Kropf

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

ANGELLA M. K., Ca se No. 6:24-cv-02142-AR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

_____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Angella M. K. seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision

denying Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff (1) argues that the Administrative Law Judge

failed to incorporate in the residual functional capacity (RFC) determination limitations assessed

by a consultive psychologist, Dr. Scott Alvord; (2) challenges the ALJ’s finding as unpersuasive

opinions about her limitations from Kimberly Richards, her therapist; and (3) contends that the

ALJ’s discounting of her subjective symptom testimony lacked clear and convincing reasons.

(Pl.’s Br. at 4-17, ECF 9.) The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the

Commissioner applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial

evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020).

With that standard of review applied, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

(1) Dr. Alvord’s Limitations. The ALJ characterized as “moderate” the following limitations

from consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Alvord: plaintiff’s difficulty in understanding,

carrying out, and remembering instructions; her difficulty in concentrating and persistently

working at a reasonable pace; her difficulty maintaining effective social interactions—

consistently and independently—with coworkers, supervisors, and the public; and her ability to

cope with normal pressures at work. (Tr. 29.) Plaintiff takes issue with how the ALJ translated

those findings when posing hypotheticals to the vocational examiner and including limitations in

the RFC determination. (Pl.’s Br. at 7.)

For example, the RFC included limiting plaintiff to “occasionally hav[ing] direct

interaction with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors” (Tr. 24), yet plaintiff contends

that that time limitation fails to consider Dr. Alvord’s limitation about her ability to maintain

effective social interaction on a consistent and independent basis. (Pl.’s Br. at 7; Pl.’s Reply Br. at

2-3.) That is, according to plaintiff, “an RFC limiting the amount of time Plaintiff spends with

supervisors, coworkers, or the public does not accurately account for whether that interaction is

appropriate or effective when it does happen.” (Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3.) In plaintiff’s view, the RFC

limiting her to occasional direct interaction with the supervisors, coworkers, and the public and

no fast-paced or production work fails to account for “[p]laintiff’s individual response to stress”

as provided in SSR 85-15, available at 1983-1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 343 (Jan. 1, 1985).

The ALJ did not err here. Much of plaintiff’s argument hinges on how much significance

the ALJ should have given to the term “moderate.” But the ALJ is “responsible for translating

and incorporating clinical findings” by Dr. Alvord “into a succinct RFC” and when posing

questions to the vocational expert. Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th

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Cir. 2015); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he ALJ is the final

arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.”).

Plaintiff asserts also that Dr. Alvord’s treatment notes were consistent with her own

subjective testimony regarding areas of socialization, such as leaving the house or dealing with

demands from supervisors. (Pl.’s Br. at 8.) And she argues that the ALJ failed to account for her

anxiety flares, auditory hallucinations, and her response to time pressures when incorporating Dr.

Alvord’s opinion into the RFC. But the ALJ did not err in not incorporating plaintiff’s own

testimony into the RFC. As discussed below, the ALJ appropriately discounted plaintiff’s

testimony, and therefore was not required to include her discredited limitations in the RFC. See

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting claimant’s argument

that RFC was incomplete because it did not account for her limitations where ALJ appropriately

discounted her testimony).

(2) Kimberly Richards. Kimberly Richards, a licensed professional counselor, was plaintiff’s

therapist and provided two opinions about plaintiff’s mental health impairments. In her 2022

opinion, Richards opined that plaintiff has limitations—including limitations as to plaintiff’s

social functioning—that would preclude performance for 30 percent of the workday. (Tr. 9.)

Richards also opined that plaintiff would be absent five or more days per month and off-task for

30 percent of the workday due to her nervous system dysregulation. (Tr. 25.) That opinion was

followed by another in 2024, in which Richards stated that plaintiff’s symptoms of distress have

remained unchanged, and that despite weekly therapy, plaintiff “becomes dysregulated and

isolates when feelings arise causing her to be overwhelmed. When this occurs, she exhibits

increasing levels of agoraphobia and cannot take care of her basic needs.” (Id.) The ALJ was not

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persuaded, finding that, despite Richards’ long-term treating relationship with plaintiff, Richards’

opinions were neither well-supported by her treatment notes nor consistent with the overall

record. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that the social-functioning limitation opined

by Richards was unpersuasive is not supported by or consistent with the record. (Pl.’s Br. at 10-

12; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 4); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (the regulations require ALJs to evaluate the

supportability and consistency of a medical opinion when assessing its persuasiveness); Woods v.

Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (ALJs must “articulate . . . how persuasive [they] find

all of the medical opinions” and “explain how [they] considered the supportability and

consistency factors”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). The court disagrees.

To start, the ALJ observed that Richards’ treatment notes “heavily focused” on plaintiff’s

relationships with family members and romantic partners rather than her vocational ability or

functioning. (Tr. 25.) That observation is supported by the record. (Tr. 25; see also Tr. 1413,

1415, 1493, 1479 (treatment notes examine plaintiff’s relationships, exercises to help heal those

relationships, with the main goal of helping plaintiff understand and accept her past experiences,

particularly regarding her abusive relationship). Further, the ALJ considered Richards’ treatment

notes that showed that when plaintiff engaged in activities or responsibilities related to

vocational activities, plaintiff reported experiencing a positive effect on her symptoms, which

undermined the severe limitations assessed by Richards. (Tr. 25, citing Tr. 1383, 1437-38

(discussing how babysitting gave plaintiff a sense of purpose), 1466 (“She reported feeling

‘stable’ this week, noting that she had been busy helping her grandmother and mom.”), 1474

(“The client seemed to find some solace in her current coping mechanisms, specifically working

in her parents’ yard, which seems to help her manage her feelings of anger.”).)

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The ALJ was also unconvinced by Richards’ opinion about the extent of plaintiff’s

dysregulation: “regarding [plaintiff’s] risk of ‘dysregulation,’ as referenced in [Richards’]

opinion for why plaintiff is so severely limited, the treatment notes mention only a couple

specific examples of dysregulation.” The plaintiff contests that finding, asserting that because

she sometimes experienced “psychological dysregulation even in the safe, familiar setting of her

therapist’s office,” this supports Richards’ opinion about how her dysregulation would negatively

affect her ability to work. (Pl.’s Br. at 11.) But the ALJ’s finding is supported by the record—

dysregulation is mentioned twice in Richards’ treatment notes: a mention that living with

plaintiff’s family causes her to feel dysregulated and another mention that plaintiff became

dysregulated during therapy after discussing her family origins. (Tr. 1411, 1433.) Neither

mention of dysregulation was related to work, and the ALJ was entitled to conclude that the

sparse mention of dysregulation in the treatment notes did not support Richards’ opinion as to

plaintiff’s dysregulation relating to her ability to work. The ALJ did not err.

(3) Subjective Symptom Testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give specific, clear

and convincing reasons for discounting two parts of her subjective symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br.

at 12-16); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015) (if a claimant provides

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment and there is no affirmative evidence of

malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting the

claimant’s testimony); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The first part concerns her ability to sit or stand for

more than 20 minutes and the second part concerns her difficulties with social interactions.

(a) Sitting and Standing. Plaintiff testified that her fibromyalgia and arthritis limited

her to sitting or standing for about 10-15 minutes at a time (Tr. 47-54), which the ALJ found not

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credible, as that claimed limitation was not included in the RFC. Plaintiff argues that the parts of

the record the ALJ relied on for that finding are not, when properly considered, inconsistent with

her testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 12-14). In particular, plaintiff contests the ALJ’s finding that her

physical examinations were “mostly unremarkable” (Tr. 27), asserting that the examinations on

which the ALJ relies were focused on health issues other than her fibromyalgia and arthritis. (Pl.s

Br. at 13-14.) The court has reviewed the treatment notes for the examinations and has no reason

to second guess the ALJ’s consideration of those notes—even if the treatment providers were

“focused” on issues other than her arthritis and fibromyalgia, they were nevertheless

examinations where plaintiff’s “normal appearance” and “normal gait” were observed, and no

functional abnormalities were noted. (Tr. 1508, 1515, 1525, 1529.) See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53

F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When objective medical evidence in the record

is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as

undercutting such testimony.”). And the ALJ was permitted to rely on treatment notes showing

that her fibromyalgia was effectively controlled when she was on her medication (Tr. 26, citing

Tr. 1094, 1098, 1108, 1120, 1506-08), and, in the most recent examination, an observation that

plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was stable and controlled with Lyrica (Tr. 27, citing Tr. 1508, 1515,

1524, 1529, 1532, 1536-37).

The court is also not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly relied on

physical activities described in treatment notes to discount her symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at

14.) Those treatment notes relied on by the ALJ reflect that plaintiff engaged in daily walks,

remodeling, babysitting of grandchildren, yard work, and exercise which had therapeutic

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purposes and effects. (Tr. 25) Those examples of vocational activities that were beneficial stood

in contrast, as the ALJ pointed out, to “the few broad and vague references to the claimant’s

struggles with work, stress at work, . . . and ability to maintain employment.” (Id.) It is enough

that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and suggest a greater

physical and mental capacity than alleged by plaintiff. (Tr. 52, 53, 1531, 1534, 292, 599); see

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other ground by statute, 20

C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (“Even where [a claimant’s] activities suggest some difficulty functioning,

they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant to the extent that they contradict claims of a

totally debilitating impairment.”); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.

1997) (inconsistencies between testimony and conduct may be considered in weighing a

claimant’s credibility.).

(b) Social Interaction. Plaintiff testified that, because of her anxiety and auditory

hallucinations, she has difficulty interacting with others and maintaining focus and argues that

the RFC limiting her “to a low stress environment with limited expectations regarding pace and

with limited interactions with others” insufficiently captured her difficulty with concentration.

(Pl.’s Br. at 14-15.) That is because, according to plaintiff, the ALJ erred in focusing on

plaintiff’s better moments and failing to account for when plaintiff is doing worse. (Pl.’s Br. at

15) (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is error to reject a

claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment.”)).

The court disagrees. The instances in the record that the ALJ relied on to discount

plaintiff’s symptom testimony about her social interactions were not merely a “few isolated

instances of improvement.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017 (“Cycles of improvement and

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debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ

to pick out a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat

them as a basis for concluding a claimant 1s capable of working.”). Here, the ALJ acknowledged

that plaintiff's symptoms “ebbed and flowed over time” (Tr. 25) but identified many instances of

stability and improvement. (Tr. 24-27, see also Tr. 598, 604-05, 611-12, 631, 984, 1095, 1118,

1349, 1435, 1437, 1459; Tr. 26, citing Tr. 1093 (the ALJ explaining that plaintiff “received

treatment for her mental impairments with medication management, which was noted to be

working well”)). The ALJ’s findings here are supported by substantial evidence. (See also Tr.

634-35, 981, 1073, 1508-09.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s analysis provides specific, clear and

convincing reasons to discount plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony.

Because the ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical opinion evidence and subjective

symptom testimony, the RFC accounted for the limitations credited by the ALJ and supported by

substantial evidence in the record; the ALJ did not err at step five.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision. DATED:

February 17, 2026.

United States Magistrate Judge

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