explaining that a prisoner has no protected liberty interest unless the sanction imposed extends the length of his sentence or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a prisoner has no protected liberty interest unless the sanction imposed extends the length of his sentence or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
- setting forth standard for analyzing First Amendment restrictions in the prison context
- dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
- dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GREGORY TYREE BROWN, No. 23-35145
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:22-cv-05094-TOR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHERYL STRANGE, Secretary of
Corrections; STEPHEN SINCLAIR, in their
individual and official capacities; SCOTT J.
RUSSEL, Deputy Secretary of Corrections;
JEFFREY A. UTTECHT, Warden, in their
individual and official capacities; SCOTT
SVOBODA, in their individual and official
capacities; KEVIN WALKER, in their
individual and official capacities; L W
ADAMS, in their individual and official
capacities; DANIELLE OYEN, in their
individual and official capacities; JENER
COELR, in their individual and official
capacities; DONALD HOLBROOK, in their
individual and official capacities; RONALD
FREDRICK, in their individual and official
capacities; DALE CALDWELL, in their
individual and official capacities; R
RIVERA, in their individual and official
capacities; JAMES ROGERS, in their
individual and official capacities;
CAROLINE ROOP, in their individual and
official capacities; CINDY DAVENPORT,
in their individual and official capacities;
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
DAVE WILLIAMS, in their individual and
official capacities; ROMERO, Corrections
Officer, in their individual and official
capacities; HUIST, Corrections Officer, in
their individual and official capacities;
SLUSSER, Corrections Officer, in their
individual and official capacities;
McCARTHY, Corrections Officer, in their
individual and official capacities; DUVALL,
Corrections Officer, in their individual and
official capacities; YEATER, Corrections
Officer, in their individual and official
capacities; TUNGENARD, Corrections
Officer, in their individual and official
capacities; MITCHELL, Corrections Officer,
in their individual and official capacities;
PIERCE, LTI,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 18, 2026**
Before: CALLAHAN, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Gregory Tyree Brown appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional claims arising from the confiscation of personal property in prison.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 23-35145
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
To the extent Brown alleged a due process claim challenging the disciplinary
action taken against him, the district court properly dismissed Brown’s claim
because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was deprived of a
protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)
(explaining that a prisoner has no protected liberty interest unless the sanction
imposed extends the length of his sentence or imposes an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).
To the extent that Brown alleged constitutional claims challenging
defendants’ failures to process his grievances, the district court properly dismissed
Brown’s claims because “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a
specific grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.
2003).
Dismissal of Brown’s First Amendment claims and remaining Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims was premature because the allegations that Brown
was deprived of noncontraband property in connection with unconstitutional prison
policies, liberally construed, are “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file
3 23-35145
an answer.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1116; see also Prison Legal News v. Ryan, 39
F.4th 1121, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2022) (setting forth standard for analyzing First
Amendment restrictions in the prison context); Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053,
1057-58 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth standard for analyzing due process claims for
deprivation of property, including whether a predeprivation hearing is required,
and explaining that “where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing
before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a
postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). We reverse the judgment in part and remand for further
proceedings on these claims only.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
4 23-35145