Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

MARRIO WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5:23-cv-544-KKM-PRL

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________________

ORDER

Marrio Williams, a Florida prisoner, timely1 filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state-court

1 A state prisoner has one year from the date his judgment becomes final to file

a § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This one-year limitation period is

tolled during the pendency of a properly filed state motion seeking collateral

relief. See id. § 2244(d)(2). The appellate court affirmed Williams’s conviction

on November 21, 2017. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. F.) His judgment became final ninety

days later, on February 19, 2018, when the time to petition the Supreme Court

for a writ of certiorari expired. See Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir.

2002). The limitation period did not begin to run, however, because on January

12, 2018, Williams had filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. H.) That petition remained pending until May

31, 2018, when the appellate court declined to reconsider its denial of the

petition. (Id., Exs. K, M.) The limitation period began to run the next day. After

291 days of untolled time, on March 19, 2019, Williams filed a motion to correct

illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). (Id., Ex.

W.) The postconviction court denied relief, and the mandate affirming the

decision was issued on August 16, 2019. (Id., Exs. X, AA, BB.) The clock did

not restart at that point because, on June 20, 2019, Williams moved for

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Id., Ex.

R.) That motion remained pending—and the limitation period was tolled—

until June 16, 2023, when the mandate affirming the denial of relief was

entered. (Id., Exs. U, V.) The limitation period resumed the next day, leaving

Williams 74 days—or until August 30, 2023—to file his federal habeas petition.

Williams met the deadline with one day to spare, submitting his petition on

August 29, 2023. (Doc. 1.) Therefore, the petition is timely.

conviction for first-degree murder. (Doc. 1.) Having considered the

petition, (id.), and the response in opposition, (Doc. 8), the petition is

denied.2 Because reasonable jurists would not disagree, a certificate of

appealability also is not warranted.

I. BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of July 25, 2012, Williams and his co-

defendants Curtis Wilson and Lawrence Vickers murdered a confidential

informant (CI). The victim, Jamie Seeger, began working as a CI for the

Citrus County Sheriff’s Office in February 2012. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 370.)

Over the next two months, Seeger participated in twenty-three controlled

purchases of crack cocaine from fifteen drug dealers. (Id. at 334, 370.)

Among those who sold crack to Seeger were Williams and Vickers. (Id.

at 335–37, 397–400, 403.)

On June 6, 2012, Williams was arrested on a warrant for sale of

cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell. (Id. at 1541–42.)

Around this time, Vickers was arrested for the same offenses. (Id. at 360.)

Both sets of charges stemmed from their sale of crack to Seeger. (Id.

at 351, 360, 1541.) On July 19, 2012—six days before Seeger was

2 Although afforded the opportunity, Williams did not file a reply.

murdered—the prosecution provided Williams’s attorney with video

footage of the controlled purchase. (Id. at 1547–49.) That footage revealed

Seeger as the CI who had bought crack from Williams. (Id. at 353.)

On the evening of July 24, 2012, Seeger called and texted several

people to purchase crack. (Id. at 427, 451.) She no longer worked as a CI,

having been terminated after she was “placed on probation” for grand

theft. (Id. at 410.) Seeger eventually arranged to buy crack from Williams

at a gas station in Crystal River. (Id. at 430–31, 605, 643.) Seeger’s

mother came along because she “didn’t feel comfortable with [Seeger]

going alone.” (Id. at 428.) As the two drove to the gas station, Seeger

received a call from “the person that she was meeting up with.” (Id. at

430.) She told her mother that the person was “Doodu” or “Duda.” (Id.)

Williams went by the nickname “Duda.” (Id. at 605, 643.) During the

phone conversation, Williams changed the location of the sale and told

Seeger to “come alone.” (Id. at 430–32.) Seeger dropped her mother off at

the gas station and drove to the new location. (Id. at 433–35.)

Minutes later, law enforcement received a 911 call about shots

fired. (Id. at 485–86, 488–89.) Soon after, Seeger was found dead in the

driver’s seat of her car. (Id. at 469–74.) She had been shot nine times in

the chest. (Id. at 871–84.)

The ensuing investigation confirmed Williams’s role in the killing.

Law enforcement learned that several hours before the murder, Williams

had picked up his girlfriend Angela Kinchen at her house. (Id. at 609.)

The two drove to a Quality Inn hotel in Crystal River. (Id. at 611–12.) On

the way there, Williams told Kinchen “about how some girl was trying to

play with his life and how she had a list of names that she was going to

start telling the police on and how his name was one of them.” (Id. at 613.)

Shortly after midnight, Williams checked into the hotel. (Id. at 684–87.)

He stayed in the room with Kinchen for approximately thirty minutes

before leaving. (Id. at 615–17.) Soon after, Kinchen fell asleep. (Id.

at 617–18.)

Around 3:00 a.m., Kinchen awoke to a phone call from Williams.

(Id. at 618.) He asked whether she wanted to accompany him as he drove

his friend to St. Petersburg. (Id.) The friend was Curtis Wilson, one of

Williams’s co-defendants. (Id. at 1228.) Kinchen agreed to join the two

men. (Id. at 619.) As they drove across the Howard Frankland bridge,

Williams told Wilson, “Hey, you could throw that out now.” (Id. at 623.)

Kinchen saw Wilson grab “something [that] was wrapped up” and

“chuck[] it out the window.” (Id.) Months later, a law enforcement diving

team recovered a handgun from the bottom of Tampa Bay. (Id. at 731–

35.) The gun matched eight shell casings found at the scene of the

murder. (Id. at 774.)

After dropping Wilson off in St. Petersburg, Williams and Kinchen

drove back to Crystal River. (Id. at 625–28.) On the way home, Williams

asked, “Remember the chick I was telling you about before that was

playing on my life and was snitching on us and stuff?” (Id. at 629.)

Kinchen replied, “Yeah.” (Id.) Williams said that “he had to X her off the

map,” and that he had paid Wilson $1,000 to kill her. (Id. at 629–30.)

Williams later told his cellmate in the county jail that “when [] Wilson

was shooting the car up, it looked like [the] Fourth of July.” (Id. at 1394.)

Williams also told the cellmate that he and Vickers were present during

the murder. (Id. at 1393.)

Williams was charged with first-degree murder. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A,

at 92.) The prosecution initially sought the death penalty, but the trial

court determined that Williams was ineligible for that punishment

because he was “intellectually disabled.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 564–65.) The

case went to trial. (Id., Ex. B.) Williams was found guilty as charged, and

he received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. (Id. at 1869–70,

1877.) His direct appeal was unsuccessful, as were his efforts to seek

postconviction relief in state court. (Id., Exs. F, K, M, N, P, R, U.) This

federal habeas petition followed. (Doc. 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER SECTION 2254

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354,

1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief under the AEDPA can be granted

only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “The power of the

federal courts to grant a writ of habeas corpus setting aside a state

prisoner’s conviction on a claim that his conviction was obtained in

violation of the United States Constitution is strictly circumscribed.”

Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022).

Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be

granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.

For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established

Federal law” encompasses the holdings only of the United States

Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). This section “defines two

categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas

relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id.

at 404. First, a decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413.

Second, a decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. The AEDPA

was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-

court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694. As a result, to obtain relief under the

AEDPA, “a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75 (2003) (stating that “[t]he state court’s application of clearly

established federal law must be objectively unreasonable” for a federal

habeas petitioner to prevail and that the state court’s “clear error” is

insufficient).

When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its

decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific

reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are

reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). But the habeas

court is “not limited by the particular justifications the state court

provided for its reasons, and [it] may consider additional rationales that

support the state court’s determination.” Jennings v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 55 F.4th 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2022). When the relevant state-

court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision—such as

a summary affirmance without discussion—the federal court “should

‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 584 U.S.

at 125. The state may “rebut the presumption by showing that the

unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds

than the lower state court’s decision.” Id.

For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), “it is not enough to show that

‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding

in question.’” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1525 (2022)

(quotations omitted). “An unreasonable determination of the facts occurs

when the direction of the evidence, viewed cumulatively, was too

powerful to conclude anything but the petitioners factual claim.” Teasley

v. Warden, Macon State Prison, 978 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). A state court’s

findings of fact are presumed correct, and a petitioner can rebut the

presumption of correctness afforded to a state court’s factual findings

only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Even where a petitioner succeeds in rebutting the presumption, he

must show that the state court’s decision is “based on” the incorrect

factual determination. Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th

1025, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022). This is because a state court decision may

still be reasonable “even if some of the state court’s individual factual

findings were erroneous—so long as the decision, taken as a whole,

doesn’t constitute an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ and isn’t

‘based on’ any such determination.” Id. (quoting Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J.,

concurring)).

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Williams alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. Under the well-known, two-part standard articulated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to succeed, he must show

both deficient performance by his counsel and prejudice resulting from

those errors. Id. at 687.

The first part “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The lynchpin of this analysis is

whether counsel’s conduct “was reasonable considering all the

circumstances.” Id. at 688. A petitioner establishes deficient performance

if “the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. A court “must

judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of

the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id.

“[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Id.

The second part requires showing that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. “An error by counsel, even if

professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment

of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id.

at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

“The question [on federal habeas review of an ineffective assistance

claim] ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher

threshold.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). Consequently, federal

petitioners rarely prevail on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

because “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both

highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly

so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotation and citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One—Denial of Motion to Compel DNA Testing

Williams argues that the trial court violated his rights to due

process and a fair trial by denying his motion to compel DNA testing of

“cigarette butts found at the scene of the murder.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) Law

enforcement located three cigarette butts near the car where Seeger was

shot. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 594.) One was “six feet or so” from the car,

another was “a little bit farther,” and the last was approximately “25

yards” away. (Id. at 594–95.) Law enforcement did not test the butts for

DNA. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A, at 940.) Williams moved to compel “the State to

conduct DNA testing,” arguing that the results would “exonerate him

from the charges.” (Id.) The trial court denied the request, finding an

“insufficient showing . . . of . . . need [for] this matter.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. A,

at 1907; see also Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 6.) Williams now contends that the

DNA tests could have yielded “physical evidence not matching [him],”

which could in turn have “created a reasonable doubt” as to his guilt.

(Doc. 1 at 5.)

This claim fails because Williams cannot show “actual prejudice”

under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). “On collateral review,

a federal constitutional error is harmless unless there is actual prejudice,

meaning that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence

on the jury’s verdict.” Mansfield v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 679 F.3d 1301,

1307 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted). “To show prejudice under

Brecht, there must be more than a reasonable possibility that the error

contributed to the conviction.” Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1123 (11th

Cir. 2010). “The Brecht standard reflects the view that a State is not to

be put to [the] arduous task [of retrying a defendant] based on mere

speculation that the defendant was prejudiced by trial error; the court

must find that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the error.” Davis

v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 268 (2015).

Williams fails to show “more than a reasonable possibility” that the

outcome of his trial would have been different had the cigarette butts

been tested for DNA. Mansfield, 679 F.3d at 1313. Williams speculates

that his DNA would not have been found on the butts. (Doc. 1 at 5.) But

he offers no evidence to support that assertion, and there is no indication

that the butts have ever undergone any form of forensic analysis. On this

record, “it is just as likely that had the [butts] been tested for DNA, the

results could have inculpated [Williams].” Berry v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

No. 1:16-cv-234-WTH-GRJ, 2018 WL 6494520, at *13 (N.D. Fla. June 13,

2018), adopted by 2018 WL 6487994 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2018).

Regardless, Williams’s “[s]peculation is insufficient to carry the burden

of a habeas corpus petitioner as to what evidence could have been

revealed by further investigation.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043,

1060 (11th Cir. 2002).

Even if Williams’s DNA were not found on the cigarette butts, that

result would not “exonerate” him. The “absence of [a defendant’s] DNA

on . . . items collected from [a] crime scene” does “not prove that [he] was

neither the perpetrator nor present at the crime scene.” Gore v. State, 32

So. 3d 614, 620 (Fla. 2010). That is especially true here. The cigarette

butts were found on a public road several feet away from the car where

Seeger was shot. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 594–95.) And nothing in the record

establishes when the butts were discarded. Thus, a negative DNA result

“would not demonstrate that [Williams] was not present at the scene of

the crime and participating with his co-defendants in the commission of

the crime[].” Galloway v. State, 802 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA

2001).

B. Ground Two—Failure to Investigate Competency to

Stand Trial

Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to

fully investigate the issue of competency and have him evaluated before

trial.” (Doc. 1 at 8–9.) As noted above, the trial court concluded that

Williams was ineligible for the death penalty because he was

“intellectually disabled.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 564–65.) That conclusion

rested on three psychological evaluations of Williams. Each diagnosed

him with “mild” intellectual disability based on, among other things, his

“full scale” IQ of 62. (Id. at 570, 574, 585.) But one evaluation found no

evidence of “any active hallucinations, delusions, obsessions,

compulsions, flight of ideas, or loosening of associations.” (Id. at 584.)

Another evaluation noted that Williams’s “speech [was] productive and

well-articulated and even in pace and volume,” and that his “stream of

thought [was] relevant, sequential, and goal directed.” (Id. at 577.) Aside

from mild intellectual disability, the only mental health diagnoses were

“Alcohol Use Disorder, Moderate” and “Other Specified Personality

Disorder with Prominent Antisocial Features.” (Id. at 570.)

According to Williams, counsel failed to “adequately investigate

[his] mental health and failed to request a competency determination

prior to trial.” (Id., Ex. R, at 55.) Had counsel done so, “there is [allegedly]

a reasonable probability that [Williams] would have been found

incompetent to proceed.” (Id.)

The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

Trial counsel testified that she never had any concerns about Williams’s

“competency.” (Id. at 199–200.) In her view, he “was functioning . . . not

at a high level, but at a normal, maybe a little slightly less than average

level.” (Id. at 201.) Counsel explained that she had “fairly extensive

conversations” with Williams “about the facts of the case.” (Id. at 202.)

According to her, “[t]here was no question in [her] mind that . . .

[Williams] could recite the facts of the case” and “tell [her] what he . . .

recalled from his perspective.” (Id. at 213.) Moreover, Williams “certainly

understood [counsel’s] role and that [she] was there for him.” (Id.) He also

“understood [the prosecutors’] role” and the “role of the judge.” (Id.) In

short, counsel “didn’t really have any questions as to [Williams’s]

competency.” (Id.)

The postconviction court ultimately rejected Williams’s ineffective

assistance claim, finding that he “failed to meet his burden” of showing

either deficient performance or prejudice. (Id. at 136.) The court noted

that “[t]hree evaluations were conducted on [Williams] by three separate

doctors, and none of them found anything that raised issues of

competency, only intellectual disability.” (Id.) Moreover, counsel did not

have “any concern regarding [Williams’s] competency,” and Williams

“was able to effectively communicate with his attorneys.” (Id. at 136–37.)

According to the court, Williams “actively participated in the discussion

about the facts and strategy for defense in his case.” (Id. at 137.) The

court acknowledged Williams’s “intellectual disability” but found that it

“alone [was] not enough to raise concern about competency.” (Id.) In

short, “[n]othing was presented that could have demonstrated a

reasonably competent attorney would have questioned [Williams’s]

competency to proceed.” (Id.)

This ruling was reasonable. To show prejudice, Williams must

establish that “if his trial counsel had performed as he [suggests], there

is a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have determined

that [he] was incompetent to stand trial.” Oats v. Singletary, 141 F.3d

1018, 1025 (11th Cir. 1998). The test for determining competency to stand

trial is “whether a criminal defendant [1] has sufficient present ability to

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding and [2] whether he has a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him.” Drope v. Missouri, 420

U.S. 162, 171 (1975).

A fairminded jurist could agree that there is no reasonable

probability Williams “would have been found incompetent” had counsel

pursued the matter. Lawrence v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 464,

480 (11th Cir. 2012). To be sure, Williams was diagnosed with mild

intellectual disability. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 570, 574, 585.) But “in the

absence of evidence that the defendant was incapable of understanding

the proceedings sufficiently to assist counsel, low intelligence, mental

deficiency, or signs of mental illness are insufficient to show

incompetence.” United States v. Greene, 767 F. App’x 793, 797 (11th Cir.

2019); see also United States v. Williams, No. 21-cr-20515, 2023 WL

3902135, at *17 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2023) (“[I]t is well settled that low

intellect alone does not amount to incompetency to stand trial.”

(collecting cases)), adopted by 2023 WL 3901469 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2023).

Indeed, “[m]any courts have found defendants with a mild intellectual

disability—previously classified as those with an IQ approximately

between 51 and 69—to be competent to stand trial.” United States v.

Lewis, 685 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1244 (D.N.M. 2023) (collecting cases).

Williams fails to establish that his low intelligence “caused him to

be confused and to lack understanding of the proceedings under the legal

standard of competence.” Sheley v. Singletary, 955 F.2d 1434, 1438 (11th

Cir. 1992). To the contrary, Williams “was able to effectively

communicate with his attorneys” and “actively participated in the

discussion about the facts and strategy for defense in his case.” (Doc. 9-2,

Ex. R, at 136–37.) Thus, Williams has not met his burden of

“affirmatively prov[ing] prejudice” from counsel’s alleged mishandling of

the competency issue. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; see also Cox v. Sec’y,

DOC, No. 2:11-cv-439-JES-UAM, 2013 WL 4734065, at *6 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 3, 2013) (no prejudice where petitioner “presented no evidence that”

he “would have been found incompetent to proceed” and “nothing in the

record indicate[d] that [he] was incompetent at the time of his trial”).

C. Ground Three—Failure to Adequately Argue for

Judgment of Acquittal

Williams faults trial counsel for failing to present a “legally

sufficient motion for judgment of acquittal.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) He vaguely

asserts that counsel should have “artfully present[ed] a motion based on

the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Id.) According to Williams,

counsel “did not make any argument regarding the theory of [d]efense,

nor did she explain how through its witnesses the State failed to refute

[his] probable innocence.” (Id.)

The postconviction court rejected this claim, finding no “deficiency

by trial counsel.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 424.) The court noted that, although

Williams “attempt[ed] to argue that his trial counsel made a general

barebones argument, the record show[ed] that his counsel pointed out

specific portions of the State’s evidence that [were] insufficient [and]

made arguments in support thereof.” (Id. at 423.) Williams’s “mere

disagreement with the exact arguments made by trial counsel [was] not

enough to show deficiency.” (Id.) In sum, the court found that counsel

“sufficiently attacked the evidence presented against [Williams] by

setting forth the weaknesses in the evidence.” (Id. at 423–24.)

The rejection of this claim was reasonable. “Courts must ‘indulge

[the] strong presumption’ that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

that counsel ‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314

(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90). “The pivotal

question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland

standard was unreasonable,” which is “different from asking whether

defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Richter,

562 U.S. at 101. Thus, to prevail on his ineffective assistance claim,

Williams must “show that no reasonable jurist could find that his

counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable

professional conduct.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 975 F.3d 1165, 1176

(11th Cir. 2020).

Williams fails to meet his burden. Under Florida law, a court

“should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence,

when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, fails to establish a

prima facie case of guilt.” State v. Lee, 230 So. 3d 886, 888 (Fla. 4th DCA

2017). Here, counsel appropriately sought a judgment of acquittal on the

ground that the prosecution failed to “prove a prima fa[cie] case” of first-

degree murder. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 1505.) Counsel argued that the “main

evidence” against Williams came from his girlfriend Angela Kinchen. (Id.

at 1503.) According to counsel, Kinchen’s testimony lacked weight

because she was “very clearly pressured into making a statement.” (Id.)

This was a reference to law enforcement’s alleged threat to “take

[Kinchen’s] children away” unless she told the truth about the murder.

(Id. at 1505.) Counsel also noted that “there [was] absolutely no forensic

evidence to tie [] Williams to the crime,” nor were there any “eyewitnesses

tying him to the scene.” (Id. at 1504.) Finally, counsel maintained that

“the fact that [] Seeger and [] Williams may have been in communication

that night [did] not at all mean that he was the one who perpetrated her

murder.” (Id.)

Williams fails to show that “the approach taken by defense counsel

would not have been used by professionally competent counsel.” Butts v.

GDCP Warden, 850 F.3d 1201, 1233 (11th Cir. 2017). First, Williams

claims that counsel “did not make any argument regarding the theory of

[d]efense.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) That is incorrect. Counsel advanced the theory

that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to tie Williams to the

murder. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 1503–05.) That theory did not secure an

acquittal, but it was a reasonable defense strategy. Second, Williams says

that counsel failed to “explain how through its witnesses the State failed

to refute [his] probable innocence.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) But counsel did just

that, arguing that Kinchen’s testimony should be disregarded because

she was “very clearly pressured into making a statement.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex.

B, at 1505.) Thus, a reasonable jurist could conclude that Williams failed

to overcome “the strong presumption in favor of competence.” Chandler,

218 F.3d at 1314.

D. Ground Four—Failure to Request Instruction on Lesser

Included Offense

Williams contends that trial counsel should have requested a jury

instruction on the lesser included offense of “manslaughter by culpable

negligence.” (Doc. 1 at 14.) According to Williams, the evidence

“established that he did not have the requisite premeditated intent to

commit first-degree murder” because he “was unaware that [Wilson] was

planning on killing the victim.” (Id.) Thus, Williams contends, counsel

was ineffective for “failing to request the [lesser included] instruction or

objecting to the instructions as given.” (Id.)

The postconviction court reasonably rejected this claim. (Doc. 9-2,

Ex. N, at 425–26.) Florida law requires a jury to “render a true verdict

according to the law and the evidence.” Sanders v. State, 946 So. 2d 953,

958 (Fla. 2006). Thus, a jury may convict of a lesser included offense “only

if it decide[s] that the main accusation has not been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. In accord with this principle, the jury in Williams’s

case was instructed that if it “return[ed] a verdict of guilty, it should be

for the highest offense which has been proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 1843.) I must assume that the jury followed

this instruction. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“[A] court should

presume . . . that the judge or jury acted according to law.”). As noted

above, the jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder—a higher

offense than manslaughter by culpable negligence. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B,

at 1869–70.) Therefore, “even if the lesser offense instructions had been

given, the jury would not have been permitted to convict [Williams] of the

lesser included offense[] because it had concluded that the evidence

established that he was guilty of the greater offense[].” Crapser v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., 855 F. App’x 626, 628 (11th Cir. 2021).

Williams’s claim “depends . . . on the possibility of a jury pardon—

that is, that the jury would have disregarded its oath and violated its

instructions by acquitting him of the greater offense and convicting him

of a lesser one even though the evidence supported both crimes.” Id. “The

possibility of a jury pardon, however, cannot establish prejudice under

Strickland.” Thornton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:18-cv-762-MMH-

PDB, 2021 WL 2073685, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2021); see also Santiago

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 472 F. App’x 888, 889 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The

jury in [petitioner’s] trial concluded that the evidence against him

supported his conviction for the greater offenses on which it was

instructed; therefore, even if the lesser offense instructions had been

given, the jury would not have been permitted to convict [petitioner] of

the lesser included offenses because it had concluded that the evidence

established that he was guilty of the greater offenses.”). Thus, the

postconviction court reasonably rejected this claim.

E. Ground Five—Failure to File “Legally Sufficient” Motion

for New Trial

Williams contends that trial counsel failed to file a “legally

sufficient” motion for new trial. (Doc. 1 at 15.) Counsel raised several

issues in the motion for new trial, including evidentiary rulings before

and during trial, the court’s decision to sever Williams’s trial from his co-

defendants’, and alleged errors in the jury instructions. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. A,

at 1246–49.) The motion was denied. (Id. at 1252.) Williams now contends

that “several of the claims” in the motion were “underdeveloped.” (Doc. 1

at 15.) He offers scant details about what counsel should have said. For

example, Williams complains that counsel “failed to outline how he was

prejudiced by the introduction of [the victim’s] hearsay statements” to

her mother. (Id.) But Williams does not identify the statements, nor does

he explain how they harmed his case. (Id.)

The postconviction court found that Williams “failed to satisfy

either prong under Strickland.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 426.) The court noted

that Florida law sets forth “three grounds that require the court to grant

a new trial: jurors decided the verdict by lot; the verdict was contrary to

law or the weight of the evidence; or new and material evidence was

discovered that probably would have changed the verdict if introduced.”

(Id.) The court rejected Williams’s assertion that the “motion filed by trial

counsel was [] barebones.” (Id.) It noted that the motion “contained

twenty-five specific errors, many of which were issues previously argued

and ruled on by the [trial court].” (Id.) Moreover, although “the motion

did include some general statements, . . . those statements [were]

supported by the multitude of other specific errors set forth by trial

counsel in the motion.” (Id.) Because Williams failed to show that

additional argument would have made a difference, the court found that

counsel was not “ineffective for [allegedly] making a barebones motion

for new trial.” (Id.)

This ruling was reasonable. “[A]lthough the issue of ineffective

assistance . . . is one of constitutional dimension,” a federal court “must

defer to the state’s construction of its own law when the validity of the

[ineffective assistance] claim . . . turns on state law.” Pinkney v. Sec’y,

DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017). Such deference is required

here. The postconviction court held that, as a matter of Florida law, any

additional argument would not have entitled Williams to a new trial.

(Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 426.) Thus, the postconviction court “already has told

us how the issue[] would have been resolved under Florida state law had

[counsel] done what [Williams] argues [she] should have done.” Herring

v. Sec’y. Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2005). That

determination is binding on federal habeas review. See Tobitt v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:20-cv-1841-TPB-JSS, 2023 WL 3338846, at *7 (M.D.

Fla. May 10, 2023) (“By finding [petitioner’s] claim ‘without merit,’ the

state court determined that any state law motion for a new trial would

have failed. This Court must defer to the state court’s determination of

this underlying state law question.”).

Because the postconviction court “authoritatively decided as a

matter of [Florida] law” that Williams would not have prevailed on an

expanded motion for new trial, the remainder of the analysis is

straightforward. Calhoun v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 92 F.4th

1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 2024). “A lawyer cannot be deficient for failing to

raise a meritless claim.” Freeman v. Atty. Gen., 536 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th

Cir. 2008). Therefore, the postconviction court reasonably concluded that

counsel was not ineffective for failing to include additional argument in

the motion for new trial.

Deference aside, Williams is not entitled to relief because his

assertion of ineffective assistance is conclusory. See Wilson v. United

States, 962 F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Conclusory allegations of

ineffective assistance are insufficient.”). Williams says that the motion

for new trial was “underdeveloped,” but he provides little to no detail

about how counsel could have improved on the arguments in the motion.

(Doc. 1 at 15.) In addition to the example quoted above, Williams

complains that counsel presented a “deficient” argument when she

challenged “the jury instruction informing the jury that the penalty [was]

up to the judge.” (Id. at 16.) But Williams does not explain why counsel’s

argument was “deficient,” nor does he present any legal authority to

support his contention that the instruction was erroneous. (Id.) “[A]

district court cannot be expected to do a [habeas] petitioner’s work for

him.”3 Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir.

2011).

3 Williams appears to fault counsel for failing to “preserve” certain hearsay

objections for appeal. (Doc. 1 at 16.) But Strickland “focuses on the outcome at

trial, not on appeal.” Ramos v. Dep’t of Corr., 575 F. App’x 845, 846 (11th Cir.

2014). Indeed, Strickland made clear “that when the claimed error of counsel

occurred at the guilt stage of a trial (instead of on appeal),” courts “are to gauge

prejudice against the outcome of the trial: whether there is a reasonable

probability of a different result at trial, not on appeal.” Purvis v. Crosby, 451

F.3d 734, 739 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, any alleged failure to preserve

objections cannot support habeas relief. See Carratelli v. Stepp, 382 F. App’x

829, 832 (11th Cir. 2010) (where counsel raised issue but failed to “properly

preserve[]” it for appeal, district court “correctly affirmed the state court

F. Ground Six—Failure to Initiate Plea Negotiations

Williams faults trial counsel for failing to initiate plea negotiations

before trial. (Doc. 1 at 18.) On the morning of trial, the court asked the

parties whether they could reach “any resolution short of trial.” (Doc. 9-

2, Ex. B, at 14.) Defense counsel said that she had not been “approached

with any possibilities.” (Id. at 15.) After briefly conferring with her client,

counsel announced that Williams “would be willing to make a five-year

offer.” (Id. at 16.) The prosecution “respectfully rejected” the offer and

confirmed that it did not intend to make a counteroffer. (Id. at 16–17.)

An hour-long recess followed during which Williams proposed a twenty-

year sentence. (Id. at 19.) That offer was rejected as well. (Id.)

Williams now contends that counsel “was ineffective for failing to

engage in plea negotiations with the State” before trial. (Doc. 1 at 18.)

According to Williams, counsel “failed to engage in a single [pretrial]

conversation” with the prosecution to “determine whether [it] was

amenable to a lower sentence.” (Id.)

decisions holding that the relevant prejudice inquiry should focus on trial, not

the appeal”).

The postconviction court rejected this claim for lack of “prejudice.”

(Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 429.) It noted that, on the morning of trial, defense

counsel “made not only one, but two offers to the State, both of which

were rejected.” (Id. at 428–29.) The court acknowledged Williams’s

assertion that counsel should have “ma[de] a plea offer sooner,” but it

reiterated that “the State refused to accept any of [Williams’s] offers or

to make any kind of counteroffer.” (Id. at 429.) Thus, Williams “failed to

show any prejudice” from the absence of pretrial plea negotiations. (Id.)

This ruling was reasonable. “If a plea bargain has been offered, a

defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering

whether to accept it.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). “If that

right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led

to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the

imposition of a more severe sentence.” Id. But “[i]f no plea offer is made”

by the prosecution, the issue of “effective assistance of counsel in

considering whether to accept [an offer] simply does not arise.” Id. That

is because “there is no constitutional right to plea bargain.” Weatherford

v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). Thus, to show prejudice in this

context, a petitioner must prove that the prosecution “offered a plea deal.”

Davis v. United States, No. 20-11149, 2022 WL 402915, at *2 (11th Cir.

Feb. 10, 2022); see also United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252,

1256–57 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court’s factual finding that the

government never made a firm plea offer finds adequate support in the

record. Thus, [the defendant] cannot make the requisite Strickland

showing that but for [counsel’s] ineffective assistance, he would have pled

guilty.”); Kingsberry v. United States, 202 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2000)

(“Logic dictates . . . that to establish . . . prejudice [from deficient advice

during the plea process], the petitioner must begin by proving that a plea

agreement was formally offered by the government.”).

As Williams himself concedes, the prosecution “extended no plea

offers” in this case. (Doc. 1 at 18.) The only offers came from Williams on

the first day of trial. As noted above, the prosecution rejected Williams’s

five- and twenty-year offers. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 16–17, 19.) Because the

prosecution made no offers and Williams had “no right to be offered a

plea,” he cannot show Strickland prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure

to initiate plea negotiations. Lafler, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012); see also

Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333, 342 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that

Strickland “prejudice could not have occurred” because petitioner “was

never offered a plea bargain”); Freeman v. Inch, No. 3:17-cv-951-LC-HTC,

2019 WL 2360895, at *4 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2019) (“Since [petitioner] does

not allege that any offer was made, either formally or informally, [he]

cannot demonstrate [Strickland prejudice].”), adopted by 2019 WL

2360080 (N.D. Fla. June 4, 2019).

G. Ground Seven—Failure to Investigate Surveillance

Footage

Lastly, Williams argues that trial counsel failed to adequately

investigate surveillance footage from a bank near the scene of the

murder. (Doc. 1 at 19–20.) At trial, a detective testified that he had

viewed the footage, which showed only the “headlights” of a vehicle

around the time of the murder. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. B, at 416–17.) The detective

claimed that law enforcement was unable to copy the footage “from that

branch.” (Id. at 417.) Williams now contends that counsel “should have

conducted an independent investigation to attempt to retrieve the

surveillance footage.” (Doc. 1 at 20.) Alternatively, counsel should have

“moved for a continuance” and “coordinate[d] with the State” to “view the

video footage.” (Id.)

The postconviction court held that Williams “failed to show any

prejudice” because the “video provided no evidence that would have aided

in his defense or exonerate[d] him.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex. N, at 429.) The court

reasoned that, according to the “testimony presented at trial,” the “video

showed only headlights, nothing that would identify the specific vehicle

in the video.” (Id. at 429–30.)

A fairminded jurist could agree with the finding of no prejudice.

“The prejudice prong requires the petitioner to establish a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome at trial would have

been different.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 767 F.3d 1252, 1261

(11th Cir. 2014). “It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Instead, “counsel’s errors [must be] so

serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Id. at 687. “Applying AEDPA to Strickland’s prejudice

standard, [I] must decide whether the state court’s conclusion that

[counsel’s] performance . . . didn’t prejudice [Williams]—that there was

no substantial likelihood of a different result—was so obviously wrong

that its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

Mungin v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 89 F.4th 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024).

Williams fails to meet his burden. As the postconviction court

noted, the surveillance footage “showed the road behind the bank with

only the headlights of a vehicle, not [the] make or model.” (Doc. 9-2, Ex.

N, at 429.) Because no “specific vehicle” was visible, the footage had little

to no evidentiary value. (Id. at 429–30.) On this record, “some fairminded

jurists could agree” that Williams failed to show prejudice, which means

that “federal habeas relief must be denied.”4 Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d

1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011).5

4 Williams argues that counsel should have moved for either a mistrial or a

new trial based on the detective’s testimony about the surveillance footage.

(Doc. 1 at 20.) But that footage would not have helped Williams’s case, so any

error was harmless and thus supplied no basis for a mistrial or a new trial. See

Heady v. State, 215 So. 3d 164, 165–66 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“A motion for

mistrial should be granted only when the error is deemed so prejudicial that it

vitiates the entire trial, depriving the defendant of a fair proceeding.”); State

v. Paille, 601 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (mistrial unwarranted

when “matters were either not error or were harmless error”).

5 In his petition, Williams vaguely asserts that “counsel failed to retain experts

that would help explain the evidence that the State did introduce.” (Doc. 1

at 20.) But Williams does not say which experts counsel should have retained,

nor does he identify the “evidence” that required “expla[nation].” (Id.) Thus,

Williams’s assertion is too conclusory to warrant relief. See Hittson v. GDCP

Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding habeas petition

“insufficient” because petitioner had “not alleged any facts to support his

allegations” of ineffective assistance).

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute

entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1). Instead, a district court or court of appeals must first issue

a certificate of appealability (COA). Id. “A [COA] may issue... only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To obtain a COA, Williams must show that

reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the underlying

claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Williams has not made the requisite showing.

Finally, because Williams is not entitled to a COA, he is not entitled to

appeal in forma pauperis.

It is therefore ORDERED that Williams’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, (Doc. 1), is DENIED. The CLERK is directed to enter

judgment against Williams and in Respondent’s favor and to CLOSE this

case.

ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, on January 22, 2026.

athryn’Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge

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