Com. v. Mumford, C.

J-S42021-25 2026 PA Super 31

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

CHRISTOPHER M. MUMFORD :

:

Appellant : No. 81 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 17, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-38-CR-0000760-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 19, 2026

Appellant, Christopher M. Mumford, appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed in the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas, following

his jury trial convictions for persons not to possess a firearm and firearms not

to be carried without a license.1 We affirm Appellant’s convictions but vacate

and remand for resentencing.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

During the trial, the jury heard testimony from several

officers involved in the investigation which stemmed from a

vehicle chase originating out of Lancaster County[.] The

jury heard testimony from Officer Brandon Brandt from the

Northern Lancaster County Regional Police Department.

Officer Brandt testified that on April 28, 2022, around 1:43

a.m., he observed a silver Ford van that did not have

operating license plate lights. Officer Brandt stated that

after making this observation he began to follow the vehicle

and noted the vehicle’s license plate number was KGG2840.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1).

J-S42021-25

Officer Brandt also testified that while following the vehicle,

it sped up and took a route as if it was trying to get away

from him. Officer Brandt stated that it was at this point that

he attempted to initiate a traffic stop but the vehicle failed

to stop. Officer Brandt stated that the vehicle fled and that

he lost sight of the vehicle during the chase.

However, Officer Brandt explained that he was later able to

relocate the vehicle based on skid marks on the road

following the van’s path of travel. Officer Brandt stated that

it appeared that the vehicle had gone off the road and was

involved in a crash. The jury also heard from Officer Brandt

that at some point during the chase, the vehicle turned

around and passed him going in the opposite direction.

Officer Brandt indicated that is when he got a look at the

driver who appeared to be a [white] male, approximately

40-50 years old, wearing dark clothing. Officer Brandt

testified that during the pursuit the driver kept increasing

his speed and due to safety reasons, as well as department

policy, he discontinued the chase.

Officer Brandt further testified that upon discontinuing the

pursuit, he ran the license plate of the vehicle, and it came

back to an address on South Ninth Street in Lebanon, PA.

Officer Brandt then notified Lebanon County Dispatch and

provided the license plate, description of the vehicle, and

the description of the driver. The motor vehicle footage

(MVR) from Officer Brandt, which was operating during the

interaction with the vehicle, was admitted into evidence and

played for the jury. Furthermore, photographs of the

vehicle Officer Brandt attempted to conduct a traffic stop on

were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury.

Photographs of where the vehicle crashed were also

admitted into evidence and shown to the jury. Additionally,

Officer Brandt identified Appellant in court as the individual

he saw driving and fleeing the crash scene on April 28, 2022.

The jury also heard testimony from Officer Roger Soliday

from the Lebanon City Police Department. Officer Soliday

testified that on April 28, 2022, he heard the description of

the vehicle over dispatch; a silver van with a Pennsylvania

license plate KGG2840. The jury heard from Officer Soliday

that around 2:39 a.m., he observed the van matching the

description and initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle. Officer

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Soliday testified that the vehicle pulled over. However, as

the vehicle was coming to a stop, the passenger door flew

open, and a passenger got out and fled the scene. Officer

Soliday testified that as the passenger got out and ran, he

observed the individual discarding an item. Officer Soliday

stated that the object looked like a firearm based on its

shape and that he heard it skid across the sidewalk when it

fell. During his testimony, Officer Soliday clarified that he

was not the officer who ultimately recovered the firearm but

that he did see it while it was on the street.

Officer Soliday further testified that the passenger that fled

from the vehicle matched the description of the driver that

was given previously over dispatch. Officer Soliday stated

he observed a white male, approximately 40-50 years old,

wearing dark clothing. He also stated that he remembered

the suspect’s height and build and that he caught a glimpse

of the side profile of the suspect as he ran away. Officer

Soliday identified the Appellant in court as the individual he

saw fleeing the scene on April 28, 2022.

Officer Soliday explained to the jury that he decided not to

pursue the passenger but instead remained at the scene

with the vehicle and spoke with the driver. The driver was

identified as Richard Phillips, who was an older black male,

approximately 70 years old.[2] Officer Soliday testified that

Mr. Phillips was very [cooperative] and told him that the

individual who fled from the vehicle was named “Chris”.

However, Mr. Phillips did not know the individual’s last

name. Officer Soliday testified that Mr. Phillips stated that

he was giving “Chris” a ride home after “Chris” was in an

accident with the vehicle earlier that night. At some point

Mr. Phillips showed the Officer the location where he was

going to drop “Chris” off. That address was associated with

Appellant, Christopher Mumford.

The jury also heard testimony that Officer Soliday was given

a wallet, which Mr. Phillips retrieved from the passenger side

area. The wallet included a driver’s license, multiple credit

cards, bank cards, and a Pennsylvania benefits card, all with

[Appellant,] Christopher Mumford’s name. Officer Soliday

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2 Mr. Phillips died prior to trial.

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was also shown the photographs that had been previously

admitted and identified by Officer Brandt as the vehicle that

fled earlier that night. Officer Soliday testified that it was

the same vehicle he initiated the traffic stop on that night.

The MVR from Officer Soliday, which was operating during

the traffic stop, was also admitted into evidence and played

for the jury. Officer Soliday was also shown photographs of

the firearm and identified it as the same firearm that was

recovered from the scene. Additionally, the actual firearm

that was found at the scene was admitted into evidence and

identified by Officer Soliday.

Lieutenant Sean Buck from the Lebanon City Police

Department was called to [testify] regarding his

involvement in the investigation. Lieutenant Buck testified

that he was the backup unit that responded to assist Officer

Soliday with the traffic stop. Lieutenant Buck testified that

upon arriving on the scene, he observed a gun on the

sidewalk on the passenger side of the vehicle. Lieutenant

Buck stated he was the officer who collected and secured

the firearm from the scene. He confirmed the firearm was

loaded when it was found. The photographs of the firearm,

which was a Tarus 9-millimeter Luger, were admitted into

evidence and shown to the jury. Lieutenant Buck identified

the gun as the same firearm that he recovered from the

scene on April 28, 2022. Lieutenant Buck testified to the

process of collecting the firearm and the preservation of the

chain of evidence. Lieutenant Buck also testified that at

some point during the investigation he was asked to collect

a buccal swab from Appellant. A stipulation was entered by

Counsel that Lieutenant Buck properly recovered the DNA

sample from [Appellant]. Additionally, Lieutenant Buck

identified Appellant in court as the individual he collected

the buccal swab from.

The jury also heard testimony from Lieutenant Buck

regarding whether Appellant had a concealed carry permit.

Lieutenant Buck testified that he was informed by the

Pennsylvania State Police that Appellant did not have a

license to carry firearms. Lieutenant Buck also testified to

certified records that reflected the previous convictions of

Appellant. The certified records showed that Appellant had

convictions for Burglary, from April 23, 1998; Delivery of

Controlled Substances, from April 28, 2004; Delivery of

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Controlled Substances, from February 29, 2012; Delivery of

Controlled Substances, from February 29, 2012; and

Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance,

from February 26, 2017.

The jury heard testimony from Lieutenant Keith Uhrich of

the Lebanon City Police Department. Lieutenant Uhrich

testified that his involvement in the case began after the

firearm was collected from the scene and placed in the lab

for processing. Lieutenant Ulrich stated that during the

investigation he was asked to fingerprint the gun for latent

prints. He testified that no latent prints were found on the

firearm. The photograph of the firearm previously admitted

was shown to Lieutenant Ulrich, who identified it as the

same firearm he tested for fingerprint purposes. Lieutenant

Ulrich testified that he was later asked to have the gun

tested for DNA, which involved swabbing the firearm and

then submitting it to the State Police Crime Lab for DNA

analysis. Lieutenant Uhrich explained the process of

collecting prints and swabbing for DNA, as well as the steps

taken in order to preserve the chain of evidence and prevent

cross contamination.

Corporal Christopher Sulitka, qualified as an expert in the

field of firearms and tool mark examinations, testified that

he was asked to analyze the ballistic functionality of a black

Taurus G2c 9-millimeter handgun. Corporal Sulitka

explained to the jury how ballistic functionality is tested and

testified that this particular firearm was functional and

capable of discharging ammunition. The photograph of the

firearm previously admitted was shown to Corporal Sulitka

who identified it as the same firearm he tested for

functionality purposes.

The jury also heard from Alexandria Gambone of the

Pennsylvania State Police Harrisburg Regional Lab, who was

qualified as an expert in the area of serology. Ms. Gambone

testified that she received the swabs of the Taurus G2c 9-

millimeter handgun and then she prepared the swabs to be

sent to DNA for analysis. Ms. Gambone testified that she

later received a buccal swab from [Appellant] and also

prepared that sample to be sent for DNA analysis. Ms.

Gambone explained the process of preparing the evidence

for testing and explained the steps taken to preserve the

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chain of evidence and prevent cross contamination.

Lastly, the jury heard from Breanna Brown, qualified as an

expert in DNA identification, from the Pennsylvania State

Police Lab. Ms. Brown testified that she received the swabs

from the firearm and processed it for DNA. Ms. Brown

explained that she obtained a partial DNA profile that

consisted of three contributors from the swab of the Taurus

G2c 9-millimeter handgun. Ms. Brown testified that she also

analyzed the buccal swab collected from [Appellant]. Ms.

Brown stated that she then compared the DNA profile

collected from the swab of [Appellant] and compared it to

the profiles found on the gun. Ms. Brown testified that

Appellant … was determined to be a potential DNA match to

that found on the gun. Ms. Brown explained that the same

profile obtained from this handgun is 2.0 million times more

likely that it originated from [Appellant], and two other

individuals, than if it had originated from three other,

unknown individuals in the population. On cross

examination, Ms. Brown explained that for the amount of

DNA that is required for a DNA profile to be created, an

individual has to have interaction with the object.

Therefore, Ms. Brown concluded that the contributor of this

DNA profile handled the particular gun in this case due to

the amount of DNA which was found on it.

(Trial Court Opinion, dated 5/8/25, 5-11) (record citations omitted).

On October 22, 2024, the jury convicted Appellant of persons not to

possess firearms and firearms not to be carried without a license. The jury

found Appellant not guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence.

On December 11, 2024, the court conducted a sentencing hearing and

imposed a term of 7 to 15 years of imprisonment for persons not to possess

a firearm, and a concurrent term of 3½ to 7 years of imprisonment for carrying

a firearm without a license. On December 17, 2024, the trial court entered

an amended sentencing order, which added a one-year term of reentry

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supervision to the previously imposed sentence. (See Amended Order of

Sentence, filed 12/17/24). Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

On January 15, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On January 16,

2025, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a motion for

extension of time to file a concise statement, which the trial court granted,

directing that Appellant have 21 days following the lodging of the trial notes

of testimony to file the statement. The notes of testimony were lodged on

March 11, 2025, and Appellant filed an untimely concise statement on April 7,

2025.3

On June 23, 2025, this Court issued a rule to show cause why Appellant’s

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3 It is well settled that only issues properly raised in a timely Rule 1925(b)

statement are preserved for appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

In criminal cases, where the appellant is represented by counsel, however,

the failure to file a timely concise statement may be deemed to be per se

ineffectiveness and the issues are not automatically waived. See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(c)(3); Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 432-33 (Pa.Super.

2009) (en banc) (explaining that counsel’s failure to file timely concise

statement is functional equivalent of filing no statement at all, as both failures

waive all issues on appeal; thus, counsel’s failure to file timely concise

statement in criminal case constitutes per se ineffectiveness, for which

remand under Rule 1925(c)(3) is permitted). Nevertheless, “where the trial

court addresses the issues raised in an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we

need not remand but may address the issues on their merits.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 186 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 641 Pa. 56, 165 A.3d 892 (2017). See also Burton, supra at 433

(stating: “[I]f there is an untimely filing, this Court may decide the appeal on

the merits if the trial court had adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion

addressing the issues being raised on appeal”). Under these circumstances,

as the trial court had the opportunity to prepare an opinion addressing the

issues raised, we decline to find waiver or remand.

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appeal should not be quashed as untimely, explaining that it appeared that

the notice of appeal, filed on January 15, 2025, was filed more than thirty

days after the trial court imposed Appellant’s sentence. In response to this

Court’s rule to show cause, Appellant claimed that there was a distinction

between the sentencing order imposed in open court on December 11, 2024,

and the amended sentence entered on the docket on December 17, 2024.

Specifically, Appellant argued that the December 17, 2024 amended sentence

added a one year term of re-entry supervision. By order dated July 9, 2025,

this Court discharged the rule to show cause and referred the issue of the

timeliness of the appeal to this panel.

Before we address Appellant’s issues raised, we must ascertain whether

this appeal is properly before us. Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he

timeliness of an appeal and compliance with the statutory provisions granting

the right to appeal implicate an appellate court’s jurisdiction and its

competency to act.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 630 Pa. 169, 176, 106

A.3d 583, 587 (2014) (citations omitted). As this Court has explained, “[w]e

lack jurisdiction to consider untimely appeals, and we may raise such

jurisdictional issues sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d

1242, 1244 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d

497, 500 (Pa.Super. 2014)).

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 903(a), a notice of

appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the order from which the

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appeal is taken. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). “Absent extraordinary circumstances, an

appellate court lacks the power to enlarge or extend the time provided by

statute for taking an appeal. Thus, an appellant’s failure to appeal timely an

order generally divests the appellate court of its jurisdiction to hear the

appeal.” Williams, supra at 176, 106 A.3d at 587 (citations omitted).

Generally, “in cases where the trial court amends the judgment of

sentence during the period it maintains jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5505,”

the appeal lies from the amended judgment of sentence rather than the

original sentence. Commonwealth v. Wenzel, 248 A.3d 540, 545

(Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, 670 Pa. 169, 264 A.3d 753 (2021). See

also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (stating: “[A] court upon notice to the parties may

modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the

prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been

taken or allowed”); Commonwealth v. Broadie, 489 A.2d 218, 220

(Pa.Super. 1985) (holding: “a modified sentence constitutes a new sentence

from the date of which the time for filing a notice of appeal will begin to run

anew”).

Here, the trial court imposed its original sentence on December 11,

2024, and issued its amended sentence on December 17, 2024. Because the

court issued the amended sentence within thirty days, we consider the

amended sentence to be the operative sentence for the purpose of appeal.

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal within

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30 days of the date that the court issued its amended sentence.

Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:

I. Whether the Commonwealth failed to prove every

element of the offense of persons not to possess firearms,

as the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant

actually or constructively possessed the firearm 60 days

following his firearm disability?

II. Whether the Commonwealth failed to prove every

element of the offense of carrying a firearm without a

license, as the evidence was insufficient to prove that

Appellant carried a firearm inside of Mr. Phillips’ vehicle or

carried the firearm concealed on their person?

III. Whether the trial court erred by not making a finding

that Appellant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently

exercised his right to remain silent at his jury trial?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

Appellant’s first two issues concern the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his convictions. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

“presents a pure question of law and, as such, our standard of review is de

novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Santiago,

294 A.3d 482, 485 (Pa.Super. 2023).

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the

evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the

verdict when it establishes each material element of the

crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,

beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of

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fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that

the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a

crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.

Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that

of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,

accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s

convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Akeley, 320 A.3d 106, 110-11 (Pa.Super. 2024) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to

prove that he possessed the firearm. Appellant claims that Officer Soliday

was the sole witness who observed the passenger discard an item. Appellant

emphasizes that Officer Soliday described the item discarded as something “in

the shape of what looked like it could possibly be a pistol or firearm” but the

officer did not indicate that the firearm later found on the side of the street

was the same item that the passenger discarded. (See Appellant’s Brief at

20) (quoting N.T. Trial, 10/22/24, at 39). Appellant suggests that because

there were three DNA sources on the firearm, the Commonwealth failed to

prove that the driver of the vehicle, Mr. Phillips, did not discard the firearm.

Appellant also suggests that it is plausible that his DNA transferred onto the

surface of the firearm on an earlier occasion, prior to his firearm disability.

Appellant concludes that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that

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he actually or constructively possessed the firearm 60 days following his

firearm disability required to sustain his conviction for persons not to possess

firearms. We disagree.

The Uniform Firearms Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture,

control, sell or transfer firearms

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense

enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this

Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence

or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c)

shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or

manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use,

control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this

Commonwealth.

(2)(i) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,

a person who is prohibited from possessing, using,

controlling, selling, transferring or manufacturing a

firearm under paragraph (1) or subsection (b) or (c)

shall have a reasonable period of time, not to exceed

60 days from the date of the imposition of the

disability under this subsection, in which to sell or

transfer that person’s firearms to another eligible

person who is not a member of the prohibited person’s

household.

* * *

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a). Under Section 6105, “an individual is subject to

criminal prosecution if he unlawfully possesses: (1) any weapon that is

specifically designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by

means of an explosive; or (2) the frame or receiver of such a weapon.”

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 671-72 (Pa.Super. 2009),

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appeal denied, 607 Pa. 704, 4 A.3d 1054 (2010).

This Court has held that “[p]ossession can be found by

proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint

constructive possession.” Commonwealth v. Heidler, 741

A.2d 213, 215 (Pa.Super. 1999)[(en banc)]. Where a

defendant is not in actual possession of the prohibited items,

the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had

constructive possession to support the conviction.

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa.Super.

2013) (conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a) supported

by a finding of constructive possession). See also

Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745 (Pa.Super.

2004) (same). “Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a

pragmatic construct to deal with the realities of criminal law

enforcement.” Hopkins, supra at 820 (citation and

quotation omitted). “We have defined constructive

possession as conscious dominion,” meaning that the

defendant has “the power to control the contraband and the

intent to exercise that control.” Id. (citation and quotation

omitted).

“To aid application, we have held that constructive

possession may be established by the totality of the

circumstances.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).

It is well established that, “[a]s with any other element of a

crime, constructive possession may be proven by

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Haskins,

[677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa.Super. 1996)] (citation omitted).

In other words, the Commonwealth must establish facts

from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the

defendant exercised dominion and control over the

contraband at issue.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36-37 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 651 Pa. 10, 202 A.3d 42 (2019).

“To find constructive possession, the power and intent to control the

contraband does not need to be exclusive to the [defendant] ... and may be

found in one or more actors where the item in issue is in an area of joint

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control and equal access.” Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432,

437-38 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 285 A.3d 879 (2022).

See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 611 Pa. 381, 407, 26 A.3d 1078,

1094 (2011) (explaining that constructive possession of item may be found in

one or more individuals if they are occupant of same vehicle and item is

located is area of joint control and equal access); Haskins, supra at 330

(stating: “The fact that another person may also have control and access does

not eliminate the defendant’s constructive possession; two actors may have

joint control and equal access and thus both may constructively possess the

contraband”). Finally, a witness’ testimony alone is sufficient to prove that a

defendant possessed a firearm. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Antidormi,

84 A.3d 736, 757 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 626 Pa. 681, 95 A.3d 275

(2014) (determining witness’ testimony alone was sufficient evidence to prove

possession element under Section 6105(a)(1)).

Instantly, the trial court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient

to support the jury’s finding that Appellant was in possession of the firearm.

As the court explained,

[e]ven though the gun was not found directly on Appellant’s

person, evidence was presented that connected the

Appellant to the firearm, including DNA evidence. Officer

Brandt identified Appellant as the driver who fled in

Lancaster County. Officer Soliday identified Appellant as the

passenger who later fled from the vehicle when he

conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle in Lebanon County.

Officer Soliday testified that when the individual got out of

the vehicle and ran, he dropped an object that resembled a

firearm. That object was later recovered from the scene and

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identified as a loaded, fully functioning Taurus G2c 9-

millimeter handgun.

The jury also heard testimony from Officer Soliday regarding

his discussions with the driver, Mr. Phillips. Mr. Phillips

informed Officer Soliday that the passenger who jumped out

of the car and ran was named “Chris”. Mr. Phillips also told

Officer Soliday that “Chris” was driving the car earlier that

night but got into a crash. Furthermore, the address where

Mr. Phillips was dropping “Chris” off came back to an

address associated with Appellant. A wallet which had a

driver’s license, credit cards, and bank information

belonging to Appellant, Christopher Mumford was also found

on the passenger side of the vehicle, the same vehicle in

which the suspect fled from.

Expert testimony was provided that a partial DNA profile

was found on the handgun. While the partial profile

consisted of three contributors, a DNA expert testified that

Appellant’s DNA was a match to one of those individuals.

The jury also heard testimony from the DNA expert that due

to the amount of touch DNA that was recovered from this

particular firearm, she believed the individual contributor

personally handled the gun. Furthermore, certified records

were admitted into evidence which showed that Appellant

had convictions for Burglary, Delivery of Controlled

Substances, and Possession with Intent to Deliver a

Controlled Substance, all of which are considered

enumerated offenses under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b), (c)

prohibiting Appellant from possessing a firearm in this

Commonwealth. All the previous convictions occurred 60

days before the incident on April 28, 2022.

(Trial Court Opinion, dated 5/8/25, at 11-12). On this record, the court

ultimately concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury

finding both that Appellant possessed the firearm and that he was ineligible

to possess a firearm.

The record supports the trial court’s analysis. Here, Officer Brandt

testified that he saw Appellant discard what looked like a firearm. Additionally,

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Lieutenant Buck testified that he later recovered a firearm from that sidewalk

on the passenger side of the vehicle. Further evidence establishing Appellant’s

possession included the driver of the vehicle’s identification of the passenger

who fled as “Chris,” the wallet containing Appellant’s ID cards found in the

vehicle, and Appellant’s DNA found on the firearm which had been thrown by

the passenger. On this record, the jury could reasonably infer that Appellant

was the passenger who discarded the firearm. See Akeley, supra; Rojas-

Rolon, supra. Finally, as the court explained, the certified records admitted

into evidence showed that Appellant had prior convictions which prohibited

him from possessing a firearm in this Commonwealth. Thus, the evidence was

sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for persons not to possess a

firearm. Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to

prove that he carried a firearm inside the vehicle. Appellant claims that the

driver, Mr. Phillips, had carried the firearm inside the vehicle, and Appellant

insists that the police investigation focused on Mr. Phillips possessing the

firearm. Appellant insists that his mere presence near the firearm was

insufficient to establish constructive possession. Appellant concludes that the

evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish that he unlawfully

carried a firearm without a license. We disagree.

Section 6106 of the Crimes Codes provides:

§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

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(a) Offense defined.—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person

who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who

carries a firearm concealed on or about his person,

except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,

without a valid and lawfully issued license under this

chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

* * *

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a).

Our Supreme Court has stated that “[b]y its plain terms, Section 6106

applies to ‘any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle[.]’”

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 335 A.3d 1047, 1053

(2025) (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)). The Court explained that to

convict a defendant of carrying a firearm without a license, “there were only

three elements the jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt: [First, that

defendant] carried the firearm in a vehicle.... Second, that [he] was not in

his place of abode; that is his home or a fixed place of business.... And, third,

that [he] did not have a valid and lawfully issued license to carry a firearm.”

Id. Furthermore, as discussed above, “it is possible for two people to have

joint constructive possession of an item.” Hopkins, supra at 820–21 (citing

Commonwealth v. Sanes, 955 A.2d 369, 373 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal

denied, 601 Pa. 696, 972 A.2d 521 (2009)).

Instantly, the trial court explained that the evidence established that

Appellant was connected to both the firearm and the vehicle in question.

Furthermore, Appellant did not have a license to carry a firearm and would

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have been unable to obtain such license to carry a firearm in a vehicle based

on his prior felony convictions. Therefore, the court concluded that the

Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict of

guilty for carrying a firearm without a license. (Trial Court Opinion, dated

5/8/25, at 13).

The record supports the trial court’s determination. As discussed above,

the evidence admitted at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient for the jury to reasonably

infer that Appellant was the individual who discarded a firearm as he fled from

the scene of the traffic stop. The jury could also reasonably infer that

Appellant possessed the firearm in the vehicle prior to the traffic stop. As this

Court has explained, the power and intent to control a firearm necessary for

constructive possession need not be exclusive to the defendant. See Rojas-

Rolon, supra. On this record, it is reasonable to infer that even if, as

Appellant insists, the firearm was possessed by Mr. Phillips, Appellant could

have also exercised dominion and control over the firearm while it was in the

vehicle. See Hopkins, supra. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence at trial was

sufficient to establish that Appellant carried the firearm in the vehicle without

a license. See Akeley, supra. Appellant’s second issue is meritless.

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding

that Appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right

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to testify. Appellant claims that the trial court’s colloquy was inadequate in

that the court did not determine if Appellant was under the influence of drugs

or alcohol, which could impair his ability to understand; if any promises were

made to Appellant not to testify; or if anybody forced or coerced him not to

testify or if he made the decision of his own free will. Appellant acknowledges

that a trial court is not required to conduct a colloquy, but he suggests that

the court failed to ensure that Appellant understood that he was waiving his

right to testify knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (Appellant’s Brief at

27). Appellant concludes that we must grant relief on these grounds. We

disagree.

Preliminarily, we must discern whether Appellant properly preserved

this issue for our review. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302(a)

establishes that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). As this Court has

explained, the requirement that an appellant raise an issue before the trial

court extends to issues regarding the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of

the right to testify. Commonwealth v. Duffy, 832 A.2d 1132, 1137

(Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 694, 845 A.2d 816 (2004) (holding

that where “[a]ppellant did not object to the trial court’s failure to conduct a

colloquy regarding waiver of [the a]ppellant’s right to testify. … [a]ppellant

failed to preserve this issue for appeal”) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we

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conclude that Appellant failed to preserve this issue for appeal.4

Although the issues that Appellant presents on appeal merit no relief,

our review of the record indicates that the court imposed an illegal sentence

when it modified Appellant’s sentence outside his presence. This Court has

explained:

The legality of a criminal sentence is non-waivable, and this

Court may raise and review an illegal sentence sua sponte.

Because the legality of a sentence presents a pure question

of a law, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of

review is de novo. If no statutory authorization exists for a

particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and must be

vacated.

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 673 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 889-90

(Pa.Super. 2019)).

____________________________________________

4 Moreover, we note that a “trial court is not required to conduct a colloquy to

determine whether a defendant has made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary

waiver of his right to testify.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d

1255, 1264 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en banc) (footnote omitted); see also Duffy,

supra at 1137 n.3 (explaining: “there is no requirement that the trial court

conduct an on-the-record colloquy when a defendant waives his right to

testify”). “Nevertheless, a criminal defendant must understand his decision

not to testify if not by colloquy, then by the presumed competent advice of

counsel.” Washington, supra at 1264 (citation omitted).

Our review of the record indicates that the trial court had a discussion with

Appellant concerning his decision to remain silent. (N.T. Trial, 10/22/24, at

137-40). Appellant confirmed that he spoke with his attorney about his choice

not to testify both prior to trial and during the brief recess that the court

provided prior to discussing Appellant’s decision whether to testify or not.

Thus, even if Appellant had preserved this issue, the record indicates that

Appellant had the “presumed competent advice of counsel” prior to making

his decision to waive his right to testify. See Washington, supra.

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Pennsylvania law sets forth a requirement for mandatory imposition of

reentry supervision in Section 6137.2, which “applies to persons committed

to the department with an aggregate minimum sentence of total confinement

under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9756(b) (relating to sentence of total confinement) of

4 years or more.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2(a). The statute mandates that

“[a]ny person under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a period of reentry

supervision of 12 months consecutive to and in addition to any other lawful

sentence issued by the court.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2(b).

This Court considered the implications of Section 6137.2 in

Commonwealth v. Santiago, No. 768 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 1462304

(Pa.Super. filed Apr. 4, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).5 There, the trial

court sentenced the appellant to an aggregate term of 7½ to 15 years of

incarceration. Id. at *7. This Court concluded that the “[a]ppellant was

subjected to the mandatory reentry supervision requirements of 61 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6137.2” and the trial court’s original sentence, which omitted the

requirement for reentry supervision, was an illegal sentence. Id. Accordingly,

this Court concluded that the trial court possessed the authority to mold a

new, statutorily correct sentence. Id. Nevertheless, this Court held that the

trial court’s amended sentence was also an illegal sentence, where there was

no indication that the trial court held a resentencing hearing or that Appellant

____________________________________________

5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

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was otherwise present in court when the amended sentence was imposed. Id.

The Court considered a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Norris, No.

1439 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 6458962 (Pa.Super. filed Oct. 4, 2023)

(unpublished memorandum), when we considered sua sponte whether the

“trial court entered an illegal sentence when it amended [the a]ppellant’s

sentence outside his presence.” Id. at *6. This Court explained that because

the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of more than four years,

Section 6137.2 required that the court impose a term of one year of reentry

supervision. Id. at *7. Although the trial court issued an amended sentence

adding the term of reentry supervision,

there is no indication on the trial court docket that the trial

court held a resentencing hearing or that [the a]ppellant

was present in court when the amended sentence was

imposed. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 602 (“The defendant shall be

present at every stage of the trial including the impaneling

of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the

imposition of sentence[.]”). As such, the trial court entered

an illegal sentence.

Id. Therefore, this Court vacated the amended sentence and remanded for

resentencing.

Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of

7½ to 15 years of incarceration; as such, Appellant was subject to the

mandatory reentry supervision requirements of 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2. The

trial court’s initial sentence on December 11, 2024 did not include a term of

reentry supervision. (See N.T. Sentencing, 12/11/24, at 7-8). Because

reentry supervision is mandated by Section 6137.2, the initial sentencing

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order was an illegal sentence. See Santiago, supra. Although the trial

court’s December 17, 2024 amended sentencing order included the term of

reentry supervision, because there is no indication that the trial court

conducted a resentencing hearing or that Appellant was present when the

amended sentence was imposed, that sentence is similarly illegal. See id;

Norris, supra; Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A). Thus, we conclude that the trial court

entered an illegal sentence by amending Appellant’s sentence outside of his

presence. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s convictions but vacate the

amended sentence and remand for the trial court to conduct resentencing

consistent with this decision.

Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded

for resentencing consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/19/2026

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