Calvin Lowe v. Lona McCastlain, in Her Official Capacity as Chairwoman of the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board; Dexter Payne, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Arkansas Division of Correction; And Tim Griffin, Arkansas Attorney General

Cite as 2026 Ark. 34

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CV-25-220

Opinion Delivered: February 19, 2026

CALVIN LOWE

APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE

JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT

COURT

V.

[NO. 35CV-24-760]

LONA MCCASTLAIN, IN HER HONORABLE JODI RAINES

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DENNIS, JUDGE

CHAIRWOMAN OF THE

ARKANSAS POST-PRISON

TRANSFER BOARD; DEXTER

PAYNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS

DIVISION OF CORRECTION; AND

TIM GRIFFIN, ARKANSAS

ATTORNEY GENERAL

APPELLEES AFFIRMED.

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice

Calvin Lowe appeals from the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s order denying and

dismissing Lowe’s petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, in which he

asked that appellees be compelled to consider him parole eligible. The circuit court found

that Lowe’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity and granted appellees’ motion for

summary judgment. We affirm.

In 1991, Lowe was found guilty by a jury of two counts of capital murder and was

sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without parole. This court affirmed.

Lowe v. State, 309 Ark. 463, 830 S.W.2d 864 (1992). In the present petition, Lowe

contended that he has been denied parole eligibility in violation of his rights to due process

and equal protection. He maintained that Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-93-615

(parole eligibility procedures), -621(2)(A) (applying to those who were minors at the of their

offense), and -1805(b) (governing release procedures for those who committed a felony on

or after January 1, 2025) (Repl. 2024) create a liberty interest in parole eligibility. Lowe

further asserted that the denial of his parole eligibility represented age-based discrimination

in violation of his right to equal protection because inmates who committed capital murder

as minors may be parole eligible after serving thirty years pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-93-621.

When the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment is based on whether

the pleadings state sufficient facts for an exception to sovereign immunity, we apply the

abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Lenard v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 186, 519 S.W.3d 682.

In those instances, the facts alleged in the petition are treated as true and are viewed in the

light most favorable to the party who filed the petition. Id. Here, viewing the facts alleged

in Lowe’s petition as true, Lowe does not state an exception to sovereign immunity, and

his claim is therefore barred.

This court has recognized that the defense of sovereign immunity may be

surmounted if a lawsuit seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief establishes an illegal,

unconstitutional, or ultra vires act. Brizendine v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. 34,

708 S.W.3d 351. A petitioner seeking to surmount sovereign immunity under this

exception is not exempt from complying with our fact-pleading requirements. Id. The

petitioner must provide facts to state a claim based on the alleged illegal, unconstitutional,

2

or ultra vires state action, and short, conclusory statements and bare allegations will not do.

Id.

The three statutes relied on by Lowe create discretionary entitlement to parole

eligibility for certain felonies and are inapplicable to inmates who have been convicted of

capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. It is well established that Arkansas parole

statutes do not create a protectable liberty interest in discretionary parole decisions, and an

inmate has no protectable liberty interest in parole. Schuldheisz v. Felts, 2024 Ark. 137, 696

S.W.3d 817; see also Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arkansas parole

statutes do not create a liberty interest because they provide that the parole board “may”

instead of “shall” grant parole.).

Generally, in Arkansas, a sentence of life means life. Hobbs v. Turner, 2014 Ark. 19,

431 S.W.3d 283. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-607(c)(1) states in pertinent part

that an inmate under sentence of life imprisonment is not eligible for release on parole unless

the sentence is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency. Here, Lowe’s sentence

has not been commuted to a term of years by executive clemency.

To sustain his equal-protection claim, Lowe must allege that he is a member of a

protected class or that a fundamental right has been violated, that he was treated differently

from other similarly situated inmates, and that there was no rational basis for the different

treatment. Wood v. Ark. Parole Bd., 2022 Ark. 30, 639 S.W.3d 340. As stated above, Lowe,

who committed capital murder when he was twenty-nine, has no fundamental right to

parole, and he is not similarly situated to inmates who were minors when the crime of

capital murder was committed; consequently, there is a rational basis for the separate

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sentencing standards applied to minors as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (1984). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when

it found that Lowe’s petition for relief was barred by sovereign immunity pursuant to article

5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution.

Affirmed.

BAKER, C.J., concurs.

WOMACK, J., dissents.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Dismissal of the case is proper pursuant

to article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. 1 Absent an express constitutional

provision to the contrary, the State can never properly be a defendant in any of its

courts.2 Here, Lowe improperly made the State a defendant when he petitioned for

mandamus and declaratory relief in a new civil action below, 35CV-24-760.3 Instead, he

should have petitioned in his related, underlying criminal case. Accordingly, this court, like

the circuit court below, lacks jurisdiction. For these reasons, the circuit court’s order must

be reversed and the case dismissed.

Calvin Lowe, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

1

See Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319,

327 (Womack, J., dissenting).

2

Id.

3

See Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112, at 5 (Womack, J., dissenting) (reasoning Article

5, section 20 required the dismissal of the appeal from denial of writ of mandamus and

declaratory judgment).

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