State v. Burns

[Cite as State v. Burns, 2026-Ohio-544.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 1-25-06

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

CARDARIUS BURNS, OPINION AND

JUDGMENT ENTRY

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CR 2024 0218

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: February 17, 2026

APPEARANCES:

William T. Cramer for Appellant

John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee

Case No. 1-25-06

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Cardarius Burns (“Burns”), appeals the February

13, 2025 judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to

serve an adult prison term of ten to thirteen and one-half years upon his guilty plea

to a charge of aggravated robbery with a 3-year firearm specification. Burns

contends his constitutional right of confrontation was violated at his bindover

hearing held in the juvenile division of the common pleas court, thus invalidating

his transfer to the general division. As explained below, we find no error in the trial

court proceedings.

{¶2} The charges in this case arose from a February 13, 2024 armed robbery

at a house in Lima, Ohio. On that occasion, two 14-year old sisters, L.S. and A.S.,

worked with Ronnie Brown (“Brown”) and Burns, both of whom were seventeen

years old, to rob Malik Dennis (“Dennis”) of a handgun. The two girls lured Dennis

to the residence and when he arrived, Brown and Burns hid in a bathroom while one

of the girls took Dennis to a bedroom, intending to entice him to put his gun down.

A.S. used her cell phone to communicate with Burns and Brown so they would

know when to commence the robbery. After learning that Dennis put his gun on the

bed, Brown and Burns came out of hiding with their own guns drawn and faces

covered and assaulted Dennis. Then, they took Dennis’s gun and phone, and fled

the residence. Dennis also left the residence, went back to his house where he

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retrieved another gun, returned to the girls’ house, and fired his gun through a

window, striking and killing L.S.

{¶3} Dennis was arrested for murder and when he was interviewed by

detectives, he disclosed the robbery. At this point in the investigation, officers

began to search for Brown. Officers went to arrest Brown at his home. After

officers made contact with Brown at the front door, Burns fled out a window in the

house dropping a loaded handgun. Burns was quickly apprehended nearby.

{¶4} A complaint was filed on February 21, 2024 in the juvenile division of

the common pleas court alleging that Burns was a delinquent child pursuant to R.C.

2152.02(E)(1) based on the commission of five offenses that would be felonies if

committed by an adult: (1) complicity to commit aggravated robbery in violation of

R.C. 2923.03(A)(3) and R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a first-degree felony, with a three-year

firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145(A); (2) having a weapon while under

disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony; (3) complicity

to commit grand theft of a firearm in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(3) and R.C.

2913.02(A), charged as a fourth-degree felony; (4) having a weapon while under

disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony; and (5)

obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.3l(A), a fifth-degree felony.

In addition, on March 8, 2024, the State filed a notice of mandatory bindover under

R.C. 2152.12(A)(l)(b), alleging that Burns was at least 16-years-old at the time of

the offense, there was probable cause to believe that Burns committed these acts, at

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least one of the offenses was a category two offense, and Burns displayed,

brandished, indicated possession of, or used a firearm during the offense.

{¶5} The juvenile court held a preliminary hearing on August 12, 2024 to

determine whether probable cause existed to support the State’s mandatory bindover

motion. At the hearing, the State presented testimony from three detectives along

with various exhibits. Anticipating the detectives’ testimony would contain

extensive hearsay, counsel for Burns raised an objection prior to, and at various

points during the hearing, challenging the admissibility of the testimony. The State

cited this Court’s precedent in State v. Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474 (3d Dist.) in support

of the proposed testimony. The trial court overruled the objections.

{¶6} Detective Jesse Harrod, the primary investigator on the case, Detective

Steven Stechschulte, who assisted with the investigation including participating in

various interviews, and Detective Kent Miller, who performed a data extraction

from A.S.’s cell phone, all testified. While the detectives provided direct testimony

about the actions each of them took to further the investigation of the events that

occurred on February 13, 2024, their testimony also included abundant hearsay from

various witnesses and co-conspirators. For example, Detective Harrod testified

about his interview with A.S. shortly after the shooting which led him and Detective

Stechschulte to interview Dennis who disclosed the robbery incident. Because A.S.

was not forthcoming with information, the detectives interviewed her five times

over the course of several days. Detective Stechschulte repeated the information

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gathered from these interviews as well as interviews conducted with Brown, Burns

and other witnesses. Detective Miller testified regarding the communications

between A.S. and Burns that were extracted from A.S.’s cell phone.

{¶7} On September 25, 2024 the juvenile court held an additional hearing to

allow counsel to present their respective arguments. Immediately thereafter, the

court announced its decision.

{¶8} In a judgment entry filed on September 26, 2024, the juvenile court

memorialized its findings, indicating there was probable cause to believe Burns

committed each of the acts alleged. Additionally, the juvenile court found Burns

was 17-years-old when the offenses occurred; that the offense of complicity to

commit aggravated robbery was a category two offense under R.C. 2152.02(BB);

and that Burns allegedly had a firearm on or about his person or under his control,

and displayed, brandished, indicated that he possessed, or used the firearm in the

commission of the offense. Accordingly, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction

and transferred the matter to the general division of the common pleas court for

Burns to be tried as an adult.

{¶9} On October 17, 2024 the grand jury indicted Burns on five counts: (1)

aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.0l(A)(l), a first-degree felony, with a

three-year firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145(A); (2) felonious assault in

violation of R.C. 2903.ll(A)(2), a second-degree felony, with a three-year firearm

specification under R.C. 2941.145(A); (3) grand theft of a firearm in violation of

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R.C. 2913.02(A)(l), a third-degree felony; and (4) and (5) two counts of having a

weapon under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), both third-degree

felonies.

{¶10} After several pre-trial hearings, Burns and the State agreed to enter a

negotiated plea with Burns pleading guilty to the aggravated-robbery charge and

accompanying firearm specification. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State

agreed to dismiss all other charges. The parties also agreed to jointly recommend a

sentence of a minimum term of seven years for the aggravated robbery, along with

three consecutive years for the firearm specification, for a total indeterminate

sentence of ten to thirteen and one-half years.

{¶11} The trial court accepted Burns’s plea on the aggravated robbery with

the firearm specification and adopted the joint sentence recommendation.

{¶12} Burns appeals his conviction asserting a single assignment of error:

Appellant's Due Process right to confront and cross-examine the

witnesses against him was violated by allowing detectives to relay

extensive hearsay from alleged co-conspirators and others during

a juvenile bindover hearing.

{¶13} Burns asserts that his inability during the bindover hearing to cross-

examine those who furnished information to the detectives violated Due Process

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and his rights under the Confrontation Clause. This Court has previously addressed

this issue and found contrary to Burns’s assertion.1

{¶14} “Generally, the admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion

of the trial court.” State v. Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), citing State v.

Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 62. However, rulings that implicate the Confrontation

Clause are reviewed de novo. State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97. Further,

when it exists, an appellate court must follow precedent enunciated by the Supreme

Court of Ohio and should not arbitrarily stray from following its own jurisprudence

on a legal issue. See generally Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 1

(“Stare decisis is the bedrock of the American judicial system. Well-reasoned

opinions become controlling precedent, thus creating stability and predictability in

our legal system.”)

{¶15} R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 govern the mandatory transfer of a child

from the juvenile court to the general division of the common pleas court. As

relevant to this case, these code sections required transfer of the case for criminal

prosecution as an adult if the juvenile court found that several criteria were met: (1)

at least one of the acts of the juvenile would constitute an offense if committed by

an adult and that offense is a category two offense; (2) the child was 16 or 17 years

of age at the time of the act charged; (3) either the child was previously adjudicated

1

In his brief on appeal, Burns acknowledges this Court’s prior rulings on this issue and presents the

argument “merely to preserve it for potential further review.”

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a delinquent child for committing an act that is a category one or a category two

offense and was committed to the department of youth services on the basis of

that adjudication, or the child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the

child's person or under the child's control while committing the act charged and

to have displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the

firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged; and

(4) there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act that is charged

as a category two offense. R.C. 2152.10(A)(2); R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b).

{¶16} The constitutional right to confrontation is a trial right and has not been

extended to preliminary proceedings. State v. Lamb, 2021-Ohio-87, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.),

citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987). Moreover, “[t]he Supreme

Court of Ohio held that the right to confrontation relates to the actual trial for the

commission of the offense and not to the preliminary examination where it is

determined whether the accused is to be bound over to the grand jury. Id., citing

Henderson v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 187, 188 (1964).

{¶17} In Grim we agreed with the other Ohio Appellate Districts and

statements from the Supreme Court of the United States that confrontation is

essentially a trial right and a probable cause hearing did not constitute a criminal

trial. State v. Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). See also State v. Dell, 2022-

Ohio-2483, ¶ 59 (5th Dist.). We found neither a violation of Grim’s right to

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confrontation nor his Due Process rights. Grim at ¶ 16. We quoted at length from

a Twelfth District opinion that had recently addressed the issue:

The United States Supreme Court has explained that ‘[t]he right to

confrontation is basically a trial right.’ Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,

725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). A juvenile transfer

hearing “is not a trial as it does not ‘find as a fact that the accused

minor is guilty of the offense charged. It simply finds the existence of

probable cause to so believe.’” State v. Garner, 6th Dist. Lucas No.

L-18-1269, 2020-Ohio-4939, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio

St.3d 83, 93 (2001). The United States Supreme Court ‘has repeatedly

declined to require the use of adversarial procedures to make probable

cause determinations.’ Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134

S.Ct. 1090, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014). The federal courts have repeatedly

held that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply

to preliminary hearings. Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court has held

that the constitutional right to confront one’s accusers ‘relates to the

actual trial for the commission of the offense and not to the

preliminary examination * * *.’ (Emphasis added.) Henderson v.

Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 187, 188, 198 N.E.2d 456 (1964).

Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Fuell, 2021-Ohio-1627, ¶ 29-30 (12th Dist.), appeal

allowed, 2021-Ohio-2923, and appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed, 2022-

Ohio-1607.

{¶18} The purpose of the bindover hearing is for the juvenile court to decide

whether the statutory criteria for a mandatory bindover has been met and ascertain

whether probable cause exists to find that the juvenile committed the act that would

constitute a qualifying offense. The juvenile court is not tasked with the

determination of one’s guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense

charged. State v. Lamb, 2021-Ohio-87, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.); see also State v. Riley, 2013-

Ohio-1332, ¶ 49 (5th Dist.) (“[t]he juvenile bindover procedure is analogous to the

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adult preliminary hearing: both evaluate probable cause, neither is a determination

of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”).

{¶19} Consistent with our precedent in Grim, which involved the identical

issue, we find no error by the juvenile court, or violation of Burns’s Due Process or

Confrontation Clause rights, when it admitted the testimony of the detectives

detailing their interviews of co-conspirators and other witnesses. Grim, 2023-Ohio-

4474, at ¶ 16; see also State v. Barrett, 2024-Ohio-1108 (3d Dist.). Moreover,

Burns has not directed us to any recently decided United States Supreme Court or

Ohio Supreme Court authority indicating that our holdings in Grim and Barrett were

incorrect or that the right to confrontation applies to a juvenile court’s preliminary

hearing.

{¶20} Having found the federal and state Confrontation Clauses were

inapplicable at Burns’s bindover hearing, we overrule his assignment of error.

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and

argued, we affirm the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED:

/jlm

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