at 274 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash.

State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008)). In light of this authority and interest

in regulating elections, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]o subject every voting

regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of [s]tates seeking to assure that

elections are operated equitably and efficiently.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. “Accordingly,

the mere fact that a [s]tate’s system creates barriers tending to limit the field of candidates

from which voters might choose does not of itself compel close scrutiny.” Id. Instead,

courts examine First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges using a balancing test

derived from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) and Burdick known as the

Anderson-Burdick balancing test. See SAM Party, 987 F.3d at 274; see also Murray v.

Cuomo, 460 F. Supp. 3d 430, 444–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Under the Anderson-Burdick test, the Court “must first consider the character and

magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the

precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its

rule.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. While undertaking this inquiry, “the Court must not only

determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the

extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id.

Weighing these interests, if the Court concludes that the plaintiff’s “rights are subjected to

severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of

compelling importance.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289); see

also Lerman v. Bd. of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2000). On the other hand, if “a

state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,”

then “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the

restrictions.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788); see also

Lerman, 232 F.3d at 145.

Plaintiff is not the first individual to challenge the constitutionality of New York’s

ballot access framework, and “the Second Circuit has repeatedly upheld [New York’s]

signature requirements as constitutional, finding that ‘a requirement that ballot access

petitions be signed by at least 5% of the relevant voter pool is generally valid, despite any

burden on voter choice that results when such a petition is unable to meet the

requirement.’” Dekom v. New York, No. 12-cv-01318, 2013 WL 3095010, at *15 (E.D.N.Y.

June 18, 2013) (quoting Prestia v. O’Connor, 178 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1999)), aff’d,

583 F. App’x 15 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order); see also Hewes v. Abrams, 884 F.2d 74,

75 (2d Cir. 1989); McMillan v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, 234 F.3d 1262 (2d Cir. 2000)

(summary order). The Court nevertheless examines the constitutionality of the signature

requirement as applied to plaintiff’s specific circumstances.

A. Constitutionality of New York’s Signature Requirement As Applied

to an Incarcerated, Indigent Prospective Candidate.

Beginning with the burdens that the regulation imposes on plaintiff as an

incarcerated and indigent individual, the Court determines that the ballot access

requirement inherently burdens plaintiff’s First Amendment protections for ballot access.

See Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 468 (discussing the “First Amendment rights to organize,

access the ballot, and vote for the candidate of [one’s] choice”). However, the burden is not

unduly severe. It is true that plaintiff cannot personally go door to door gathering

signatures from the public. But this does not prevent plaintiff from complying with the

signature requirement; plaintiff has other means by which he can amass the necessary

signatures. Notably, plaintiff can do what many other political candidates do—solicit

volunteers to gather signatures on the candidate’s behalf. Indeed, the Supreme Court has

explicitly stated that it is “unimpressed” with arguments that burdens imposed by a

signature-gathering requirement are too onerous given that “[h]ard work and sacrifice by

dedicated volunteers are the lifeblood of any political organization.” Am. Party of Tx. v.

White, 415 U.S. 767, 787 (1974). Plaintiff argues that he cannot, within 12 days of the

proclamation of a special election, “somehow coordinate a massive . . . voter signature

gathering operation at the snap of his fingers from a prison cell.” Opp’n 2. But just as New

York law does not require plaintiff to collect the signatures personally, the law also does

not require him to personally coordinate a signature-gathering operation—plaintiff could

instead have a supporter of his campaign coordinate the collection of signatures. Finally,

plaintiff argues that because he is indigent, he cannot pay professional canvassers to solicit

signatures for him. AC 5. But plaintiff can, as many other candidates do, seek out political

donations to his political campaign and use the donations to pay professional canvassers.

Though plaintiff undoubtedly faces greater difficulty clearing the signature requirement

than he would were he not incarcerated and not indigent, the Court is not persuaded that

these burdens are insurmountable.

Plaintiff’s principal argument for the severity of the burden is based on U.S. Term

Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Opp’n 2. The facts of that case are unlike those

here. Thornton involved a state law that imposed term limits on Members of Congress,

which made it legally impossible for certain individuals to be listed on the ballot, not

merely more difficult. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783–84. By contrast, New York’s

signature-gathering requirement does not absolutely prohibit anyone from getting on the

ballot—it simply imposes burdens that will be easier for some individuals to overcome than

others.

Furthermore, plaintiff’s arguments bear similarity to arguments already considered

and rejected by the Second Circuit. In Dekom, plaintiffs with disabilities seeking to run for

office argued that New York’s signature requirement “violate[d] the Equal Protection

Clause of the Constitution because the process favors . . . nondisabled candidates, who can

more easily do the physically demanding task of going door-to-door to obtain the requisite

number of signatures.” Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010, at *13. Plaintiffs also argued that the

physically demanding nature of the signature requirement more broadly violated

“fundamental rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” because

gathering signatures was, for plaintiffs, unduly burdensome. Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010,

at *14. The district court rejected each of these arguments, Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010, at

*13–15, and the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, Dekom, 583 F. App’x 15 (summary

order). In rejecting related claims that the signature requirements violate the Americans

with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, the district court explained that the

plaintiffs were “in no way excluded from obtaining signatures and submitting designating

petitions. Although Plaintiffs’ disabilities may make it more difficult for them to

individually canvas neighborhoods to obtain signatures, [New York] does not require

candidates to personally collect signatures. In fact, it is expected that volunteers will assist

candidates in obtaining signatures.” Dekom, 2013 WL 3095010, at *12. The district court

also noted that “the very purpose of the petitioning process is to separate candidates on

the basis of their support, which includes the support of volunteers needed to gather the

requisite number of signatures.” Id. (quoting LaRouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir.

1993)).

Turning next to the State of New York’s interests, the state maintains the signature

requirement given its “interest in assuring that there is public support for specific

candidacies.” Mot. 14. The Supreme Court has expressly noted that “[s]tates may condition

access to the general election ballot by a minor-party or independent candidate upon a

showing of a modicum of support among the potential voters for the office.” Munro v.

Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986). Courts widely agree that states are

entitled to limit ballot-access via laws requiring the collection of signatures. For example,

the Second Circuit has noted that states “have an important interest in requiring some

preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing a candidate’s

name on the ballot, so as to avoid confusion, deception, and even frustration of the

democratic process at the general election.” Prestia, 178 F.3d at 88 (quoting Jenness v.

Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)) (finding a 5% signature ballot access requirement

constitutional “despite any burden on voter choice that results when . . . a petition is unable

to meet the requirement”); see also SAM Party of N.Y. v. Kosinski, 576 F. Supp. 3d 151,

165 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), aff’d sub nom., Libertarian Party of N.Y. v. NYSBOE, No. 22-cv-

00044, 2022 WL 10763416 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2022) (summary order).

Comparing plaintiff’s burdens to the state’s interests, the Court concludes that

plaintiff has failed to state a claim that the signature requirement, as applied to him, falls

beyond the scope of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. Plaintiff’s rights are not subject

to “severe” restrictions, but rather restrictions that are “reasonable” under the

circumstances given the state’s important and widely-recognized regulatory interests.

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to plausibly state a claim that the

signature requirement is unconstitutional as applied to him, and plaintiff’s claims

premised on this theory must be dismissed.

B. Constitutionality of New York’s Differing Requirements for

Independent Candidates and Party Nominees

Separate from plaintiff’s status as an incarcerated and indigent individual, plaintiff

challenges the constitutionality of New York’s policy of requiring that independent

candidates collect signatures to access the special election ballot but permitting political

party nominees to access the special election ballot without either collecting signatures or

winning a primary election. AC 4 (“Under NY state law (N.Y. Elec. Law § 6-142), political

parties are guaranteed ballot placement in special elections, and there is no primary

process, yet candidates who are independent/‘independent bodies’ must nominate

candidates through independent nominating petitions, which must include signatures of

a specified number of registered voters.”). Plaintiff argues that this differential treatment

is unconstitutional, presumably because plaintiff believes it violates the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. AC 5.

The Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim that New York’s

differential treatment of independent candidates and party nominees in special elections

is unconstitutional. The Second Circuit previously held that it did not violate the Equal

Protection Clause for New York to require independent candidates to gather more

signatures than major party candidates. Kuntz v. N.Y. State Senate, 113 F.3d 326, 328 (2d

Cir. 1997). The only material differences between the present case and Kuntz are that (1)

in Kuntz, major party candidates still needed to collect 625 signatures, id. at 328, whereas

the current suit concerns special elections where major party candidates need not collect

any signatures, and (2) Kuntz centered on a general election where major party candidates

had already won a primary election, id. at 327, 329, while the current suit focuses on

special elections where political parties may place a candidate on the ballot without that

candidate having won a primary election.

The Court finds that neither difference between the present facts and Kuntz leads

to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. First, the fact that party nominees for special

elections do not need to collect any signatures does not render the signature requirement

for independent candidates unconstitutional. The Supreme Court previously upheld a

Georgia law under which independent candidates were required to collect a specified

number of signatures but candidates who had won the primary of a major party were not

required to collect any. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433. Thus the fact that New York requires

independent candidates to collect signatures to earn special election ballot access is

constitutional even though New York does not require party nominees to collect any

signatures to earn the same special election ballot access.

Second, the fact that major party candidates may appear on special election ballots

without previously winning a primary election likewise is insufficient to state a claim that

New York’s statutory scheme is unconstitutional. To be sure, part of Kuntz’s rationale for

upholding a lesser signature requirement for major party candidates was that

“[c]andidates who have won their party’s primary have already demonstrated a substantial

level of support, unlike independent candidates.” Id. at 328. The fact that New York

currently permits major party candidates to appear on special election ballots without

either collecting signatures or winning a primary thus makes the constitutionality of the

instant law a slightly closer question than the constitutionality of the law in Kuntz.

Nevertheless, this difference does not render New York’s law unconstitutional. At bottom,

states “have an important interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant

modicum of support before printing a candidate’s name on the ballot.” Prestia, 178 F.3d

at 88 (quoting Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442). The fact that a candidate has either won a

primary election or collected a specified number of signatures does show that the

candidate has “a significant modicum of support,” but these are not the only indicia by

which New York could reasonably determine that a candidate has sufficient backing. In

New York, political parties must demonstrate considerable support in recent elections to

maintain their status as political parties. See Walden, 153 F.4th at 124 (citing N.Y. Elec.

Law § 1-104(3)) (explaining that an organization may maintain its status as a political party

only if its “candidates for Governor of New York and President of the United States, in their

respective preceding elections, each received at least two percent of the total votes cast or

130,000 votes, whichever is greater.”). In the context of a special election, where a

replacement elected official must be selected promptly in order to prevent constituents

from lacking political representation, the fact that a candidate has been selected by a

political organization whose candidates recently obtained more than 130,000 votes is itself

a reasonable indicator of “a significant modicum of support.” Prestia, 178 F.3d at 88.

States are entitled to limit ballot access only to candidates who plausibly have meaningful

support, Munro, 479 U.S. at 193, and the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have explicitly

upheld laws that require independent candidates to demonstrate such support by meeting

requirements from which major party nominees are exempt, Kuntz, 113 F.3d at 29;

Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442. The Court therefore finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim

that New York’s differential treatment of party-nominated candidates and independent

candidates in special elections violates the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, plaintiff’s

claims premised on this theory must therefore be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment

and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Natasha C. Merle

NATASHA C. MERLE

United States District Judge

Dated: January 30, 2026

Brooklyn, New York