Noem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MAYRA RODRIGUEZ VEGA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:26-cv-3097-MDH

)

JIM ARNOTT, et. al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and parole

has been terminated without prior written notice. Pending is her Verified Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in which she argues federal statutes and the Due Process Clause require that she

be released or granted a hearing. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s statutory arguments, and on

that basis, it concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who last entered the United States on or about

1996 or 1997. She has never left the United States for 30 years. Petitioner is married to a United

States Citizen and has three U.S. Citizen children, ages 21, 20, and 13. She is a stay-at-home

mother. She is the beneficiary of an approved immigrant Petition filed on her behalf by her U.S.

Citizen spouse. Petitioner is currently in removal proceedings before the Kansas City Immigration

Court. She is scheduled for an individual hearing on March 20, 2026, before the Immigration

Judge.

On January 7, 2026, she was taken into custody by ICE/ERO. Petitioner called the Topeka,

Kansas Police Department seeking assistance on November 28, 2025, after her husband would not

let her leave the residence; she was arrested instead and charged with aggravated battery. Those

charges were dismissed on January 6, 2026. She was then turned over to ICE. She has been held

without a bond hearing. She is currently being held in Greene County Jail in Springfield, Missouri.

Petitioner brought this proceeding, seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, against (1) the acting field office director for ICE Kansas City, (2) the Secretary of DHS,

and (3) the Greene County Sheriff, all in their official capacities.1 She asserts her detention violates

the Immigration Nationality Act (INA), and the Due Process Clause. Respondents argue that

Petitioner is not entitled to be considered for release, and the Court resolves the parties’ arguments

below.

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion of Remedies

Petitioner would like to be considered for release on bond. Respondent argues this Court

should dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction as Petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative

remedies in not requesting a bond hearing with an IJ. However, any request for such consideration

is futile because the DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EIOR”) have taken

the position that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory and bond is categorically not permitted.

Further, in September 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that a person in

Petitioner’s circumstances is not entitled to consideration for release on bond. See Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29&N Dec. 206 (BIA 2025).

1 Petitioner’s Petition lists Sheriff Arnott as a party by virtue of his administration of the Greene County Jail where

Petitioner is currently detained. While Sheriff Arnott was not served in this case as of the date of this Order, the Court

construes the proper party holding Petitioner in custody as the Department of Homeland Security through Immigration

and Customs Enforcement. As DHS and ICE are utilizing the Greene County Jail to hold Petitioner and other detainees,

the Court expects its ruling to apply to the Government and those aiding the Government regarding this specific case.

II. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that three statutory provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(3), 1252(g) and

(b)(9) deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. The Court disagrees.

Section 1252(e)(3), entitled “Challenges on validity of the system,” limits the scope of

judicial review of “orders under Section 1225(b)(1)” and limits venue to the U.S. District Court

for the District of Columbia. Petitioner is “not challenging the lawfulness of any particular statute,

regulation, or written policy or procedure.” Thus, § 1252(e)(3) does not strip this Court of

jurisdiction. See Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 2025 WL 2630826 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025), at *10.

Further, this statute only bars jurisdiction based on those held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. However,

the Court finds that Petitioner is being held under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Therefore, 8 U.S.C. §

1252(e)(3) does not deprive the Court of Jurisdiction.

Sections 1252(g) and (b)(9) apply narrowly to systemic challenges to regulations

implementing expedited removal, review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or

the process by which removability will be determined, not to constitutional or statutory claims

which precede and are collateral to that process, including, as relevant here, unlawful arrest or

detention. See Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, No. 25-CV-493-LJV, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135986,

2025 WL 1953796, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025); see also Hernandez-Cuevas v. Olson, No.

4:25-cv-00830-BP, at 3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 05, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)). Petitioner is not

challenging any of these decisions or actions, so the above provisions do not deprive the Court of

jurisdiction. This Court concludes it has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas petition.

III. 8 U.S.C. §§1225 and 1226

Petitioner argues that she is being detained in violation of immigration laws because she is

not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2) and is instead subject to the

discretionary detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), which requires that she be given a bond

hearing. Respondents argue Petitioner is properly detained because she entered and has remained

in the United States without inspection or admission and is therefore deemed an “applicant for

admission” to whom such mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies and is

ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing before an IJ. Considering the parties’ arguments,

this Court joins the numerous federal courts that have rejected Respondent’s interpretation of §

1225(b)(2).2

Statutory Background

Historically, noncitizens already residing in the country, such as Petitioner, were placed in

standard removal proceedings and received bond hearings, unless their criminal histories rendered

them ineligible under § 1226(c). See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 138 S.Ct. 830, 200

L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). Noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had previously entered

without inspection, were not deemed “arriving aliens” under § 1225(b), but were instead subject

to § 1226(a). See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287, 138 S.Ct. 830 (“In sum, U.S.

immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the

country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”)

2 As of the date of this Order the Court is not aware of any appellate decisions from this Circuit. The Court however

will highlight cases from District Courts in this Circuit as supporting the analysis in this case: Barrajas v. Noem, 2025

WL 2717650, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Sep. 23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2712427, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23,

2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2466670, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025). The Court is aware that the Fifth

Circuit issued a 2-1 decision from a 3-judge panel agreeing with the Respondents’ position and rejecting Petitioner’s

arguments and hundreds of district court decisions across the country. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, Case No. 25-

20496 (5th Circuit, 02/06/2026). The Fifth Circuit’s decision does not bind this Court.

(emphasis added). In Jennings, the Court framed its discussion of §1225 as part of a process that

“generally begins at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine

whether a [noncitizen] seeking to enter the country is admissible.” 583 U.S. at 287, 138 S.Ct. 830.

Then, when discussing §1226, Jennings describes it as governing “the process of arresting and

detaining” noncitizens who are living “inside the United States” but “may still be removed,”

including noncitizens “who were inadmissible at the time of entry.” Id. at 288, 138 S.Ct. 830.

The legislative history behind §1226 also tends to support Petitioner's argument that it

governs noncitizens like herself that reside in the United States but previously entered without

inspection. Before IIRIRA passed, the predecessor statute to §1226(a) governed deportation

proceedings for all noncitizens arrested within the United States. Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779

F.Supp.3d 1239, 1247 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994) (“Pending a

determination of deportability ... any [noncitizen] ... may, upon warrant of the Attorney General,

be arrested and taken into custody.”); Hose v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A

deportation hearing was the ‘usual means of proceeding against a[ ] [noncitizen] already physically

in the United States[.]’ ”)). This predecessor statute, like §1226(a), included discretionary release

on bond. Rodriguez, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1260 (citing § 1252(a)(1) (1994) (“[A]ny such [noncitizen]

taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney General ... be continued in custody ... [or]

be released under bond[.]”)). Upon passing IIRIRA, Congress declared that the

new §1226(a) “restates the current provisions in [the predecessor statute] regarding the authority

of the Attorney General to arrest, detain, and release on bond a[ ] [noncitizen] who is not lawfully

in the United States.” Rodriguez, 779 F.Supp.3d at 1260 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at

229; see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 210 (same)). Because noncitizens like Petitioner were

entitled to discretionary detention under §1226(a)’s predecessor statute and Congress declared its

scope unchanged by IIRIRA, this background supports Petitioner's position that she too is subject

to discretionary detention under §1226(a).

Now, pursuant to the July 8, 2025, ICE memo entitled “Interim Guidance Regarding

Detention Authority for Applicant for Admission,” DHS and ICE deem any person who entered

the United States without inspection as an “applicant for admission” under §1225(a), and therefore

argue that they are subject to mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2)(A). The Court agrees with

Petitioner that a plain reading of §1226(a) and an analysis of statutory construction support the

argument that §1226(a) applies to her rather than §1225(b)(2).

Plain Language

The plain language of §1225(b)(2) provides that “an alien who is an applicant for

admission,” shall be detained for a proceeding under §1229(a) of this title, “if the examining

immigration officer determines that [the alien] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted.” (emphasis added). Respondents’ interpretation does not follow that plain

language. Petitioner is not “seeking admission,” he is already present in the U.S. Martinez v. Hyde,

No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (explaining that

for §1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, “an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine that the

individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’; and (3) not clearly and

beyond doubt entitled to be admitted’”). One who is “seeking admission” is presently attempting

to gain admission into the United States. Id. at *6 (discussing the plain meaning of “seeking”); see

also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025)

(interpreting “seeking admission” to mean a person who is actively “seeking” lawful entry. Lopez-

Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“

‘[S]eeking admission’ ... implies action – something that is currently occurring, and in this

instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”). Through its reading of the

statutory definition of “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1), the Government has completely

ignored the “seeking admission” language. Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *6 (explaining

how the Government's preferred interpretation would simply strike the phrase “seeking admission”

from the statute in violation of the rule of statutory interpretation prohibiting a construction that

turns terms into surplusage). Noncitizens who are present in the country for years, are not actively

‘seeking admission.’” See Hernandez-Cuevas v. Olson, No. 4:25-cv-00830-BP, at 3 (W.D. Mo.

Nov. 05, 2025) (citing Barrera v. Tindall, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025)

(quotations omitted)). Thus, as Petitioner has been in the United for over 30 years, she is not

“seeking admission” within the meaning of §1225(b)(2)(A).

Legislative Intent

Further, Congress specified that the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies to those “seeking admission” and did not use the phrase “applicant for admission” that it

defined previously in § 1225(a)(1). See J.A.M. v. Streeval, 2025 WL 3050094, at *2 (M.D. Ga.

Nov. 1, 2025) (“Had Congress intended for this subsection to apply to all applicants for admission,

it could have said so by simply replacing the phrase “an alien seeking admission” with the term

“an applicant for admission;”).

Statutory Construction

Moreover, Respondents’ interpretation is inconsistent with recent amendments to § 1226.

In 2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which added § 1226(c)(1)(E) and requires detention

of aliens who are inadmissible pursuant to § 1182(a)(6)(A), (D), or (E). Hernandez-Cuevas (W.D.

Mo. Nov. 5, 2025) at 6. But under the Respondent’s interpretation of these provisions, such aliens

are already subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)—which means the 2025

amendments to § 1226 have no purpose. Id. “[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that

a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be

inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Id. at 6 (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.

303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up)). Moreover, “[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume

it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Id. at 6 (citing Stone v. I.N.S., 514

U.S. 386, 397 (1995)).

For these reasons, Respondents’ interpretation of §1225 is not supported by the plain

language of the text, statutory construction, or legislative intent. Thus, Petitioner is subject to the

discretionary detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1226, not §1225.

Section 1226(c)

Section 1226(c) provides, however, that detention is mandatory for certain nonresidents.

Doe v. Moniz, 800 F. Supp. 3d 203, 211 (D. Mass. 2025). Prior to a recent amendment, section

1226(c) provided that DHS “shall take into custody” nonresidents who “hav[e] committed” certain

enumerated offenses, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(B), have “been sentence[d] to a term of

imprisonment for at least 1 year” for certain enumerated offenses, Id. § 1226(c)(1)(C), or who are

members or participants in terrorist activities or organizations, Id. § 1226(c)(1)(D). In such cases,

the Supreme Court has found that detention without a bond hearing is justified “for the brief period

necessary for [the nonresident's] removal proceedings.” Moniz, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 211

(citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003)).

As relevant here, the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), added a new

subparagraph, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), that makes detention mandatory for nonresidents who

satisfy two conditions. First, the nonresident must be “inadmissible under paragraph

(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i). Second, the

nonresident must “[be] charged with, ... [be] arrested for, ... [be] convicted of, admit[ ] having

committed, or admit[ ] committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary,

theft, larceny, shoplifting, or” certain violent offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). Under the

Laken Riley Act, detention is mandatory even if a nonresident has not been convicted of the

enumerated offenses, so long as he has been arrested for one of them.

Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under the Laken Riley

Act because she was charged with aggravated battery.3 Petitioner makes no argument as to the

applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) to the facts of her case. However, the Court takes issue

with the Due Process, or lack thereof, that results from a classification under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).

When the Supreme Court considered Section 1226(c) prior to the Laken Riley Act

amendment, it found the Section “mandate[d] detention during removal proceedings for a limited

class of deportable aliens—including those convicted of an aggravated felony.” Doe v. Moniz, 800

F. Supp. 3d 203, 211 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 517–18, 123 S.Ct. 1708). And

critically, in Demore, the habeas petitioner “[did] not dispute the validity of his prior convictions,

which were obtained following the full procedural protections our criminal justice system offers.”

Id. (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 123 S.Ct. 1708). The Supreme Court held that the detention

of “a criminal alien who has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of [the detainee's]

3 It should be noted that while Petitioner was once arrested for and charged with an alleged offense which is covered

by the Lakin Riley Act, at this time she is not under arrest for the alleged offense. The charges were dismissed, and

she was released from custody. She has never been tried or convicted for the alleged offense on which the

Government brings detention under Lakin Riley Act.

removal proceedings” did not violate due process because such detention “serves the purpose of

preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings,

thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.” Id.

(citing Demore, at 528, 531, 123 S.Ct. 1708). The Court underscored the legislative findings

supporting Section 1226(c)—prior to the Laken Riley Act's amendments to that section—of the

need to detain “deportable criminal aliens” based on statistics suggesting their likelihood of not

appearing for removal hearings and their likelihood of subsequent arrests before deportation

proceedings began. See id. (citing Demore, at 518–21, 123 S.Ct. 1708). As the First Circuit has

explained, Demore upheld the constitutionality of a mandatory detention procedure as “applie[d]

to a class of noncitizens who had already been convicted (beyond a reasonable doubt) of

committing certain serious crimes.” Id. (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 35 (1st Cir.

2021) (emphasis added)).

The court in Moniz pointed out that “the Congress enacting the Laken Riley Act made no

findings that “merely being arrested for ...[the enumerated crimes]... correlated with flight risk or

dangerousness in any way.” See id. at 216 (finding that respondents failed to explain how detention

without a bond hearing in such circumstances serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal

aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings).

Respondents in this case similarly make no argument how detention without a bond hearing

in such circumstances serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing

prior to or during their removal proceedings. Like the court in Moniz, this Court will use the three-

part test set out by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) to

assess due process challenges by individuals detained under Section 1226 and seeking a bond

hearing. Under Mathews,

identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires

consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected

by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional

or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added).

Mathews Factors

Undoubtedly, the private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—

the interest in being free from physical detention[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124

S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). Petitioner was taken into custody by ICE/ERO on January 7,

2026, after her charge for aggravated battery was dismissed on January 6, 2026. Her arrest stems

from a domestic disagreement. Petitioner called the Topeka, Kansas Police Department seeking

assistance on November 28, 2025, after her husband would not let her leave the residence; she was

arrested instead and charged with aggravated battery. She is a stay-at-home mom with a daughter

under her care, and she has lived in this country for over 30 years. Petitioner has now been detained

and unable to fulfill her responsibilities for over 60 days.

The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner's liberty is high where, as discussed above,

detention is based on an arrest for which charges have been dismissed and the underlying conduct

for which bears no relationship to dangerousness or flight risk. And “once the flight risk

justification evaporates, the only special circumstance [ ] present is the alien's removable status

itself, which bears no relation to a detainee's dangerousness.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,

691-692, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).

The final factor “ultimately entails an assessment of the ‘public interest.’ ” Hernandez-

Lara, 10 F.4th at 32 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 347, 96 S.Ct. 893). In Hernandez-Lara,

“[t]he government fail[ed] to explain why its proffered interest in securing appearance at removal

proceedings and for deportation holds sway where a noncitizen is not a flight risk.” Id. Indeed,

“limiting the use of detention to only those noncitizens who are dangerous or a flight risk may save

the government, and therefore the public, from expending substantial resources on needless

detention.” Id. at 33 (citing Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 854 n.11 (2d Cir. 2020), for

budget data on daily costs of ICE detention). Furthermore, “such unnecessary detention imposes

substantial societal costs” such as reduced economic contributions and tax payments by detained

immigrants. Id. Here, the public has no interest in the detention without bond of someone against

whom no criminal charges are pending and who is an active member in her community and a pillar

for her family.

In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the court finds that her

detention without a bond hearing violates her Due Process rights.

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal

Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Pursuant to the EAJA, a court shall award to a

prevailing party fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any civil action, brought by or

against the United States, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C §

2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, a petitioner must submit an application

within thirty days of final judgment, and the petitioner's net worth must be less than two million

dollars at the time the civil action was filed. See id. §§ (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). The EAJA was

enacted with the purpose of removing the financial disincentive for individuals challenging or

defending against government action and encouraging challenges to improper government action

as a means of helping formulate better public policy. See, e.g., Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S.

154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the

financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.” (citation omitted));

Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The EAJA was passed partly to encourage

challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as

helping to formulate public policy.” (citations omitted)).

As explained throughout, the Court finds the position of the United States is not

substantially justified. The manner in which the provisions have historically been interpreted,

legislative intent, statutory construction, and the plain text of the statutes all support that the United

States is not substantially justified in its novel interpretation of §1225. Thus, Petitioner may pursue

an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. No later than February 27, 2026,

Petitioner must be provided a bond hearing. Any decision to retain Petitioner in custody following

the bond period shall set forth the reasons for the continued detention.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner

outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order. Petitioner shall promptly

report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by Respondent. Petitioner may submit an

application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the entry of final judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 20, 2026

/s/ Douglas Harpool

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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