Beecher Store, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue Alcoholic Beverages Division

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–1422

Submitted October 8, 2025—Filed February 20, 2026

Beecher Store, Inc.,

Appellant,

vs.

Iowa Department of Revenue Alcoholic Beverages Division,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas A.

Bitter, judge.

An alcohol licensee appeals sanctions arising from sales of alcohol to

underage buyers. Affirmed.

May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman, Mansfield,

and McDonald, JJ., joined. Oxley, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which

Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J., joined.

Theodore T. Appel (argued), Kevin C. Rigdon, and Olivia A. McGovern of

Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and John R. Lundquist (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

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May, Justice.

Drinking alcohol can create dangers. In response to those dangers, Iowa’s

elected lawmakers have enacted various restrictions on the sale of alcohol. Two

of those restrictions are relevant here.

First, Iowa Code section 123.49(2)(h) (2022) prohibits employees of a retail

alcohol licensee—such as a liquor store—from selling alcohol to people who are

under the age of twenty-one. We call this prohibition “the underage rule.”

Second, Iowa Code section 123.50(3) imposes sanctions on alcohol

licensees if their employees violate the underage rule. And if multiple violations

occur within specified timeframes, the sanctions get tougher. For instance,

although a first violation subjects the licensee to a $500 civil penalty, a

“second violation within two years” subjects the licensee to both a $1,500 civil

penalty and a thirty-day license suspension. Id. § 123.50(3)(a)–(b).

In this case, the question is whether the sanctions for a “second violation

within two years” apply when a liquor store employee violates the underage rule

twice in one day by making two separate sales of alcohol to two different minors

about five minutes apart. The answer is yes. In that scenario, there are two

violations: a first violation with the first minor and a second violation with the

second minor. And because the two violations occur on the same day, the

“second violation” occurs “within two years” of the first. So the sanctions for a

“second violation within two years” apply. See id.

I. Background.

Beecher Store, Inc. (Beecher) holds a class “E” retail alcohol license for its

business, Beecher Liquor in Dubuque. This kind of license authorizes Beecher

to sell beer, liquor, and wine “to go.” See id. § 123.30(3)(e)(1).

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On the evening of October 15, 2022, the Dubuque Police Department

conducted compliance checks at alcohol-selling businesses across Dubuque,

including Beecher Liquor. Outside of Beecher Liquor, officers gave cash to two

underage individuals and sent them inside to try to buy alcohol. Each buyer

went to a cooler, grabbed a single alcoholic beverage, and approached the

counter to check out. There were two employees behind the counter. Owais

Mohammed Khan was one of them. Each buyer approached Khan separately.

Each buyer presented an alcoholic beverage to Khan separately. Khan checked

out each buyer separately. Each buyer left with a beverage.

The buyers presented the beverages to the police officers. They told the

officers that Beecher’s clerk had looked at their IDs but did not scan the IDs to

verify their ages.

The police issued two criminal citations to Khan—one for each sale. Each

citation charged Khan with violating Iowa Code section 123.49(2)(h), the

prohibition on selling alcohol to underage people. The first citation identified the

violation time as 9:45 p.m. on October 15. The second citation identified

9:50 p.m. as the violation time.

Khan pleaded guilty to both citations on October 19. Then the Iowa

Alcoholic Beverages Division (ABD) issued two civil penalty orders to Beecher.

The first order imposed a civil penalty of $500. That is the penalty required by

Iowa Code section 123.50(3)(a) for a first violation of the underage rule.

The second order imposed the civil penalty of $1,500 plus a thirty-day

license suspension. Those are the penalties required for a second violation within

two years. Id. § 123.50(3)(b).

Beecher did not contest the first-violation order. But Beecher did contest

the second-violation order.

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Beecher’s contest was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ). Beecher

complained that it had received no notice between the two violations. And so,

Beecher argued, the ALJ should use “leniency” to determine “that both violations

were, in fact, one series of events” and, therefore, a second-violation order was

not warranted.

The ALJ rejected Beecher’s request. Although the two sales were close

together in time, the second sale was still a second violation. So the ALJ upheld

the second-violation order.

Beecher sought agency review of the ALJ’s decision. The ABD rejected

Beecher’s challenge and, instead, issued a final agency decision that affirmed

and adopted the ALJ’s decision. Beecher then filed a petition for judicial review.

The district court denied Beecher’s petition. Beecher then filed this appeal, which

we retained.

II. Issues Presented.

Beecher raises two arguments here:

1. The ABD wrongly interpreted Iowa Code section 123.50(3).

2. Alternatively, Iowa Code section 123.50(3) is “void for vagueness” under

the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution.

III. Standards of Review.

We apply different standards of review to different kinds of arguments.

Going in reverse order, we review Beecher’s constitutional argument de novo.

Banwart v. Neurosurgery of N. Iowa, P.C., 18 N.W.3d 267, 272 (Iowa 2025);

Jim O. Inc. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 587 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Iowa 1998).

As for Beecher’s statutory-interpretation argument, “[w]e review an

agency’s interpretation of a statute for errors at law unless the legislature has

clearly vested interpretive authority in the agency.” Calcaterra v. Iowa Bd. of

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Med., 965 N.W.2d 899, 903 (Iowa 2021); see Renda v. Iowa C.R. Comm’n,

784 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 2010). “If agency discretion has been granted by the

legislature,” we apply a more deferential standard and “will reverse [the] agency’s

interpretation only if it is ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.’ ”

Calcaterra, 965 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 10).

In Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, we identified two circumstances

in which we will find that interpretive authority has been granted to an agency.

The first is where the legislature has “explicitly” granted interpretive authority.

784 N.W.2d at 11; see, e.g., Iowa Ass’n of Sch. Bds. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ.,

739 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa 2007) (noting that Iowa Code section 256.9(16)

(2003) explicitly provided that the director of the department of education

“shall . . . [i]nterpret the school laws and rules relating to the school laws”

(alteration and omission in original)). That is not the situation here. Although

section 123.10 grants rulemaking authority to the ABD, that is not the same as

authority to interpret the statute. See Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 11, 13.

Renda also said that interpretive authority is implied “when the statutory

provision being interpreted is a substantive term within the special expertise of

the agency.” Id. at 14. But if “the provisions to be interpreted are found in a

statute other than the statute the agency has been tasked with enforcing,” or if

the terms at issue have “an independent legal definition that is not uniquely

within the subject matter expertise of the agency, we generally conclude the

agency has not been vested with interpretative authority.” Id.

In this case, the interpretive question is whether two violations on one

evening can count as both a first violation and a “second violation within two

years” for purposes of Iowa Code section 123.50(3). We don’t think that any of

the statutory words involved—“second,” “violation,” “within,” “two,” and

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“years”—are “substantive term[s]” that fall “within the special expertise” of the

ABD. Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 14. Rather, they are common, everyday words. They

appear throughout the Iowa Code. And they are regularly interpreted by courts

in a variety of contexts. So we believe that review for errors at law is appropriate.

See Calcaterra, 965 N.W.2d at 903. We proceed to that review now.

IV. Analysis.

A. Statutory Interpretation. Although drinking alcohol may have

benefits, its dangers are well known. And we have long recognized that the State

of Iowa, “in the exercise of its police power,” may protect its citizens against those

dangers by regulating traffic in alcohol or, indeed, “prohibit[ting] it entirely.”

McLane v. Bonn, 30 N.W. 478, 480 (Iowa 1886).

Iowa has exercised that power through enactment of the Iowa Alcoholic

Beverage Control Act, which is now codified in Iowa Code chapter 123. The

reasons for the Act are explicitly stated. In its very first section, the Act states

that it “shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state, for the

protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the

state, and all its provisions shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment

of that purpose.” Iowa Code § 123.1. The Act then declares it “to be public policy

that the traffic in alcoholic liquors is so affected with a public interest that it

should be regulated to the extent of prohibiting all traffic in them, except as

provided in” the Act. Id.; see Sanford v. Fillenwarth, 863 N.W.2d 286, 290

(Iowa 2015) (“The Act is predicated on a policy that ‘traffic in alcoholic liquors’

should be strictly regulated in the public interest.”).

These protective policies are advanced through the Act’s many substantive

requirements. For instance, Iowa Code section 123.2 flatly prohibits the sale of

alcohol “except upon the terms, conditions, limitations, and restrictions

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enumerated” in the Act. Those terms include a requirement that retail alcohol

vendors, such as Beecher, must hold and maintain an alcohol license. See id.

§ 123.30(3)(e)(1). Even so, an alcohol license is “not property” that a licensee

could own. Id. § 123.38(1). Rather, the license “is a personal privilege” that is

“revocable for cause.” Id. To retain that privilege, licensees must comply with the

host of other restrictions imposed in chapter 123.

As explained, two of those restrictions are particularly relevant here. First,

Iowa Code section 123.49(2)(h) contains the underage rule, that is, the rule that

employees of retail alcohol licensees must not sell any alcoholic beverage to an

underage person “knowing or failing to exercise reasonable care to ascertain

whether the person is” underage.

A separate provision, Iowa Code section 123.50(3), holds licensees

responsible for their employees’ violations of the underage rule. It holds them

responsible by mandating sanctions for licensees whose employees are convicted

or found in violation of that rule. The type of sanctions depends on the timing

and number of violations, as follows:

• Under paragraph (3)(a), “[a] first violation shall subject the licensee or

permittee to a civil penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars.” Id.

§ 123.50(3)(a).

• Under paragraph (3)(b), “[a] second violation within two years shall

subject the licensee or permittee to a thirty-day suspension and a civil

penalty in the amount of one thousand five hundred dollars.” Id.

§ 123.50(3)(b).

• Under paragraph (3)(c), “[a] third violation within three years shall

subject the licensee or permittee to a sixty-day suspension and a civil

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penalty in the amount of one thousand five hundred dollars.” Id.

§ 123.50(3)(c).

• Under paragraph (3)(d), “[a] fourth violation within three years shall

result in revocation of the license.” Id. § 123.50(3)(d).

Section 123.50(3) is also specific about how to calculate the number of

violations that have occurred within a given time period. It requires that “[t]he

date of any violation shall be used in determining the period between violations.”

Id. § 123.50(3)(e)(1).

In this case, the ABD imposed sanctions on Beecher for two violations. The

first violation occurred when Beecher’s clerk sold alcohol to the first underage

buyer. Under paragraph (3)(a), this first violation subjected Beecher to a $500

civil penalty.

The second violation occurred when Beecher’s clerk sold alcohol to the

second underage buyer. Because this “second violation” occurred minutes after

the first violation, it also occurred “within two years” of the prior violation.

Therefore, under paragraph (3)(b), the second violation subjected Beecher to a

“thirty-day suspension” as well as a $1,500 civil penalty.

On appeal, Beecher argues that the second-violation penalty was unlawful

because the second violation was too close in time—only minutes apart—with

the first violation. We disagree. We find the meaning of a statute in its words.

See Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020) (“[W]e ask only what the

statute means” and “[t]his is necessarily a textual inquiry as only the text of a

piece of legislation is enacted into law.” (first quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes,

The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899))). The words

of section 123.50(3)(b) do not support Beecher’s theory. As the ALJ properly

noted, “[t]here is no minimum period of time required in [section 123.50(3)(b)]

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between the first and second violations.” Rather, section 123.50(3)(b) only

prescribes a maximum period—two years—that can separate the two violations.

If the legislature had also intended to require a minimum period of separation

between the violations—so many minutes, hours, or days—the legislature surely

would have said so. But it did not. And, of course, “[w]e are not at liberty to

rewrite the statute.” Marek v. Johnson, 958 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2021).

Beecher also suggests that “recidivist principles” require us to find that

the second violation can’t count as a “second violation” under the statute

because Beecher wasn’t penalized between the first and second violations. As

support, Beecher points us to cases in which we have relied on a “principle of

strict construction” when interpreting statutes (mostly criminal, although not

all) that impose escalating penalties for recidivist behavior. State v. Conley,

222 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Iowa 1974). Beecher also points to a presumed legislative

“purpose” for greater sanctions to apply only to “persistent violators” who

continue to commit new crimes despite the “separate warning” that is provided

by each cycle of violation, conviction, and punishment. Id.

We reject Beecher’s theory. As noted, we are bound by the words that the

legislature chose, the text of the statute. And here, the text could hardly be

clearer or plainer. So long as there are two violations—a first violation and a

“second violation”—“within two years,” section 123.50(3)(b) applies. Conversely,

nothing in the text supports Beecher’s view that there must be a punishment

between the two violations. And, of course, we cannot add an

intervening-punishment requirement that the legislature chose not to enact. See

Miller v. Cath. Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., 7 N.W.3d 367, 377 (Iowa 2024)

(“[T]he letter of a clear and unambiguous statute cannot be disregarded under

the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” (quoting Bride v. Trinity Hosp., 927 N.W.2d

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416, 420 (N.D. 2019))); Wallace v. Wildensee, 990 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Iowa 2023)

(“[W]e cannot refuse to follow Iowa statutes for the sake of public policy because

we sit on a court of law, not a court of public policy.”).

We have considered all the other points raised in Beecher’s briefs. They do

not alter our conclusion. For instance, Beecher contends that if two violations

occur on the same date, those violations cannot occur “within two years” of each

other. As support, Beecher points to Iowa Code section 123.50(3)(e)(1), which

provides that “[t]he date of any violation shall be used in determining the period

between violations” for purposes of section 123.50(3). According to Beecher, this

means that when two violations occur on the same date, there is no period

between the violations, and, therefore, the violations cannot have occurred

“within two years” of each other.

We disagree. Ultimately, Beecher is arguing that section 123.50(3)(e)(1)

requires that a particular bit of time—at least a change from one date to the

next1—must pass between violations. As explained, though, we don’t see a

minimum-passage-of-time requirement in the text. Instead, we think

section 123.50(3)(e)(1) just tells us how to measure the time that passes

“between violations.” It tells us to measure the time between “[t]he date[s] of [the]

violations” themselves (rather than, for instance, the dates of employees’

personal convictions for those violations). We have followed this approach

throughout our analysis.

More broadly, Beecher’s theory is hard to square with ordinary English.

See Jorgensen v. Smith, 2 N.W.3d 868, 874 (Iowa 2024) (“[W]e usually give

statutory words their ordinary meanings.”). While it is true, as Beecher notes,

1In practice, this could be a very small period of time. If the first violation occurs at

11:59 p.m. on December 31, and the second violation occurs at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, then

the violations occur on two different dates (in two different years).

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that both violations occurred on the same date, that doesn’t mean that the two

violations couldn’t have occurred “within two years” of each other. By way of

analogy, consider John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. They both died on the

same date (July 4, 1826). Yet no one would doubt that Adams’s death happened

within two years of Jefferson’s. Likewise, in this case, we have no doubt that the

two violations—both on the same date—occurred within two years of each other.

And so the second violation was indeed a “second violation within two years” for

purposes of section 123.50(3)(b).

B. Due Process Challenge. Finally, we mention Beecher’s due process

argument. As Beecher notes, the due process doctrine of “void for vagueness”

sometimes prohibits enforcement of statutes. State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539

(Iowa 2007).

As we recently explained, however, “[a] civil statute is generally deemed

unconstitutionally vague only if it commands compliance in terms ‘so vague and

indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.’ ” Banwart, 18 N.W.3d at 276

(quoting Advance Pharm., Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 377, 396 (2d Cir. 2004)).

And so we reject vagueness challenges to unambiguous provisions. State v.

Rhodes, 6 N.W.3d 741, 752 (Iowa 2024).

It follows that we must reject Beecher’s vagueness attack here. Because

section 123.50(3) is not ambiguous, it is not unconstitutionally vague.

We also reject Beecher’s complaint that because police have discretion as

to how many underage buyers they can send to a liquor store on any given

evening, the police have too much power to “arbitrarily decide what level of

sanctions” a licensee should receive.

Again, we see no ambiguity in section 123.50(3). The statute is quite clear

about what specific events will trigger what specific sanctions. It contains none

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of the vagueness that might allow police (or courts) to make arbitrary decisions

about what sanctions should follow from what events.

Also, Beecher overlooks the fact that licensees have both the power and

the responsibility to prevent their employees from selling alcohol to minors.

Sanctions can occur only if a licensee chooses to shirk that responsibility. We see

nothing “arbitrary” or unfair about that.

V. Conclusion.

Because there were two violations within two years, sanctions under

section 123.50(3)(b) were properly issued. We affirm.

Affirmed.

Waterman, Mansfield, and McDonald, JJ., join this opinion. Oxley, J., files

a dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J., join.

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#24–1422, Beecher Store, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Division

Oxley, Justice (dissenting).

The majority’s opinion is notable for its simplistic approach to interpreting

Iowa Code section 123.50(3) (2022). But its simplistic approach is specious.

The majority purports to apply the plain text of section 123.50(3) yet refuses to

engage with the actual words used. The word “two” is not—as the majority

simplistically declares—interchangeable with the word “second.” Rather,

cardinal numbers (e.g., one, two, three) express quantity, while ordinal numbers

(e.g., first, second, third) express order. The two numerical concepts sometimes

overlap, but they are distinct concepts. The distinction between cardinal and

ordinal numbers has played a foundational role in fifty-two years of precedent

involving recidivist statutes. See generally State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501

(Iowa 1974) (deciding as a matter of first impression that some habitual offender

statutes are recidivist statutes). The majority is wrong to ignore that precedent.

Recidivism describes the “tendency to relapse into a previous condition or

mode of behavior” or “repeated relapse into criminal or delinquent habits.”

Recidivism, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1895 (unabr. ed.

2002). Iowa has a large, well-settled body of caselaw recognizing that certain

habitual offender statutes—which impose escalating penalties for repeated

violations of a statute—are interpreted using recidivist principles. E.g., State

v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 286, 288–91 (Iowa 2005) (discussing Iowa’s caselaw).

A habitual offender statute is recidivist when the text of the

“statute emphasizes conviction and disposition of the prior offense.” Conley, 222

N.W.2d at 502. In a recidivist statute, a violation is a second (or third or fourth)

offense and subject to the statute’s enhanced penalties only if the violation

happens after the previous violation has resulted in conviction and penalty.

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E.g., id. at 502–03; State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2000) (en banc);

State v. Hollins, 310 N.W.2d 216, 217–18 (Iowa 1981). As we recently said in a

unanimous opinion, “[s]equence matters.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.

v. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Iowa 2020). The reason sequence matters is

simple: “There can be no recidivism until after conviction of crime and imposition

of penalty.” Conley, 222 N.W.2d at 502–03; accord Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 644–45.

The enhanced punishment applies when an offender repeats his offense despite

the “restraining influence” of previous punishment. Conley, 222 N.W.2d at 503.

“By 1998, our cases consistently held that this state followed the general

rule that each offense must be complete as to a conviction and sentencing before

commission of the next in order to qualify for the enhancement of penalty under

a habitual offender statute, unless the legislature expressly provided otherwise.”

Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 291 (emphasis added) (distinguishing Iowa Code

section 124.401(5), which was enacted without an express definition of a “second

offense,” from section 124.411(2) at issue in State v. Wade, 467 N.W.2d 283, 285

(Iowa 1991), which did include an express definition). We have recognized

recidivist principles this way in a variety of contexts, both criminal and civil.

See, e.g., Conley, 222 N.W.2d at 502–03 (criminal statute); Tindal, 949 N.W.2d

at 644–45 (attorney discipline); Patchette v. State, 374 N.W.2d 397, 399–401

(Iowa 1985) (civil statute).

Rather than engage with these cases, the majority simply ignores our

precedent holding that—unless the general assembly expressly provides

otherwise—“each succeeding conviction must be subsequent in time to the

previous conviction” for enhanced penalties under a recidivist statute. Patchette,

374 N.W.2d at 400–01 (quoting Hollins, 310 N.W.2d at 217). Our prior decisions

demonstrate that section 123.50(3) is a recidivist statute based on the language

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the general assembly used. Yet the majority simply ignores those cases,

destabilizing more than five decades of once-coherent precedent. I respectfully

dissent.

A. Section 123.50(3) Is a Recidivist Statute. Iowa has long followed

“the general rule” around the country for recidivist statutes. Conley, 222 N.W.2d

at 503. In State v. Conley, we recognized for the first time that some habitual

offender statutes require a particular sequence for enhanced penalties to apply.

Id. The statute at issue deemed someone a “habitual criminal” after they had

been “twice convicted of crime, sentenced, and committed to prison” for a

sentence of three years or more. Id. at 501–02 (quoting Iowa Code § 747.5).

A habitual criminal received greater punishment. Id. The statute was considered

recidivist because, in determining when an enhanced penalty applies, it made

specific reference to the conviction or disposition of the prior offenses. Id. at

502–03 (“Here the statute defines the conditions for its application. In doing so

it makes the nature of the disposition of the two prior convictions determinative

of their use as predicates for the greater penalty upon a third conviction. The

defendant must have been on each prior occasion ‘convicted of crime, sentenced,

and committed to prison . . . .’ Significantly, the statute emphasizes conviction

and disposition of the prior offense.”). Thus, we held that the defendant was not

a habitual criminal even though he committed three qualifying felonies because

the proper sequence did not exist. Id. at 503. “[T]he fact both offenses antedated

both convictions [was] determinative.” Id. at 502.

The logic behind a statute that enhances penalties for sequential violations

requires that the “imposition of penalty must precede each succeeding offense.”

Id. Beecher correctly argues that there must be some “separate warning” that

“serves as a predicate for” applying an enhanced penalty under the habitual

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offender statute. Id. We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle since Conley

was decided in 1974. See, e.g., Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 288–91; Woody,

613 N.W.2d at 218; Patchette, 374 N.W.2d at 400–01; Hollins, 310 N.W.2d at

216–18; State v. Robinson, 262 N.W.2d 270, 271–72 (Iowa 1978); State

v. Tillman, 228 N.W.2d 38, 41–42 (Iowa 1975). A recidivist statute is “intended

to apply [enhanced penalties] to persistent violators who have not responded to

the restraining influence” that accompanies legal consequences. Conley,

222 N.W.2d at 503.

This framework applies outside of the criminal context as well.

See Patchette, 374 N.W.2d at 399–401. In Patchette v. State, we addressed loss

of good time credits in a prison disciplinary setting and concluded the statute

was “aimed at persistency of the conduct rather than solely looking to the

number of offenses involved” because of its “graduated punishment on a

step-by-step basis.” Id. at 401. We interpreted the statute using our ordinary

recidivist principles from the Conley line of cases, rather than following cases

interpreting habitual offender statutes that depend purely on the number of

violations committed. Id. at 400–01 (explaining a statute “aimed at repeated acts

or persistent conduct . . . ‘ordinarily rule[s] out the separate use of two

convictions which arose out of the same acts.’ ” (quoting State v. Thomas,

275 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Iowa 1979) (en banc))).

In Patchette, we construed Iowa Code section 246.41 (1983), which

imposed loss of good time credits for prison rule violations as follows:

A prisoner who violates any of such rules [of discipline] shall forfeit

the reduction of sentence earned by him, as follows:

1. For the first violation, two days.

2. For the second violation, four days.

3. For the third violation, eight days.

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4. For the fourth violation, sixteen days and, in addition,

whatever number of days more than one that he is in punishment.

5. For the fifth and each subsequent violation, or for an

escape, or attempt to escape, the warden shall have the power, with

the approval of the state director, to deprive the prisoner of any

portion of all of the good time that the convict may have earned.

Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 246.41 (1983)). When the prisoner in Patchette

committed five violations that all arose from the same circumstances, we said

that separate but simultaneous offenses could not be used to enhance

punishment beyond the “first violation.” Id. at 400–01.

We distinguished the recidivist scheme in Patchette from habitual criminal

statutes that “focused on the number of convictions rather than the persistency

of the conduct.” Id. at 401 (citing Thomas, 275 N.W.2d at 423; State v. Baudler,

349 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1984)). Because the scheme at issue provided escalated

punishment for sequential violations, we held it “more closely resemble[d] the

traditional habitual offender statute” that enhances punishment for recidivism

than it did a habitual offender statute from the motor vehicle code that

suspended a person’s driver’s license once they reached a specified number of

driving violations. Id. (discussing Thomas, 275 N.W.2d at 423). We were clear

that the recidivist scheme did “not permit enhancement of the penalty by acts

committed simultaneously.” Id. Like Conley, the sequence of events was

dispositive under the recidivist statute in Patchette. Id.; Conley, 222 N.W.2d at

503.

The majority makes no mention of it, but section 123.50(3) is materially

indistinguishable from the recidivist civil penalty scheme in Patchette. “If any

liquor control licensee, wine or beer permittee, or employee of a licensee or

permittee is convicted or found in violation of section 123.49, subsection 2,

paragraph ‘h’, the administrator or local authority shall . . . assess a civil penalty

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as follows,” with escalating punishment for a “first violation,” a

“second violation,” and a “third violation,” until a “fourth violation . . . result[s]

in revocation of the license [to sell alcohol].” Iowa Code § 123.50(3) (2022). There

is no principled reason section 123.50(3) should be interpreted differently from

the statute in Patchette.

Not all habitual offender statutes are recidivist statutes. The legislature

has enacted statutes that punish habitual offenders more severely based on the

pure number of their statutory violations without considering the persistence of

the conduct to punish recidivism more severely. See, e.g., Thomas, 275 N.W.2d

at 422–23 (“[T]he statute defines habitual offender as one who has accumulated

three convictions for separate and distinct offenses. It focuses on the number of

convictions rather than on the persistency of the conduct.”); Wade, 467 N.W.2d

at 285 (“Wade relies on the general rule of recidivism statutes which is that the

second offense must come after the earlier conviction. However, the general rule

must yield to specific language in the statute defining its terms.”). This

distinction—whether the text of the statute punishes the persistency of illegal

conduct or the total number of offenses—is outcome-determinative here.

Our decisions in State v. Thomas and State v. Wade also illustrate that

section 123.50(3) is aimed at the sequence rather than the total number of

violations. See Thomas, 275 N.W.2d at 422–23; Wade, 467 N.W.2d at 285.

In Thomas, the statute at issue defined a “habitual offender” as “any person who

has accumulated convictions for separate and distinct offenses” of certain traffic

laws, and “[t]hree or more convictions within a six-year period” suspended the

habitual offender’s driving privileges. 275 N.W.2d at 422–23 (emphasis added)

(quoting Iowa Code § 321.555(1)). So, when a driver received two convictions for

reckless driving and driving without a license that resulted from the same

19

underlying acts, it did not matter under the statute that the traffic violations

occurred at the same time. Id. The statute merely contemplated whether the

driver “accumulated three convictions for separate and distinct offenses.” Id. at

423. Because reckless driving and driving without a license are “separate and

distinct offenses” that put the defendant over the statute’s threshold of three

convictions within six years, the defendant qualified as a habitual offender and

had their driver’s license suspended. Id. Recidivist principles did not apply

because the statute referred to the number of violations rather than the

persistence of the offender’s conduct. Id. (“[T]he legislature intended three

convictions within six years to be grounds for suspension without the added

condition that each must occur at a different time.”). Thomas turned on the

statute’s use of cardinal numbers rather than ordinal numbers.

The general assembly also avoids recidivist principles by expressly defining

“second offense” in the operative statute. In Wade, the defendant challenged his

treatment as a second offender under what is now Iowa Code section 124.411

(2026) (previously codified at section 204.411 (1989)) because he hadn’t been

convicted of his first drug offense when he committed a second one. See

467 N.W.2d at 285. “Wade relie[d] on the general rule of recidivism statutes

which is that the second offense must come after the earlier conviction.” Id. We

rejected Wade’s argument because “the general rule must yield to specific

language in the statute defining its terms.” Id.; accord State v. Gardner,

18 N.W.3d 487, 490 (Iowa 2025) (same with respect to Iowa Code

§ 907.3(1)(a)(2)–(3) (2023)). And the statute did just that where it expressly

provided:

For purposes of this section, an offense is considered a second or

subsequent offense, if, prior to the person’s having been convicted of

the offense, the offender has ever been convicted under this chapter

20

or under any state or federal statute relating to narcotic drugs or

cocaine, marijuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs.

Wade, 467 N.W.2d at 285 (quoting Iowa Code § 204.411(2) (1989)).

“This statute,” we concluded, “is quite clear: A defendant is a second offender if

his conviction for the second offense follows his conviction for the first. The

statute does not require the first conviction to precede the commission of the

second offense.” Id. (emphasis added). If section 123.50(3) had a similar

definition as that contained in section 204.411(2), the majority would be correct

that “two violations—a first violation and a ‘second violation’—‘within two years’ ”

would suffice for enhanced punishment. But it doesn’t—a critical point the

majority fails to address.

The development of operating while intoxicated (OWI) law in Iowa further

demonstrates that the general assembly distinguishes between habitual offender

statutes that punish recidivism compared to those that punish the number of

offenses. In 1984, Iowa law provided that a person’s “first offense” of OWI was a

serious misdemeanor, the “second offense” was an aggravated misdemeanor, and

the “third offense and each subsequent offense” was a class “D” felony. State

v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1984) (quoting Iowa Code § 321.281(2)

(1981)), superseded by statute, 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1220, § 2, as recognized in,

State v. Spoonemore, 598 N.W.2d 311, 311 (Iowa 1999). In State v. Clark, we held

that the enhanced penalty for a “third offense” did not apply when two prior OWI

convictions occurred on the same day. Id. at 536–37. We interpreted that

statute’s sequential language using ordinal numbers to require each prior OWI

to have reached final judgment for an enhancement to apply to a subsequent

OWI. Id.

The general assembly then amended the OWI statute “[i]n an apparent

response to our decision in the Clark case.” Spoonemore, 598 N.W.2d at 311. In

21

State v. Spoonemore, the operative statutory language specified that “[e]ach

previous violation shall be considered a separate previous offense.” Id. at 312

(quoting Iowa Code § 321J.2). We said the amended statute “clearly negates the

[recidivist] characterization of prior offenses that this court adopted in the Clark

case.” Id. The legislature expressly provided that each OWI violation enhanced

punishment without regard to the sequence of offenses and convictions. See id.

at 311–12 (holding that two prior OWI convictions counted as multiple prior

offenses despite being entered on the same day—after we reached the opposite

conclusion in Clark). The statute here is more like the original statute in Clark

than the revised statute in Spoonemore because it uses sequential language

without defining when enhanced penalties apply. See Iowa Code § 123.50(3)

(2022).

Here, nothing in the statute mandating civil penalties to alcohol licensees

for illegal sales to minors removes it from our Conley line of caselaw.

See 222 N.W.2d at 503. The statutes in Thomas, Wade, and Spoonemore

legislated around the well-established general rule for recidivist statutes by

expressly punishing habitual offenders for the number of statutory violations

they accumulated without regard to whether each subsequent violation followed

the prior conviction. Section 123.50(3) is not the same. It “provides a graduated

punishment on a step-by-step basis,” which “makes the statute more closely

resemble the traditional habitual offender statute than the type” that punishes

numerosity instead of persistency. Patchette, 374 N.W.2d at 401.

The relevant inquiry, then, is not whether there were two underlying

violations of section 123.49(2)(h), like Beecher’s store clerk committed by making

two illegal alcohol sales in back-to-back transactions within seconds of one

another. Cf. id. at 400–01 (rejecting enhanced penalties under a recidivist statute

22

despite five simultaneous underlying violations). The inquiry is instead whether

a licensee’s employee has been convicted of violating section 123.49(2)(h)—or the

Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division (ABD) has made an administrative finding that

the licensee violated section 123.49(2)(h)—prior to the second violation. A first

conviction or finding is a prerequisite for section 123.50(3)(b)’s enhanced penalty

to apply. That is lacking here, so Beecher’s penalty for a “second violation”

should be vacated.

B. The Majority Ignores Prior Cases to Avoid Engaging with Our

Recidivist Precedents. The majority relies on two key premises to avoid

engaging with our precedents on recidivist statutes. First, it asserts that

section 123.50(3) is unambiguous—its “text could hardly be clearer or plainer.”

But we held over twenty years ago (in a case not mentioned by the majority) that

a functionally identical civil penalty scheme for illegal underage sales of tobacco

products was ambiguous. See Nash Finch Co. v. City Council, 672 N.W.2d 822,

826 (Iowa 2003) (discussing Iowa Code § 453A.22(2) (1999)). That statute, like

section 123.50(3), did not “expressly state when a violation should be considered

a ‘second,’ ‘third,’ or ‘fourth’ violation.” Id.

Second, the majority contrasts the “principle of strict construction” used

to interpret a criminal penal statute, Conley, 222 N.W.2d at 503, with the liberal

construction provision in the Iowa Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, see Iowa Code

§ 123.1. But, again, the majority doesn’t mention that we have rejected the

argument that a particular term in a recidivist statute “should not suffer the

same limited interpretation accorded it in penal statutes” just because it is “not a

penal statute and thus . . . not subject to strict construction.” Hajek v. Iowa

State Bd. of Parole, 414 N.W.2d 122, 124 (Iowa 1987) (en banc). Removing these

23

faulty premises, the majority’s already-sparse support for its rejection of

recidivist principles withers away entirely.

1. Section 123.50(3) is ambiguous. Statutory text is ambiguous when

“reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute.”

Est. of Butterfield v. Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 834, 838

(Iowa 2023) (quoting State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Iowa 2018)).

Specific language can create ambiguity, as can “the context of the entire statute

or related statutes.” Id. (quoting Sherwin–Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue,

789 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010)). “In many cases, we have identified statutory

text that, although clear in isolation, becomes ambiguous in a statute’s broader

context.” Id. at 839; accord Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of the Iowa Ass’n for Just.,

867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 2015) (“[E]ven if the meaning of words might seem clear

on their face, their context can create ambiguity.”). “[C]ontext is critical, and

context comes from ‘the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same

statute and other provisions of related statutes.’ ” Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc.,

975 N.W.2d 670, 681 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Com. Bank v. McGowen, 956 N.W.2d

128, 133 (Iowa 2021)); accord Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (“Words and phrases shall be

construed according to the context and the approved usage of the

language . . . .”).

In construing an ambiguous statute, we start with the presumption that

the general assembly understands the state of the law. See, e.g., Simon Seeding

& Sod, Inc. v. Dubuque Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 895 N.W.2d 446, 467 (Iowa 2017);

Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 446 (Iowa 2016); Iowa Farm Bureau Fed’n v.

Env’t Prot. Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d 403, 434 (Iowa 2014); Ackelson v. Manley Toy

Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013); State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d

365, 370 (Iowa 2012); Hines v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 330 N.W.2d 284, 288–89

24

(Iowa 1983); Jahnke v. Inc. City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780, 787 (Iowa 1971).

That canon is especially instructive here because we have repeatedly said that

“unless the legislature expressly provided otherwise,” habitual offender statutes

using sequential language like that contained in section 123.50(3) require a

conviction for the first violation before an enhanced penalty for a subsequent

offense applies. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 291. We have long followed “the general

rule of recidivism statutes which is that the second offense must come after the

earlier conviction” while recognizing that “the general rule must yield to specific

language in the statute.” Wade, 467 N.W.2d at 285.

The majority can conclude that section 123.50(3) is unambiguous only by

ignoring fifty-plus years of cases where we have used recidivist principles to

interpret habitual offender statutes using language like that at issue here.

E.g., Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 288–91. The consistency provided by stare decisis

is especially important when we are interpreting statutes because the general

assembly can change the statute’s language if it intended something different.

See Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890 N.W.2d 50, 61

(Iowa 2017). Even if the majority disagrees with Beecher’s position, it should at

least acknowledge that “reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the

meaning of the statute.” Est. of Butterfield, 987 N.W.2d at 838 (quoting Coleman,

907 N.W.2d at 135). The majority instead takes the easy way out by declaring

the statute unambiguous, sidestepping the need to engage with the state of the

law on recidivist statutes.

The problem for the majority, though, is that we have already held that a

civil penalty scheme identical to the one in section 123.50(3) is in fact ambiguous

in determining when its enhanced penalties apply. Nash Finch Co., 672 N.W.2d

at 826 (holding that Iowa Code section 453A.22, the equivalent civil penalty

25

statute for underage tobacco sales, is ambiguous as to what constitutes a

“second violation”). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority just omits discussion

of Nash Finch Co. v. City Council from its opinion, too.

Section 123.50(3) is indistinguishable from section 453A.22, which

governs underage sales of tobacco products rather than alcohol. See id. at

826–27. The civil penalties provision for underage sales of tobacco products

provides as follows:

2. If a retailer or employee of a retailer has violated section

453A.2 or section 453A.36, subsection 6, the department or local

authority, . . . in addition to the other penalties fixed for such

violations in this section, shall assess a penalty upon the same

hearing and notice as prescribed in subsection 1 as follows:

a. For a first violation, the retailer shall be assessed a civil

penalty in the amount of three hundred dollars. Failure to pay the

civil penalty as ordered under this subsection shall result in

automatic suspension of the permit for a period of fourteen days.

b. For a second violation within a period of two years, the

retailer shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount of one

thousand five hundred dollars or the retailer’s permit shall be

suspended for a period of thirty days. The retailer may select its

preference in the penalty to be applied under this paragraph.

c. For a third violation within a period of three years, the

retailer shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount of one

thousand five hundred dollars and the retailer’s permit shall be

suspended for a period of thirty days.

d. For a fourth violation within a period of three years, the

retailer shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount of one

thousand five hundred dollars and the retailer’s permit shall be

suspended for a period of sixty days.

e. For a fifth violation within a period of four years, the

retailer’s permit shall be revoked.

Iowa Code § 453A.22(2). We said this language was ambiguous because “[i]t does

not . . . expressly state when a violation should be considered a ‘second,’ ‘third,’

26

or ‘fourth’ violation by the particular retailer.” Nash Finch Co., 672 N.W.2d at

826.

The civil penalties for underage alcohol sales are likewise ambiguous

because the statute functions in exactly the same way as the one for tobacco

products:

3. If any liquor control licensee, wine or beer permittee, or

employee of a licensee or permittee is convicted or found in violation

of section 123.49, subsection 2, paragraph “h”, the administrator or

local authority shall, in addition to criminal penalties fixed for

violations by this section, assess a civil penalty as follows:

a. A first violation shall subject the licensee or permittee to a

civil penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars. Failure to pay

the civil penalty as ordered under section 123.39 shall result in

automatic suspension of the license or permit for a period of

fourteen days.

b. A second violation within two years shall subject the

licensee or permittee to a thirty-day suspension and a civil penalty

in the amount of one thousand five hundred dollars.

c. A third violation within three years shall subject the

licensee or permittee to a sixty-day suspension and a civil penalty

in the amount of one thousand five hundred dollars.

d. A fourth violation within three years shall result in

revocation of the license or permit.

Iowa Code § 123.50(3). If section 453A.22(2) is ambiguous, as we said in

Nash Finch Co., it’s hard to accept the majority’s conclusion that the same

language in section 123.50(3) is not.

The majority opinion states that the statutory text “could hardly be clearer

or plainer” on this point: two criminal sales under section 123.49(2)(h) within

two years must constitute both a first and second violation under section

123.50(3). But it could be clearer and could be plainer—if it were like the statutes

at issue in Wade or Spoonemore. As discussed above, the analysis changes when

a statute expressly defines what counts as a second offense for recidivism

27

purposes. But section 123.50(3) does not. And when the general assembly does

not expressly declare that a second offense counts irrespective of sequence, then

“the general rule that each offense must be complete as to a conviction . . . before

commission of the next in order to qualify for the enhancement of penalty under

a habitual offender statute” applies. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 291.

At a minimum, section 123.50(3) is ambiguous. The majority is wrong to

claim otherwise.

2. A liberal construction cannot defeat the statute’s text. The majority’s

second flawed premise is that recidivist principles cannot apply because the

general assembly declared that chapter 123 “shall be deemed an exercise of the

police power of the state, for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals,

and safety of the people of the state, and all its provisions shall be liberally

construed for the accomplishment of that purpose.” Iowa Code § 123.1. That

general declaration does not allow us to ignore—as the majority so adamantly

does—our recidivism precedents. Recidivism principles do not, as the majority

asserts, turn on principles of strict construction. Indeed, we have expressly

rejected the argument that recidivist principles necessarily rely on strict

construction. Hajek, 414 N.W.2d at 123–24.

“Laws can be more readily understood and uniformly applied when terms

do not shift in meaning from one statute to another.” Id. at 124. In Hajek v. Iowa

State Board of Parole, we thus held that a parole statute’s use of

“prior convictions” meant that it was a recidivist statute even though it was “not a

penal statute” that is “subject to strict construction.” Id.; see also Conley,

222 N.W.2d at 502 (noting that a statute is recidivist when it “emphasizes

conviction and disposition of the prior offense”). Whether the public policy

underlying a statute is to “punish offenders” or “protect the public,” the text of

28

the statute governs all the same. Hajek, 414 N.W.2d at 124. And here, the

majority fails to give due weight to the sequential language in section 123.50(3)

imposing escalated civil penalties.

“[O]ur duty in construing this statute, even with the instruction to

construe it broadly, requires first that we provide ‘a fair interpretation as opposed

to a strict or crabbed one . . . .’ ” Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686,

702 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 233 (2012)). A liberal construction to protect against

the dangers of alcohol cannot brush aside the recidivist scheme in the text of

section 123.50(3) to instead impose more severe penalties on a licensee than the

text allows. See id. (“Such a provision doesn’t allow courts to ignore the ordinary

meaning of words in a statute and to expand or contract their meaning to favor

one side in a dispute over another. We effectuate the statute’s ‘purposes’ by

giving a fair interpretation to the language the legislature chose; nothing more,

nothing less.”).

* * *

Because section 123.50(3) is ambiguous and a liberal construction cannot

override the text of the statute, I would apply our long-held general rule for

recidivist statutes. The language used in section 123.50(3) is “aimed at persistent

or repeated conduct” rather than “the number of offenses.” Patchette,

374 N.W.2d at 401.

Even the ABD concedes that the majority’s holding is unfair to alcohol

licensees. Before the ALJ, it “acknowledged the general question of ‘fairness’

raised by [the police department’s] methods”—that is, procuring multiple

violations under the civil scheme in one age-compliance check based on the

number of buyers the police sent into the store. See Walsh v. Kirby, 529 P.2d 33,

29

40–41 (Cal. 1974) (en banc). The ALJ similarly noted that Beecher’s argument

“that it generally seems unfair to assess back-to-back penalties to the licensee

without the opportunity for the licensee to take corrective action following the

first penalty” was “a rational and reasonable argument [that] is well received.”

On petition for judicial review, the district court also recognized that Beecher

made “compelling arguments, specifically regarding the rule for recidivist

statutes and the public policy implications of this statute.” And at oral argument

before our court, the ABD again conceded that its position “has that feeling of

unfairness to it.” Properly applying our jurisprudence concerning recidivist

statutes avoids that unfairness. See, e.g., Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 644–45;

Patchette, 374 N.W.2d at 399–401; Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 288–91; Conley,

222 N.W.2d at 503. Unfortunately, the majority’s oversimplified reading of

section 123.50(3) repeats the mistakes below.

Section 123.50(3) does not, as the majority holds, punish the number of

alcohol sales involved in a particular violation. It punishes persistent conduct

more severely only after a licensee has previously been convicted or found in

violation of section 123.49(2)(h). I would therefore reverse the district court and

remand the case to dismiss the enhanced penalty against Beecher for a

“second violation” under section 123.50(3)(b).

Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J., join this dissent.