Ferreiras

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

NORTHERN DIVISION

at Covington

ASHLEY FERREIRAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00074-SCM-CJS

)

v. )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION

THE CITY OF COVINGTON, et al., ) AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

*** *** *** ***

Getting arrested is never a pleasant experience. And unless the arrestee

surrenders, it always involves at least some modicum of force or coercion. Some

arrests involve more force than others. There is nothing inherently unlawful about

that. Of course, the Constitution prohibits the use of too much force. Specifically, a

police officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he or she uses an objectively

unreasonable amount of force under the circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v.

Stoneburner, 716 F.3d 926, 933 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 397 (1989)). Here, the Plaintiff claims that the police did just that in arresting

her. But she is wrong. Given that the Plaintiff resisted arrest and assaulted the

police, it was not objectively unreasonable for the police to subdue her by striking her

twice, placing her in handcuffs, and forcing her into the back of a police car. Thus,

the Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim is unavailing. And so are her other claims.

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Facts

This case arises out of Plaintiff Ashley Ferreiras’s arrest by City of Covington

Police Officers Doug Ullrich and Anthony Fritsch on the night of May 4, 2023. Most

of the facts concerning the events of that night are either not disputed by the parties

or are clearly depicted in body-camera video footage. Thus, the facts below are taken

in the light most favorable to Ferreiras, except that any of the facts clearly depicted

by body-camera footage are viewed in the light depicted by such footage. Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007); Earnest v. Genesee County, 841 F. App’x 957,

960 (6th Cir. 2021).

At the time of the arrest, Ferreiras lived in a two-level house at 1549 Nancy

Street with her partner, Maxwell Mayberry. [Dkt. 71, Ferreiras Deposition, at 11:1–

9, 10:20–23]. She was on bedrest while recovering from surgery that had occurred

eight days earlier to treat her broken left ankle. [Id. at 23:3–18, 34:10–15]. Her

brother, Jancarlos Ferreiras, was temporarily staying with her to aid her recovery.

[Id. at 22:7–23:5].

At about 11:17 p.m., Officers Ullrich and Fritsch entered Nancy Street in their

police cruiser to pull over a vehicle with a broken headlight. [Dkt. 76-1, KYIBRS

Report, at 6]. Both officers exited their cruiser and initiated the traffic stop, which

took place at the end of the street with houses on both sides. [Dkt. 76-2, Ullrich BWC

Video, at VR 00:00:54–02:45]. According to the KYIBRS Report, the officers learned

during the stop that the driver was Mayberry, that he did not possess insurance, and

that the vehicle had a stolen license plate. [Dkt. 76-1 at 6]. Officers Jansen and

Goshorn then arrived via bicycle to assist with the stop. [Id.]. Officers Goshorn and

Fritsch conducted the stop at Mayberry’s vehicle while Officers Ullrich and Jansen

stood by Officer Ullrich’s cruiser. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:04:14–31].

From her second-floor bedroom, Ferreiras noticed the stop unfolding outside

her home, so she called out to the officers to ask what was going on. [Dkt. 71 at 29:23–

30:7; Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:05:44–51]. Officer Ullrich responded, “Hi,” to which

Ferreiras replied, “Hello, what’s going on?” [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:05:44–51].

Ferreiras’s brother then helped her down the stairs so that she could further

investigate the police activity because Ferreiras recognized that the subject of the

stop was her partner, Mayberry. [Dkt. 71 at 30:3–14].

Ferreiras then exited the side of her home and again asked the officers what

was going on. [Id. at 35:17–36:5]. She was using crutches to walk due to her surgery,

but she continued to walk through her fenced-in yard toward the gate that faced the

street. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:27–32]. As Ferreiras reached for the gate, Officer

Ullrich stated, “Nope, don’t come out here.” [Id. at VR 00:08:32–38]. Ferreiras then

asked, “Why not?” and opened the gate to exit her yard and enter the sidewalk on

Nancy Street. [Id. at VR 00:08:32–38]. Officer Ullrich told Ferreiras that she could

not approach because she was “not welcome at [his] stop,” but she continued to walk

toward the sidewalk in the traffic stop area. [Id. at VR 00:08:32–38]. Once again,

Officer Ullrich warned Ferreiras to halt by saying, “If you come out here and you

interrupt the stop, you’re going to go to jail.” [Id. at VR 00:08:38–39].

Undeterred by Officer Ullrich’s commands and admonitions, Ferreiras closed

the gate behind her and continued onto the sidewalk. [Id. at VR 00:08:39–43]. Officer

Ullrich told her to “go back inside the yard,” and she replied, “Sorry, this is my house.”

[Id. at VR 00:08:42]. Ferreiras continued advancing on the sidewalk in the direction

of Mayberry’s stopped car, and Officer Ullrich told her, “Okay, go back inside your

yard.” [Id. at VR 00:08:42–44]. She responded that this was her house, and Ullrich

once again told her to leave. [Id. at VR 00:08:45–48].

Officer Ullrich stepped forward in front of Ferreiras on the sidewalk and then

said, “I am going to put you in handcuffs and take you to jail if you do not go back

inside your yard.” [Id. at VR 00:08:48–08:54]. At the same time, Officer Jansen

repositioned himself to support Officer Ullrich. [Dkt. 90-1, Jansen BWC Video, at VR

00:08:27]. Ferreiras stopped moving forward but refused to go back to her yard, and

she warned Officer Ullrich not to disrespect her. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:48–09:05].

Again, Officer Ullrich said Ferreiras was “not welcome” at the stop, but she replied,

“You are not welcome to talk to me like that.” [Id. at VR 00:08:48–09:05]. Officer

Ullrich then gave Ferreiras a choice: “Go back in the yard or go to jail.” [Id. at VR

00:08:57–09:02]. Ferreiras remained on the sidewalk and told him not to disrespect

her as she placed her hand out with an open palm. [Id. at VR 00:08:57–09:02].

Meanwhile, her brother was on the other side of the gate observing the confrontation,

and he started to walk toward Officer Ullrich and Ferreiras. [Id. at VR 00:09:06–

09:10].

Having decided that Ferreiras was noncompliant and refused to obey his order

to leave the vicinity of the traffic stop, Officer Ullrich placed Ferreiras under arrest

and told her she was “going to jail.” [Id. at VR 00:09:06–09]. To make the arrest,

Officer Ullrich grabbed Ferreiras and the crutch on her right arm, but she initially

pulled her arm away, backed up, and yelled, “Don’t touch me!” twice. [Id. at VR

00:09:07–12; Dkt. 71 at 38:18–39:3]. She then yelled at Officer Ullrich, “Get the ****

off of me!” twice as he told her to stop. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:15–24]. Meanwhile,

Officer Jansen instructed Ferreiras’s brother, Jancarlos, to step away and return to

the yard, which he did despite his verbal protests about how the officers were

conducting Ferreiras’s arrest. [Dkt. 90-1 at VR 00:08:46–09:17]. The officers’ body-

cameras captured the ensuing struggle with Ferreiras, but the Court will note which

aspects of the footage are unclear.

Officer Fritsch attempted to help by grabbing Ferreiras’s left arm and

discarding the other crutch she was holding. [Dkt. 76-3, Fritsch BWC Video, at VR

00:09:14–20]. The officers believed that the crutches could have been used as

potential weapons or caused injury. [Dkt. 72, Officer Ullrich Deposition, at 111:2–

113:8; Dkt. 70, Officer Fritsch Deposition, at 32:15–33:5]. Ferreiras then elbowed

Officer Fritsch in the nose, which knocked off and broke his eyeglasses. [Dkt. 76-2 at

00:09:26–32; Dkt. 70 at 34:7–18; Dkt. 76-6, Jury Instructions and Verdict, at 6, 10

(providing that Ferreiras was convicted of criminal mischief for damaging the

eyeglasses)]. Immediately thereafter, Ferreiras and both officers fell to the ground.

[Dkt. 76-3 at VR 00:09:25; Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:26]. The body-camera footage is

unclear whether they fell to the ground because the officers knocked Ferreiras down

or if it was because Ferreiras attempted to break free. [Dkt. 76-3 at VR 00:09:21–26;

Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:27]. Taken in the light most favorable to Ferreiras based on

the footage, the officers are the reason that Ferreiras fell. [Dkt. 71 at 39:4–12].

A struggle ensued on the ground between Ferreiras and the two officers. [Dkt.

76-3 at VR 00:09:21; Dkt. 76-2 at 00:09:28; Dkt. 71 at 39:13–24]. The officers used

additional force by pushing and grabbing to try to handcuff Ferreiras as she laid

facedown, but this proved difficult. [Dkt. 76-3 at VR 00:09:21–10:00; Dkt. 76-2 at VR

00:09:30]. The footage clearly shows Ferreiras thrashing and kicking, [Dkt. 76-2 at

VR 00:09:32], but she claims she writhed on the ground to minimize any additional

pain or injury to her ankle. [Dkt. 71 at 39:13–24; Dkt. 90 at 20 (conceding that the

kick plausibly happened)]. Both sides agree that Officer Ullrich then struck Ferreiras

on the side of her head during his attempt to handcuff her.1 [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:35;

Dkt. 76-4, Ullrich Use of Force Report, at 2; Dkt. 72 at 122:9–13].

After Officers Ullrich and Fritsch successfully restrained Ferreiras with

handcuffs, they pulled her up to her feet and told her they were going to walk her to

1 Officer Ullrich claims he only struck Ferreiras once, [Dkt. 72 at 121:24–122:13], and

that it was because she bit him, [Dkt. 72 at 260:4–16]. Ferreiras denies having bitten

him. [Dkt. 71 at 66:21–22]. Officer Fritsch suggests that Officer Ullrich struck

Ferreiras twice even though Officer Fritsch did not see it happen. [Dkt. 70 at 61:5–

18, 124:22–125:11]. The footage shows that Officer Ullrich made two movements with

his hand toward Ferreiras’s head during the struggle, but it is unclear whether one

or two of the strikes connected. [Dkt. 76-2 at 00:09:36–38]. Thus, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Ferreiras, the Court assumes that Officer

Ullrich hit her twice in quick succession while trying to subdue her, and also assumes

that she did not bite Officer Ullrich.

the cruiser—or drag her if necessary due to her noncompliance. [Dkt. 76-3 at VR

00:12:24–34]. Ferreiras then insulted Officer Ullrich with profanity and asked him

how she was supposed to walk. [Id. at VR 00:12:40–56]. The officers proceeded to

carry Ferreiras to the cruiser and ask her for her assistance with getting her into the

rear passenger door, but she refused. [Id. at VR 00:13:20–32; Dkt. 76-2 at VR

00:13:19–32].

Officer Ullrich then attempted to turn Ferreiras’s body to move her into the

cruiser, and his hand can be seen touching the lower side of her chest in the process.

[Dkt. 90-2, Brown BWC Video, at VR 00:03:38–40; Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:13:45].

Ferreiras then verbally accused Officer Ullrich of touching her breast and nipple.

[Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:13:50–54]. After a brief pause, Officers Ullrich and Fritsch guided

Ferreiras into the cruiser and attempted to close the door, but Ferreiras repeatedly

kicked the door back open before it could be secured shut. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:14:23–

15:00]. Ferreiras was taken to the St. Elizabeth Edgewood Hospital emergency room

and was treated for minor injuries like scrapes and scratches and bruising on her

body, head, arms, and legs. [Dkt. 71 at 91:20–92:7; 114:7–115:7]. The officers then

continued to conduct the traffic stop after Ferreiras was removed from the site. [Dkt.

90-2 at VR 00:05:05]. Ferreiras’s brother—who complied with the officers’ order to

return to the yard—was not arrested.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky pursued criminal charges against Ferreiras

for her conduct during the arrest, and a Kenton County jury found her guilty of:

(1) resisting arrest in violation of KRS 520.090, a Class A misdemeanor; (2) third

degree criminal mischief in violation of KRS 512.040, a Class B misdemeanor

(repealed 2024); (3) obstructing an emergency responder in violation of KRS 525.015,

a violation; and (4) third degree assault in violation of KRS 508.025, a Class D felony.

[Dkt. 76-5, Kenton Circuit Court, 23-CR-769 Final Judgment, at 1–2; Dkt. 76-6].

On May 3, 2024, Ferreiras filed suit against the City of Covington and Officers

Ullrich and Fritsch. [Dkt. 1]. As to Officers Ullrich and Fritsch, Ferreiras makes

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment due to the

alleged use of excessive force (Count I) and for violations of the First Amendment due

to alleged retaliation (Count III), and she also alleges negligence (Count VIII),

intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IX), and negligent infliction of

emotional distress (Count X). [Id. at ¶¶ 84–88, 94–98, 119–29]. She also asserts a

sexual-abuse claim solely against Officer Ullrich (Count VII). [Id. at ¶¶ 113–18].

Finally, Ferreiras raises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the City of Covington based

on Monell liability (Count VI). [Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 106–12 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978))].

This Court previously dismissed Counts II, IV, and V upon the Defendants’

Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. [Dkt. 24; Dkt. 18]. At the conclusion

of discovery, the Defendants filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment on all

remaining claims.2 [Dkt. 76].

2 This Court also granted Ferreiras’s Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental

Authority, which briefed the Court on the applicability of two opinions that followed

the summary judgment briefing: Steger v. Willis, No. 2:24-095-DCR, 2025 WL

2792118 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2025); and Mata v. City of Grayson, No. 23-122-DLB-

EBA, 2025 WL 3451641 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2025). [Dkt. 118; Dkt. 102].

II. Analysis

The Court’s role at this stage is not to make credibility determinations or

resolve any material factual disputes. Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 895 (6th. Cir.

2013). Instead, all facts must be construed, and all reasonable inferences must be

drawn, in favor of the nonmovant—except that any facts clearly depicted by video

footage are construed in the light depicted by such footage. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–

81; Earnest, 841 F. App’x at 960. Viewing the record in this light, the Court must

grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Peffer v. Stephens,

880 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986)). Because there is no evidence on which a reasonable jury could find

in favor of the Plaintiff, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A. Ferreiras’s excessive-force claim under § 1983 fails as a matter of

law.

Ferreiras alleges that Officers Ullrich and Fritsch violated her right under the

Fourth Amendment to be free from excessive force when they arrested her on May 4,

2023. This claim fails for two reasons. First, there was no constitutional violation

because the officers did not use force that was objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances. See Smith, 716 F.3d at 933 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Second,

even if one were to set that point aside for the sake of argument, the claim would still

fail because of qualified immunity.

1. The officers’ conduct did not violate Ferreiras’s

constitutional rights.

A violation of a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive

force occurs when an officer uses force that is deemed objectively unreasonable. See

id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). This standard considers “whether the totality

of the circumstances justifies a particular level of force.” Wright v. City of Euclid, 962

F.3d 852, 865 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Coffey v. Carroll, 933 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir.

2019)); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (noting a court must balance “the nature and

quality” of the seizure “against the countervailing governmental interests at stake”)

(citations omitted). Three factors guide a court’s evaluation of the totality of the

circumstances: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether [s]he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396. Ultimately, of course, “[r]easonableness is always the touchstone of Fourth

Amendment analysis.” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427 (2017)

(quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 477 (2016)). “[O]fficers may

employ only the force reasonably necessary to effect an arrest.” Chaney-Snell v.

Young, 98 F.4th 699, 717 (6th Cir. 2024).

When assessing the three Graham factors for reasonableness, this Court must

view the circumstances “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”

Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428 (warning against the use of hindsight to assess an

application of force). This lens accounts for the fact that police officers often make

“split-second judgments” during “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving”

circumstances. Caie v. West Bloomfield Township, 485 F. App’x 92, 95 (6th Cir. 2012)

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Further, this Court must assess each defendant’s

liability based on their own individual actions. Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650

(6th Cir. 2010). Applying these principles, neither Officer Ullrich nor Officer Fritsch

used excessive force on Ferreiras.3

i. Officer Ullrich did not use excessive force against Ferreiras.

After considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds that Officer

Ullrich acted reasonably and did not subject Ferreiras to excessive force. Officer

Ullrich’s uses of force against Ferreiras included: (1) grabbing Ferreiras’s right arm

and removing her crutch; (2) striking Ferreiras with a closed fist during the struggle

on the ground; and (3) moving Ferreiras to the cruiser and pushing her into the back

seat. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:07–12, 09:35–40, 13:20–32; 14:23–15:00]. A reasonable

officer in Ullrich’s position would deem these exercises of force—and any ancillary

3 The Defendants contend that Ferreiras should be precluded from basing her

excessive-force claim on any use of force that occurred before she was handcuffed.

This issue is ultimately irrelevant because the Court concludes that no use of force in

this case was unconstitutionally excessive. But the Defendants are correct

nonetheless. A § 1983 action cannot “necessarily imply the invalidity of [a plaintiff’s]

conviction.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Heck preclusion can arise

when a plaintiff is convicted of a crime and does not raise excessive force as an

affirmative defense despite the opportunity to do so. Parvin v. Campbell, 641 F. App’x

446, 449 (6th Cir. 2016). If such plaintiff claims excessive force was used against her

before and after she was handcuffed, Heck will bar the pre-handcuffing claim and

permit the post-handcuffing claim. Matheney v. City of Cookeville, 461 F. App’x 427,

431 (6th Cir. 2012). Ferreiras was convicted of resisting arrest but did not assert

excessive force as a defense, [Dkt. 76-5 at 1], even though Kentucky law permitted

her to do so. See Burke v. Forbis, No. 3:18-cv-802-DJH-CHL, 2021 WL 2418574, at

*3 (W.D. Ky. June 14, 2021). Accordingly, Heck precludes her from claiming that

excessive force was used against her before she was handcuffed.

uses of force connected to them—to be necessary to arrest and subdue Ferreiras based

on the Graham factors.

The first Graham factor weighs in favor of Ferreiras. Officers Ullrich and

Fritsch arrested Ferreiras for obstructing an emergency responder in violation of

KRS 525.015, [Dkt. 76-1 at 1], which is not a severe crime. See Reed v. Campbell

County, 80 F.4th 734, 748 (6th Cir. 2023) (finding the severity of an obstruction

offense is “minimal”). The Defendants concede this point. [Dkt. 76 at 16; Dkt. 90 at

14].

The second Graham factor, however, weighs in favor of Officer Ullrich. Officer

Ullrich did not anticipate that Ferreiras would confront the officers during the traffic

stop. [Dkt. 72 at 79:2–4, 87:5–12]. Ferreiras exited her home with her brother while

using crutches, but the officers did not know at the time the extent of her injuries or

why she was approaching them. [Dkt. 72 at 91:9–18; Dkt. 70 at 112:19–113:5].

Crutches are not traditionally thought of as weapons, but Officers Ullrich and Fritsch

testified they viewed the crutches as potential weapons given their limited

information about Ferreiras’s intentions while approaching them. [Dkt. 72 at 111:2–

113:8; Dkt. 70 at 32:15–33:5]. Regardless, “a suspect need not be armed to pose an

imminent threat to an officer’s safety.” Mitchell v. Schlabach, 864 F.3d 416, 422–23

(6th Cir. 2017).

Viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, see Graham,

490 U.S. at 396, Ferreiras posed an immediate threat the moment she exited her gate

and continued to walk toward the traffic stop in defiance of Officer Ullrich’s clear and

unequivocal orders. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:37–44]. For all the officers knew,

Ferreiras was interfering with the stop to stir up trouble.

The danger posed by Ferreiras subsequently spiked when she pulled away her

arm and then fell alongside Officers Ullrich and Fritsch. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:07–

31; Dkt. 71 at 38:18–39:8]. During the struggle that ensued on the ground, both

officers were in a compromised and off-balance position, subject to Ferreiras’s

thrashing movements. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:32–55]. Ferreiras no longer posed an

immediate threat once she was in handcuffs, but Officer Ullrich’s efforts to seat her

in the cruiser used only the minimal force necessary under the circumstances. [Id.

at VR 00:14:23–15:00]; see Chaney-Snell, 98 F.4th at 717. Thus, the second Graham

factor supports Officer Ullrich using force to subdue Ferreiras and address the threat

she posed to the officers and public.

The third Graham factor—active resistance to arrest—weighs heavily in favor

of Officer Ullrich. Active resistance includes any act of noncompliance combined with

“some outward manifestation” of “volitional and conscious defiance.” See Mata v. City

of Grayson, No. 23-122-DLB-EBA, 2025 WL 3451641, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2025)

(quoting Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2017)). Ferreiras’s

conduct prior to the arrest, her conduct during Officers Ullrich’s and Fritch’s attempt

to arrest her, and her conduct after she was handcuffed all amount to active

resistance. These actions later culminated in Ferreiras’s convictions for assault,

resisting arrest, criminal mischief, and obstructing an emergency responder. [Dkt.

76-6].

Ferreiras exhibited clear manifestations of noncompliance from the moment

she left her home, which escalated as she exited her gate and approached the stop.

[Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:32–55]. Officer Ullrich issued no fewer than eight commands

to Ferreiras to either stop advancing or return to her yard. [Id. at VR 00:08:32–39,

08:42–09:02]. Rather than adhere to those simple and clear commands, Ferreiras

vocally refused to leave the stop and advanced toward the officers until Officer Ullrich

intercepted her on the sidewalk. [Id. at VR 00:08:39–08:54]. Ferreiras argues she

did not confront the officers and that by placing her hands in the air she was

extending an “olive branch” to show she did not want any trouble. [Dkt. 90 at 15].

That is contrary to the video evidence, which clearly depicts the events leading up to

Ferreiras’s arrest. Taken in the light depicted by such footage, no reasonable jury

could find that Ferreiras did not confront the officers when she ignored commands

and approached them after exiting her gate. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:48–08:54].

Ferreiras put her hands up to signal her refusal to obey Officer Ullrich’s commands

to return to her home. [Id. at VR 00:08:57–09:02]. What followed was the natural

consequence of her confronting police officers during someone else’s traffic stop and

refusing the officers’ commands.

When Officer Ullrich approached Ferreiras to arrest her, he initially used a

minimal amount of force—essentially doing nothing more than clasping her arm to

facilitate handcuffing her. [Id. at VR 00:09:07–12]. That initial use of force was so

miniscule that no reasonable juror could conclude it was objectively unreasonable. If

it were otherwise, then practically every arrest ever effectuated would be a potential

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

It was only when Ferreiras started actively resisting arrest that Ullrich’s use

of force escalated. And that escalation was justified. Police officers have the right to

arrest a suspect when they have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed,

see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), and this includes a

“subsidiary right to use the ‘physical coercion or threat thereof’ required to ‘effect’

[the suspect’s] detention,” Chaney-Snell, 98 F.4th at 716 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396). Ferreiras does not contest that Officers Ullrich and Fritsch had probable

cause to arrest her for a variety of crimes, including assault.4 Thus, Officer Ullrich

had the right to arrest Ferreiras for her offense and use the amount of force necessary

to detain her.

By pulling her arm away, backing up, and vocally refusing to comply during

Officer Ullrich’s initial attempt to arrest her, Ferreiras combined her acts of

noncompliance with an outward manifestation of defiance. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR

00:09:07–12]. The result was active resistance by Ferreiras that justified additional

force to make the arrest. As the body-camera footage shows, that additional force

included grabbing Ferreiras and knocking away her crutches to secure her arms. [Id.

at VR 00:09:07–25]. Doing so was not objectively unreasonable. In fact, it is hard to

4 Nor could she. A jury convicted Ferreiras of those crimes, [Dkt. 76-5], which

necessarily means that the officers had probable cause to arrest her. See Watson v.

City of Marysville, 518 F. App’x 390, 392 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mark v. Furay, 769

F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985)).

see what else should have been done—especially from the viewpoint of a reasonable

officer in Ullrich’s position. Ferreiras lost her balance and fell alongside the officers

because of their use of force, [Id. at VR 00:09:20–30], but Officer Ullrich had to make

a split-second decision to remove the crutch before it could cause an injury—either

intentionally or unintentionally. His heat-of-the-moment decision was not objectively

unreasonable.

Once on the ground, Ferreiras writhed due to the pain she was experiencing in

her ankle, cursed at the officers, and made a kicking motion. [Id. at VR 00:09:32]. A

reasonable officer under these tense circumstances would not be able to discern

whether Ferreiras was flailing, contorting her body, and kicking due to discomfort or

to fight the officers. Bear in mind that Ferreiras was subsequently convicted of

assault, resisting arrest, and criminal mischief for her actions during this sequence,

[Dkt. 76-6], which included striking both Officer Ullrich and Officer Fritsch and

breaking Officer Fritsch’s glasses. [Dkt. 76-2 at 00:09:26–32; Dkt. 70 at 34:7–35:12;

Dkt. 71 at 104:13–105:4]. During the chaos, it was reasonable for Officer Ullrich to

strike Ferreiras with his hand to subdue her and allow him to apply handcuffs.

Under similar circumstances, the Sixth Circuit has found that physical

takedowns, knee strikes, and tasers are appropriate to subdue an actively resisting

suspect. See, e.g., Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2015); Caie, 485 F.

App’x at 96; Earnest, 841 F. App’x at 960; Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 940, 944

(6th Cir. 2002) (holding officers’ use of force to be reasonable when they twisted and

turned a suspect to secure handcuffs and roughly pushed the suspect into a police

car). In Roell v. Hamilton County, for instance, the court found the third Graham

factor supported use of force against a suspect who “resisted the deputies’ attempts

to restrain and handcuff him by kicking, flailing, and wriggling away from their

grasp.” 870 F.3d 471, 482 (6th Cir. 2017). Even if Officer Ullrich’s act of knocking

away Ferreiras’s crutch was the reason why the subsequent struggle on the ground

occurred, “law-enforcement officers cannot be held liable solely because they created

the circumstances requiring the application of force.” See Roell, 870 F.3d at 482

(citing Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s precedents, the active threat posed by Ferreiras’s

resistance and assault on the officers justified Officer Ullrich in grabbing her and

striking her in the head to complete the arrest.

Ferreiras’s conduct distinguishes the facts of this case from others she cites

where force was found to be unreasonable. In Steger v. Willis, this Court found an

officer may have used excessive force against a suspect by pushing a gate into them,

striking them, and forcing them to the ground during an arrest for a disorderly

conduct offense. No. 2:24-095-DCR, 2025 WL 2792118, at *3–4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 30,

2025). The suspect swore at the officers in a raised voice, but the suspect did not pose

a threat that would warrant the level of force applied. See id. Moreover—and

perhaps most importantly—the suspect stayed “on his own property, behind a gate,”

and “did not ignore any commands to submit to arrest.” See id. Ferreiras, however,

did the opposite. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:32–38]. And unlike the suspect in Steger,

Ferreiras was convicted of assault, criminal mischief, and resisting arrest. [Dkt. 76-

5]; see 2025 WL 2792118, at *2.

In Mata v. City of Grayson, this Court found repeated strikes to the back of a

handcuffed suspect were unreasonable because a “spontaneous assault” or

“unprovoked and unnecessary blow” to a suspect who poses no threat is excessive

force. 2025 WL 3451641, at *8 (quoting Coley v. Lucas County, 799 F.3d 530, 539 (6th

Cir. 2015) (citation omitted)). But here, Officer Ullrich struck Ferreiras twice in

response to her elbowing, thrashing, and kicking before she was handcuffed—not as

a spontaneous or unprovoked blow. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:09:35].

Thus, as a matter of law, Officer Ullrich’s use of force in subduing and

handcuffing Ferreiras was not objectively unreasonable. And the same is true of the

force that Officer Ullrich used after handcuffing Ferreiras. Officer Ullrich’s post-

handcuffing use of force was minimal. That use of force simply involved moving

Ferreiras to the patrol car and placing her in the back seat. Because of Ferreiras’s

refusal to cooperate and her limited movement due to the ankle injury, it was not

unreasonable for Officers Ullrich and Fritsch to drag her to the police cruiser and

push her into it. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:13:19–14:00]. Bear in mind that Ferreiras

violently kicked the rear door open before Officer Ullrich could finally secure her in

the passenger compartment. [Id. at VR 00:14:40–15:00]. This underscores both her

recalcitrance and the reasonableness of the officers’ actions in response.

Ferreiras argues that her “physical limitations” rendered unreasonable the

uses of force because she “couldn’t get into a car on her own, couldn’t comply with the

Officers’ commands,” and needed to be helped up. [Dkt. 90 at 15, 21]. Ferreiras left

the comfort of her home to confront the officers and disobey their orders despite her

injury. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:08:27–09:09]. She posed a risk to the officers at the scene

of the stop—as evidenced by her assault conviction and her elbow that broke Officer

Fritsch’s glasses—and she resisted arrest. [Dkt. 76-6]. Her injuries made

transporting her to the cruiser more difficult, but Ferreiras refused to comply when

Officer Ullrich sought her assistance with getting her through the door. [Dkt. 76-2

at VR 00:13:19–32]. Only then did Officer Ullrich push her into the cruiser and

attempt to close the door despite her kicks. [Id. at VR 00:14:23–15:00]. None of these

uses of force was unreasonable—even in light of her injured ankle.

Given the weight of the factors in favor of Officer Ullrich, no reasonable jury

could find that he exerted excessive force against Ferreiras during her arrest. The

underlying obstruction offense may have been minor, but Ferreiras posed an

immediate threat prior to and during her arrest, and the entire sequence of events

was littered with acts of resistance by her. Considering the Graham factors and the

totality of the circumstances, Officer Ullrich did not use an objectively unreasonable

amount of force. Thus, he did not violate Ferreiras’s Fourth Amendment rights.

ii. Officer Fritsch did not use excessive force against Ferreiras.

For similar reasons, Officer Fritsch also did not act in an objectively

unreasonable manner in using force against Ferreiras. Officer Fritsch took a

supportive role during Ferreiras’s arrest, and his uses of force included: (1) grabbing

Ferreiras’s left arm and removing her crutch; and (2) moving Ferreiras to the cruiser

and helping Officer Ullrich place her into the back seat.5 [Dkt. 76-3, at VR 00:09:15–

30, 00:13:20–32]. Each use of force—and any ancillary use of force connected with

it—was reasonable under the circumstances.

Just like with Officer Ullrich, the first Graham factor weighs in favor of

Ferreiras, but the second and third factors weigh in favor of Officer Fritsch.

Ferreiras’s minor obstruction offense is more than offset by the threat she posed to

the officers and her active resistance throughout the arrest process. Ferreiras’s

crutch could have been used to injure one of the officers, so it was reasonable for

Officer Fritsch to knock it away from her reach. [See Dkt. 70 at 32:15–33:5]. Plus, in

the heat of the moment, an officer in Fritsch’s position could easily—and reasonably—

have believed that the crutch needed to be discarded so that it did not get in the way

of his effort to steady Ferreiras and facilitate her placement in handcuffs. Once

Ferreiras was handcuffed, Officer Fritsch helped move her to the cruiser and push

her into the passenger compartment. [Dkt. 76-3 at VR 00:13:20–15:00; Dkt. 76-2 at

VR 00:14:23–15:00]. Given her recalcitrance, the means that Fritsch and Ullrich used

to move Ferreiras to the patrol car and put her in its back seat were not objectively

unreasonable. As with Officer Ullrich, a consideration of the Graham factors and the

totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that no reasonable jury could find

that Officer Fritsch used an objectively unreasonable amount of force. Thus, Officer

Fritsch also did not violate Ferreiras’s Fourth Amendment rights.

5 The Defendants are correct that only the second use of force survives Heck

preclusion. But, again, this point is ultimately irrelevant because no use of force was

objectively unreasonable.

2. The officers would be entitled to qualified immunity in any

event.

Even if one were to look past the absence of a constitutional violation,

Ferreiras’s excessive-force claim would still fail because Officers Ullrich and Fritsch

would be entitled to qualified immunity. In other words, even if there were a violation

of Ferreiras’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, the actions of

Officers Ullrich and Fritsch were not contrary to “‘clearly established’ law at the time

[they] acted.” See Mitchell, 864 F.3d at 424.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity in an excessive-force case when

his or her conduct—even if ultimately determined to be unconstitutional—“did not

violate clearly established Fourth Amendment excessive-force principles.” Moore v.

Oakland County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 2025). For an officer’s actions to

violate clearly established law and negate qualified immunity, a plaintiff must point

to existing precedent that “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 11 (2015)). Stated differently, a plaintiff must show that the law was “‘sufficiently

clear’ such that ‘every reasonable official would have understood’ that the officer’s

actions violated it.” Moore, 126 F.4th at 1167 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011)). A legal principle can be clearly established even if there is not a

case directly on point, but the “law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”

See White, 580 U.S. at 79 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

“This requires a high ‘degree of specificity’” because a more generalized rule would

“avoid[] the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular

circumstances.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2018) (quoting

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). Ultimately, there must be fair and

clear notice to the officer that his or her conduct was unlawful because qualified

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). Under this standard, Officers Ullrich and Fritsch are entitled to qualified

immunity. There was simply no existing authority that clearly demonstrated that

their particular conduct violated Ferreiras’s rights.

Ferreiras, however, claims Officers Ullrich and Fritsch violated her right as a

disabled or injured person to not be “subjected to excessive force in connection with

her disabilities and injuries, particularly when the same are obvious, and/or actually

known by the Officers.” [Dkt. 90 at 23]. She argues that Officers Ullrich and Fritsch

violated this right by not accounting for her broken ankle when they used physical

force to arrest her and move her into their cruiser. [Id. at 23–24].

In support of this proposition, Ferreiras first cites St. John v. Hickey, which

found “the right of a nonviolent arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly

inflicted during an arrest” is clearly established. 411 F.3d 762, 774 (6th Cir. 2005)

(abrogated in irrelevant part by Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8). There, officers used

excessive force against a wheelchair-bound suspect who was physically compliant but

had muscular dystrophy, which rendered his legs unable to bend. Id. at 765–66.

There was no evidence in the record that the suspect was violent or physically

resisting the officers during the arrest, and the defendant did not contend that the

suspect posed any safety risk. See id. at 772. In light of the suspect’s known

disability, it clearly violated the Fourth Amendment when the officers pushed the

suspect into the cruiser and attempted to bend his legs, causing pain and injury. See

id. at 775.

Ferreiras also cites Vance v. Wade, in which the Sixth Circuit found an officer

violated a suspect’s right to be free from excessive force when the officer pulled on the

suspect’s handcuffs, shoved the suspect’s head and shoulder down onto the cruiser’s

floorboard, and closed the door to force the suspect’s legs into the car. 546 F.3d 774,

783–84 (6th Cir. 2008). The suspect—who was recovering from neck and back

surgery—had been uncooperative and interfered with the execution of a search

warrant before the arrest. See id. at 779, 785. Next, the officer escorted the suspect

to the backseat of the cruiser with the car door open and his feet on the ground, left

the scene for several minutes as the situation calmed, then returned to cram the

suspect into the car’s passenger compartment. See id. at 778, 785–86 (noting the

suspect was “cooperatively sitting handcuffed” on the edge of the backseat before the

officer returned). The delay combined with the unnecessarily rough use of force was

a clear Fourth Amendment violation even though the suspect did not inform the

officers about his surgeries until after he was in the cruiser. See id. at 784. But had

the officer escorted the suspect into the car and forced him into the compartment

without delay, qualified immunity likely would have applied due to the need to

“minimize risks and calm a potentially volatile situation.” Id. at 785.

Lastly, Ferreiras points to Burden v. Caroll, which found it unreasonable for

an officer to violently shove a suspect against a brick wall upon arriving at the scene,

and then shove the suspect again into the same wall. 108 F. App’x 291, 292–94 (6th

Cir. 2004). While the officer may not have known whether it was clearly unlawful to

shove the suspect the first time to secure the area, it was certainly unlawful to do it

again once it was clear there was no safety or flight risk. See id. at 294 (“It is well

established that a police officer cannot continue to use force once a reasonable officer

would conclude that force is no longer justified by the circumstances.”).

None of these cases is sufficiently particularized to the facts of Ferreiras’s case

to put Officers Ullrich or Fritsch on notice that their actions were unlawful or that

the constitutional question was beyond debate. Unlike the suspect in St. John,

Ferreiras actively resisted arrest, and her ankle injury did not limit her ability to

move to the same extent as a person with muscular dystrophy. Merely pushing

Ferreiras forward onto the seat of the car is not comparable to an attempt to bend the

legs of a suspect with muscular dystrophy. [Dkt. 76-2 at VR 00:14:23–15:00].

Further, the degree of force used to cram the suspect in the police cruiser in Vance

was much more severe than the force used by Officers Ullrich and Fritsch. [Id.].

Ferreiras was pushed onto the seat—not slammed onto the floorboard. [Id.]. There

was also no significant delay between Ferreiras’s arrest and the effort to place her in

the cruiser because Ferreiras needed to be promptly removed from the traffic stop so

that it could continue unimpeded. [Id.]. And unlike the officer in Burden, who used

rough force despite the lack of any safety risk, Ferreiras actively resisted arrest,

continued to pose a threat, and was not subdued during the uses of force until

immediately before she was handcuffed. [Id. at VR 00:09:07–10:10]. She even kept

resisting after being handcuffed and placed in the police car by kicking the door open.

The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Guptill v. City of Chattanooga, 160 F.4th

768 (6th Cir. 2025), bears mentioning here. In that case, an off-duty police officer

moonlighting as a hospital security guard punched a partially restrained patient in

the head as the patient was passively resisting treatment for a mental health

emergency. See id. at 781–82. The blow caused the patient to suffer “head trauma.”

Id. at 773. Despite those seemingly unjustifiable circumstances, the Sixth Circuit

held that the officer’s actions were protected by qualified immunity. It concluded

that:

No binding caselaw Guptill identified or that we could find has

determined that an officer responding to a perceived medical emergency

and a partially restrained patient who is passively resisting medication

cannot use a single punch to enforce compliance when that individual

pulls away from the officer, even if the officer was not entirely sure about

the resistance.

Id. at 782 (quotations and citation omitted). If qualified immunity applied to the use

of force under those circumstances, it is impossible to see how it could not also apply

here, where Ferreiras was actively and violently resisting the officers, not passively

resisting like the plaintiff in Guptill.

The bottom line is that Ferreiras cannot identify a case that found the force

used against her unconstitutional under similar circumstances. This means that she

has not identified any violation of a clearly established right, and so Officers Ullrich

and Fritsch are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 excessive-force claim no

matter whether their conduct was unconstitutional.

B. Ferreiras’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim also fails as a

matter of law.

Ferreiras also claims Officers Ullrich and Fritsch violated her First

Amendment rights to free speech and association by retaliating against her with

improper treatment during and after her arrest. [Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 94–98]. To assert such

a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: “(1) [she] engaged in protected conduct;

(2) an adverse action was taken against [her] that would deter a person of ordinary

firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal

connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated

at least in part by [her] protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394

(6th Cir. 1999). If a plaintiff can make that showing, “the burden shifts to the

defendant to show he would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff had not

engaged in protected conduct.” Sevy v. Barach, 815 F. App’x 58, 63 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citing Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001)). However, in the

summary judgment context, it is the defendant-movant’s burden to demonstrate a

lack of evidence to support the plaintiff-nonmovant’s retaliation claim. See Lubrizol

Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 200 F. App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2006).

As with the excessive-force claim, there are two levels to analyzing Ferreiras’s

First Amendment retaliation claim: (1) whether the officers violated her First

Amendment rights; and, if so, (2) whether the officers are entitled to qualified

immunity because the rights at issue were not clearly established at the time of the

violation. See Sevy, 815 F. App’x at 60, 62–64. And just as with the excess-force

claims, the first question must be answered here in the negative, and the second must

be answered here in the affirmative. Thus, Officers Ullrich and Fritsch are entitled

to summary judgment on Ferreiras’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

1. Officers Ullrich and Fritsch did not violate Ferreiras’s First

Amendment rights.

Even assuming Ferreiras was engaged in protected conduct, no reasonable jury

could find that any adverse actions taken against her were motivated by such

protected conduct. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ferreiras—except

where the body-camera footage is clear—she cannot satisfy the causation element of

her retaliation claim.

To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must be able to show her protected conduct was

the but-for cause of the defendant’s adverse action. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391,

398–99 (2019). In other words, Ferreiras must show that the adverse action would

not have been taken against her if not for the defendant’s retaliatory motive. See id.

at 399. This can be hard to prove when a plaintiff’s conduct mixes protected speech

with unprotected activities, like the commission of a crime. See Sevy, 815 F. App’x at

63 (citing Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d 421, 430–31 (6th Cir. 2019)); see also

Nieves, 587 U.S. at 402 (“[I]t is particularly difficult to determine [for retaliatory

arrest claims] whether the adverse government action was caused by the officer’s

malice or the plaintiff's potentially criminal conduct.”). Here, it is not just difficult to

prove, but impossible.

Ferreiras cannot prove causation because the adverse actions toward her were

a result of her own unlawful interference with the traffic stop and her own unlawful

acts of resisting arrest—not her speech or associations. Officer Ullrich had probable

cause to suspect Ferreiras was committing an obstruction offense, which resulted in

a conviction. [Dkt. 76-5]. And a plaintiff cannot establish causation for a retaliatory

arrest unless they first prove the arresting officer lacked probable cause. See Nieves,

587 U.S. at 401; Sevy, 815 F. App’x at 63; Hagedorn v. Cattani, 715 F. App’x 499, 506

(6th Cir. 2017). Recognizing this, Ferreiras concedes that she cannot assert a claim

for retaliatory arrest due to her convictions that establish probable cause. [Dkt. 90

at 30]. Instead, Ferreiras argues her “primary allegations” involve Officers Ullrich

and Fritsch retaliating against her speech by assaulting her. [Id.]. The problem with

Ferreiras’s claim is the alleged assault consisted of the lawful force Officers Ullrich

and Fritsch used to arrest her and secure her in the cruiser. More to the point, the

alleged assault by the officers was in response to her own assault on the police

officers, not her exercise of First Amendment rights.

The officers’ treatment of Ferreiras’s brother confirms this point. He was

engaged in the same protected First Amendment activity as her, yet he was neither

arrested nor subjected to the use of force by the officers. What made the difference?

He complied with the officers’ commands and returned to the fenced-in yard while his

sister refused to comply and then assaulted the officers. Given these circumstances,

it makes no sense to say that what happened to his sister was retaliation for her

exercise of First Amendment rights. The only reasonable explanation for their

different outcomes is that they had absolutely nothing to do with their exercises of

First Amendment rights and everything to do with their completely opposite

responses to the officers’ lawful commands to return to their yard and not obstruct

the traffic stop. It is simply impossible for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that

there was a causal relationship between Ferreiras’s First Amendment activity and

the adverse actions of which she complains. Rather, the record clearly establishes

that those adverse actions were caused solely by her own unlawful conduct.

For these reasons, there was no violation of Ferreiras’s First Amendment

rights. Thus, Officers Ullrich and Fritsch are entitled to summary judgment on

Ferreiras’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.

2. Alternatively, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity

on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

Ferreiras has not pointed to any case clearly establishing that what happened

to her was a violation of her First Amendment rights. There is no doubt that some of

Ferreiras’s conduct—i.e., speaking to the officers and expressing her displeasure with

their actions—was protected by the First Amendment. And if that conduct had

resulted in either her arrest or the use of force against her, she would have a pretty

good argument that her clearly established First Amendment rights were violated.

But that is not what happened. Instead, she was arrested and subjected to force

because she unlawfully obstructed the officers’ conducting of a traffic stop, refused to

comply with the officers’ lawful orders to stop obstructing the traffic stop, and then

actively resisted arrest and assaulted the officers. And there is no authority

whatsoever clearly establishing that the First Amendment gave Ferreiras a right to

engage in that conduct. Thus, no reasonable officer in Ullrich’s or Fritsch’s position

could have had any inkling that arresting Ferrerias and using force to overcome her

active resistance would violate her First Amendment rights. This means that, at the

very least, Officers Ullrich and Fritsch are entitled to qualified immunity on

Ferreiras’s First Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001).

C. Ferreiras cannot sustain a Monell claim under § 1983 against the

City of Covington.

Ferreiras also pursues a claim against the City of Covington for its alleged role

in causing its police officers to violate Ferreiras’s rights or failing to prevent such

violations. [Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 107–12]. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the

Supreme Court held that municipal bodies can be sued under § 1983, but only when

the execution of the municipal body’s policies or customs caused the plaintiff’s injury.

436 U.S. at 694. Examples of municipal policies or customs cognizable under Monell

include inadequate training or supervision of the municipal body’s police officers. See

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of

Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, a municipal body cannot

be liable in a § 1983 Monell claim if there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Robertson v.

Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014)). This Court has held that Officers Ullrich

and Fritsch did not violate Ferreiras’s rights under the Constitution, so the City of

Covington is entitled to summary judgment.

Even so, there is insufficient evidence in the record for Ferreiras to prove her

Monell claim. To show inadequate training or supervision, Ferreiras would need to

demonstrate that the inadequacy that caused her injury was the result of the City’s

deliberate indifference. See Romero v. City of Lansing, 159 F.4th 1002, 1015 (6th Cir.

2025) (citing Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 286–87 (6th Cir. 2020));

Thomas, 398 F.3d at 429 (citing Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir.

1996)). Deliberate indifference is difficult to prove and requires the plaintiff to show

either: (1) the municipality was on notice of prior instances of similar

unconstitutional conduct but ignored any specific deficiencies in its policies; or (2)

there was only one violation of federal rights, but the municipality’s policy was “so

reckless or grossly negligent that future police misconduct is almost inevitable or

would properly be characterized as substantially certain to result.” Harvey v.

Campbell County, 453 F. App’x 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hays v. Jefferson

County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). Officers Ullrich and Fritsch received

general training on proper uses of force and de-escalation techniques. [Dkt. 76-9;

Dkt. 70 at 11:8–12:18]. There is some evidence that the City does not provide

substantial ongoing training on these topics, [Dkt. 70 at 66:18–67:7, 88:1–95:19], but

Ferreiras fails to connect her injury to any specific inadequacy in the general training

that the officers received—especially given the active threat she posed during her

arrest. She also has no evidence that the City was on notice of similar prior uses of

excessive force or that her alleged injury was substantially certain to occur. Thus,

Ferreiras’s Monell claim cannot stand even if there was an underlying constitutional

violation.

D. Ferreiras’s Kentucky state law claims also fail.

Finally, Officers Ullrich and Fritsch also move for summary judgment on

Ferreiras’s claims for sexual abuse, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Officers Ullrich and Fritsch

assert qualified immunity or point to evidence in the record to negate each claim.

[Dkt. 76 at 30–32]. At no point in the summary judgment briefing has Ferreiras

acknowledged these claims or countered the officers’ qualified immunity arguments.

This alone is a sufficient basis to grant summary judgment for the officers on these

claims. See Local Rule 7.1(c) (“Failure to timely respond to a motion may be grounds

for granting the motion.”).

Even so, the claims fail on their merits. Officer Ullrich has demonstrated the

absence of evidence supporting Ferreiras’s sexual abuse claim, so he is entitled to

summary judgment. Clear body-camera footage indicates that Officer Ullrich did not

make sexually abusive contact with Ferreiras, [Dkt. 90-2 at VR 00:03:38–40; Dkt. 76-

2 at VR 00:13:45–55], and Ferreiras has not come forward with rebuttal evidence to

establish a genuine issue for trial. See Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 934

(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256).

Ferreiras’s negligence and emotional distress claims must also fail because

Officers Ullrich and Fritsch are entitled to qualified official immunity under

Kentucky state law. Under Kentucky law, a police officer is entitled to qualified

official immunity for any discretionary acts taken in good faith and within the scope

of the officer’s authority. See Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001) (citation

omitted); see also Jerauld ex rel. Robinson v. Kroger, 353 S.W.3d 636, 638–40 (Ky. Ct.

App. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant officials on qualified

official immunity grounds regarding claims of negligence and intentional infliction of

emotional distress). An act is discretionary if the officer exercises “discretion and

judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment,” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at

522, unlike a ministerial act that requires obedience to another’s orders or is based

on an absolute duty to act when specific facts arise, see Morales v. City of Georgetown,

709 S.W.3d 146, 154–55 (Ky. 2024) (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522). Here, Kentucky

law allowed Officers Ullrich and Fritsch to use reasonable force to arrest Ferreiras,

see KRS 503.090(1), which required the officers to use their judgment to determine

the necessary amount of force to apply. Their uses of force were discretionary, in good

faith, and within the scope of their statutory authority. See Nichols v. Bourbon Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 26 F. Supp. 3d 634, 642 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (citing Woosley v. City of Paris,

591 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (E.D. Ky. 2008)). Ferreiras has provided no argument to

the contrary regarding her state law claims, so Officers Ullrich and Fritsch are

entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

III. Motions to Strike and Exclude

Both Ferreiras and the Defendants also have pending motions regarding the

admissibility of experts. [Dkt. 78; Dkt. 80]. Because the Court grants summary

judgment to the Defendants on all claims, these motions are moot.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, [Dkt. 76], as to all of Ferreiras’s claims. Additionally, the Court DENIES

Ferreiras’s Motion to Exclude, [Dkt. 80], and the Defendants’ Motion to Strike, [Dkt.

78], as moot. A separate judgment will be entered consistent with this opinion.

Dated this 19th day of February, 2026.